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Effect of Entrepreneurial Orientation on Firm Performance and 
Failure: A Longitudinal Analysis 
 
Nazha Kamel Gali  
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis aimed to examine the longitudinal effects of  entrepreneurial orientation 
(EO) and each of its dimensions, innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking, on 
firm performance, among surviving and failed firms, as well as on the risk of firm 
failure. By utilising the theoretical framework of organisational learning theory and 
prospect theory, this thesis advances knowledge on EO by challenging the 
dominating EO-as-Advantage perspective.  
This research adopted a quantitative methodology by objectively measuring EO at 
the firm-level and examining its effects along a longitudinal timeframe from the pre-
crisis (fiscal year 2000) to the post-crisis period (fiscal year 2014). The thesis 
utilised secondary data from Compustat and CRSP databases to collect financial and 
market information on a sample of US large firms in the high-technology industry. 
The sample consisted of a total of 742 firms with 5,011 observations. Study 1 used 
fixed effect panel regression to examine the effect of EO and its dimensions on 
short-term and long-term measures of firm performance over time in the sample of 
surviving firms versus the sample of failed firms. Study 2 of this thesis examined 
the effect of EO and each of its dimensions on the risk of firm failure. The analysis 
of the data for Study 2 was done by the Cox proportional Hazard regression.  
EO was shown to have an inverse U-shaped effect on performance among surviving 
firms and a negative effect on performance among failed firms. It was revealed that 
innovativeness had a significant positive effect on long-term performance; whereas 
proactiveness and risk taking had a significant negative effect on long-term 
performance. It was also shown that EO as well as its dimensions increased risk of 
failure over time. Such results provide evidence for the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective and align with our predictions on EO from organisational learning theory 
and prospect theory.  
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1.1 Background 
 
Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is now considered to be the most central element of 
management science (Gupta & Dutta, 2016; Gupta & Gupta, 2015). The amount of 
scholarly work on EO is increasing and accelerating at a point to which research 
into the EO construct has overtaken the broader corporate entrepreneurship concept 
by some margin (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011). Basso et al. (2009) noted that EO is 
widely acknowledged as a “robust and rigorous scientific construct” since a 
cumulative body of knowledge continues to be developed. The increasing interest in 
EO has led to the construct to be a stabilised mature concept in the entrepreneurship 
literature and in the broader management literature (Gupta et al., 2016; Rauch et al., 
2009; Wales, 2016). This profound interest in EO has rippled into journals outside 
of the entrepreneurship field and into policy-based research, since EO has 
significant outcomes not only at the firm-level but also at the macro-economic level 
by impacting economic growth (e.g. Mthanti & Ojah, 2017).  
 
EO is an essential part of corporate entrepreneurship strategy. EO is manifested as 
an entrepreneurial process or behaviour within an organisation (Ireland et al., 2009). 
The literature generally acknowledges and accepts the initial conceptualisation of 
EO as a firm-level behaviour (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983) and that such 
behaviours are sustained over time (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Miller, 2011). It is this 
sustained characteristic of EO, which manifests EO as an organisational behavioural 
state and not an “anomaly” (Ireland et al., 2009; Wales, 2016).  A firm that exhibits 
a high level of EO indicates that they are likely to be pioneers in their industry and 
willing to experiment with new forms of knowledge assets to explore new avenues 
for growth (Mthanti & Ojah, 2017; Wales, 2016). Thereby, highly entrepreneurial 
firms are more likely to embrace change and proactively respond to changes in the 
external market (Miller, 2011).  
 
The strategic management literature has centred upon the importance of EO in 
achieving higher performance (e.g. Anderson et al., 2015; Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2003, 2005). Several authors, following the Rauch et al. (2009) meta-analysis, have 
considered that EO is vital for enhancing a firm’s performance in the short-run 
(Andersén, 2017). Yet, the outcomes are less known and straightforward when 
examining the effect of EO over time. Only recently, it has been shown that the 
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positive effect of EO decreases over time (Gupta & Gupta, 2015). Most importantly, 
the definitional conceptualisation of EO places an emphasis on sustained recurring 
entrepreneurial behaviours (Covin & Slevin, 1991). This indicates it is essential to 
capture the longitudinal effect of EO over time rather than focus on a short-term 
assessment of the value of EO (Gupta & Gupta, 2015). One cannot conclude that 
EO leads to a sustained competitive advantage if its outcomes are not examined in 
the long-run (Covin & Miller, 2014). Sustaining entrepreneurial behaviours over a 
significant period is likely to produce more variation in the outcomes of EO than if 
assessed in the short-term (Wales, 2016). 
 
Firms that are high in EO, are essentially engaging in more exploratory innovative, 
proactive, and risk-taking behaviours, which would increase the variance in the 
distribution of the outcomes originating from it, with certain behaviours leading to a 
successful outcome and others conversely leading to losses (Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2011). This inherent risk associated within EO is not captured in the literature, since 
most of the research has considered EO to be directly linked to an increase in firm 
performance (Rauch et al., 2009) and shareholder value (Shahzad et al., 2016). 
Thus, the accepted view among researchers is that the primary goal of EO is to 
enhance the firm’s financial outcomes (Rauch et al., 2009). To come to this 
conclusion is premature as an increase in risky explorative endeavours is bound to 
lead to uncertain outcomes, according to organisational learning theory (March, 
1991). Even though exploratory entrepreneurial behaviours eliminate the myopia of 
exploitative adaptive processes (Hughes et al., 2007), such an increase in 
exploration increases the variance in possible outcomes. Thereby, the variance-
producing nature of EO raises the possibility that variation would lead to costly 
errors. Over time, there is a high(er) probability that exploration would put 
precedence on foolish experimentation over efficiency and reliability (March, 2006), 
a problem also known as the failure trap (Levinthal & March, 1993).   
 
The EO literature has become stagnant in terms of developing new measures of EO 
(Gupta & Dutta, 2016) that would revitalise the EO research and challenge the 
dominating EO-as-Advantage perspective (described above). The latter, which has 
been the majority of the stance of research on the EO-firm performance relationship, 
considers that it is almost-inherently beneficial for firms to pursue EO (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011). The new lens of examining the outcomes from EO, termed the 
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EO-as-Experimentation perspective, considers that EO would promote variability 
among firm-level outcomes due to the higher association of EO with 
experimentation (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). A study, by Mthanti and Urban 
(2014), has shown that experimentation is highly related with EO. They found that 
firms that highly experiment and invest in new technologies to yield new products 
are more likely to have higher EO levels. This experimentation inherent within EO 
would lead to more variation in its outcomes. Thus, based on the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective, EO might lead to higher rates of failure among failed 
firms even though it enhances the relative firm performance among surviving firms 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
Interestingly, following the Rauch et al. (2009) meta-analysis, most of the studies 
have accepted that EO as a gestalt construct enhances firm performance without 
considering essentially that EO leads to a higher performance variance and higher 
failure (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). This problem is likely to be exacerbated by the 
passage of time. Furthermore, the gestalt conceptualisation of EO has become the 
dominant stance in the literature. Even though the EO dimensions have been shown 
to have differential effects on a firm’s performance (e.g. Hughes & Morgan, 2007; 
Kreiser et al., 2013; Shahzad et al., 2016), researchers either bundle the different EO 
dimensions into a gestalt construct (Eshima & Anderson, 2017; Mthanti & Ojah, 
2017) or examine the shared effects among the EO dimensions (Lomberg et al., 
2017). 
 
The above analysis indicates that there is insufficient evidence and consideration for 
the possible outcomes of EO on the risk of firm failure, which necessitated the need 
for this thesis.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows: the upcoming section will outline a detailed 
discussion of the gaps in the literature, the motivation for conducting this research, 
followed by the aims and objectives of this research, the research’s significance and 
purpose in terms of its theoretical contribution. Then, sections covering a synopsis 
of the methodology used and the significant findings of this thesis will be outlined. 
Lastly, the chapter will provide a summary of the contents of the upcoming chapters 
of the thesis.  
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1.2 Literature Gaps 
 
First, the literature has been limited by a survivor or a sample selection bias (Rauch 
et al., 2009; Wales, 2016). Our research has argued for and has shown that the 
literature has been biased towards examining the EO and firm performance 
relationship among a sample of surviving firms. The sole focus on a sample of 
surviving firms has originated from the initial works by Zahra and Covin (1995) and 
Wiklund (1999), in which the authors excluded firms from their study if they 
underwent a merger or acquisition or bankruptcy. This is alarming as it has paved 
the way for subsequent authors (Lomberg et al., 2017; Rauch et al., 2009; Wiklund 
& Shepherd, 2003, 2005) to neglect the examination of the possible effects of EO on 
firm-level outcomes among a sample of failed firms. Since EO is associated with 
experimentation and engaging in behaviours of proactive discovery, innovative or 
trial-and-error experimentation, and risk-taking, this could entail that EO might lead 
to a financial loss (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Thereby, it is surprising that 
previous authors have disregarded the examination of the effect of EO on firm 
performance among failed firms. Considerably, EO represents a construct of inquiry 
that has reached a mature stage, which has been saturated in iterating the same logic, 
replicating the same methods, and arriving at similar conclusions to satisfy the EO 
researchers’ groupthink enigma of self-fulfilling fallacies (Gupta & Dutta, 2016). 
 
Second, the literature has been biased by a conceptualisation-measurement 
misalignment.  Most of the literature has captured and measured EO at the 
managerial level by utilising the widely known Miller (1983)/Covin and Slevin 
(1989) scale, which has received strong empirical support (Covin & Miller, 2014). 
This EO scale or alternative versions of it are administered to top managers or 
senior executives. This reveals that EO researchers are measuring EO by top 
managerial opinions or dispositions towards EO. However, EO has been 
conceptualised as firm-level behaviours, specifically behaviours of innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and risk-taking (Miller, 1983). Essentially, it is such behaviours and 
actions of the firm that imply an entrepreneurially oriented firm (Covin & Slevin, 
1991). A disposition towards entrepreneurial behaviours does not necessarily 
translate into real, actual entrepreneurial behaviours because there are certain 
constraints on the managerial tendency towards entrepreneurial behaviours such as 
low managerial discretion (Gupta et al., 2016). Managerial discretion is considered 
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as the leeway or an absence of constraint that allows top managers to enact their 
desires for the firm (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). Thereby, this constitutes a 
conceptualisation-measurement misalignment problem, in which most authors claim 
to conceptualise EO as firm-level behaviour and commonly measure EO by 
gathering self-reported data using the EO scales. Such EO scales do not capture the 
firm-level behaviour but reflect managerial tendencies and beliefs towards 
entrepreneurial behaviours (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011). Furthermore, there is an 
inherent limitation in the form of single informant problem by utilising the EO 
scales (Wales, 2016). 
 
Third, the literature has been biased by a cross-sectional study design limitation. 
Essentially, the time effect of EO has been mostly disregarded until recently (Gupta 
& Gupta, 2015; Gupta et al., 2016). Most of the literature on EO has been in the 
form of cross-sectional studies that examine EO at one point in time by utilising the 
EO scales (e.g. Lomberg et al., 2017; Rauch et al., 2009). Such studies do not 
capture the effect of EO over time, yet an essential aspect of entrepreneurial 
behaviours is that they must be consistently and recurrently exhibited over time 
(Covin & Slevin, 1991). Thus, temporal stability, the defining characteristic of EO 
(Anderson et al., 2015), is not being addressed in the literature.   
 
Fourth, previous work has been biased by solely testing the value of EO on 
aggregate performance or short-term measures of firm performance (e.g. 
profitability) that do not exclusively reveal the effect of EO in the long run (Gupta 
& Gupta, 2015; Gupta & Wales, 2017). This has resulted in a general consensus in 
the literature that EO enhances firm performance, yet it is not theoretically known 
what outcomes would arise from examining EO and each of its dimensions against 
different performance indicators (e.g. Rauch et al., 2009). EO represents consistent 
and recurrent behaviours and as such is a long-term orientation whose value must be 
tested over time on measures that reflect the long-term performance or even 
viability of a business. More so, firm performance is a multi-faced phenomenon, in 
which various performance indicators represent different dimensions of firm 
performance (Gupta & Wales, 2017). Thus, testing EO against one performance 
indicator or an aggregate index would obscure the unique firm outcomes from EO.  
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Lastly, the gestalt conceptualisation of EO has been predominant in the literature 
(e.g. Eshima & Anderson, 2017), in which researchers consider EO to be the joint 
exhibition of its dimensions, even though the EO dimensions have been shown to 
exhibit varying effects (e.g. Hughes & Morgan, 2007; Karmann et al., 2016). By 
aggregating the independent dimensions into an EO index, it would conceal the 
independent effects of each of the EO dimensions. Theoretically speaking, the EO 
dimensions might exhibit different performance effects among themselves and even 
when tested on several performance indicators. As George and Marino (2011) 
stated, examining the lower order EO dimensions rather than the higher order EO 
construct would provide theoretical insights. Astonishingly, researchers continue to 
adopt the more widely accepted gestalt conceptualisation of EO (e.g. Gupta et al., 
2016). Instead, by considering the unique effects of each of the EO dimensions then 
firms can obtain the optimal mix of the EO dimensions, which are required to 
enhance a firm’s performance (Hughes et al., 2007).  
 
After considering the problems in the literature, the next section will outline the 
motivation for conducting this research. 
 
1.3 Motivation for Research 
 
The motivation behind this thesis stemmed from the critical issues that have 
undermined our understanding of the effect of EO on firm-level outcomes. Given 
that EO has originated from the strategy research, it is understandable that EO and 
the firm performance relationship has dominated EO research (Rauch et al., 2009). 
This stems from Covin and Slevin (1991) consideration that firm performance is the 
ultimate and most relevant dependent variable when examining the outcomes from 
EO. Thus, it is crucial to examine the outcomes from EO in terms of its value on an 
organisation’s performance as well as on long-term survival (Gupta & Wales, 2017). 
 
Even though the theoretical underpinnings of the EO and firm performance 
relationship have not been explicitly and robustly theorised, most researchers 
assume a priori that EO would enhance firm performance and in turn promote firm 
survival (Wales, 2016). This is a largely important issue as three decades of EO 
research have hinged on the assumption that EO produces beneficial outcomes 
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(Gupta & Wales, 2017). Thereby, the causal mechanism underlying the EO and firm 
performance relationship is assumed rather than tested (Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2011). The EO-as-Experimentation perspective can provide a fine-grained in-depth 
examination of the possible outcomes of EO on several firm-level outcomes 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Unfortunately, only few studies have examined EO 
from the EO-as-Experimentation perspective. Only one study, following the 
Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) study, used insights from the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective to theorise that EO enhances the variability in innovation outcomes, and 
that realised absorptive capacity is needed for ensuring that EO would lead to 
enhanced firm performance (Patel et al., 2015). Furthermore, few researchers have 
examined the outcomes of EO in a representative sample of surviving and failed 
firms (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Only one study recently has found that EO 
negatively moderates the family involvement and risk of failure relationship 
(Revilla et al., 2016). Such findings challenge the EO-as-Advantage perspective and 
corroborate the EO-as-Experimentation perspective. 
 
Most research currently still aligns with the resource-based view of EO and the 
dynamic capability perspective (Covin & Miller, 2014). Recent researchers consider 
that EO should move away from the perspective that it involves only exploratory 
behaviours (Eshima & Anderson, 2017). Yet, EO is not a resource orientation, but 
an inherent risky strategic behaviour, which could lead to uncertain outcomes 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). To assume and clearly state that EO firms grow faster 
(e.g. Eshima & Anderson, 2017) would be to ignore its risky double-edged nature.  
 
Recent research continues to only examine the outcomes of EO among a sample of 
surviving firms and conclude that EO is universally beneficial for firms (Wales, 
2016). The consistent findings in the EO literature on the EO-as-Advantage 
perspective is due to the popularity of using responses of managers to reflect 
entrepreneurial orientation (Eshima & Anderson, 2017). This limited approach 
introduces self-response bias and subjectivity bias (Mthanti & Ojah, 2017). Thereby, 
EO has been grounded in upper echelon theory, which considers that firm-level 
behaviour to be a reflection of managerial sensing for opportunity recognition 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). However, a managerial or individualistic attribute 
cannot be given to an originally firm-level conception (Miller, 1983).  
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This thesis moved away from the dominance of upper echelon logic and the 
resource-based view to theorise the outcomes of EO in a homogenous sample of 
surviving and failed firms in the high-technology industry using insights from 
organisational learning theory (a theory of firm-level experimentation and 
exploration). By using organisational learning theory as the backbone of this thesis, 
the dominating positive feature of EO could be challenged (Gupta & Dutta, 2016).  
 
The next section will outline the aims and objectives of this research along with the 
main research questions of this thesis. 
 
1.4 Aims, Objectives, and Research Questions 
 
The main aim of this thesis was to examine the causal effect of the entrepreneurial 
orientation of a firm on several performance indicators as well as on the risk of 
failure in a sample of surviving and failed firms over time. It also examined the 
different effects of each of the EO dimensions (innovativeness, proactiveness, and 
risk-taking) on firm performance and probability of failure. The thesis was separated 
into Study 1 and Study 2: Study 1 focused on the effect of EO/EO dimensions on 
firm performance measures among the sample of surviving versus failed firms. 
Study 2 examined the effect of EO and each of its dimensions on the risk of firm 
failure.  
 
To achieve these aims, the thesis addressed the following main objectives. Firstly, to 
explore the overall impact of EO as well as the separate influences of each of its 
dimensions on short-term and long-term performance from the pre-crisis (the fiscal 
year1 2000) to the post-crisis period (the fiscal year 2014) in a sample of large US 
surviving firms versus failed firms in the high-technology industry. Secondly, to 
explore the impact of EO and its separate dimensions on the probability of firm 
failure among the same sample of surviving and failed firms.  
 
The thesis aimed to answer the following essential research questions for Study 1 
and Study 2 respectively:  
                                                        
1 fiscal year means that it is a yearly period, at the end of which the company’s financial records 
close and may not necessarily be the same as a calender year 
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(1) What are the effects of EO/separate effects of each of the EO dimensions on 
firm performance in separate samples of surviving and failed firms? 
 
(2) What are the effects of EO and its dimensions on firm failure? 
 
This thesis addressed the research questions by: (1) examining the longitudinal 
effects of EO and each of its dimensions on various firm performance measures in a 
sample of firms that survived, (2) examining the effects of EO and its dimensions on 
firm performance among firms that did not survive, and (3) studying the effects of 
EO/its dimensions on the risk of firm failure using insights from the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
To enable the separate examination of outcomes from each dimension of EO, this 
thesis deconstructed and unraveled the latent EO construct into its three main 
components of innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking. The measures of each 
of the EO dimensions were constructed using objective proxies in response to the 
recommendation by Miller (2011). The separate effect of each of these dimensions 
was examined on short-term and long-term firm performance utilising a longitudinal 
panel dataset (Lumpkin et al., 2010). Panel data analysis is more reliable than a 
cross-sectional snapshot examination (Hsiao, 2014). Few researchers have 
considered the panel effect of EO on firm value over time (e.g. Gupta & Gupta, 
2015; Gupta et al., 2016). Most of the research has been in the form of cross-
sectional studies which focus on accounting measures of firm performance (Gupta et 
al., 2016; Miller, 2011). The use of the panel data would address issues of reverse 
causality, endogeneity, and heterogeneity (Mthanti & Ojah, 2017; Miller, 2011). 
Thus, similar to few researchers (e.g. Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011; Short et al., 
2010), this study examined the effect of EO on a long-term valuation forward-
looking indicator (in the form of Tobin’s Q). Although, the main measure in this 
study is Tobin’s Q, an accounting measure of firm performance (Return on Assets) 
was included as well in order to have a multi-dimensional aspect of firm 
performance (Gupta & Wales, 2017; Rauch et al., 2009).  
 
The context of the study, which covered the pre-crisis (the fiscal year 2000) to the 
post-crisis (the fiscal year 2014) period, is informative as the context of the study 
would bring insights into the effects of EO (Zahra & Wright, 2011). The panel form 
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of the thesis comprised a significant historical event (the financial crisis), which has 
witnessed several firm failures (e.g. Revilla et al., 2016). Researchers have largely 
ignored the consideration of the effect of EO on firm-level outcomes among a 
sample of failed firms and have continued to over-emphasise the performance-
enhancing effects of EO among samples that include only surviving firms (Rauch et 
al., 2009). By focusing on a sample of high-technology firms, then context-sensitive 
insights into the EO and firm performance relationship can be made (Miller, 2011). 
Most of the literature on EO has been in the context of heterogeneous samples 
(Wales, 2016). Even though examining the EO-firm performance relationship in a 
heterogeneous sample would provide more generalisability for the results, this 
would come at the expense of context-specific revelations. Even more so, every 
industry differs in its approach and driving force for engaging in EO and this 
heterogeneity would jeopardise realising and capturing the risks generated from EO 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Particularly in the high-technology industry, this 
downside nature or experimentation inherent within EO can lead to a suboptimal 
outcome or even failure (Patel et al., 2015). 
 
This research was the first to address the risks associated with EO and to test the 
over-arching bias of the positive outcomes of EO. The recent paper by Gupta and 
Dutta (2016) pointed out the lack of criticism or critique of the positive stance on 
the EO-firm performance relationship and this paper is in effect a significant 
breakthrough in the EO literature on the double-edged sword nature of EO. By using 
insights from the EO-as-Experimentation perspective and repositioning EO at the 
firm-level, the EO literature would be advanced.  
 
The next section will outline the research significance and purpose in terms of its 
theoretical contribution to the literature.  
 
1.5 Theoretical Foundation 
 
The significance of this thesis was that it addressed a problem that has been largely 
ignored in the EO scholarly research, which is the effect of EO on firm 
survival/failure. Most of the studies in the literature examine the effects of EO 
among a sample of surviving firms only (e.g. Rauch et al., 2009). In turn, there has 
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been almost a tacit denial of the problems posed by EO in the face of the hegemony 
of the EO-as-Advantage perspective, as evidenced by the survival bias that plagues 
the study of EO. 
 
Previous studies on the effects of EO coincide with the EO-as-Advantage 
perspective, which is derived from the resource-based view of the firm (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011). The resource-based view considers that EO is a valuable and rare 
resource and enables firms to earn superior performance (Barney, 1991; Barney et 
al., 2001). While such a theory considers EO as an intangible knowledge-based 
resource, which is important for a firm’s continued survival, the causal mechanisms 
of the effects of EO on firm performance are not clearly understood and are rather 
assumed in the literature (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). The EO-as-Advantage 
perspective considers that EO, as a rare and inimitable resource or capability, would 
lead to a sustained competitive advantage (Patel et al., 2015). Thereby, based on the 
EO-as-Advantage perspective, most researchers agree that EO has a positive effect 
on firm performance.  Moreover, the EO-as-Advantage perspective considers that 
since EO leads to a sustained competitive advantage over time, it enhances firm 
survival (Rauch et al., 2009; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). This argument requires a 
longitudinal study, yet this is absent from the EO research (Gupta & Gupta, 2015).  
 
On the other hand, the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, which is derived from 
organisational learning theory, considers that EO more likely involves exploratory 
learning activities that may be far from the firm’s competencies. Thus, EO might 
lead to either a successful outcome or a loss (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 
1991). In this sense, even though EO might have a positive effect on the relative 
performance of surviving firms, it might lead to a higher risk of being in financial 
distress (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Prospect theory has great potential in 
revealing the risks associated with EO and its potential downside. That is, prospect 
theory considers that firms choose to engage in behaviours based on their reference 
point (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000), and thus perceive an outcome either as a gain 
or a loss based on their performance relative to their reference point (Swift, 2016). 
Surviving firms, that are in the gain domain, are likely to be more risk-averse in 
comparison to financially distressed firms in the loss domain. This means that firms 
that are suffering from losses are more likely to be more risk taking and engaging in 
experimentation (i.e. entrepreneurial behaviours), but it is this search for exploratory 
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endeavours that leads to a higher risk of experiencing failure (Levinthal & March, 
1993; March, 2006). Thereby, according to organisational learning, it was theorised 
that EO has a positive relationship with the risk of failure and prospect theory 
emphasises that financial distressed firms are more likely to engage in EO.  By 
engaging more in EO, this leads to the outcome of failure. 
 
This thesis contributed to theory and the body of knowledge on EO by using the 
theoretical lens of organisational learning theory and prospect theory, which have 
been mostly disregarded in the EO literature. In fact, there are only two research 
papers using organisational learning theory to theorise outcomes from EO (Patel et 
al., 2015; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) theorised based on organisational learning theory that 
EO increases variation in firm-level outcomes, increasing chances of success and 
failure. Yet, no research followed upon their theoretical development in the EO 
literature. Furthermore, Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) called for identifying new 
dependent variables to assess the value of EO, yet no research has followed upon 
their suggestion. Recently, Gupta and Wales (2017) indicated that researchers have 
now accepted the undisputed revelation that EO enhances firm performance (Covin 
et al., 2006; Rauch et al., 2009), yet most of the research considers either a short-
term measure or a hybrid measure of performance. In this respect, what constitutes 
the performance hybrid index is rather arbitrary, and it is not known what is being 
captured (or not) within the dependent variable index (Gupta & Wales, 2017).   
 
Most importantly theorising outcomes from EO must come from a specific outcome 
and within a particular context. If EO is considered as an exploratory orientation, 
then a clear target is not growth or performance, but more likely the risk of failure 
(Gupta & Wales, 2017). It is not surprising then that slightly more than half of the 
research conducted on EO includes ‘theor’ in its text since EO is not commonly 
tested in a particular context and against a specific firm-level outcome for 
researchers to ensure the generalisation of their research results (Wales, 2016). 
Using a heterogenous sample of firms to test the overall effect of EO on an 
aggregate performance index would not theoretically advance our understanding of 
EO or even lead to deeper and more relevant and meaningful insights.  
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Organisational learning theory has been utilised in the literature to examine the 
effect of relative exploratory orientations on the risk of firm failure (Swift, 2016; 
Uotila et al., 2009). This reveals that insights into the effect of EO on the risk of 
firm failure is made possible within the theoretical foundation of organisational 
learning theory. Moreover, no research paper on the EO-firm performance 
relationship uses insights from prospect theory (e.g. Swift, 2016).  Prospect theory 
reveals the double-edged nature of EO by theorising that firms that are financially 
distressed would engage more in EO and this increasing focus on EO would 
eventually lead to their failure.  
 
This research is groundbreaking as it revealed, through drawing theoretical 
arguments from organisational theory and prospect theory, that EO as a firm-level 
behaviour is an increasingly risky orientation with its possibility to enhance a firm’s 
failure. No previous research has examined the longitudinal effect of EO on the 
probability of failure over time. This is alarming as the inherent destructive nature 
of experimentation of EO is largely ignored in the literature. A recent review of the 
most common theoretical frameworks used in the EO literature do not include 
organisational theory or prospect theory (Wales, 2016). Of the most commonly used 
theoretical perspectives are the resource-based view, organisational change, and 
network theory (Wales, 2016). By using instead organisational learning theory and 
prospect theory to theorise outcomes from EO on its downside risk, then our 
knowledge on EO would be advanced. The next paragraphs will outline an overview 
of the hypothesised effects from EO and its dimensions. 
 
Organisational learning theory distinguishes between exploratory and exploitative 
endeavours; exploratory behaviours are riskier and lead to higher uncertainty 
(March, 1991). Firms that are increasingly explorative at the expense of exploitative 
would more likely face a higher risk of lower performance outcome (March, 2006; 
Swift, 2016). The EO-as-Experimentation perspective considers that EO would 
enhance the performance of surviving firms. On the contrary we posited, according 
to organisational learning theory, that surviving firms that are highly entrepreneurial 
would have lower performance. Thus, it was expected that EO would have an 
inverse U-shaped effect on firm performance among the sample of surviving firms. 
Furthermore, we considered that EO would lead to a higher rate of failure (Wiklund 
& Shepherd, 2011).  
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This thesis not only examined the overall effect of EO, but also the separate effects 
of each of the EO dimensions. Most of the literature has disregarded the 
independent and individual effects of the EO dimensions (Wales, 2016). This gestalt 
conceptualisation of EO and hybrid measurement of firm performance has led 
researchers to prematurely conclude that EO is beneficial to a firm’s performance. It 
is thereby important to break away from this dominant gestalt conceptualisation of 
EO and the value of EO through the dependent variable firm performance, which 
produce results that coincide with the EO-as-Advantage perspective. Firstly, this 
thesis posited, according to organisational learning theory, that although being 
innovative (as an exploratory dimension of EO) is resource-intensive in the short-
run (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001), it would lead to long-term benefits for firms 
(Roberts & Amit, 2003). Furthermore, we predicted that innovativeness would 
decrease the risk of firm failure, as it has been shown that innovative firms have 
better survival than non-innovative firms (Cefis & Marsili, 2005). 
 
Even though proactiveness has been shown to have a positive effect on performance 
(Rauch et al., 2009), recent evidence has revealed that being proactive might not 
benefit firms. Specifically, Karapandza (2016) performed textual analysis on 10k 
annual reports of firms from 1993 until 2014 and revealed that firms which use 
future tense language in their annual reports generate fewer stock returns. Thereby, 
this thesis hypothesised that being proactive is not beneficial for a firm, in which 
firms that operate in aggressive competitive markets must invest in market 
opportunities to remain viable. Taking long-term forecasted gambles by re-investing 
in the business would not pay off in a highly competitive environment such as the 
high-technology industry (Patel et al., 2015). The reason that possibly proactiveness 
has been shown to have a positive effect on a firm’s performance is that it has been 
assessed against short-term metrics in the literature (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). Thus, 
we predicted that proactiveness will cause diminishing returns in the long-run and 
would have a positive effect on a firm’s failure.  
 
According to organisational learning theory, risk-taking is associated with uncertain 
outcomes and might eventually lead to a higher probability of failure (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011). When a firm is involved in risky behaviours, then it essentially 
tolerates a probability of failure due to high costs of taking risks (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2005).  High levels of risk taking are likely to be counter-productive for 
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firms (Rauch et al., 2009). Risk-taking has been shown to have a negative effect on 
a business’s performance (Hughes & Morgan, 2007; Kreiser et al., 2013; Short et 
al., 2010). Thereby, it was hypothesised that risk-taking leads to an increase in the 
hazard of failure and has a negative effect on the long-term performance. 
 
In summary, this thesis advanced the knowledge on EO and each of its dimensions 
by considering their longitudinal effect on separate firm-level outcomes 
(performance as well as risk of failure) among a sample of high-technology firms, 
and developed its theoretical underpinnings from organisational learning theory and 
prospect theory. This thesis extended upon the EO-as-Experimentation perspective 
to examine the potential downsides associated with EO. No researcher followed 
upon the EO-as-Experimentation perspective (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011) to test 
the risk of failure from a sole focus on an entrepreneurial orientation.  
 
As a last note, this research does not imply that engaging in more entrepreneurial 
behaviours is ill-advised for firms, but that firms must be able to manage the double-
edged nature of EO and its variance producing capability (Patel et al., 2015; Swift, 
2016). By managing the exploratory nature of EO, firms are then able to distinguish 
between bad exploratory entrepreneurial endeavours and successful endeavours. 
This would then potentially limit the uncertainty and risks inherent within EO 
(Swift, 2016). The aim of this thesis was to advance knowledge on the longitudinal 
effect of EO by revealing that EO might be aligned more with the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective. This means that engaging in more entrepreneurial 
behaviours and a sole focus on EO over time might enhance the risk of firm failure. 
This downside nature of EO can be revealed through the theoretical framework of 
organisational learning theory and prospect theory. 
 
The next section will consider some concerns pertaining to the methodology.  
 
1.6 Synopsis of Methodology 
 
The following thesis examined the causal effect of EO as well as each of the EO 
dimensions from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period along a 15-year timeframe 
on a firm’s financial performance and risk of failure. The thesis used panel 
34 
 
regression analysis for Study 1 and survival analysis for Study 2. The sample 
consisted of large (more than 500 employees) US surviving and failed firms in the 
high-technology industry. The dataset was a longitudinal panel of 742 firms 
comprising in total 5,011 observations. 
 
The methodology used to examine the effect of EO and each of its dimensions on 
firm performance measures was a panel fixed effect regression. A fixed effect 
regression would control for variables that are fixed over time and capture the 
heterogeneity in the data, which makes it far more superior to a pooled OLS 
(ordinary least squares) regression (Wooldridge, 2015). For examining the effect of 
EO and each of its dimensions on the risk of firm failure, the proportional hazard 
regression model was used.  
 
To measure each of the regressors (EO and its dimensions) and the dependent 
variables (firm performance measures) objective proxies were used. The objective 
measurement surpasses the common method of subjective managerial responses, 
which is limited due to self-response managerial, subjectivity, and cross-sectional 
biases (Mthanti & Ojah, 2017). Furthermore, to capture the multi-dimensional 
conceptualisation of EO (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996), it is important to develop 
alternative measurements to the EO scale. The latter was conceived by Miller (1983) 
and Covin and Slevin (1989) to represent the gestalt view of EO. In this thesis, EO 
is captured by using objective measures since the initial EO scale was not conceived 
to capture the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of Lumpkin and Dess (1996) 
(Wales, 2016). 
 
Many previous researchers have used proxies for the investigation of management 
and strategic phenomena (Engelen et al., 2015; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). 
Proxies are considered archival measures to represent theoretical constructs 
(Ketchen et al., 2013). Researchers, especially in the fields of accounting, and 
finance have long focused on developing proxies for secondary data measures 
(Hribar & Yang, 2015; Malmendier & Tate, 2005).  
 
There is a recurring call in the EO literature to develop new measures of EO, 
however few researchers have answered this call (George & Marino, 2011; Lyon et 
al., 2000). This is in no small part due to the dominance of the Miller/Covin and 
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Slevin scales and the complexity of developing new measures (Covin & Wales, 
2012). The Covin and Slevin EO scale (1989) has been widely used in the literature 
to examine the EO-performance relationship (Rauch et al., 2009). However, such a 
summated scale combines the three dimensions of EO into a single construct, which 
might disregard the independent impact of each dimension on firm performance 
(Hughes & Morgan, 2007; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). This was postulated by 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) who suggested that the dimensions of EO might influence 
firm performance differently. Later, Hughes and Morgan (2007) showed that the 
dimensions of EO had contrasting effects on firm performance and might be context 
specific (Wales, 2016; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Thereby, a scale that combines 
the three dimensions into a single construct might generate misleading 
interpretations and cause researchers to consider that such an independence between 
the EO dimensions does not exist (Kreiser et al., 2002; e.g. Lomberg et al., 2017). 
The popularity of such a scale has discouraged researchers from developing new 
measures of EO (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011).  
 
More recently, and since Lyon’s et al. (2000) call, few researchers have started to 
use alternative methods to measure EO by using content analysis (Gupta et al., 
2016; Short et al., 2010) or developing proxies for the EO dimensions (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2011; Shahzad et al., 2016). As such secondary data, which is more 
advantageous, was used to capture EO, since it avoids the aforementioned biases of 
a survey methodology (Lyon et al., 2000).  
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The following section represents the structure of the chapters and will outline the 
organisation of the forthcoming chapters and the contents of each chapter. The 
thesis is divided into 11 chapters as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the main construct EO, which was examined. It will reveal the 
definitions, dimensions, as well as the distinct phases of EO in the literature and 
highlight the gaps and importance of this thesis in addressing those gaps. Most 
importantly, this chapter will brush upon the theoretical framework of this thesis and 
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signify its theoretical contribution. Lastly, it will briefly discuss the timeframe 
included within this research, the financial crisis era.    
 
Chapter 3 includes a detailed discussion of the study’s theoretical framework. The 
chapter begins with summarising the research questions addressed in Study 1 and 2. 
Before discussing the theoretical underpinnings, the chapter will outline the 
theoretical conceptualisation of EO as well as the conceptualisation of the firm-level 
outcome, failure. Then, the chapter identifies the theoretical framework of this 
thesis, which was based on organisational learning theory and prospect theory. 
Finally, the chapter outlines the hypothesised effects from EO and each of its 
dimensions on firm performance (among surviving and failed firms) as well as the 
risk of failure.  
 
Chapter 4 discusses the philosophical positioning underpinning (ontology and 
epistemology) of this thesis. Furthermore, the chapter includes a discussion of the 
research methodology and design as well as a reasoning for the chosen sample to 
test the EO-as-Experimentation perspective and test the research’s hypotheses.  
 
Chapter 5 outlines a discussion of the variables (independent variables, EO and its 
dimensions and controls, and dependent variables, firm performance measures) 
included in Study 1 along with their conceptual definitions and measurements. The 
chapter also outlines the regression models and describes the assumptions of the 
fixed effect regression used in the Study.  
 
Chapter 6 outlines a discussion of the variables (regressors EO and its dimensions 
and the controls and the dependent variable, risk of firm failure). The chapter 
includes a conceptualisation of firm failure and its measurement. Lastly, it considers 
the assumptions of the survival analysis model used.  
 
Before outlining chapter 7 and 8, the analysis chapters of Study 1, the thesis outlines 
a synopsis section on the comparison of the mean values of the EO construct and its 
main dimensions in the sample of surviving firms versus the failed firms. 
 
Chapter 7 outlines the analysis results of Study 1 of the effects of EO and each of its 
dimensions on the firm performance measures (short-term proxied by return on 
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assets and long-term performance proxied by Tobin’s Q) in the sample of surviving 
firms. It starts with a descriptive analysis of the main constructs in the sample. It 
also presents the testing of the assumption of the fixed effect regression before 
outlining its results.  
 
Chapter 8 presents the testing of the fixed effect regression in the sample of failed 
firms and outlines the descriptive statistics and the results of the effects of EO and 
its dimensions on the firm performance measures.  
 
Chapter 9 outlines the analysis results of Study 2 of examining the effects of EO and 
its dimensions on the risk of firm failure. The chapter also considers the testing of 
the assumptions of the proportional hazard survival analysis model before outlining 
the results of the analysis. Furthermore, the chapter considers the effects of EO and 
its dimensions in each separate sample of failed firms.  
 
Chapter 10 presents the discussion of the results of Study 1 and Study 2 and their 
implications for the theoretical development of the EO construct. Firstly, it briefly 
outlines the gaps and the ways in which the gaps were addressed. Then, it separately 
discusses the results of Study 1 and Study 2, followed by the theoretical 
contributions of this research.  
 
Chapter 11 outlines the conclusions of this thesis and the limitations along with the 
possible future research avenues. It also briefly summarises the research findings 
and their theoretical and managerial implications. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
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2.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
 
In this chapter, the concept of entrepreneurial orientation (EO), its various 
connotations and conceptual definitions and dimensions are introduced. A review of 
the literature on entrepreneurial orientation is presented with attention given the 
three specific phases of research on EO. 
 
The aim of the chapter is to develop and provide a clear illustration of the evolution 
of the EO literature, the current state-of-the-art of the body of knowledge on EO and 
deficits in current knowledge about the EO construct.  
 
The chapter begins with outlining the various definitions and conceptions relevant to 
EO in the literature and the issue of its dimensionality. Later, problems with the 
definitional conceptualisation of EO are presented. The chapter then explains 
thoroughly the three distinct phases of EO. These include the conceptual 
development of EO, the examination of the EO-firm performance relationship, and 
the current stage of the EO-firm performance relationship. The chapter ends with a 
synopsis to the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis (i.e. organisational learning 
and prospect theory) and an outline of the studies that challenge the dominating EO-
as-Advantage perspective in the literature.  
 
The next section will consider the different definitions of the entrepreneurial 
orientation construct.  
 
2.2 Definitions of EO 
 
Entrepreneurial orientation or firm-level entrepreneurial behaviour has become a 
largely sought-after construct in the overall field of entrepreneurship (Covin & 
Lumpkin, 2011; Rauch et al., 2009; Wales et al., 2011). The concept of EO is the 
‘most established’ and prominent theoretical and scientific robust construct with an 
extensive amount of empirical and theoretical considerations being directed towards 
it (Covin et al., 2006; Gupta et al., 2016; Wales, 2016).  
 
EO has been explored in textbooks (Morris et al., 2010) and the business press as 
well (Certo et al., 2009). This is because researchers are intrigued to understand the 
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role of EO in organisations due to its strategic relevance and its effect on firm 
performance as evidenced by the scholarly literature (Rauch et al., 2009).  
 
There is an increasing interest in examining EO or firm-level entrepreneurship, 
considering the large number of studies from the 1970 to the 1990 era that focus on 
the impact of environmental, strategic, and organisational contingencies on EO 
(Zahra et al., 1999). A recent review has shown that the study of EO has 
significantly increased since 2000 (Martens, 2016). From 2000 until 2009, 115 
articles were published on EO and from 2009 until 2016 as much as 281 articles 
were published in notable journals such as Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 
and Journal of Business Venturing. This reveals the significant exponential interest 
in the EO construct among the scholarly community. By the end of 2016, about 551 
research studies on EO have been conducted (Wales, 2016).  
 
EO has been conceptualised in several ways in the literature, in which researchers 
have used several labels such as entrepreneurial mode (Mintzberg, 1973), 
entrepreneurial intensity (Morris, 1998; Morris & Sexton, 1996), entrepreneurial 
posture (Covin & Slevin, 1991), entrepreneurial propensity (Brockhaus, 1980; 
Busenitz & Barney, 1997), entrepreneurial style (Chaston, 1997; Covin & Slevin, 
1988; Khandwalla, 1976/77), entrepreneurial proclivity (Griffith et al., 2006; 
Matsuno et al., 2002; Stewart et al., 1999), entrepreneurship (Miller, 1983), 
intrapreneurship (Antoncic & Hisrich 2003; Kuratko, et al., 1990), strategic posture 
(Covin & Slevin, 1989, 1990; Covin et al., 1990) and corporate entrepreneurship 
(Morris & Paul, 1987; Wiklund & Shepherd 2003, 2005; Zahra & Covin, 1995; 
Zahra, 1996). Thus, researchers have not settled on a uniform definition of EO in the 
literature (Covin & Wales, 2012). Most importantly, all such past studies have 
employed some derivation of the same scale that was developed by Miller and 
Friesen (1982). Thus, essentially, they are measuring the same organisational 
construct, yet they have several labels attached to it (Zahra et al., 1999).  
 
This lack of a uniform conceptualisation of EO, by attaching several labels to it, is 
problematic since it indicates that there is no consensus in the EO literature. Thus, 
advances in the EO literature would be deferred by conceptual disagreements and 
different definitions attached to the same construct. This lack of consistency risks 
stretching the EO concept and eventually leads to the devolvement of EO into a 
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pseudo-science (George & Marino, 2011). The way that this thesis advances the EO 
literature is by refocusing and measuring EO at its essence, i.e. at the firm-level. The 
following paragraphs will outline the different definitions that researchers have 
provided to portray the EO concept and the key debate on whether EO is a 
dispositional attitudinal construct or a firm-level concept.  
 
Most scholars (Basso et al., 2009; Gupta & Dutta, 2016) agree that the origin of EO 
is depicted in the works of Mintzberg (1973), Khandwalla (1976/77), and Miller 
(1983). Later, the concept of within-firm entrepreneurship was firmly demonstrated 
as a firm-level phenomenon in the form of EO by the works of Covin and Slevin 
(1989, 1991) and Lumpkin and Dess (1996, 2001). Entrepreneurial orientation 
involves a set of behaviours that characterise organisations’ decision-making 
processes and practices towards competition, its markets, and its environment 
(Covin & Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Lyon et al., 2000; Miller, 1983). In 
this sense, EO involves a set of firm-level behaviours that drives decision-making 
towards creating new methods of production, new products, and entering new 
markets (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990).  
 
Initially, EO was conceived by Mintzberg (1973) as a managerial disposition and 
indicated that the degree to which entrepreneurial behaviour is manifested depends 
on the extent to which managers search for new opportunities under conditions of 
high uncertainty. Thus, Mintzberg (1973) emphasised the managerial 
characterisation of EO. Accordingly, Mintzberg (1973) considered that a firm’s 
strategies or actions reflect the top managerial personalities or decisions. 
Khandwalla (1976/77) reinforced the concept that EO is a managerial disposition. 
He considered that EO is the propensity of top-level entrepreneurially oriented 
managers to take on risky and aggressive bold decisions in contrast to more 
conservative and cautiously-oriented decisions. Thus, Mintzberg (1973) and 
Khandwalla (1976/77) recognised EO as a managerial disposition to decision-
making, and this was widely accepted by subsequent scholars (Covin & Slevin, 
1988; Miller & Friesen, 1982).  
 
Later, Miller and Friesen (1982), influenced by the managerial characterisation of 
EO (Khandwalla, 1976/77; Mintzberg, 1973) differentiated between conservative 
and entrepreneurially oriented firms based on the firms’ managerial motives. Miller 
42 
 
and Friesen (1982) found that the propensity of entrepreneurially oriented managers 
drives their firms to be more innovative and risk taking. Accordingly, firms are 
entrepreneurial in nature when their top managers innovate whilst engaging in risky 
behaviours or actions. Furthermore, Covin and Slevin (1988), in a similar manner to 
Khandwalla (1976/77) and Miller and Friesen (1982), considered entrepreneurial 
firms to reflect top managerial styles and philosophies. Thus, the authors considered 
conservative firms, in contrast to entrepreneurial firms, to reflect a top management 
style that is non-innovative, reactive, and risk-averse.   
 
Building on the works of Mintzberg (1973), Khandwalla (1976/77), and Miller and 
Friesen (1982), and moving on from the managerial dispositional conceptualisation 
of EO, the EO construct was defined as a firm-level behaviour by Miller (1983). 
Miller (1983) did not frame it as EO, but rather as firm-level entrepreneurship. He 
defined it as the joint exhibition of innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking. 
Miller (1983) stated that the variables of innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk 
taking covaried significantly with EO. In doing so, Miller (1983, p. 770) indicated 
that an entrepreneurial firm is one that  
“engages in product market innovation, undertakes somewhat risky ventures, 
and is first to come up with proactive innovations, beating competitors to the 
punch”.  
 
In other words, Miller (1983) conceptualised EO as a composite construct composed 
of these three dimensions. Innovativeness is believed to be a central component of 
EO because of its emphasis on novelty, technological advancement, and exploring 
opportunities (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Innovativeness involves engaging in 
experimentation and creativity (Miller, 1983), and is central for high-technology 
oriented firms (Miller, 2011). Proactiveness, the opportunity-seeking component of 
EO, involves anticipating future demand rather than being reactive to environmental 
changes (Miller, 1983). Risk taking involves taking bold decisions and actions by 
venturing into new or emerging markets or by borrowing heavily and being willing 
to tolerate the uncertainty that comes with such entrepreneurial actions (Miller, 
1983). An important aspect of risk taking is that it could itself result in an uncertain 
outcome that may carry a financial loss (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). The behavioural 
perspective of the manifestation of EO within an organisation by Miller (1983) was 
the initial breakthrough of the managerial attitudinal perspective of EO first outlined 
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by Mintzberg (1973). The behavioural perspective has enabled the objective 
measurement of EO at the firm-level in this thesis.  
 
Consistent with Miller (1983), scholars have indicated that a firm is entrepreneurial 
when its decisions emphasise innovative, proactive, and risky strategies (Morris & 
Paul, 1987). This set a trend, in which the Miller (1983) definition of EO as the 
firm-level behaviours of innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking became the 
dominant characterisation and definition adopted in the literature. However, 
subsequent research studies also set in place a second feature of Miller’s definition 
and characterisation that became dominant among studies of EO: the 
interdependency of its dimensions. This is captured in Zahra and Neubaum’s (1998) 
definition of EO as the sum or total of a firm’s behaviours, which encompass radical 
innovative, proactive, and risk taking strategic actions. Thus, investigators following 
Miller’s conceptualisation of EO considered an entrepreneurially oriented firm to be 
one that exhibited innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking as a sum whereby 
the higher the exhibition of these three firm-level behaviours, the higher the EO of 
the firm.  
 
To extend the characterisation of EO as a firm-level behaviour, Covin and Slevin 
(1991) indicated that it is the organisations’ behaviours and actions that make it 
entrepreneurial, and that EO pervades consistently and is manifested recurrently 
throughout an organisation. Thus, in line with Miller (1983), Covin and Slevin 
(1991) considered that a firm is only entrepreneurial when it exhibits entrepreneurial 
behaviours consistently across time and throughout the organisation.  
 
Subsequent authors have also considered EO as an organisational pervasive concept 
that pervades or manifests homogenously across hierarchical levels or departmental 
units in an organisation (Covin et al., 2006; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003, 2005). That 
is, there is a subtle agreement that the level of EO and the relative composition of its 
dimensions is manifested in a similar degree in relation to its exhibition and impact 
across an organisation (Wales et al., 2011). However, Wales et al. (2011) indicated 
that EO is a much more complex ‘multi-faceted phenomenon’ that pervades 
heterogeneously across organisational hierarchical  levels. Wales et al. (2011) 
extended Covin and Slevin’s (1991) proposition and indicated that firm-level EO, as 
an organisational phenomenon, varies within a firm, and by extension may vary 
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across levels of analysis within the firm. EO can then be demonstrated in different 
ways, varying spatially and temporally. This indicated that EO might be more 
complex than a homogenously recurring phenomenon. As such, firms may cycle 
from periods with high EO to periods with low EO (Wales et al., 2011) and 
sustaining entrepreneurial behaviours over time will likely increase the variation of 
outcomes (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). This is important since viewing EO as a 
homogenous pervasive phenomenon might have contributed to EO being 
continuously and consistently considered as an inherently positive and performance 
enhancing concept. This view is reductive to the complexity of the nature of EO. 
Instead, viewing EO as a multi-dimensional heterogenous concept can provide a 
more in-depth understanding of its outcomes (Gupta & Sebastian, 2014; Wales et 
al., 2011).  
 
Subsequent to Miller (1983), Lumpkin and Dess (1996) differed from previous 
authors such as Miller (1983) and Zahra and Neubaum (1998) in two important 
ways. First, they added two dimensions to the conceptual definition of EO: 
‘competitive aggressiveness’ and ‘autonomy’. Competitive aggressiveness refers to 
an organisation’s ability to stay ahead of its adversaries (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). 
Autonomy refers to the degree to which an organisation encourages its employees to 
independently pursue entrepreneurial ideas (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Second, 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) also explicitly emphasised that EO is not characterised by 
a joint or single exhibition of all its dimensions, but rather that a firm can be 
considered entrepreneurial if it exhibits one or more of the dimensions of EO. For 
instance, an organisation can be considered entrepreneurially oriented when it 
engages in new venture creation whilst avoiding risks. Thus, Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996, p.136-137) defined EO as: 
“processes, practices and decision-making activities that lead to new entry, 
entering new or established markets with new or existing goods or services as 
characterized by one or more of the following dimensions: a propensity to act 
autonomously, a willingness to innovate, take risks, a tendency to be aggressive 
toward competitors, and proactive relative to marketplace opportunities”.  
 
In contrast to Miller (1983) and studies in his tradition, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) 
conceptualised EO as a multi-dimensional construct wherein each of the dimensions 
of EO had varying effects that should be studied independently. To a much lesser 
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extent, few authors have adopted the enlarged multi-five-dimensional version of EO 
put forward by Lumpkin and Dess (1996) in contrast to Miller’s (1983) three-
dimensional version. For instance, Hughes and Morgan (2007) offered one of the 
earliest studies into the independent effects of the five dimensions of EO on firm 
performance. Thus, there are contrasting views on the definitional conceptualisation 
of EO in the literature (three-dimensional versus five-dimensional). This thesis 
focuses on the three dimensions of EO (innovativeness, proactiveness, risk taking) 
as positioned by Miller (1983), but adopts the multi-dimensional conceptualisation 
of Lumpkin and Dess (1996). We adopt the three-dimensional conceptualisation of 
Miller (1983) since the three dimensions of EO are the core of what it truly signifies 
to be entrepreneurial (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011). We also adopt the multi-
dimensional conceptualisation of EO by Lumpkin and Dess (1996) to enable us to 
examine the separate impact of the three EO dimensions. 
 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) also sought to clarify and extend the understanding of EO 
by indicating that there is a difference between the concept of EO and 
entrepreneurship. Accordingly, entrepreneurship represents new entry while EO 
represents the process that leads to new entry. Thus, EO is the process through 
which entrepreneurship within or by firms is achieved rather than the outcome of 
corporate entrepreneurship. Thus, EO can be considered as the driver of 
entrepreneurial endeavours of firms. The notion of (and emphasis placed on) new 
entry differentiates Lumpkin and Dess’ (1996) definition of EO from its 
predecessors. Elements of ‘new entry’ might be attached to the innovativeness 
dimension raised in Miller’s (1983) work and contained in the definition and 
operationalisation of EO put forward by Covin and Slevin (1991). In part, it 
characterises that an entrepreneurially oriented firm is more likely to embrace 
change in markets and at times lead that change through its actions. At the least, it 
admits that a firm exhibiting an EO will have a greater tendency to respond to 
external challenges in an entrepreneurial manner, while responding to the internal 
pressures, which generates in a manner that helps overcome the natural tendency 
towards inertia within organisations.  
 
The above discussion gives a sense of the wide variation in the literature with 
regards to defining and conceptualising EO, a problem echoed by Covin and Wales 
(2012). Some scholars consider EO to reflect managerial attitudes whereas others 
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consider it to be a firm-level behaviour.  In that sense, scholars differ with regards to 
whether EO should be considered a behavioural construct or an attitudinal construct 
or both (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011; Miller, 2011). To confuse matters further, there 
are authors such as Covin et al. (2006) who conceptualised EO to include both 
behavioural and attitudinal components. Their definition of EO encompasses 
managerial beliefs and preferences as well as behaviours.  
 
Anderson et al. (2015), on the other hand, indicated that there is a major challenge 
when mixing attitudinal and behavioural components within a single construct (EO). 
Thus, Anderson et al. (2015) reconceptualised EO as the managerial tendency to 
engage in risky endeavours as well as firm-level innovative and proactive 
behaviours. The authors indicated that most of the literature assumes that the 
different dimensions of EO share the same antecedents and most frequently 
researchers have used the Miller (1983)/Covin and Slevin (1989) summated EO 
scale. However, according to the authors, there should be a conceptual distinction 
and as such behavioural (innovativeness and proactiveness) and attitudinal 
components (risk taking) of EO should not be mixed. Accordingly, in the Anderson 
et al. (2015) paper, proactiveness and innovativeness were collapsed or confounded 
into a single dimension, which was the behavioural component of EO. On the other 
hand, risk taking was the attitudinal dimension of EO. This inconsistency in 
defining the EO dimensions makes a clear case for adopting a multi-dimensional 
approach.  
 
As such, several researchers have conceptualised EO differently. There is no 
consensus in the EO research with regards to exploring the nature of the EO 
construct from the perspective of attitudes and behaviours. For the purposes of this 
research, however, under the dominant conceptualisation of EO in the literature, risk 
taking is considered as a behavioural component of EO. As Miller (1983) initially 
proposed, innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking are firm-level behaviours 
that constitute the EO construct. However, we adopt Lumpkin and Dess’ (1996, 
2001) proposition that the EO dimensions do not perfectly covary, thus having 
varied independent effects to enable us to examine the separate effects of the EO 
dimensions. Furthermore, research examining the separate EO dimensions has found 
that they have varying effects (Hughes & Morgan, 2007; Lomberg et al., 2016).   
47 
 
There has been quite a thorough exploration of the concept of EO with researchers 
providing multiple definitions. However, there is consensus in the literature that EO 
is a complex construct in which an entrepreneurially oriented firm is likely to be 
more inclined to exhibit more innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking. 
However, EO might result in uncertain outcomes because it involves risks. An issue 
that has received far less treatment is Lumpkin and Dess’ (1996) belief that the 
dimensions that make up EO might vary independently such that their performance 
effects might not be uniform (Hughes & Morgan, 2007). Interestingly, at the time of 
their work, Lumpkin and Dess (1996) argued that there existed an untested biased 
assumption in the literature that higher EO leads to higher firm performance levels 
(Covin & Slevin, 1991). This sparked a wealth of research that sought to find 
empirical support for the relationship between EO and business performance, 
largely implicating a positive EO-performance relationship (Rauch et al., 2009).  
 
The following section will be comprised of a discussion on the dimensions of EO 
and its gestalt composite conceptualisation versus its multi-dimensional view. 
 
2.3 Dimensions of EO and the Gestalt Conceptualisation versus Multi-
Dimensional View of EO 
 
Originating from Miller’s (1983) conceptualisation, the three-dimensional view of 
EO has been repeatedly acknowledged in the literature. This view considers EO to 
encompass: innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking. A significant research 
trend among past studies is to adopt the three-dimensional view of EO. Yet, 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) added two dimensions to EO: competitive aggressiveness 
and autonomy. Thereby, there is a debate in the literature regarding the constituents 
of EO (three or five-dimensional view).  
 
Furthermore, the dimensionality of EO (gestalt or multi-dimensional view) has been 
a subject of dispute. As a construct, EO has been treated by the majority of 
researchers as a composite construct, which considers that the different dimensions 
of EO relate in the same way to firm performance (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Miller, 
1983). The gestalt conceptualisation of EO has been the dominant stance taken in 
the EO literature (Rauch et al., 2009). Miller (1983) introduced the three dimensions 
of EO (innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking) and indicated that a firm must 
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be high in all three dimensions for it to be considered ‘entrepreneurial’. Thereby, a 
firm cannot be sufficiently or sustainably entrepreneurial if the dimensions of EO do 
not positively covary. Miller (1983) introduced the foundational conceptualisation 
of EO on which consequently many studies have adopted the composite three-
dimensional conceptualisation of EO (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011; Lomberg et al., 
2017).  
 
However, a major limitation of the gestalt conceptualisation of EO is that it can 
obscure the independent effects of each of the dimensions of EO on firm-level 
outcomes. Thus, if the different EO dimensions are combined into a single construct 
and studied against performance, then this would conceal the independent effects of 
each of the EO dimensions (Hughes & Morgan, 2007). However, this is not to 
undermine the feasibility of the composite conceptualisation of EO, whereby the 
objectives of the research are simplistic in nature (Kreiser et al., 2002). This 
research does not aim to question the gestalt conceptualisation of EO. As Covin et 
al. (2006) noted, the question of the dimensionality of EO is not insightful for the 
research on EO.  
 
More recently, the work of some scholars was shown not to align with the 
composite conceptualisation of EO (Hughes & Morgan, 2007; Kreiser et al., 2002; 
Karmann et al., 2016; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Zahra, 1993). Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996) conceptualised EO as a theoretical multi-dimensional concept with each of 
its five components (innovativeness, proactiveness, risk taking, competitive 
aggressiveness, and autonomy) representing independent aspects of entrepreneurial 
behaviour capable of varying independently. Thus, some researchers have shown 
that the risk taking dimension of EO has a curvilinear relationship with firm 
performance while innovativeness and proactiveness have direct positive 
relationships with performance (Tang et al., 2008). Similar studies have shown that 
risk taking dimension of EO has a negative effect on firm performance whereas 
innovativeness and proactiveness have a positive effect (Hughes & Morgan, 2007). 
Thus, studies have shown that the risk taking dimension has an opposing effect in 
comparison to innovativeness and proactiveness; thereby by combining the 
dimensions, it would result in the EO dimensions’ effects being masked out or 
cancelled (Dai et al., 2014; Karmann et al., 2016). However, against the popularity 
of the Miller (1983) gestalt conceptualisation of EO, Lumpkin and Dess’s (1996) 
49 
 
conceptualisation of EO has been neglected. Most researchers have adopted Miller’s 
(1983) three-dimensional composite conceptualisation of EO (Lomberg et al., 2017; 
Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003, 2005; Zahra & Garvis, 2000). Yet, few researchers 
have adopted the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of EO as proposed by 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) (e.g. Hughes & Morgan, 2007). The multi-dimensional 
approach allows for finer detailed exploration of the varying effects of the different 
EO dimensions. However, no conceptualisation is regarded as universally 
appropriate or superior to the other, and it depends on the purpose of one’s research 
(Covin & Lumpkin, 2011; Kreiser et al., 2002).  
 
It is interesting that some researchers have altered the original dimensions of Miller 
(1983) and Lumpkin and Dess (1996) (Antonic & Hisrich, 2003; Jambulingam et 
al., 2005; Richard et al., 2004; Salavou & Lioukas, 2003; Tan, 2002; Voss et al., 
2005). A meta-analysis of by Rauch et al. (2009) revealed that variations of the EO 
scale was done by about half of the studies without any theoretical justification. For 
instance, Antoncic and Hisrich (2003) indicated that EO, which they described as 
‘intrapreneurship’ (which is sometimes itself used as an alternative term for 
‘corporate entrepreneurship’) should include eight dimensions: product/service 
innovation, process innovation, proactiveness, risk taking, competitive 
aggressiveness, self-renewal, entering new businesses, and business venturing. Voss 
et al. (2005) replaced competitive aggressiveness with “competitive scanning”. Tan 
(2002) and Jambulingam et al. (2005) added “long-term orientation” and 
“motivation” respectively to the original EO scale of Miller (1983). Some 
researchers have combined the dimensions of EO such as risk taking/proactiveness 
(Richard et al., 2004) and innovativeness/proactiveness (Salavou & Lioukas, 2003).  
Moreover, Covin and Miles (1999) confused matters further by using measures that 
were previously used to reflect proactiveness to instead capture competitive 
aggressiveness. They used organisational rejuvenation, strategic renewal, and 
domain redefinition to capture competitive aggressiveness. Other researchers have 
even limited EO to being innovative and proactive (Knight, 1997; Merz & Sauber, 
1995). Thus, researchers have ambiguously altered the original dimensions proposed 
by Miller (1983) and Lumpkin and Dess (1996) respectively without providing clear 
justification and sufficient theoretical reasoning. George and Marino (2011) 
considered that it is important to build upon previous studies that have theorised the 
EO construct (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983) rather than build new 
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dimensions or alter the already-existing and theoretically valid dimensions of EO. 
Thereby, there is a need to maintain consistency in the conceptualisations and 
definitions of EO. Such multi-dimensional ‘umbrella’ concepts such as EO are 
particularly subject to scholarly dispute and conceptual confusion and this warrants 
clearly defining such a concept prior to the research endeavour (Della Porta & 
Keating, 2008).   
 
For such reasons, only the original dimensions of EO as initially proposed by Miller 
(1983) were investigated in this research thesis. George and Marino (2011) 
indicated that it is better for researchers to examine the original three dimensions of 
EO as proposed by Miller (1983), since the three-dimensional conceptualisation of 
EO lies at a higher level of abstraction and is more generalisable. The reason for 
excluding autonomy in this thesis is that it may be an individualistic characteristic, 
which is difficult to conceive at a firm-level. Some researchers have indicated that it 
may be an antecedent or a driver of EO rather than a dimension of EO (Edmond & 
Wiklund, 2010; Lumpkin et al., 2009). Moreover, other researchers have indicated 
that competitive aggressiveness might not be a separate dimension of EO and might 
be a part of the proactiveness dimension instead (Hough & Scheepers, 2008; cf. 
Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). 
 
Each of the dimensions of EO, according to the multi-dimensional conceptualisation 
of Lumpkin and Dess (1996), establishes a unique relationship with a proposed 
dependent variable, signifying a firm-level outcome. Specifically, Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996) explained that the more a firm is entrepreneurially oriented, the more it 
will be displayed towards the entrepreneurial end of at least one of the five 
dimensions of EO. However, an entrepreneurially oriented firm does not have to be 
“high” in each dimension of EO. In other words, unlike the gestalt view of EO, the 
multi-dimensional view of EO posits that a firm can be entrepreneurial without 
having each of the dimensions of EO strongly and positively covarying. In addition, 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) indicated that, although related, the dimensions of EO 
may vary independently. This implies that each dimension of EO may relate to firm-
level outcomes in different ways (Covin et al., 2006; Hughes & Morgan, 2007). 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) also predicted that some of its dimensions may have 
antagonistic effects on measures of firm performance. Hughes and Morgan (2007), 
found support for Lumpkin and Dess’s (1996) concerns, reporting a mixture of 
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effects by the five dimensions of EO across a variety of firm performance measures.   
 
For the purposes of this research, the multi-dimensional approach is adopted to 
allow the exploration of the various effects of each of the original three EO 
dimensions (as proposed by Miller (1983)) on firm-level outcomes. Furthermore, 
this research examined the overall effect of EO, even though the separate EO 
dimensions were considered to have independent effects. The reason that this 
research examined the overall effect of EO as well as its separate dimensions is that 
it provides the ‘best of both worlds’ analysis as Miller (2011) termed it. Moreover, it 
would reveal new insights into the theoretical construct ‘EO’. Yet, this research did 
not consider that the EO dimensions form a ‘collective catchall’ (Miller, 2011) and 
sided with the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of EO, in which Miller (2011) 
noted that insights can be attained from examining the EO dimensions 
independently. EO was considered as an ‘umbrella concept’, which is multi-
dimensional in nature and encompasses various dimensions. It would be reducible to 
consider such a complex construct as a uni-dimensional variable (Della Porta & 
Keating, 2008; Jackman, 1985).  
 
With the issue of the dimensionality, arises the issue of measurement of EO. The 
measurement of EO must align with its theoretical conceptualisation (Covin & 
Wales, 2012). Most of the research on EO has adopted the original Miller (1983)/ 
Covin and Slevin (1989) summated EO scales in line with the gestalt 
conceptualisation of EO (Rauch et al., 2009). Researchers surprisingly, despite the 
findings that the EO dimensions have separate effects (Hughes & Morgan, 2007), 
have continued to combine the EO dimensions into a single EO index (e.g. Gupta et 
al., 2016). This approach masks the independent effects of each of the dimensions 
and creates a measurement conundrum for scholars with no clear answer (Covin & 
Wales, 2012). Thus, challenges have been raised by some researchers (Lyon et al., 
2000), and the scales have been subject to criticism. Some items of the scales have 
shown evidence of low reliability (George & Marino, 2011; Kreiser et al., 2002). 
However, concerns about such measurements have been neglected by researchers 
likely because of the wide acceptability and well-recognised value of such scales 
and because of the desirability of the outcomes that are achieved (Covin & Wales, 
2012), resulting in a risk of self-fulfilling fallacies. Yet, still the EO scales have 
been subject to testing and were shown to be valid and reliable measures of EO in 
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different cultural contexts leading to the Miller (1983)/Covin and Slevin (1989) 
scales to become the dominant measures of EO (Knight, 1997; Kreiser et al. 2002). 
Thus, researchers have not been concerned with developing new alternative 
objective measures of EO (Covin & Wales, 2012). Theoretically speaking, adopting 
a gestalt approach to examining EO might reduce its firm value since it masks the 
independent effects of each of the EO dimensions. Thereby, EO might not be 
universally beneficial for firms to pursue and this cannot be captured sufficiently 
when adopting a gestalt approach (Hughes & Morgan, 2007).  Thereby, this thesis 
has resorted to develop secondary objective measures to account for the 
independence of each of the EO dimensions in support of the multi-dimensional 
conceptualisation of EO (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  
 
In conclusion, this thesis adopts the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of EO, 
which will enable the examination of the independent effects of each of the three 
dimensions of EO originally proposed by Miller (1983) (Hughes & Morgan, 2007; 
Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). If EO was instead taken as a composite construct, such a 
course of action would risk obstructing a clear comprehensibility of EO as a 
construct. Moreover, in terms of the thesis wider contributions and implications, it 
would be beneficial to identify the different unique effects of each of the dimensions 
of EO so that firms could seek the optimal combination to improve firm 
performance (Hughes et al., 2007; Kreiser et al., 2002). Thus, the objective of the 
following thesis is to explore the relationship between EO/separate EO dimensions 
and firm performance/risk of failure and as such reveal richer relationships.    
 
The next section will consider the definitional problems of EO after outlining the 
different definitional and dimensional conceptualisations of the EO construct. 
 
2.4 Problems with the Definitions and Dimensions of EO 
 
There have been different perspectives in defining entrepreneurial orientation by 
researchers. Many researchers have questioned the nature of the EO construct 
(Covin & Lumpkin, 2011; Miller, 2011). The reason arguably behind the lack of an 
agreement to conceptualising EO could be due to different labels being attached to 
the construct, but fundamentally the various labels refer to the same construct.  
The dimensionality issue of EO has also been a point of disagreement among 
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scholars. Some scholars consider EO to consist of innovativeness, proactiveness, 
and risk taking (Miller, 1983) whereas other researchers include two more 
dimensions competitive aggressiveness and autonomy onto the EO construct 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). Furthermore, researchers tend to disagree on whether EO 
is an all-encompassing gestalt construct utilising a summated scale as initially 
positioned by Miller (1983) or as a multi-dimensional construct as alternatively 
positioned by Lumpkin and Dess (1996). Interestingly, most of the research on EO 
aligns with the composite conceptualisation of Miller (1983). Thereby, perhaps this 
might have mis-directed researchers from exploring the differential effects of the 
dimensions of EO on firm performance (e.g. Hughes & Morgan, 2007). Even 
though researchers acknowledge astonishingly that the EO and firm performance 
relationship might vary independently as Lumpkin and Dess (1996) argued, yet they 
tend to universally conceal the independent nature of the EO dimensions by 
combining them and summing them into an EO index (e.g. Stam & Elfring, 2008).  
 
Building upon the previous critique of the EO literature, there has been a 
disagreement in the literature whether EO is a disposition/attitudinal construct or a 
behavioural construct (Anderson et al., 2015; Covin & Lumpkin, 2011). For 
instance, some scholars view the EO construct as a predisposition or an attitudinal 
construct, in which EO reflects top managerial beliefs and attitudes instead of firm 
behaviours (Khandwalla 1976/77; Miller & Friesen; 1982; Mintzberg, 1973). On the 
other hand, and similar to this thesis stance, most researchers view EO as a 
behavioural construct (e.g. Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983). Lastly, there are 
researchers who have considered EO to include both firm-level behavioural 
outcomes as well as managerial attitudes and beliefs (e.g. Anderson et al., 2015; 
Covin et al., 2006).  
 
The lack of an agreement with regards to whether EO is an attitudinal construct or a 
behavioural construct can be linked back to, as it has been noted by Miller (2011), 
the Miller (1983)/Covin and Slevin (1989) commonly used EO scale. This scale has 
some items that refer to firm behaviours whereas other items that are attitudinal in 
nature. Anderson et al. (2015) is one of the few studies that has re-conceptualised 
EO (Gupta, 2015). In line with Miller’s (2011) concern, the authors developed an 
alternative scale for EO and essentially considered EO as encompassing firm 
behaviours (innovativeness and proactiveness dimensions) and re-conceptualised the 
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risk taking dimension of EO as a managerial attitude towards risk taking instead of 
being behavioural in nature (Anderson et al., 2015). Yet, this has only added more 
ambiguity to the EO construct. To avoid such ambiguity, the following thesis has 
resorted to using secondary objective measures for each of the EO dimensions that 
represent firm behaviours to reiterate the conceptualisation of EO at the firm-level 
(Miller, 2011; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011).  
 
Conceptualising EO as a disposition or as an attitudinal construct rather than a firm 
behaviour is problematic. Having a disposition or a tendency towards 
entrepreneurship does not ensure the presence of entrepreneurial behaviours. EO 
consists of sustained entrepreneurial behaviours. An occasional exhibition of 
entrepreneurial behaviours is not reflective of a firm exhibiting EO (Covin & 
Lumpkin, 2011). The point is that a firm’s disposition to entrepreneurship can be 
associated with EO, but is not EO in itself. Thus, a managerial tendency towards an 
entrepreneurial posture or orientation may not enact into an entrepreneurial 
orientation at the firm level as there are certain constraints on the entrepreneurial 
proclivity of managers (i.e. in conditions of low managerial discretion or high board 
power) (Anderson & Covin, 2014; Gupta et al., 2016). Thus, EO has predominantly 
been conceptualised as a firm-level behaviour rather than as a managerial attitude or 
a disposition (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996, 2001). As Covin and 
Slevin (1991, p. 8) indicated “behavior is the central and essential element in the 
entrepreneurial process”. Thereby, this thesis considers EO to consist of firm-level 
behaviours.  
 
The next section will begin with a review of the literature on EO highlighting the 
distinct three phases of EO: the conceptual development and the initial investigation 
of the EO-firm performance relationship, the further exploration of the EO-firm 
performance relationship, and finally the current state of the art of knowledge of the 
EO-firm performance relationship. 
 
2.5 A Review of the Body of Knowledge on EO 
 
Vij and Bedi’s (2012) literature review on the EO construct divided the literature on 
EO into three models: (1) the EO construct model, in which EO is the dependent 
variable and researchers examine its antecedents (Miller & Toulouse, 1986; 
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Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990); (2) the EO strategy model, in which researchers focus 
on the alignment of EO with different strategies (Covin & Slevin, 1988; Dess et al., 
1997; Khandwalla, 1976/77; Mintzberg, 1973); and (3) the EO-firm performance 
model, in which researchers focus on the EO-performance relationship and consider 
intervening variables (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Kreiser & Davis, 2010; Wiklund, 
1999; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005).   
 
Past research on the EO phenomenon can be summarized into three types of 
thematic phases. The first phase of the literature on entrepreneurial orientation was 
characterised by a conceptual development of EO. The second phase of the literature 
on EO was characterised by an explicit focus on exploring the relationship between 
EO and firm performance to ‘validate’ EO as a meaningful subject for examination. 
Due to the large body of empirical evidence of the positive effects of EO on firm 
performance (Rauch et al., 2009), the research has acknowledged the precedence of 
EO for firms with few researchers challenging the EO-as-Advantage perspective as 
the third theme of the literature on EO (Gupta & Sebastian, 2014).  
 
While much evidence exists on the EO-performance relationship, how and why its 
enhancing performance effects come about is not well understood. However, most 
of the research takes for granted a positive EO-firm performance relationship 
(Rauch et al., 2009; Rosenbusch et al., 2013). This is true regardless of the 
undercurrent studies that persist to reveal inconsistent results that seem to challenge 
the EO-as-Advantage perspective.  
 
The phases signify the progression of EO in the literature with the dominant 
recognition of the concept of EO at the firm-level (Gupta & Sebastian, 2014; 
Martens et al., 2016). It is important to reiterate the origins of EO at the firm-level. 
Most of the studies take the stance that EO is advantageous to the firm. However, 
there are studies that reveal opposing effects of each of the EO dimensions. Thus, it 
is important to examine the effects of each of the EO dimensions on firm 
performance/risk of failure with the notion of EO at the firm-level. The following 
sections will focus on the development of EO in the literature from its initial 
conception until its maturation and prominence among entrepreneurship scholars. 
The three stages of EO can be considered as introduction, growth, and maturity 
similar to the product life-cycle of a firm (Gupta & Dutta, 2016). EO currently has 
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reached a mature stage (Gupta & Dutta, 2016), yet recent studies still emphasise the 
positive impact of EO with clear knowledge voids on its implications (Wales, 2016; 
Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). 
 
2.5.1 Phases of EO Research Over Time 
 
The following section considers the various phases of the EO literature. Several 
research articles were published recently that summarise the literature on EO and 
the gaps that are still present (Gupta & Dutta, 2016; Gupta & Wales, 2017; Wales, 
2016). Most of the literature on EO considers EO to be beneficial for firms and 
coincides with the EO-as-Advantage perspective, which originates from the 
Resource-based view (RBV), a theory that considers EO to be a valuable resource 
for firms (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011; Covin & Miller, 2014; Gupta & Sebastian, 
2014).  
 
The importance of the dependent variable firm performance in EO research was first 
considered by Covin and Slevin (1991) (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011), and research to 
date still tests the value of EO on organisational performance (Martens et al., 2016). 
Yet, the focus has been on the effect of EO on short-term measures (such as 
profitability). This has caused the EO and firm performance research to be 
premature (Gupta & Wales, 2017). Wales (2016) noted that there is a need for more 
robust theorising in the EO literature and the emergence of new theoretical 
breakthroughs, which would revitalise the EO construct.  
 
2.5.1.1 The First Phase of EO research 
 
The beginning of the section considers the first phase on EO research, which is 
separated into the conceptual development of EO and its initial emergence as a 
theoretical construct in the literature and the initial investigation of the EO-firm 
performance relationship.  
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2.5.1.1.1 The First Phase of EO Research: The Conceptual Development of EO  
 
Research on firm-level entrepreneurship can be traced back to the early works of 
Mintzberg (1973) and Khandwalla (1976/77) (Gupta & Dutta, 2016). Mintzberg 
(1973), recognised the strategic characterisation of an ‘entrepreneurial strategy-
making mode’ based upon the extent to which firms were proactive and 
opportunity-seeking in conditions of high environmental uncertainty (Gupta & 
Dutta, 2016). Furthermore, Khandwalla (1976/77) was one of the early empirical 
works on EO who contributed to the measurement of the risk taking dimension of 
EO. This later influenced the development of the EO scale (Covin & Slevin, 1989). 
Consequently, Miller and Friesen (1982) developed a three-items measure of 
innovativeness and two-item measure of risk taking. Thus, such seminal works were 
a major influence in developing the EO scales by Miller (1983)/ Covin and Slevin 
(1989). Zahra et al. (1999) indicated that most studies have employed a derivative of 
the EO scale developed by Miller and Friesen (1982). Specifically, the Miller and 
Friesen (1982) paper influenced Miller (1983) by developing the measurement and 
defining one of the dimensions of the EO construct. Such authors showed that 
entrepreneurially oriented managers can sustain innovation and implement it more 
readily than their more conservative counterparts.  The EO scale was further 
developed by Covin and Slevin (1989) by adding a three-item measurement of 
proactiveness and an item for the risk taking dimension, which yielded a three-item 
measurement for each dimension of EO. Most of the research on EO has adopted the 
Covin and Slevin (1989) scale, in which Knight (1997) revealed that the EO scale 
by Covin and Slevin (1989) was valid and reliable. Lumpkin and Dess (1996) 
considered that some items of the scale pertaining to proactiveness dimension 
captured the competitive aggressiveness dimension and as such considered  two 
items as representing competitive aggressiveness instead.  
 
The above measurements supplied the universal means to assess and measure the 
EO dimensions and have influenced the research community to utilise existing 
overly-used scales rather than develop new measures of EO. Perhaps by using 
alternative measures of EO, new revelations might arise to uncovering the nature of 
EO and the effects of each of its dimensions. Clearly, the scales might not be 
capturing the presence or absence of EO at the firm-level, but reflecting managerial 
perceptions of EO since they are administered to top managers. For instance, Covin 
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and Slevin (1989) paper, which is acknowledged to be significant due to the 
development of the EO scale, has pushed scholars to presume that their developed 
scale measures EO at the firm-level when the EO scale is tailored to top managers 
and is reflective of managerial perceptions. Thus, there is a trend among the 
scholarly community to use such subjective scales that measure the entrepreneurial-
strategy making mode of managers or the managerial styles of EO rather than 
measure EO at the firm-level. If one would be measuring EO and theoretically 
considering EO to be a managerial disposition, then such scales would suffice. To 
truly capture EO at the firm-level, objective measures must be developed instead.  
 
The next section will examine the past research on the EO-firm performance 
relationship. 
 
2.5.1.1.2 The First Phase of EO Research: The Initial Consideration of the EO-
firm Performance Relationship 
 
Early research has shown that the performance-enhancing effects of EO depend on 
certain conditions either external industrial or environmental factors (e.g. hostile 
versus benign environments) (Covin & Slevin, 1988, 1989, 1990; Khandwalla 
1976/77; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996) as well as internal firm-specific factors (e.g. 
strategic mission) (Covin et al., 1994).  
 
The initial investigation of the EO and firm performance relationship was dominated 
with a focus on external environmental intervening factors that could influence the 
effect of EO on firm performance. The effect of EO was shown to be positively 
related to performance only among firms in hostile environments; whereas firms in 
a benign environment benefited more from a conservative orientation (Covin & 
Slevin, 1989). Similarly, EO has been shown to be positively related to performance 
only among firms in emerging industries rather than mature industries (Covin & 
Slevin, 1990). Thereby, in certain environmental external conditions, it may not 
benefit firms to pursue EO. Even though the examination of external factors on the 
EO-firm performance relationship dominated the literature, some researchers have 
investigated the effect of firm-specific internal factors (e.g. strategic mission) on the 
entrepreneurial strategic posture and firm performance relationship (Covin et al., 
1994). The positive effects of EO on firm performance were only observed among 
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firms whose strategic mission is to increase their market share (Covin et al., 1994). 
Thus, such studies indicate that the positive outcomes of EO on firm performance 
depend on certain factors.  
 
Some researchers have investigated the EO-firm performance relationship among 
different industries (high-technology versus low-technology industries) (Covin et al. 
1990; Zahra & Neubaum, 1998). Specifically, Covin et al. (1990) found that firms 
operating in high-technology industries tend to use more entrepreneurially oriented 
strategies than their counterparts. However, EO was shown to have a positive 
relationship with performance in firms operating in low-technology industries. A 
possible explanation is that entrepreneurial orientation represents an aggressive and 
ambitious orientation, which is more prevalent among firms that operate in high 
technology industries. However, since such firms might be prevalently 
entrepreneurial in nature, it would not provide them with a greater advantage as it 
would for firms operating in low technology industries. Thus, firms that operate in 
low technology industries would benefit more from an entrepreneurial strategic 
posture (Covin et al., 1990). Yet, other studies have shown that firms operating in 
the high-technology context benefit more from adopting an entrepreneurial 
orientation (Zahra & Neubaum, 1998). This reverts to the point that not all 
companies might benefit from an entrepreneurial posture.  
 
The context of the industry would be an important external factor to consider in 
testing the EO-as-Advantage perspective. Past research has often relied on 
heterogenous samples when examining the effects of EO (Wales, 2016). In this 
thesis, we focus on the high-technology industry, which is more relevant for the 
examination of EO and its firm-level outcomes. Studies examining heterogenous 
samples limit the potential of the research to be theoretically insightful and context-
sensitive (Miller, 2011; Wales, 2016). By choosing a more homogenous sample of 
firms, then the EO-as-Experimentation perspective of the ‘downside’ of EO can be 
tested (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
The research has tended to accept a priori that EO is advantageous for firms (Rauch 
et al., 2009). This is the case despite the initial proposition by Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996) and the above studies, which indicate that certain external and internal 
organisational factors affect the outcomes of EO. Furthermore, Lumpkin and Dess 
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(1996) posited that the EO dimensions themselves might exhibit un-uniform 
relationships with firm-level outcomes, either through direct or moderating effects 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). As such, only few researchers have adopted the multi-
dimensional conceptualisation of EO and aimed to examine the differing effects of 
each of the EO dimensions on firm performance. For instance, early researchers 
such as Venkatraman (1989) found that risk taking and competitive aggressiveness 
are negatively related to profitability of the firm, while proactiveness was found to 
be positively related to firm growth and profitability. This is very important to 
consider since we expect that the EO dimensions would impact firm performance 
differently. Yet, the multi-dimensional investigation of the effect of EO on firm-
level outcomes has been largely overlooked in the past research even though the 
multi-dimensional conceptualisation would bring new insights. 
 
The above discussion raises an important point that suggests EO is not intrinsically 
valuable to an organisation per se and is dependent upon organisational structures or 
competitive and environmental external factors. Thus, to assume that EO would lead 
to a positive performance outcome without considering the possible factors that 
affect the EO-firm performance relationship would be to mis-specify its 
applicability, value, and potential relevance. An important consideration when 
investigating the EO-firm performance relationship is not only internal or external 
organisational factors, but also the status of the firms (active or failed) in one’s 
sample. Thus, by investigating the EO and the firm performance relationship among 
a sample of failed firms, which has not been regarded by researchers, would be 
insightful to the effects of EO when considering the premise that EO could be one of 
the potent factors affecting the viability of a firm (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). 
Thus, EO is as important as factors such as firm size and firm age, which have been 
investigated in the industrial economics literature and have been shown to affect the 
risk of firm failure (Josefy et al., 2017).  
 
In summary, the initial studies above showed that EO’s enhancing effects on firm 
performance depend on certain factors. The next section will consider the focus on 
the effect of EO on firm performance, yet largely implicating a positive EO-firm 
performance relationship, in which a large number of studies followed to emphasise 
that it is beneficial for firms to pursue a firm-level entrepreneurial orientation 
(Naman & Slevin, 1993; Zahra, 1991). This is despite the fact that early research 
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revealed that the relationship of EO and a firm’s performance is contingent on 
certain factors.  
 
2.5.1.2 The Second Phase of EO research: The Relationship between EO and 
Firm Performance  
 
The second phase of EO was characterised by an explicit focus on the relationship 
between EO and firm performance.  
 
Most of the studies conducted during this second phase have argued that EO 
improves organisational performance (Kreiser & Davis, 2010; Wiklund, 1999; 
Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003; Zahra, 1996). Zahra et al. (1999) indicated that the 
breadth of research has emphasised the importance of EO in achieving higher 
performance levels.  
 
This section outlines the different important studies that explore the EO-firm 
performance relationship by showing some inconsistencies, in which certain studies 
indicate a positive EO-firm performance relationship, while others show mixed or 
negative results. The beginning of the section explores the studies that emphasise 
the positive outcomes of EO.  
 
2.5.1.2.1 Examples of Studies that Show Positive Returns from EO 
 
Most of the studies during the second era of the research on the EO-firm 
performance relationship have largely emphasised the beneficial outcomes of EO, 
which have led researchers to conclude that EO, as a strategic orientation, provides 
firms with a greater competitive advantage (Rauch et al., 2009). 
 
Most of the research on EO has been in the form of cross-sectional studies, yet there 
are few studies that have examined the effects of EO along a longitudinal timeframe 
(Wiklund, 1999; Zahra & Covin, 1995). As such, Zahra and Covin (1995) found that 
corporate-level entrepreneurship or EO is positively related to firm performance, 
which increases by time over a 7-year period, and that environmental hostility 
positively moderates this relationship. That is, the EO-firm performance relationship 
is more positive in firms that operate in hostile environments and this relationship 
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strengthens over time. The findings of the aforementioned paper were in line with 
past scholars (e.g. Covin & Slevin, 1989; Zahra, 1993). Similarly, Wiklund (1999) 
has indicated that the strength of the positive EO-performance relationship grows 
over time. This indicates that the effects of EO extend on a long-term basis. This is 
an important revelation that EO’s effects are long-term in nature, yet surprisingly 
even past studies that have examined the effects of EO on a long-term basis have 
only assessed the outcomes of EO on short-term measures of firm performance such 
as return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) (Zahra & Covin, 1995). Thus, 
there is limited attention to the consideration of the multi-dimensional nature of 
performance and the wide range of organisational performance metrics (Gupta & 
Wales, 2017). Furthermore, separating financial and market performance from firm 
survival might reveal that the effect of EO is not analogous across different metrics 
(Josefy et al., 2017). Yet, examining the effect of EO on firm-level outcomes is best 
adhered to by having ‘the best of both worlds’ approach (Miller, 2011). Thereby, 
this thesis examines the longitudinal effect of EO on short-term performance as well 
as long-term firm performance and firm survival, which are important to consider 
more so than short-term metrics. 
 
Most importantly, the Zahra and Covin (1995) and Wiklund (1999) studies excluded 
from their samples firms that were dropped due to a merger or acquisition or 
bankruptcies and did not attempt to measure the EO levels of such companies or 
even to test the effects of EO levels on their performance and risk of firm failure. 
This is surprising as there exists a survivor bias even in the presence of longitudinal 
studies. For instance, in the Wiklund (1999) paper, the sample was dropped 
significantly from 808 to 132 cases. Had the researchers considered the possibility 
of EO being associated with firm failure, perhaps they would have shown important 
revelations of the effects of EO which would result in challenging the overarching 
EO-as-Advantage perspective. 
 
The majority of researchers whom have argued for the superiority of an EO have 
utilised the Resource-based view (RBV) (e.g. Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003), the 
dominating theory of EO’s competitive advantage. This has resulted in the 
prominence of the EO-as-Advantage perspective. Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) 
modelled EO as a moderator variable to examine the role of EO on the relationship 
of a firm’s knowledge-based resources and firm performance. The researchers 
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hypothesised, based upon the RBV, that EO is a valuable resource for the firm and 
is essential in achieving higher performance returns. Thus, it was revealed, as 
hypothesised, that EO positively moderates the relationship between a firm’s ability 
to exploit its knowledge based resources and firm performance. Thereby, according 
to the authors, firms that exhibited EO performed better than others that did not. 
Similarly, Wiklund and Shepherd (2005) revealed that, as a main-effect, EO 
positively affected small business performance. Yet, utilising a configurational 
model, small firms that operated in unstable markets and had considerable access to 
capital benefited less from adopting EO. Thus, even with studies that revealed 
contingent factors that affected the EO and firm performance relationship, the 
researchers concluded that EO (as a direct effect on firm performance) was 
beneficial for firms (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). Thereby, the studies during this 
era reinforce the untested bias in the literature that EO enhances firm performance.  
 
Surprisingly, similar to Zahra and Covin (1995) and Wiklund (1999), Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2003, 2005) studies, even though included a longitudinal timeframe, 
excluded businesses that failed. Thus, there is an under-representation of failed 
firms in previous studies. In that sense, in this thesis, in-depth understanding of the 
implications of EO on firm performance and the risk of firm failure relationship was 
achieved on a set of surviving and failed firms along a longitudinal timeframe, 
which included the financial crisis, a significant period that could be characterised 
as an unstable environment.  
 
The importance of examining the EO and firm performance relationship is revealed 
through the meta-analysis by Rauch et al. (2009). Upon analysing 51 studies 
consisting of 1,259 companies, it was shown that there is a positive EO-firm 
performance relationship and a strong correlation existed between EO and firm 
performance (0.24). This explains the increasing interest of researchers in 
examining this relationship, in which such correlation between EO and firm 
performance is considered practically large in strategy research (Gupta et al., 2016).  
 
Following the Rauch et al. (2009) meta-analysis, the EO-as-Advantage perspective 
became the dominant perspective (Martens et al., 2016). This is due to major 
limitations in the Rauch et al. (2009) meta-analysis, namely the dominance of the 
gestalt conceptualisation, cross-sectional bias, and survivor bias. This meta-analysis 
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confirmed that most of the studies considered EO as a composite construct as 
initially proposed by Miller (1983) with only 13 studied out of the 51 considering 
the EO dimensions separately. Similarly, a more recent review by Wales et al. 
(2013a) noted that 123 of the 150 studies on EO, that were published from 1976 
until 2010, adopted the composite construct of EO. Thus, the multi-dimensional 
construct proposition by Lumpkin and Dess (1996) has been neglected. It is worth 
mentioning that most of the studies in this meta-analysis were cross-sectional in 
nature, measuring EO at one point in time, with few exceptions (e.g. Wiklund, 1999; 
Zahra & Covin, 1995). Moreover, none of the studies examined the rational 
possibility that EO might be associated with firm failure or at least have negative 
consequences. Thus, there is a survivor bias. For example, by considering the risk 
taking component of EO, it is possible that EO might also lead to higher 
probabilities of failure if the firm extends its risk taking beyond a sustainable level. 
In other words, EO is associated with higher outcome variance, enhancing both rates 
of firm success and failure (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Wiklund and Shepherd 
(2011) considered that EO might improve relative performance in surviving firms, 
but also would increase the possibility of firm failure. Yet, previous literature has 
been consistent in emphasising the important function of EO in attaining superior 
performance levels and gaining competitive advantage (Covin et al., 2006; Rauch et 
al. 2009; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003, 2005; Zahra & Covin, 1995).   
 
The examples of such studies outlined collectively led to an overriding normative 
position that the EO-firm performance relationship is positive with few challenges 
to this hegemony emerging. It seems that the studies have disregarded the nature of 
EO being a risky orientation and its possibility to exacerbate the decline of firms 
since the firm-level behaviours that are associated with EO are resource-intensive 
and each dimension of EO could result in significant costs for firms (Covin & 
Slevin, 1991; Rauch et al., 2009; Wales et al., 2013c). Thereby, this research 
reinforces the idea that EO is thought to be a double-edged sword with its power to 
enhance as well as increase the risk of firm failure. Thus, EO might not always 
translate into enhanced firm performance, in which there is a possibility of 
diminishing returns from EO (Kreiser et al., 2013; Wales et al., 2013c). The reason 
that such studies report only positive outcomes is that such studies are: mostly cross-
sectional, measure EO as a managerial perception rather than at the firm-level, 
assess EO against short-term measures, and only consider firms that have survived 
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when examining the EO and firm performance relationship. This is where this thesis 
is significant to the literature by addressing those gaps. This research can be 
considered as a response to the recent calls by Gupta and Wales (2017) and Wiklund 
and Shepherd (2011) to assess and align the measurement of EO by using secondary 
measures with long-term stock-market based measures of firm performance as well 
as firm failure along a longitudinal timeframe. The longitudinal aspect of this thesis 
can capture the causal effect of EO on firm-level outcomes. The use of secondary 
measures of EO and its outcomes (firm performance and failure) avoids common 
method variance or bias of survey-based studies, in which the instruments used are 
biased and would cause the variation in managerial responses (Short et al., 2010). 
This is due to the problem that several constructs are measured using multiple-item 
scales in surveys and spurious variations would arise due to the instruments used 
rather than to the actual constructs under examination.  
 
There is a trend in the research to measure and capture EO using self-reported 
measures and run at the risk of common method variance (e.g. Covin et al., 2006; 
Short et al., 2010; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). This is a major limitation that could 
lead to not capturing the theoretical construct under examination. There is a question 
of construct validity and the need to have better assessments of EO that are long-
term in nature (i.e. long-term firm performance or firm survival). Thereby, such 
studies have been tainted with a lack of capturing EO at the firm-level and testing 
the long-term effects of EO. Following the Rauch et al. (2009) meta-analysis, the 
research has taken for granted the positive outcomes of EO even though a persistent 
number of undercurrent studies of the EO-firm performance relationship revealed 
conflicting results (e.g. Hughes & Morgan, 2007).   
 
The following section will outline the studies that have revealed conflicting results 
to the dominating EO-as-Advantage perspective, and which have shown 
inconsistencies regarding the EO-firm performance relationship. 
 
2.5.1.2.2 Examples of Studies that Show Inconsistent Results on Performance 
by EO  
 
The main contribution of studies in the past on EO have been on exploring various 
moderators or factors that affect the EO-firm performance relationship in different 
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contexts (industries or firm sizes) (Gupta & Wales, 2017). Yet, such studies do not 
realise that there is a need to revitalise the measurement of EO and examine the 
effect of EO on failed firms. This is not to treat such studies as obsolete as they have 
offered a better understanding of the non-direct relationship of EO on firm-level 
outcomes and as such the contingent factors that come into play. Thus, such studies 
may reveal that in certain contexts the universal positive effects of EO do not hold. 
The following studies, similar to studies during the conceptual development era of 
EO, showed that the effects of EO might not be universally beneficial across 
alternative contexts. 
 
It has been shown that the EO-firm performance relationship is not consistently 
positive, in which certain factors might cause diminishing returns from EO. The 
idea of the harmful effects of EO beyond a certain threshold were first noted by 
Miller and Friesen (1982) and Zahra (1993). Zahra and Garvis (2000) found that 
there are diminishing returns or “upper-limits” from pursuing an aggressive EO in 
hostile international markets. They revealed that the effect of EO on firm 
performance was an inverted U-shaped relationship in a hostile environment. 
Similarly, Bhuian et al. (2005) found that firm-level entrepreneurship had an 
inverted U-shaped effect on the relationship between market orientation and firm 
performance in the non-profit context. That is, market orientation had the highest 
positive effect on performance when EO was its moderate levels. Thus, it may not 
benefit to excessively pursue EO and the positive effects of EO might not be 
consistently present when EO is at a high-level.   
 
Most studies have been conducted in the US context whereby EO was shown to 
mostly have a linear positive relationship with performance. However, Tang et al. 
(2008) studied the EO-performance relationship in an emerging economy, the 
Chinese national context. In this context, the relationship was indicated to be 
curvilinear, such that high investment in EO led to diminishing positive returns on 
firm performance (inverted U-shaped relationship). Similarly, Kemelgor (2002) 
showed that the EO-performance relationship was stronger and more significant in 
the case of US firms rather than firms in the Netherlands, and that firms in the US 
displayed higher EO levels. It is of relevance to better account for context when 
studying the EO-performance relationship. Thereby, the focus of this thesis is on 
examining the effect of EO on firm-level outcomes among US firms only.  
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In line with the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of EO by Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996), Hughes and Morgan (2007) set out to examine the independent impact of 
each of the EO dimensions (innovativeness, proactiveness, risk taking, autonomy, 
and competitive aggressiveness) on firm performance. Their results indicated that 
innovativeness had a positive effect on product performance, proactiveness had a 
positive effect on product and customer performance, whereas risk taking had a 
negative effect on product performance. Competitive aggressiveness and autonomy 
showed no effect on firm performance. Similarly, other researchers have shown that 
the EO dimensions should be modelled independently (Kreiser et al., 2002; Runyan 
et al., 2012) and that each of the EO dimensions had separate effects (Kreiser et al., 
2013; Short et al, 2010). For instance, Short et al. (2010) revealed that 
innovativeness and proactiveness had positive effects on firm market value, whereas 
risk taking was shown to have a negative effect on performance.  Thus, by 
deconstructing the various components of EO, each component had a different 
effect on firm performance. By approaching EO in a gestalt form, it would mask the 
independent effects of each of the different EO dimensions.  
 
It is apparent that the majority of previous research assumes that EO is 
advantageous to firms that practice it. However, the theoretical basis of the EO-
performance relationship has seldom been illuminated (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
The possible outcomes of EO on firm failure have not been considered. As the 
literature indicates, the relationship of EO and firm performance might not be 
always positive in certain contexts, such as in small firms (Wales et al., 2013c). This 
inconsistency in performance outcomes from EO is due to the possibility that EO is 
correlated with a higher performance variance (Wales et al., 2013b; Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011). Thereby, EO has the potential to lead to ‘below zero returns’ 
among resource-constrained small firms (Wales, et al., 2013c). This era has been 
dominated with the positive stance of the effects of EO despite such studies that 
indicate that EO might not be universally beneficial. The persistent concern over 
negative effects of EO on firm performance has been rather swept aside. We posit 
that the performance variance producing nature of EO has not been evident in the 
literature due to a survivor bias.    
 
The next section will focus on the third phase of the EO-firm performance 
relationship, which outlines the current understanding of EO.  
68 
 
2.5.1.3 The Third Phase of EO Research: The Maturation Stage of the EO-
Firm Performance Relationship  
 
The third phase of EO has reached a maturation stage since the positive EO-firm 
performance relationship has been reiterated among scholars. However, this is at 
odds with studies reporting low correlations between some of the EO dimensions 
and firm performance (Lumpkin & Dess, 2001) and with other studies that failed to 
show a significant relationship between EO and firm performance (Covin et al., 
1994) or among some of its specific dimensions and organisational performance 
(Hughes & Morgan, 2007). Interestingly, there are also some studies that have 
indicated that the relationship between EO and firm performance is not as 
straightforward as it may seem, such that the EO-firm performance relationship may 
reflect an inverted U-shaped effect (Bhuian et al., 2005; Tang et al., 2008). This 
indicates that there are contingent factors that impact the outcomes of EO. Thus, it is 
important to consider such contingencies. This thesis distinguishes itself by 
considering the possible effect of EO on firm failure and examining the effect of EO 
and its dimensions on firm performance among failed firms. 
 
The beginning of this section will consider the studies that have corroborated the 
beneficial outcomes of EO.  
 
2.5.1.3.1 The Dominance of the Positive EO-Firm Performance Relationship 
 
EO has been considered as a mature and prominent construct within 
entrepreneurship and strategy research, which has reached an adolescence stage 
(Gupta & Dutta, 2016; Slevin & Terjesen, 2011). The predominant positive EO-
performance relationship still exists, and this attests to the maturation of the EO 
construct, with the same logic being reiterated and the same measures being used by 
EO researchers (Andersén, 2010; Gupta & Dutta, 2016). The maturation of the EO 
construct came into effect after acknowledging EO as a firm-level construct which 
enhances firm performance (Gupta & Dutta, 2016).  
 
A recent meta-analysis, by Gupta and Wales (2017) of 119 research articles from 
1986 to 2011, examined the EO-firm performance relationship and found that most 
of the studies (90%) assessed EO against perceptual indicators of firm performance, 
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in the form of performance relative to competitors, rather than objective archival 
measures. Most importantly, researchers have largely relied on self-developed 
performance measures rather than on established measures. Furthermore, most 
studies relied on accounting and growth-based measures of firm performance rather 
than on stock-based measures (Short et al., 2010) or survival (Walter et al., 2006; 
Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Even alarmingly, more than half of the studies 
employed a performance index that combined several performance indicators, in 
which the use of a hybrid performance measure has been growing over time. 
Thereby, the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of firm performance has been 
largely ignored. The effects of EO thereby must be examined against alternative 
measures of firm performance rather than being combined and aggregated into a 
performance index (Gupta & Wales, 2017).  
 
As such, previous meta-analysis by Rauch et al. (2009) was more concerned with 
the performance effects of EO rather than testing the construct validity of the used 
performance measures. This thesis examined the specific performance targets (ROA 
and stock-based measures) of each of the EO dimensions (within the context of 
large high-technology US firms). Stock-based measures are important to consider 
since the effect of EO within capital markets and its usefulness for shareholders 
would facilitate the advancement of the understanding of the long-term outcomes of 
EO (Gupta & Wales, 2017). Furthermore, risk of firm failure is important to 
consider as the examination of EO against firm survival has been absent from the 
literature despite calls by Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) (Gupta & Wales, 2017).  
 
Few studies have presented new perspectives on EO (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011) 
and have employed alternative measures of EO and firm performance (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2011; Short et al., 2010). Thus, measuring the effect of EO on firm 
value, by using an objective assessment of EO, has been overlooked (Gupta et al., 
2016; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). The assessment of EO against Tobin’s Q, a 
forward-looking firm valuation market-to-book ratio, which represents the stock 
market value of a firm relative to its replacement cost, would reveal the risks or 
hazard associated with EO (Gupta et al., 2016). Firm valuation measures supersede 
accounting measures in examining and assessing the long-term impact of EO. 
Thereby, this thesis used Tobin’s Q as the objective assessment of EO’s long-term 
effects.  
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Even though the use of secondary proxies to measure each of the EO dimensions 
would allow one to measure EO at more than one-point in time and assess its 
longitudinal effect against objective long-term firm performance measures, there is a 
concern of construct validity when using archival proxies (Ketchen et al., 2013). 
Construct validity is concerned with the extent to which the objective proxy is 
measuring and capturing the construct in question. To address this issue, the proxies 
that were used to measure the constructs were ensured to be consistent with the 
definitions of the constructs. This guarantees that there is a strong conceptual 
overlap between the theoretical construct and the archival proxy used to measure it 
(Ketchen et al, 2013). Secondary data supersedes survey-based measurement since it 
has high ‘face validity’, is ‘non-reactive’, and enables measuring or quantifying 
relationships over time (Mthanti & Ojah, 2017).  
 
The Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2011) paper was the first to measure EO utilising 
objective measures. A sample of fortune 1000 firms was used to test the effect of 
EO on long-term firm performance measures (Tobin’s Q and Total Shareholder 
Return), along a longitudinal timeframe from 1996 until 2000. Yet, the authors 
bundled the various dimensions of EO into a summated index and showed that EO 
had a direct positive effect on firm performance and prematurely considered that EO 
was beneficial for large firms. Furthermore, Short et al. (2010) was the first to 
measure EO using computer-aided text analysis of shareholder letters and examined 
the effect of EO against Tobin’s Q, using a sample of S&P 500 and Russell 2000 
small firms. They revealed a positive effect of EO on firm performance. Even 
though the Short et al. (2010) and the Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2011) studies 
examined the firm valuation of EO, these studies did not account for the possibility 
of failure from EO (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Thus, this thesis re-examined the 
long-term value of an EO utilising a sample of surviving and failed firms.  
 
The dominating gestalt view of EO still plagues research (e.g. Rosenbusch et al., 
2013). Recent researchers have examined the shared bilateral effects among the EO 
dimensions (Lomberg et al., 2017). The perspective of the shared effects is 
concerned with the covariance among the EO dimensions (i.e. that the effect of one 
of the EO dimensions on a firm’s performance is dependent upon other dimensions) 
and is in line with Miller’s (1983) proposition of the composite nature of EO. As 
such, Lomberg et al. (2017) revealed that only proactiveness, from the EO 
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dimensions, had a unique effect on firm performance, whereas innovativeness and 
risk taking did not have a significant independent effect. The researchers also found 
a strong bilateral shared effect between innovativeness and proactiveness. The 
results of the paper corroborate a stream of previous research in over-emphasising 
the perspective of the shared effects between the EO dimensions. The paper is 
limited by examining such effects across a cross-section rather than longitudinally. 
If the researchers examined such effects longitudinally, different results might arise 
and the shared effects among the EO dimensions might not be as strong over time. 
Interestingly though, the researchers did find a marginal significant unique effect of 
two EO dimensions (innovativeness and proactiveness) in the high-technology 
industry. However, the researchers concluded that the shared effects among those 
two dimensions superseded in explaining the variation in firm performance. Most 
importantly, the paper revealed that the EO dimensions may be more important in 
different contexts (e.g. low-tech, high-technology, multi-sector). Thereby, this thesis 
focused on examining the effects of the separate EO dimensions only in the high-
technology sector, which is more prominent than other sectors in utlising EO (Short 
et al., 2010).  
 
The next section will consider the studies that represent challenges to the 
dominating EO-as-Advantage perspective.  
 
2.5.1.3.2 Studies Highlighting the Risks of EO  
 
A recent publication by Gupta and Gupta (2015) examined the effects of EO on a 
long-term basis over a 10-year span, and their findings indicated that the positive 
effect of EO became less significant over time and that external environmental 
factors impacted the superior effect of EO on a firm’s performance. Furthermore, 
Gupta et al. (2016) examined the longitudinal effects of EO on firm value (Tobin’s 
Q), using a four-year panel dataset, and showed that the positive impact of EO on 
the stock-market value of firms is contingent on the organisational and industrial 
discretion. This shows that the strength of the positive EO-firm performance 
relationship has been over-estimated among researchers, who have mostly relied 
upon cross-sectional studies to concur that EO is beneficial for firms. Even with 
longitudinal studies the effects of EO were only confined to surviving firms (e.g. 
Wiklund, 1999).  
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Similar to some studies during the second phase, in this era, it was shown that in 
certain contexts EO is harmful on a firm’s performance (Revilla et al., 2016; Wales 
et al., 2013c). Wales et al. (2013c) examined the EO-firm performance relationship 
in the context of small firms. These researchers indicated that small firms might lack 
the firm-level capabilities to benefit from an EO. As hypothesised, the researchers 
found an inverted U-shaped relationship between EO and firm performance. In other 
words, high levels of EO were advantageous until a certain point where positive 
returns diminished, and performance dropped. The reason for such a phenomenon is 
that in the absence of certain capabilities for small firms, high levels of EO were 
shown to be harmful to firm performance. Similarly, EO has been shown to have 
non-uniform or negative outcomes among family firms (Lumpkin et al., 2010; Naldi 
et al., 2007; Revilla et al., 2016).  
 
Other contexts have been also investigated by scholars. For example, Kraus et al. 
(2012) examined the EO dimensions-performance relationship in an economic crisis 
context during the 2009 period, which is characterised by uncertainty and instability. 
The results of the paper indicated that proactiveness directly had a positive effect on 
firm performance. The interaction of innovativeness with market turbulence had a 
positive effect on performance. However, the interaction term of risk taking with 
market turbulence was found to be negatively and significantly related to firm 
performance. Similarly, Soininen et al. (2012) have shown that the more innovative 
and proactive a firm is, the less it would be affected by an economic crisis. 
However, the more risk taking behaviour it exhibited, the more likely that its 
profitability would be affected. This reinforces the point that the EO dimensions 
have various effects on the EO-performance relationship. 
 
EO has been surprisingly linked to CEO overconfidence (Engelen et al., 2015), CEO 
narcissism (Wales et al., 2013b) as well as corruption (Karmann et al., 2016). 
Specifically, Karmann et al. (2016) stated that even though the literature on EO 
unquestionably accepts its positive effects, previous researchers have shown that EO 
might predispose managers with strong entrepreneurial disposition to engage in 
corruption and to exploit bribery opportunities (Karmann et al., 2016). The 
researchers investigated the acts of corruption from the top-level management team 
over the span of 3 years and measured the level of EO within the sample of firms. 
The results of the paper showed opposing effects of the different dimensions of EO. 
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The reason for this divergence is that, as the researchers hypothesised, the risk 
taking component of EO put forward a “dark side of EO”. This significantly 
increased the possibility of the emergence of corrupt behaviours. Yet, 
innovativeness offset that effect by decreasing the possibility of corrupt behaviours. 
The researchers also studied EO as a composite construct against organisational 
corruption and found no significant effect on corruption. This is due to the opposing 
effects of each of the dimensions innovativeness and risk taking, and serves to 
validate the point that the EO dimensions are better studied in a multi-dimensional 
model of EO. Furthermore, these findings raise theoretical and empirical concerns 
that EO is a double-edged sword capable of causing problems for organisations. 
Thus, EO should not be considered as a universally positive phenomenon that 
results in solely positive organisational outcomes. 
 
The next section will consider the few studies that have examined the effect of EO 
on firm survival/failure. The significance of the next section is in specifying the 
overwhelming amount of survivor bias in EO research, which is remaining and even 
continuing to grow (e.g. Eshima & Anderson, 2017; Lomberg et al., 2017). The 
contribution of this thesis is in resolving this survivor bias.  
 
2.5.1.3.3 Studies Examining EO and Firm Survival/Failure 
 
A recent review of management research on survival revealed that there is an 
increasing interest in examining firm survival in entrepreneurship and strategy 
research (Josefy et al., 2017). Few studies have examined the effect of EO on firm 
survival/failure.  
 
Most of the research has not been consistent in its definition of failure. Researchers 
have not specified the criteria of classifying failed firms, as some researchers placed 
firms that had undergone an acquisition as having failed without explicitly stating it. 
In this thesis, we considered firm failure to include bankruptcy or liquidity, 
privatisation, and discontinuity of ownership. Yet, distinguishably from previous 
researchers, we did not treat all such outcomes collectively as being the same 
(Josefy et al., 2017). Instead, we separately examined the effect of EO across 
different types of failure. Previous researchers have disagreed on whether 
discontinuity of ownership is considered as a type of firm failure. Some researchers 
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have excluded acquisitions from their sample (e.g. Revilla et al., 2016), whereas 
others have separated acquisitions from success and failure (e.g. Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011). According to this thesis, even though discontinuity of ownership 
may not be as a clear indicator of failure as bankruptcy or liquidity, it was still 
considered as a type of firm failure. To ensure the robustness of considering 
acquisitions and privatisations as failures, this thesis resorted to using Altman’s Z-
score, which was used to resemble the risk of exit of firms, that failed due to an 
acquisition/privatisation, from a potential bankruptcy had it not been for the 
acquisition (Josefy et al., 2017; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). The definition of firm 
failure will be expanded in the theoretical chapter 3 and its operationalisation in the 
methodological chapter 6. 
 
Mousa and Wales (2012) examined the effect of EO on the long-term survival rate 
in the context of IPO US firms during the periods 2001 until 2005. The researchers 
found that EO improved long-term survival of IPO firms. Specifically, they showed 
that the probability of IPO survival increased by 1.9 percent with every unit increase 
in EO. Their findings indicated that EO enhanced IPO firm survival, and this is in 
line with the predominant view that EO is beneficial for firms. Yet, other 
researchers have shown that EO may enhance the failure rate of firms. Revilla et al. 
(2016) investigated the moderating effect of EO on the family involvement-survival 
rate of 396 manufacturing firms in Spain. This longitudinal study was undertaken 
across periods spanning the pre-crisis to post-crisis (2007-2013). The results 
indicated that EO reduced the survival advantage of family firms. That is, EO 
negatively moderated the relationship between family ownership and survival rate. 
As the level of EO increased, the survival gap between family and non-family 
businesses became tighter. This shows that EO is not beneficial to pursue for all 
firms such as family owned firms. The Revilla et al. (2016) paper reaffirmed the 
view that the relationship between EO and performance is not as simple, positive 
and direct as previous research indicated, and offered context as one basis to 
postulate why this might be the case.    
 
Josefy et al. (2017) noted that firm failure is caused by different factors across firms 
of various developmental stages. The EO dimensions have been shown to have 
varying effects across larger versus smaller firms (Josefy et al., 2017). In this thesis, 
we focused on large firms rather than less developed smaller firms when examining 
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the outcomes of the EO dimensions, since large firms are more likely to adopt an 
entrepreneurial orientation within competitive markets (Zahra, 1991). Yet, the 
choice of large publicly traded firms has been rarely considered in EO research 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011; Rauch et al., 2009). Furthermore, studies have 
disregarded the effect of EO, a potent firm-level behaviour, on the probability of 
firm failure. Thereby, it is vital for this thesis to move forward the understanding of 
the double-edged nature of EO by examining its effect on firm failure. 
 
The next section will focus on the studies that have revealed that EO may entail 
risks, and outline the theoretical perspective of this thesis.  
 
2.5.2 Challenges to the Hegemony of the ‘EO-as-Advantage’ Perspective 
 
There is lack of incorporation of theory in EO research. Wales (2016) searched the 
combination of ‘theor’ and ‘EO’ and found it to be in 365 of 551 research papers on 
EO. This indicates that there is a lack of theoretical grounding in some of the 
research on EO. Thus, this thesis aimed to advance the understanding of the EO-
firm-level outcomes relationship by utilising organisational learning theory and 
prospect theory. 
 
Despite evidence of mixed results, the literature is mostly consistent in adopting the 
‘EO-as-Advantage’ perspective, or in other words ‘EO as a performance-enhancing 
strategy’ (Wiklund & Shepherd 2011). Yet, research has indicated that the effect of 
EO on performance is moderated by several contingencies, both external and 
internal to the firm (Covin et al., 2006; Covin & Slevin, 1988, 1989; Kraus et al., 
2012; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996, 2001; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003, 2005; Zahra & 
Covin, 1995; Zahra & Garvis, 2000).  
 
The positive effect of EO are dependent on certain contextual factors based upon 
March’s theory of organisational learning (March, 1991) (Hughes et al., 2007). 
According to the theory of organisational learning, learning can be either considered 
as explorative or exploitative. Explorative and exploitative learning reflect different 
modes of knowledge generation, which result in the manifestation of different firm-
level behaviours. Explorative learning generates new knowledge with the high 
probability of resulting in uncertain outcomes since it involves venturing into 
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activities that are opportunity-seeking and risky and far from the firm’s 
competencies. On the other hand, exploitative learning refines existing knowledge 
to generate incremental knowledge resulting in certain and immediate returns.  
 
Firms must alternate between explorative and exploitative learning to achieve 
optimal performance and maintain their viability (Uotila et al., 2009). Thereby, 
focusing solely on explorative activities can be detrimental for a firm. The higher 
the relative explorative orientation, the more detrimental it is on a firm’s long-term 
performance. Such effects are mostly evident among R&D (Research and 
Development) intensive industries (Uotila et al., 2009).  
 
The EO-as-Experimentation perspective was introduced by Wiklund and Shepherd 
(2011), who considered an alternate understanding of the EO-performance 
relationship. The EO-as-Experimentation perspective draws from organisational 
learning theory and theorises that a higher level of EO would likely result in a wide 
range of outcomes, with some firms benefiting from EO whereas other firms 
possibly failing from unsuccessful entrepreneurial activities.  
 
According to the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, a high level of EO exhibited 
among firms might either result in ‘home-runs’ or losses. Thus, there is a cost-
benefit trade-off to EO (Dai et al., 2014; Wales et al., 2013c). Since EO 
encompasses innovativeness and proactiveness components as well as a risk taking 
component, it results in variance in firm performance. The dimensions of EO are 
more aligned with the domain of trial-and-error and experimentation, and proactive 
discovery, and have more tolerance for uncertainty; thereby EO seems to involve 
explorative learning rather than exploitative learning (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
Explorative activities can either result in successful or ambiguous outcomes, which 
generate performance-variance with some firms benefiting from EO, whereas others 
failing as a result of adopting EO. This variability of outcomes resulting from EO, a 
variance-seeking explorative firm-level behaviour, characterises the double-edged 
nature of EO. This means that not every firm is able to leverage EO into producing 
positive outcomes. A recent publication by Patel et al. (2015) revealed that EO 
aligned with the EO-as-Experimentation perspective and that a high EO led to a 
variance in the innovation outcomes, resulting in either successes or failures.  
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The EO-as-Experimentation perspective also draws insights from prospect theory, 
in which according to myopic risk aversion, firms are less risk averse to decisions 
that are long-term in nature and that are less frequently evaluated. Whereas firms are 
more risk averse to decisions that are short-term in nature and that are evaluated on 
a frequent basis (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Slevin & Trejesen, 2011; Swift, 2016). 
This indicates that EO, which is an explorative and risky endeavour in nature, 
results in firm-level outcomes that must be assessed on the long-run.  
 
The nature of innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking could possibly 
materialise in performance extremes, characterised by high performance returns in 
surviving firms, yet also to higher rates of business failures among other firms. 
Innovativeness represents the development of new products and/or processes that 
deviate from the firms’ competencies and may result in a positive outcome or a loss. 
Proactiveness represents ‘long-term gambles’ on futuristic market needs, which may 
result in successful or unsuccessful outcomes (Patel et al., 2015). Lastly, risk taking 
involves engaging in activities that are of an experimentation nature and whose 
outcomes are uncertain (Patel et al., 2015; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
This emphasises the fact that prior research has been affected by a selection bias 
(surviving firms). This means that EO might have shown to have positive 
performance effects due to a selection sample bias of surviving firms only. Few 
research studies have assessed the EO-as-Experimentation perspective to explain 
why some entrepreneurially oriented organisations perform better than others, 
whereas others that might even possibly collapse (Patel et al., 2015). Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2011) were the first to reveal that, even among firms that failed, levels of 
EO were high.  This thesis tested the EO-as-Experimentation perspective by 
examining the effect of EO on long-term firm performance as well as on risk of firm 
failure. An exhibition of high levels of EO among failed firms could indicate that 
either a high EO might have contributed to their failure or that such failed firms 
increased their level of EO in response to being in distress (Slevin & Terjesen, 2011; 
Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Thereby, this thesis was able to test the cause-effect 
relationship between EO and firm performance/failure by utilising a longitudinal 
dataset.  
 
The positive EO-firm performance relationship has been critiqued in the literature 
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by few researchers (Andersén, 2010). Similar to Gupta and Wales (2017), Andersén 
(2010) reviewed recent articles on EO and considered limitations of the most 
prominent publications on EO (Wiklund, 1999; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003, 2005; 
Zahra & Covin, 1995). To summarise, the author considered that the limitations 
involved: the use of the subjective EO scales of Miller (1983)/Covin and Slevin 
(1989) or a derivation of it, the overuse of subjective profitability and growth 
performance indicators that are sometimes combined into a performance aggregated 
index, the generalisability of the positive effect of EO onto firms that are of different 
sizes, and the survivor bias of the EO-firm performance studies. These limitations 
are significant to consider and address. Thus, this thesis addressed these limitations 
by using objective measures of EO and its dimensions, including several objective 
performance indicators separately, focusing on the implications of EO onto large US 
firms belonging to the high-technology industry, and lastly including a set of 
surviving and failed firms throughout a longitudinal timeframe from the pre-crisis 
(fiscal year 2000) to the post-crisis period (fiscal year 2014).  
 
The next section will introduce the context of the thesis, the financial crisis.  
 
2.5.3 Importance of Examining Pre- to Post-Crisis Period in EO Research 
 
The global financial crisis, a wide historical event, provides an interesting context to 
examine the EO-firm performance/failure relationship. The 2008 financial crisis 
occurred on a global scale-turbulence in one country and was highly contagious, 
leading to instability in other countries. A financial crisis can be defined as “a wider 
range of disturbances, such as sharp declines in asset prices, failures of large 
financial intermediaries, or disruption in foreign exchange markets” (De Bonis et 
al., 1999, p. 60). The global financial crisis of 2008 had detrimental effects on the 
economy, effects which have not been witnessed since the Great Depression of the 
1930s (Vašková & Vašková, 2010). Between 1978 and 2007, debt held by financial 
companies grew from $3 trillion to $36 trillion (United States Financial Crisis 
Report, 2011). The entrepreneurial drive of firms during the financial crisis reveals 
that there are dark sides to taking greater risks. The increased risks were encouraged 
by the increased profit volatility. The eve of the financial crisis was dominated with 
the use of innovative novel techniques to spread the risks. However, such a process 
in a deregulated market increased the risks (Knights & McCabe, 2015). Specifically, 
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Loviscek and Riley (2013) has shown that the market risks were increasing during 
the period of 2004-2008.  
 
A study on the effect of the EO dimensions on the firms’ impact from the recession 
showed that firms that are more risk taking are more negatively affected from the 
recession (Soininen et al., 2012). It has been also shown that the risk taking 
dimension of EO negatively impacted firm performance during the financial crisis 
(Kraus et al., 2012). That is, risk taking during turbulent markets, such as the 
financial crisis, led to a possibility of more differentiated returns, even though actors 
assumed that such are calculated risks (Kraus et al., 2012).  
 
The conception among institutions was that the ‘financial innovation’ was 
distributing the risks, but it was concentrating the risks to a smaller number of 
organisations (Engelen et al., 2011). Thereby, the increased profit volatility was also 
accompanied with greater losses during the financial crisis (Beck et al., 2016), in 
which there was a failure to assess the risks (Knights & McCabe, 2015). There is a 
bright and dark side to financial innovation, i.e. financial innovation is positively 
related to economic growth, but it also promotes more risk taking among financial 
institutions (Beck et al., 2016). Thus, the two opposing views of financial 
innovation are similar to the two opposing views of EO, which are the ‘EO-as-
Advantage perspective’ and the ‘EO-as-Experimentation perspective’ (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011).  
 
Researchers have indicated that it is important to examine entrepreneurship in a 
certain context (Shane & Venkataraman, 2001; Zahra & Wright, 2011). It is 
surprising that researchers have decontexualised EO or relied on ‘general laws that 
transcend context’ (Hjorth et al., 2008, p. 81). However, accounting for the 
contextual factors provides a clearer understanding of the examined constructs and 
theoretical considerations become better grounded in the context (Zahra & Wright, 
2011).  There are several benefits of incorporating context into EO research such as 
improving the realistic nature of EO, providing a grounded explanation for the 
relationship of EO with other variables, and enhancing the theoretical underpinnings 
of EO. Thus, in this thesis, the context becomes part of the story. As such, the 
financial crisis provides an ideal context to examine the EO-performance 
relationship. 
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We include the financial crisis in the timeframe (fiscal year 2000-fiscal year 2014) 
of this thesis, since not only do environmental factors affect EO, but also EO might 
affect the environment (i.e. a possibility is that EO might have contributed to the 
financial crisis) (Rosenbusch et al., 2013). We focus on the above years as the year 
2000 witnessed a dotcom disaster in which several firms failed. This thesis aimed to 
capture the effect of EO on important firm-level outcomes along a period spanning 
from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis to measure the effect of the variation in EO 
across time on organisational outcomes. Thereby, we ensured that the observations 
of firms that have failed were after the fiscal year 2000 spanning across the 15-year 
period examined in this thesis.  
 
There is a bidirectional relationship between EO and the environment with EO 
possibly influencing the environment, an aspect that should have been explored 
(Covin & Selvin, 1991; Miller & Friesen, 1982). Thus, it is necessary to examine 
the effect of EO on firm performance as well as survival in a severe environmental 
context such as the financial crisis. New revelations can be brought to light and such 
revelations might not be in line with the predominant view in the literature that EO 
is beneficial for firms.   
 
2.6 Conclusions and Key Observations 
 
The literature has shown that EO does not always lead to positive performance. In 
certain contexts (such as in family firms or unstable markets) EO does not uniformly 
lead to positive performance results. EO might even be linked to corruptive 
behaviours (Karmann et al., 2016).  
 
The EO-firm performance literature has been plagued by a survivor bias. Most of 
the studies on EO ignored the possibility that EO might be associated with a higher 
risk of failure and did not examine the outcomes associated with such an exploratory 
risky behaviour among failed firms (e.g. Lomberg et al., 2017). Furthermore, the 
literature has continuously measured EO using the EO scale (e.g. Eshima & 
Anderson, 2017) which only captures the cross-sectional outcomes of EO, even 
though EO is a long-term orientation whose outcomes extend and are sustained over 
time (Covin & Slevin, 1991). This problem is exacerbated when the measurement of 
EO is based upon a scale that is administered to top managers. This scale would 
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capture the managerial tendencies towards entrepreneurial behaviours but would not 
measure the actual entrepreneurial behaviours of firms. Not only is the 
operationalisation of EO a major drawback, but also entrepreneurial behaviours are 
assessed on short-term measures of firm performance. Gupta and Wales (2017) 
noted the limited attention given to the wide range of organisational outcomes of 
EO. Thereby, this thesis assessed EO against a long-term measure of firm 
performance since EO is a long-term orientation and must be assessed against a 
measure that captures the time effect. In addition, to capture the multi-dimensional 
nature of firm performance, this thesis included a short-term measure of 
performance as well.  
 
This thesis explored the effects of the separate three dimensions of EO on firm 
performance and firm failure while keeping in mind organisational learning and 
prospect theory. Even though researchers have highlighted the importance of 
examining the risks associated with EO (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011), no research 
has been conducted so far to challenge the EO-as-Advantage perspective. The thesis 
can be considered one of the few studies that aimed to challenge the conventional 
conception of EO, in which such conception coincides with the EO-as-Advantage 
perspective (Gupta, 2015).  
 
This research has several contributions to the literature. Firstly, it included firms that 
have failed to challenge the EO-as-Advantage perspective. It also considered the 
effect of EO on firm performance, over time, across a significant time period from 
the pre-crisis to the post-crisis in the separate samples of surviving and failed firms. 
It objectively measured EO at the firm-level to signify the entrepreneurial firm-level 
behaviours. The thesis assessed the effect of EO across a wide range of 
organisational outcomes (short-term through return on assets/long-term firm 
performance through Tobin’s Q). Furthermore, the thesis aligned with the multi-
dimensional conceptualisation of EO, a conceptualisation that has been largely 
ignored by EO researchers, and examined the separate distinctive effects of each of 
the EO dimensions on various organisational outcomes. Lastly, the thesis 
contributes significantly to theory by evidencing the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective, which originates from organisational learning theory.  
 
By using insights into the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, this thesis separated 
82 
 
the analysis of the firm performance outcomes of EO among the surviving and 
failed firms. Most importantly, this thesis examined the direct effect of EO on the 
risk of firm failure, which has not been examined in the EO literature. Not only is it 
important to examine the performance outcomes of EO on firm performance in the 
sample of failed firms, but also it is vital to examine the impact of EO on firm 
failure to provide empirical analysis and justification for the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective.   
 
The thesis explored the relationship of EO and performance and firm failure along a 
longitudinal timeframe, which includes a massive historical event such as the 
financial crisis. Thereby, the thesis addressed two main research questions: 1) What 
are the effects of EO and its dimensions on firm performance measures over time in 
the separate samples of surviving versus failed firms?  2) What are the effects of EO 
and its dimensions on the risk of firm failure? The first research question was 
addressed in Study 1 and second research question in Study 2. 
 
It is, through this thesis, that a better understanding of EO in relationship to firm 
performance/failure would be achieved. It is surprising that the effect of EO on 
long-term firm outcomes, in the context of an economic crisis, has not been 
examined in the literature. Thereby, it is important to examine the performance 
outcomes of EO and its dimensions among surviving firms and failed firms 
separately (e.g. Lechner & Gudmundsson, 2014) and then to examine the effects of 
EO and its dimensions on the risk of firm failure. Only then, would new revelations 
be made with regards to the longitudinal outcomes of EO and its dimensions.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
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3.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
 
This chapter outlines the theories, with the research questions and hypotheses, that 
inform the anticipated effects of the overall EO construct/separate EO dimensions 
on firm performance and on risk of failure. Building on theory is important since it 
forms the building blocks or the foundations of the research endeavour. Data is only 
meaningful and subject to interpretation in the context of a certain theoretical 
foundation (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). Thus, theory provides a framework for the 
research questions and hypotheses to be tested and puts the results of the research in 
context. Furthermore, theory centers upon the nature of causal relationships, 
whereby the predictor and outcome variables in a tested pathway are identified 
whilst considering the timing of events (Crossan et al., 2011). 
 
The use of multiple theories is vital to further understand and provide 
comprehensive explanations for the relationships between the variables. This 
research achieves theory triangulation using organisational learning theory and 
prospect theory.   
 
Most of the research on EO aligns with upper echelon theory, in which 
organisational outcomes reflect managerial behaviours and organisational decision-
making rests upon the top management team (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). Thus, even though EO has initially been conceptualised as a firm-
level behaviour (Miller, 1983), its measurements are at the managerial level. 
Thereby, this research utilised the EO-as-Experimentation perspective and re-
conceptualised EO at the firm-level. The following thesis measured EO using firm-
level proxies to directly depict the behavioural exhibition of EO by the sample of 
firms.  
 
The first section will outline the research questions of Study 1 followed by the 
research questions of Study 2. Then, in the chapter, a brief section on the framing of 
the EO construct is presented. Later sections will outline the theoretical framework 
of this thesis, organisational learning theory and prospect theory. The EO-as-
Advantage perspective is then presented and critiqued. Then, the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective is outlined along with the hypotheses. Based on the 
theoretical framework of the thesis, the hypothesised effects of EO and its 
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dimensions on firm performance among surviving and failed firms as well as on the 
risk of firm failure were generated. The hypotheses of Study 1 and 2 are presented 
in each of the sections 3.6 and 3.7.  
 
3.2 Summary of the Theoretical Research Questions for Study 1 and 2 
 
This section represents the research questions of Study 1 and 2. The over-arching 
research aim was to examine the effect of EO and each of its dimensions on 
performance indicators as well as on risk of failure. Based on the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective, this thesis theorised different performance outcomes 
from EO in the sample of surviving firms and the sample of failed firms. The 
analysis of Study 1, on the effect of EO on firm performance, was conducted by 
separating the sample of surviving firms from failed firms. Study 2 focused on the 
effect of EO and each of its dimensions on the risk of firm failure in the overall 
sample. 
 
The beginning of this section will outline the research questions for Study 1, 
followed by the research questions for Study 2. This will set the stage for the 
hypotheses of this thesis.   
 
3.2.1 Research Questions for Study 1 
 
The following section outlines the research questions for Study 1, which centers 
upon examining the relationship between EO and firm performance measures 
(short-term performance or ROA versus long-term performance or Tobin’s Q) in a 
sample of surviving and failed firms.  
 
Research Question 1: What is the effect of EO on short-term and long-term 
measures of performance among surviving firms? 
 
Research Question 2: What is the effect of EO on short-term and long-term 
measures of performance among failed firms? 
 
Research Question 3: What is the effect of each EO dimension on short-term and 
long-term measures of performance? 
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After outlining the research questions for Study 1, the following section will present 
the research questions for Study 2. 
 
3.2.2 Research Questions for Study 2 
 
The following study centers on examining the effect of the EO construct as well as 
its dimensions on the risk of firm failure. The research questions for Study 2 were: 
 
Research Question 4: What are the effects of EO and each EO dimension on the 
risk of firm failure over time? 
 
Research Question 5: What are the effects of higher levels of EO/EO dimensions 
on the risk of firm failure? 
 
The next section will examine the framing of the EO construct before outlining the 
theoretical framework of this thesis.  
 
3.3 Setting the Context of EO and Firm Performance/Risk of Failure 
 
3.3.1 The EO Construct  
 
The purpose of this section is to set the stage for the subsequent sections on the 
theoretical framework of this thesis. It is vital to emphasise the origins and the 
conceptualisation of EO as a firm-level behaviour. The EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective, which has guided this research is derived from organisational learning 
theory, a theory that is positioned at the firm-level.  
 
EO was initially conceived as a strategy-making firm-level behaviour consisting of 
three dimensions: innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking (Miller, 1983). 
Furthermore, entrepreneurial behaviours are behaviours that are sustained over time 
(Covin & Slevin, 1991; Wales et al., 2011). Thus, there is a ‘temporal stability or 
consistency’ in the exhibition of entrepreneurial behaviours on a longitudinal basis 
(Anderson et al., 2015), yet researchers measure EO at one point in time by using 
the overly-used EO scales by Miller (1983) and Covin and Slevin (1989).  
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Even though researchers and the early conception of EO is set at the firm-level, the 
overly-used EO scales measure EO at the managerial level and capture the 
managerial opinions and attitudes towards entrepreneurial behaviours. Even more 
so, the EO scales have some items that refer to managerial attitudes rather than firm-
level behaviours (Anderson et al., 2015). Thereby, even though researchers have 
defined EO as a firm-level behaviour, they have relied on the EO scale, which 
measures the proclivity of managers towards entrepreneurial behaviours, but this 
scale does not measure the firm behaviour. There is a difference between managerial 
attitudes and behaviours, the latter being an outcome of the manager’s attitude. 
Thus, managerial tendency towards EO does not always translate into a behavioural 
manifestation as there might be constraints on the managers’ attitudes (Anderson & 
Covin, 2014). This mis-alignment between the conceptualisation of EO and its 
measurement has caused a measurement malaise in the EO research. There is a need 
to re-position the origins of the EO construct as a firm-level behaviour (Covin & 
Slevin, 1989; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983) rather than a managerial 
disposition (Mintzberg, 1973).  
 
3.3.2 Definition of Firm Failure 
 
This thesis considered firm failure to be a complex outcome of a firm, in which 
market exit or discontinuity of operations is due to several reasons including 
discontinuity of ownership, bankruptcy, liquidation, and privatisation (Josefy et al., 
2017). As such, firm failure is not only due to bankruptcy or insolvency even though 
bankruptcy or insolvency are clear indicators of failure (Josefy et al., 2017). Authors 
have not been consistent in their definition of failure. Some authors consider 
discontinuation of ownership as firm failure, whereas other authors consider the 
death of a business as the sole indicator of failure (Hughes et al., 2010; Josefy et al., 
2017). Others only consider acquisitions of firms that are at risk of bankruptcy as a 
type of failure (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011), whereas others exclude all acquisitions 
from the sample of failed firms (Revilla et al., 2016). Josefy et al. (2017) considered 
firm failure to be a multi-faceted phenomenon and to include discontinuation of 
ownership, bankruptcy, insolvency or liquidity (Josefy et al., 2017). In this thesis, 
the hypothesised relationships between EO and its dimensions and risk of failure are 
considered among the types of firms that failed due to discontinuity of ownership, 
bankruptcy, liquidity, and privatisation. Thereby, the hypothesised relationships are 
88 
 
tested among all the samples of failed firms. However, similar to Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2011), this thesis discounted successful exits due to merger or acquisition 
from unsuccessful exits of firms that would have filed for bankruptcy had it not 
been for the acquisition to firmly ensure that the discontinuity of ownership 
represents a clear indicator of failure, which is similar to bankruptcy and insolvency. 
This ensured that the samples of failed firms could be combined to enable us to test 
the hypothesised relationships among the overall sample of failed firms. 
 
After setting the origins of EO at the firm level and defining the dependent variable 
firm failure, the following sections will outline organisational learning theory and 
prospect theory subsequently.  
 
3.4 Organisational Learning Theory 
 
This thesis adopts organisational learning theory as its main theoretical framework, 
utilising a management science perspective, which examines the learning process 
relative to the assimilation and processing of information (Easterby-Smith, 1997). 
Organisational learning theory originated from behavioural decision theory of the 
firm (Cyert & March, 1963) and from March and Simon’s (1958) concept of 
bounded rationality. Organisational learning theory is related to behavioural 
decision theory in terms of predictions of changes in organisational behaviours and 
decision making in effect to experiences and firm aspiration levels (Argote & Greve, 
2007). Organisational learning theory has been considered an important topic for 
both management researchers and practitioners (Harvey & Denton, 1999). This 
thesis considers and examines the process of learning at the organisational level and 
the different dimensions of organisational learning and their impact on firm-level 
outcomes. Organisational learning framework is appropriate for the examination of 
entrepreneurial explorative behaviours (Garcia-Morales & Llorens-Montes, 2006).  
The key question that this thesis aims to answer is whether entrepreneurial types of 
learning are vital factors in ensuring a firm’s survival (Easterby-Smith, 1997). 
 
According to March (1991), exploration and exploitation are two different learning 
orientations and entail distinctive organisational approaches. Yet, within explorative 
learning, there are different dimensions that are involved in the process of 
acquisition of knowledge through exploration, engaging in generative learning, and 
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challenging current practices by developing new behaviours (Dess et al., 2003; 
Slater & Narver, 1995). In this thesis, we examine and focus on the effect of 
explorative intra-organisational learning sub-dimensions (innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and risk taking) on firm performance, similar to previous researchers 
that adopt an intra-organisational ecological perspective (Burgelman, 1991). Intra-
organisational learning processes are those that focus on learning that occurs within 
single formal organisations (learning that takes place within teams, groups, and 
departments) (Holmqvist, 2004). The focus is on the intra-organisational learning as 
it provides a majority of the experiential knowledge that may be transferred among 
organisations to be utilised in a collaborative network (Powell et al., 1996). As such 
intra-organisational learning may generate inter-organisational learning in a process 
termed ‘extension’, in which the knowledge and learning within an organisation is 
shared and translated to other organisations in a formal collaboration (Hamel, 1991).  
 
Organisational learning theory considers that learning occurs at multiple-levels 
(individual, group, and organisational) (Cangelosi & Dill, 1965).  Different levels of 
learning arise due to different definitions about what constitutes an “organisation” 
(Crossan et al., 1995). For instance, according to this study and in line with 
organisational-level theorists, an organisation is more than the sum of its 
organisational members, in which systems structures and procedures affect 
organisational learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Organisational learning does not 
simply arise from individuals and groups, but from the holistic organisation, which 
has an important role as well (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 
1988). Hedberg (1981, p. 6) noted that “it would be a mistake to conclude that 
organizational learning is nothing but the cumulative result of their members' 
learning… Organizations' memories preserve certain behaviors, mental maps, norms 
and values over time.” This is not to discredit learning that occurs at the individual 
or group level, but that learning goes through a process of institutionalisation and 
the learning becomes embedded and encoded within nonhuman elements such as 
systems, routines, artifacts and procedures of organisations (Crossan & Berdrow, 
2003; Shrivastava, 1983). Thus, even though individuals within the organisation 
come and go over time, the learning becomes integrated within its knowledge 
storehouses or repositories (Crossan et al., 1995). The view that organisations learn 
independently from the actors that inhabit it stems from the field of cybernetics, 
which considers that organisations are self-regulating systems with their concern to 
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control and maintain their conformity to the desired state of performance (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998; Morgan, 1986).  
 
The management literature has equated organisational learning with “sustainable 
competitive comparative efficiency” (Dodgson, 1993, p. 376) or survival (Lipshitz 
et al., 2002). In the strategic management literature, organisational learning has been 
viewed as an innately positive organisational phenomenon that leads to a sustained 
competitive advantage (Perez Lopez et al., 2005). Organisations that are fast 
learners are able to distinguish themselves in the market (Crossan et al., 1995; 
Crossan & Berdrow, 2003; DeGeus, 1988; Dodgson, 1991; Edmondson & 
Moingeon, 1998; Stata, 1989). Furthermore, irrespective of examining the separate 
underlying pathways of organisational learning, it is assumed that organisational 
learning improves future performance as it leads to new sources of capability (Fiol 
& Lyles, 1985). Yet, it is vital to break away from the assumption that 
organisational learning produces utopian outcomes (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003). As 
Levitt and March (1988, p. 335) stated, “learning does not necessarily lead to 
intelligent behavior”.  Organisational learning may hinder firm performance since 
past learning held within existing systems and structures may prevent the firm from 
exhibiting different divergent behaviours that may be useful for the firm in the 
future (Crossan et al., 1995). Furthermore, learning may not lead to expected 
improved performance as forgoing past existing strategies for new and unfamiliar 
methods of operation is risky and can lead to erroneous errors (Levitt & March, 
1988; March & Olsen, 1975). Most of the organisational learning literature has 
focused on the theoretical development of the conceptual framework of 
organisational learning rather than empirically investigating the impact of 
organisational learning (Vince et al., 2002). 
 
At the heart of organisational learning theory lies a distinction of explorative and 
exploitative activities (March, 1991). There are primarily two types of learning: 
transformational (explorative) and incremental (exploitative) (Crossan et al., 1995). 
This mirrors the classification by Fiol and Lyles (1985) of “lower” level learning 
and “higher” level learning. Similarly, Senge (1990) differentiates between 
“adaptive” and “generative” learning. Furthermore, Dodgson (1991) terms the two 
types of learning: “tactical” and “strategic”. 
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Exploration is synonymous with experimentation, risk taking, discovering, 
innovating, searching, and variability. Exploitation is synonymous with activities 
that are refining, selective, reliable, logical, and efficiency-producing over 
effectiveness (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003; Holmqvist, 2004; March, 1991, 2006). 
Exploitative learning involves incremental changes with the refining and routinizing 
existing strategies and generates reliable results (Crossan et al., 1995; Holmqvist, 
2004). While, explorative or transformation type of learning involves learning in 
areas outside of existing strategies, creating, and experimenting to generate 
significant changes in current strategies or behaviours (Argyris & Schon, 1978; 
Crossan et al., 1995).  
 
 According to organisational learning theory, EO is associated with exploratory 
activities rather than exploitative learning activities since it centers on creative 
experimentation, novelty or innovativeness, proactive searching and involves high 
risks and trialling (Crossan et al., 1999; Holmqvist, 2004; Hughes et al., 2007; 
Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Thus, entrepreneurial behaviours entail exploratory 
learning, in which the learning mechanisms at the firm-level are promoted by 
actively searching the environment (Garvin, 1993).  
 
The distinction of explorative and exploitative learning  builds on the possible 
returns, in which explorative and exploitative activities produce diverse 
performance outcomes over time (March, 2006). Exploitative activities have certain 
incremental returns at little cost and have more proximal and predictable outcomes. 
Conversely, explorative activities have less certain returns and are distant in time 
(Fiol & Lyles, 1985) and ‘often’ lead to ‘negative outcomes’ (March, 1991, p. 85). 
Essentially, when explorative learning leads to a successful outcome, it is the result 
of trial and error. Since there is ‘trialling’ and experimenting in the process, this 
leads to higher variability in outcomes with the possibility of success as well as 
failure (March, 2006; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Evidence from the literature has 
shown that a relative explorative orientation has an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with firm financial performance (Uotila et al., 2009).  
 
Firms may engage in explorative risky behaviours as a result of being displeased 
with the production of incremental returns due to an excessive focus on refining 
their strategies (March & Simon, 1958). In this case, firms are trigged to engage in a 
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process termed ‘opening-up’, which involves the process of moving from the state 
of repetitive routinization to a state of exploration and experimentation (Hamel, 
1991) in order to be more responsive to the changes in the environment (Dodgson, 
1993; Meyers, 1982). The motivation for the opening-up process is driven by below 
minimum aspiration levels of performance (Holmqvist, 2004). Thus, explorative 
learning or higher-level learning involves the use of decision heuristics and insights 
and its outcomes may entail dysfunctional behaviours (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). It is this 
constant focus on explorative learning that tends to trap firms in a failure trap that 
drives performance to lower levels needed for survival and the eventual failure of a 
firm (Levinthal & March, 1993). When firms reach below-aspirations levels of 
performance they tend to engage in more exploration and take more risks by 
drastically changing their current strategies and re-orienting themselves to re-gain 
their viability or survival (Hambrick & De’Aveni, 1988). When faced with crisis 
situations, firms engage in more exploratory risky behaviours, which reduces their 
life expectancy (March, 1981). As stated by March (1981, p. 567): “"for those 
organizations that do not survive, efforts to survive will have speeded the process of 
failure." Such a re-orientation of the firm to focus on exploration eliminates the 
cumulative learning of the firm and entails “betting the organisation” (Burgelman, 
1991, p. 255).  
 
Certain learning mechanisms tend to place an importance on achieving the 
organisational goals in the short-run. Learning strategies that are effective in the 
short-run will not necessarily guarantee survival in the long-run (Levinthal & 
March, 1993). Sustaining explorative behaviours over time is a problem that is 
heightened with learning rather than relieved. Levinthal and March (1993) termed 
the difficulty of sustaining explorative learning behaviours over time: the temporal 
myopia (tendency to overlook possible futuristic outcomes) and the myopia of 
failure (proclivity to under-estimate risk of failure). Explorative behaviours are 
likely to lead to unsuccessful outcomes, but are the only way that firms can be able 
to take the lead in the market and to ‘finish first’ (Eisenhardt, 1989; Levinthal & 
March, 1993). 
 
As stated by March (1991), firms that engage in explorative endeavours at the 
expense of exploitative activities would not reap benefits from being explorative as 
explorative activities are stochastic and whose outcomes cannot be predicted. As 
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such, even though explorative activities prevent firms from being trapped within the 
status quo (i.e. ‘competency trap’ or ‘lock-in through learning’), they might drive 
the firm into exploring new activities without building upon their existing 
competencies (Levitt & March, 1988). Thus, seeking out opportunities and delving 
into explorative endeavours lead to a cascade of new ideas and hamper the 
development of existing strategies (March, 2006). Yet, a focus on exploitative 
activities (an over-reliance on outdated procedures) leads to sub-optimal 
performance and might be ‘self-destructive’ since it ultimately results in stagnation 
(March, 1991, p. 73; Uotila et al., 2009).  
 
Lant and Mezias (1990) considered that there are three components to a learning 
model, which was influenced by Cyert and March’s (1963) behavioural theory of 
the firm and which uses insights from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979): First organisations have a target level of performance that they use as a 
reference to compare their current performance to. Second, the level of the current 
performance above or below the aspired target would influence the probability of 
organisational change. Lastly, the organisation utilizes the learning model to process 
information and assess alternatives, which is relatively a costly process of search for 
the firm. Thus, firms engage in forward-looking generative types of learning in 
order to reduce the perceived uncertainty between the amount of information needed 
and the information already possessed to perform a certain task (Galbraith, 1977). 
Generative learning becomes the focus of the organisation in an uncertain or 
ambiguous environment as it allows firms to restructure their existing norms and 
strategies (Argyris and Schon, 1978; Dodgson, 1993). 
 
The next section will outline prospect theory, since insights into the effect of EO on 
organisational outcomes can be derived from prospect theory as well (March, 1991; 
Slevin & Terjesen, 2011). Prospect theory is a behavioural economic theory that 
explains the reasons firms choose to engage in certain behaviours based on the 
potential probabilistic gains or losses. This is similar and follows the same logic of 
the learning model (Lant & Mezias, 1990). We use prospect theory to theorise how 
failed firms engage in entrepreneurial behaviours in comparison to surviving firms 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). Prospect theory was used to derive some of the  
hypotheses in this thesis, H1, H3, and H7(a, b, and c) and H8(a, b, and c), that will 
be outlined in section 3.6.  
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3.5 Prospect Theory 
 
Prospect theory is a behavioural decision theory that was developed to explain the 
individual decision making towards risk attitudes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Yet, there are several researchers that have extended prospect theory to 
organisational decision making (e.g. Bowman, 1982, 1984; Fiegenbaum, 1990; 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988). Prospect theory has emphasised the role of target or 
reference levels in examining outcomes from risk taking behaviours and proactive 
behaviours (Crant, 2000; Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1988). The concept of aspiration 
levels was derived from organisational decision making and limited rationality 
behavioural theories (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1955, 
1979, 1991). It is termed prospect theory because firms reduce each alternative in 
the decision making process to a set of prospects and evaluate each of the prospects 
based on the firms’ reference value (Fiegenbaum, 1990). In evaluating prospects, 
firms use decision heuristics and biases to assist in the decision making process, 
which suffers from high levels of uncertainty and may even lead to severe 
systematic errors and biases in interpretation (March, 1991; Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The process of engaging in entrepreneurial 
behaviours produces unknown outcomes (Knight, 1921). When faced with distress, 
firms prefer a significant greater loss from entrepreneurial behaviours with an 
uncertain probability of success to a marginal loss from risk-averse behaviours with 
certain returns (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
 
The theory predicts that firms can be classified either as risk-seeking or risk-averse 
based upon their performance relative to a reference value (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). In this thesis, we extend to consider that prospect theory is useful in 
predicting the degree of exhibition of entrepreneurial behaviours among failing 
troubled below-performing firms versus surviving firms. Furthermore, we consider 
that when entrepreneurial behaviours are deconstructed into its elements of 
innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking, prospect theory can explain elements 
of risk and uncertainty attached to the proactive forward-looking behaviours and 
risk taking behaviours (Bowman, 1982; Crant, 2000). Proactiveness and risk taking, 
according to prospect theory, operate based upon reducing the discrepancy between 
the current situation and a desired unknown futuristic state (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). 
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Prospect theory, a descendent of limited rationality behavioural theories (Cyert 
 & March, 1963; Simon, 1955), is intersected with organisational learning theory in 
that it is a theoretical framework that predicts organisational change and search and 
the outcomes associated with ‘problematic motivated search’ (Argote & Greve, 
2007; Singh, 1986). That is, organisational change and a bias towards exhibiting and 
enacting entrepreneurial behaviours is triggered from the current levels of 
organisational performance in comparison to aspiration levels (Cyert & March, 
1963; March, 1988). If organisational performance falls below desired satisficing 
levels, organisations commence on their proactive search for innovative solutions 
and strategies with high levels of uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; March 
& Simon, 1958; Singh, 1986; Winter, 1971). Thus, organisational proactive search 
is myopic and the search that was intended to address the current situation in 
actuality might enhance the organisational demise (Lant et al., 1992; Singh, 1986; 
Staw et al., 1981). In relation to organisational learning theory, this is similar to the 
problem of balancing exploration and exploitation strategies/behaviours (March, 
1991; Morgan & Berthon, 2008). Due to organisational distress, a sole focus on 
exploring new alternative strategies would affect the organisational competence 
building on existing strategies and affect the organisational survival as returns from 
exploration are less certain and more remote in comparison to exploitation (Levitt & 
March, 1988). According to prospect theory, firms are likely to be exhibiting a focus 
on entrepreneurial behaviours and risk seeking and producing strategies when their 
returns are below target levels, whereas they are likely to be more risk averse when 
their returns are above target levels (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988). 
 
In essence, previous researchers have noted that the assumptions of organisational 
learning theory can be extended to prospect theory (Slevin & Terjesen, 2011), in 
which firms must make the choice between risky explorative and conservative 
exploitative strategies using techniques of abstraction (set of alternative actions or 
models of situations), historical data (historical information of organisations), and 
decision rules (a set of alternative decisions based on expected outcomes) (March, 
1991, 2006). Such decision rules are set by firms based upon their performance 
relative to a reference point. Firms that are performing above that reference point 
are more likely to engage in exploitative strategies and to be risk-averse despite 
available opportunities (Singh, 1986) . This could entail that firms that have 
survived, which are better-performing in comparison to failed firms, would less 
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likely engage in exploratory risky activities (Fiegenbaum, 1990). Interestingly, 
failed firms have been shown to have high EO, a risky explorative strategy 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
There are four hypotheses or predictions set within prospect theory: 1) reference 
value points are central for determining the firm decision, 2) under-performing firms 
exhibit a negative risk-return relationship, 3) over-performing firms exhibit a 
positive weaker risk-return relationship, and 4) the risk-return relationship of below-
target performing failing firms is more negative and steeper (stronger in magnitude) 
in comparison to over-performing surviving firms that are in the gain domain 
(myopic loss aversion phenomenon) (Fiegenbaum, 1990). 
 
One of the main cornerstones of prospect theory, myopic loss aversion, posits that 
firms are probably more risk-averse to strategies that have an immediate return and 
are frequently assessed. Alternatively, firms are more likely to be risk-seeking to 
decisions that have less certain proximal returns and are evaluated less frequently 
(Benartzi & Thaler, 1995) . Thereby, myopic loss aversion predicts that firms are 
more likely to adopt a conservative strategy for decisions that lead to short-term 
earnings. On the other hand, firms are likely to adopt a risky strategy for decisions 
that are of a long-term nature (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). This could entail that 
firms engaging in an entrepreneurial behaviour, which is a behaviour of a long-term 
nature and whose returns are uncertain, would be more inclined to take higher risks 
and be subject to a higher mortality rate. Thereby, according to prospect theory, 
failed firms would engage more in EO. This is associated with exploratory 
behaviours since the outcomes of EO are uncertain and have a long-time 
horizon(March, 1991, 2006) . The continuous engagement in ‘exploratory 
foolishness’ is the result of trial and error in the adaptive process based upon the 
assumption that exploratory endeavours (i.e. EO) would foster growth and 
profitability (March, 2006).  
 
The next section will outline the theoretical framework for the hypothesised 
relationships between EO and firm-level outcomes. The beginning of the following 
section will critique the EO-as-Advantage perspective, the dominating theory of the 
EO-performance relationship. Then the section will present the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective. 
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3.6 EO-as-Advantage versus EO-as-Experimentation 
 
The following section represents the two opposing views in the literature on the EO-
firm performance relationship, the EO-as-Advantage perspective and the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective. The EO-as-Advantage view is derived from the 
Resource-based view (RBV), whereas the EO-as-Experimentation view is derived 
from organisational learning theory. The beginning of the section will present the 
EO-as-Advantage perspective.  
 
3.6.1 EO-as-Advantage Perspective  
 
Most of the literature on EO adopts the EO-as-Advantage perspective and poses that 
EO has a positive effect on firm-level outcomes (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011) (the 
most researched outcome being firm performance) (Rauch et al., 2009).  
 
Barney (1991) first noted that a resource or a capability must meet four 
requirements to ensure that value is captured and created from the resource. The 
requirements are that a resource is rare, valuable, inimitable, and lastly that the 
organisation is organised to take advantage or exploit the resources (VRIO 
framework) (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). The EO-as-Advantage perspective 
considers that EO, as a rare and valuable resource, is advantageous for firms and 
provides them with a ‘sustainable differentiation’ and competitive advantage, which 
leads to a higher relative performance (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, the EO-as-Advantage perspective considers that EO is an inimitable 
resource, which causes the competitive advantage of EO to be sustainable over time. 
The notion of EO as a resource or capability was framed by Newbert (2007), 
whereby EO allows firms to leverage or bundle their resources to achieve a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 2003). The conception of EO as a 
performance-enhancing resource has been adopted by most researchers who tend to 
focus on the advantageous effect of EO disregarding the risks associated with such a 
strategic organisational orientation (e.g. Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003).  
 
A resource is an input into the production process and can be either a tangible 
property-based or an intangible knowledge-based resource. It is through the 
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knowledge-based resources that firms can transform and leverage the property-
based resources to build a competitive advantage. Thus, the knowledge-based 
resources are rare, valuable, and inimitable and are essential for firms to exhibit 
entrepreneurial behaviours that are sustainable (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). 
According to RBV, EO can be considered as a critical resource or a capability 
(Newbert, 2007) that is performance-enhancing by organising and focusing on the 
knowledge-based resources to explore new opportunities, to experiment with new 
technologies and products, and to enter new external markets (Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2011). As coined by Alvarez and Busenitz (2001), EO has been an ‘intricate’ 
construct of the resource-based theory.  
 
There have been concerns with the resource-based theory. One of those main 
concerns is methodological in nature, in which the empirical analysis required to 
reveal EO as a resource that achieves a sustained competitive advantage requires a 
longitudinal analysis. Yet, a longitudinal analysis is absent from the literature on 
EO, which has argued for the competitive advantage of EO over time by using the 
RBV theory (Barney et al., 2001). Thus, cross-sectional studies, which dominate the 
EO research, are flawed by being static and not revealing causal relationships 
(Priem & Butler, 2001). Furthermore, there is an inherent problem in the 
measurement of unobservable intangible resources. This raises a concern in the 
testability of the RBV theory (Barney et al., 2001). Thereby, researchers divert to 
using observable variables to capture the unobservable constructs (e.g. intangible 
resources).  
 
There is also an issue with the depiction of EO as a resource. EO is a behavioural 
action of a firm and is an opportunity seeking behaviour, whereas a resource is the 
input into the production process and might not necessarily convert into a value-
creating behavioural outcome. There is a mis-specification problem in the unit of 
analysis of EO by attributing an input property (i.e. a resource property) to a 
behavioural construct (EO). This issue raises concerns on RBV since a fundamental 
concept to the theory is that EO is a value-creating and performance-enhancing 
resource (Priem & Butler, 2001; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005).  
 
To provide more insights into the wide range of outcomes of EO and its dimensions 
over time, the EO-as-Experimentation perspective was used. The next section will 
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present the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, the alternative positioning of the 
EO-firm performance relationship. 
 
3.6.2 EO-as-Experimentation Perspective 
 
In contrast to the EO-as-Advantage perspective, the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective builds upon the distinction between explorative and exploitative 
strategies and originates from organisational learning theory (March, 1991; Winter, 
1971). Firms may choose either to venture into new explorative activities or to 
engage in exploitative activities that involve refining or building upon existing 
competencies (Dodgson, 1993). The EO-as-Experimentation perspective considers 
that the range of outcomes from EO is broad and this might include possibility of 
failure (failure trap) (Levinthal & March, 1993). The EO-as-Experimentation 
considers that EO is a variance-seeking strategy since it involves exploratory 
innovative, proactive, and risk taking behaviours characterised with uncertainty 
(Slater & Narver, 1995). Firms might benefit from such behaviours or might 
adversely fail from losses (Levitt & March, 1988; March, 1988). Thus, EO might 
result in larger outcome variance, by increasing chances of both success and failure 
(Burgelman, 1991). Over a three-year period Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) found 
that levels of EO were high among failed firms. Thus, there is a possibility that 
either EO was a last resort to resurrect their business or it could entail that EO was a 
promoting factor leading to their failure (Slevin & Terjesen, 2011). Risk taking has 
been noted as a potent factor that might enhance firm failure, yet certain other 
dimensions of EO, if excessive, might entail the risk of higher rates of failure as 
well (Levinthal & March, 1981; Hill & Snell, 1989; Slater & Narver, 1998). This is 
coherent with the early conceptualisation of EO, which places emphasis on the 
novelty and risk-bearing aspects of EO that by extension can carry outcome 
uncertainty and hence the potential for failure (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). However, 
since most of the literature on EO has not included failed firms in their sample 
(Rauch et al., 2009), this has led to a bias towards insinuating a positive EO-firm 
performance relationship.  
 
The EO-as-Experimentation perspective posits that the risk bearing effect of EO is 
not being captured in the literature. Firms that exhibit lower levels of EO might be 
more risk averse and probably have an ingrained ‘anti-failure’ belief (McGrath, 
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1999). According to the EO-as-Experimentation perspective and prospect theory, 
firms that have survived and have a higher relative performance are more likely to 
engage in conservative risk-averse strategies (Hambrick & De’Aveni, 1988; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; March, 1981 ). Firms have a decision rule to choose 
between exploration and exploitation. Such rules consider the alternative behaviours 
based on the best anticipated outcomes. Thereby, the actions of firms are set by 
expectations of futuristic outcomes (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996). Failed firms are 
more likely to engage in risky strategies in comparison to surviving firms. Historical 
data contains cases of technologies that have initially supported experimentation and 
risk taking with the expectation that they offer great value (Albin & Foley, 1998). 
Thus, according to the EO-as-Experimentation perspective as well as prospect 
theory, failed firms are more likely to engage in exploratory risky behaviours in 
comparison to surviving firms (Bowman, 1982). The first hypothesis was based on 
organisational learning theory (in section 3.4) and prospect theory (in section 3.5) 
and predicts that: 
 
H1: Failed firms are more entrepreneurially oriented in comparison to surviving 
firms. 
 
The hypothesised outcomes from EO, according to the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective and organisational learning theory, arise from its association with 
exploratory endeavours that involve venturing into new arenas and entail a higher 
risk (March, 1991). According to the EO-as-Experimentation, EO is inherently 
related with explorative behaviours since it involves experimenting, entering new 
markets, and trial and error behaviours rather than refining or committing to existing 
strategies (Day, 1994; Holmqvist, 2004; Levitt & March, 1988; Marengo, 1993).  
 
The EO-as-Experimentation perspective theorises that EO can increase performance 
variance, in which exploratory behaviours might have the probability of success as 
well as failure (Burgelman, 1991; March, 1991). EO is associated with strategies 
that are explorative in nature, rather than conservative strategies, and are 
characterised by being distant from the firm competencies, possibly leading to 
uncertain outcomes (Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991).   
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Considering that a minimum performance level is needed for survival, EO, as an 
exploratory behaviour, might positively affect performance up to a threshold for 
surviving firms (Levinthal & March, 1981; March, 1991; Miller & Friesen, 1982). 
That is, based on the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, EO is characterised by 
having a double-edged nature, in which certain exploratory activities might result in 
either ‘home-runs’ or ‘losses/strikeouts’ (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Thereby, 
according to EO-as-Experimentation, EO results in a performance variance, 
whereby surviving firms are predicted to have entrepreneurial ventures resulting in a 
better performance in comparison to failed firms whose entrepreneurial efforts 
might not materialise into a positive performance outcome (Burgelman, 1991; 
March, 1991). Drawing theoretical arguments from organisational learning theory 
and the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, we hypothesise that surviving firms 
experiment more effectively and achieve better outcomes as a result of pursuing EO 
in comparison to failed firms. According to organisational learning theory, even 
though EO might provide better outcomes in the sample of surviving firms, such 
benefits would be outweighed by the costs of increasing levels of EO (Levinthal & 
March, 1993; March, 1991 ) in which firms are likely to over-estimate the returns 
due to their exploratory risky strategies (March & Shapira, 1987).  
 
According to organisational learning theory, EO is an exploratory risky strategy and 
with increasing levels of exploration, the returns from EO may be over-estimated 
and the problems and complexities in the process of entrepreneurial learning may be 
under-estimated and this results in a higher negative outcome (Dodgson, 1993). This 
entails that low to moderate levels of EO might be associated with a better-
performing surviving firm, in which excessive levels of exploration would 
negatively impact a firm (March, 1991). Drawing theoretical insights from 
organisational learning theory, surviving firms that excessively pursue an 
entrepreneurial risky orientation are in effect over-estimating the positive outcomes 
that have resulted from EO and under-estimating the likelihood of negative 
outcomes from EO (Levinthal & March, 1993; March & Shapira, 1987). 
Historically, it has been shown that there are cases of firms that have supported a 
risky entrepreneurial endeavour in the promise of a predicted positive value, yet the 
positive predicted values failed to materialise (Albin & Foley, 1998). Thus, 
according to organisational learning theory, surviving firms excessively pursue EO 
once historically it has been shown to result in a realised value (Barnett & 
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Burgelman, 1996). Yet, with increasing levels of EO, surviving firms are essentially 
undertaking more risks and subjecting themselves to greater probability of a poor 
performance (March, 1991). He and Wong (2004) explain that firms should not be 
overdependent on explorative behaviours. Thus, according to organisational 
learning theory, it is posited that in a sample of surviving firms, EO might increase 
performance until a threshold point. Yet, as EO increases beyond that threshold, 
firm performance of surviving firms decreases. Thereby, it is hypothesised, 
according to organisational learning theory that:  
 
H2: The relationship between EO and (a) short-term and (b) long-term firm 
performance among surviving firms is an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
 
According to the EO-as-Experimentation perspective and prospect theory, failed 
firms, which might have engaged in higher levels of risky entrepreneurial strategies 
in comparison to surviving firms, are more likely to have experienced a negative 
performance outcome as a result of being more entrepreneurially oriented (Levitt & 
March, 1988; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). EO holds potential to be a ‘double-
edged sword’: the emphasis on risk-taking, novelty, and moving proactively towards 
uncertain future markets can increase the costs in the event of such actions failing to 
materialise (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
According to organisational learning theory, since EO is associated with explorative 
risky and experimental activities, by undertaking more exploration and 
experimentation, firms subject themselves to higher risks of negative outcomes 
(March, 1991). In contrast to the sample of surviving firms, according to the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective, EO might lead to negative outcomes in the sample of 
failed firms and contribute to the possibility of failed firms performing below that 
minimum performance level needed for survival (Burgelman, 1991; Staw et al., 
1981). We predict, according to the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, that in the 
sample of failed firms, which might be engaging more in experimentation and 
exploratory risky behaviours, EO has a negative effect on their firm performance. 
Thereby, it is hypothesised according to organisational learning theory and prospect 
theory that: 
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H3: The relationship between EO and (a) short-term and (b) long-term firm 
performance among failed firms is negative. 
 
According to the EO-as-Experimentation, entrepreneurial behaviour carries high 
risks and it would negatively affect firm survival (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). That 
is, not only are higher EO levels associated with lower performance, but also EO 
might lead to higher risks of failure . That is, EO requires considerable access to 
resources and some firms may not be successful in its implementation (Covin & 
Slevin, 1991). Firms that engage in unconventional novel exploratory behaviours at 
the expense of exploitative behaviours are forgoing the reliable stable observable 
outcomes for uncertain outcomes that are characterised by a higher probability of 
failure (Burgelman, 1991; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; March, 1981). Exploratory 
behaviours lead to uncertain outcomes and are characterised by a ‘low success rate’, 
in which successful outcomes from EO are achieved through error in the process 
and this error generates greater variation (larger variance in returns) (March, 2006). 
Essentially, EO would more likely result in more self-destructive disasters rather 
than successful discoveries with its extensive explorative strategies (Levinthal & 
March, 1993). The exploratory strategy that would identify new avenues for growth 
might also contribute to higher probabilities of failure. This is because firms might 
over-estimate the value of pursuing an entrepreneurial orientation (March & 
Shapira, 1987). Even though EO might provide a competitive advantage for some 
firms, it might also lead to higher rates of failure as a result of errors of estimation 
(Dodgson, 1993; Levinthal & March, 1993). Over time there is a trade-off to an 
over-reliance on an exploratory strategic orientation at the expense of an 
exploitative orientation, in which ‘exploratory foolishness’ is unlikely to sustain 
positive outcomes and such outcomes are only the result of errors in the adaptive 
process (March, 2006). Based on the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, we 
hypothesise that firms with higher EO levels, in comparison to other firms, have 
higher rates of failure and that EO has a positive effect on the hazard of failure 
(Burgelman, 1991; Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 1988). Thus, the 
hypothesis, according to organisational learning theory and the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective, is: 
 
H4: The relationship between EO and the risk of firm failure is positive over time. 
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In the context of a changing environment, especially R&D intensive industries, 
firms must alternate between exploitative and explorative strategies to achieve 
successful outcomes (March, 1991). Yet, in the high-technology context, firms are 
subjected to frequent technological changes, which cause a firm’s existing 
competencies to be obsolete and in turn force such firms to continuously engage in 
exploratory ‘technology-push’ activities on the assumption that they would be more 
profitable (Eisenhardt, 1989; Levinthal & March, 1993; Morgan & Berthon, 2008). 
Thus, the constant changes in the environment force firms to revert to a risky 
explorative entrepreneurial orientation rather than a stable exploitative orientation 
(Garud & Nayyar, 1994; Lant et al., 1992). The constant exploration of new 
strategies and technologies leads to higher variability and higher rates of mortality. 
This sole focus on explorative entrepreneurial activities traps the firm in an endless 
cycle that leads to failure as a result of searching and experimenting, yet that failure 
leads to more searching and changing (Levinthal & March, 1993). In the above 
previous paragraph, we postulated that EO enhances the risk of failure. Thereby, 
since the high-technology industry is more entrepreneurially-oriented, it would have 
a lower survival probability in comparison to other industries. It is hypothesised, 
according to organisational learning theory, that: 
 
H5: High-technology industry is more entrepreneurially oriented and has a lower 
survival probability in comparison to other industries. 
 
After exploring the role of the EO-as-Experimentation perspective to provide a 
theoretical context for the hypothesised relationship between EO and firm 
performance/failure, the next section will consider the differential effects of each of 
the EO dimensions among themselves, according to the multi-dimensional 
conceptualisation of EO (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). In addition, the anticipated 
distinctive effects of each of the EO dimensions on organisational outcomes based 
on organisational learning theory will be presented.  
 
3.7 The Separate Effects of the EO Dimensions  
 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996) theorised that each of the EO dimensions have opposing 
effects on firm performance, a striking difference from Miller (1983) gestalt 
conceptualisation of EO. Even though this thesis examines the effect of the EO 
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dimensions as well as the overall EO construct on firm-level outcomes, it aligns 
with the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of EO and theorises that there are 
distinct effects between the EO dimensions on a similar firm-level outcome. The 
thesis also considers that there are different effects for each of the EO dimensions 
when assessed on several firm-level outcomes (i.e. short-term or long-term 
performance and risk of failure).  
 
We hypothesise that the process of learning differs among the separate dimensions 
of EO and that in effect they would have opposing effects among themselves and on 
different performance outcomes. On the other hand, the interaction among the EO 
dimensions, as an overall EO construct, exhibits similar effects on the performance 
outcomes. The difference lies in the effect of EO on the different samples of 
surviving and failed firms as hypothesised in the above sections (H2 and H3). 
 
According to organisational learning theory, different types or sub-dimensions of 
explorative learning (innovativeness, proactive learning, and risk taking) will lead to 
different performance outcomes as each involves a unique learning process. In 
summary, certain explorative behaviours may benefit the firm, whereas other 
explorative behaviours may not. Even though, according to organisational learning 
theory, explorative learning is riskier than exploitative type of learning, the benefits 
in the long-run are in generating new competencies and new knowledge bases (this 
type of explorative learning is termed innovativeness). Whereas the long-term risks 
of explorative learning are present among the risk taking and proactiveness 
dimensions. The below sections will explain the differences among the EO 
dimensions in terms of their anticipated effects on firm performance outcomes.  
 
This section will outline the hypothesised effects of each EO dimension 
(innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking) on organisational outcomes (short-
term performance, long-term performance, and risk of failure). 
 
3.7.1 Innovativeness  
 
Innovativeness not only involves technological product innovation, but also 
organisational learning processes that stimulate innovative activities (Kanter, 1984). 
At the organisational-level, firms must move away from their current prevailing 
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core practices and routines in order to explore new possible avenues (Garud & 
Nayyar, 1994), to successfully enact novel innovative solutions or new ideas 
(Calantone et al., 2002; Crossan et al., 2011), and to create and integrate new 
information and knowledge on products and processes (Burgelman & Sayles, 1986; 
Huber, 1991; Hurley & Hult, 1998). Innovative learning is the dimension of 
organisational generative learning that leads to the development of new knowledge, 
which reduces the probability that a firm’s existing competencies would become 
obsolete and allows firms to remain dynamic and improves their performance in the 
long-run (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). The explorative innovative behaviours are driven by 
generative learning processes (Morgan & Berthon, 2008) that encourage the firm to 
move away from its ‘limited core world view’ (Brown & Duguid, 1991). 
New learning opportunities for firm advancement either arise internally or 
externally (Garud & Nayyar, 1994). Despite the fact that internal and external 
technologies are important, external acquisitive technologies cannot solely maintain 
a sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Zahra et al., 1999). Internal 
experimental learning technologies are not accessible to other firms and allows 
firms to possess state-of-the-art technology (Garud & Nayyar, 1994; Lei et al., 
1996).  Innovativeness, a dimension of EO, is defined as trial-and-error learning in 
volatile knowledge forms and in fostering technological leadership by engaging in 
experimentation and creativity and investing in R&D activities (Miller, 1983; 
Thomke et al., 1998). The innovative activities that are run by formal R&D 
departments in firms are the major source of institutionalised intra-organisational 
learning in terms of promoting technological developments (Dodgson, 1993; 
Mowery, 1981). Innovative learning occurs through the firm-level organisational 
investments in R&D activities (Dodgson, 1993), which lead to enhanced internal 
improvement of the firm by new knowledge flows and the identification and 
integration of new discoveries (Zahra et al., 1999). As shown by Thornhill (2006), a 
greater R&D intensity is indicative of higher innovation. Even though a higher R&D 
intensity might not translate to successful innovations, firms that invest more in 
R&D are more likely to be highly competitive (Lin et al., 2006). Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) stated that R&D generates and facilitates innovative learning, 
which in turn enhances the organisational capabilities in identifying and using 
external new information. Furthermore, the incentive for engaging in innovative 
learning influences R&D spending at the organisational-level (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1989).  In the context of high-technology firms, innovation is a central element to 
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ensure firms remain competitive in a fast-changing industry (Chan et al., 1990). 
Innovativeness is vital for firm survival in an intensive competitive environment 
such as the high-technology industry (Audretsch, 1995; Zahra, 1996) and should be 
a priority for a firm that aims to remain competitive in today’s changing market 
(Zahra & Garvis, 2000). The high-technology industry is constantly changing and is 
characterised by being dynamic. Thereby, firms are forced to be innovative to stay 
ahead of the competition and secure first-mover advantages (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996).  
 
Innovativeness has been viewed in the literature as a firm-level behaviour that leads 
to a competitive advantage through creating differentiation and supporting 
adaptability to changing market conditions (Droge et al., 2008; Hughes & Morgan, 
2007).  Innovative learning leads to the development of new products and process 
efficiencies which ultimately lead to superior performance in the long-term 
(Burgelman & Maidique, 1989; Hall, 1999; Roberts & Amit, 2003). Thereby, the 
majority of the literature was shown to consider innovativeness as a performance-
enhancing strategy (Walker, 2004). Innovativeness requires significant capital and 
expenditure of resources, such that R&D is considered to be a costly process for 
small firms that lack the required capital (Schumpter, 1942). However, 
innovativeness in large firms has a vital role in halting failure or reversing events of 
failure (Mckinley et al., 2014). Cefis and Marsili (2005) found that innovative firms 
had survival times 11% higher than non-innovative firms. Technological and 
knowledge accumulation is central for firms to achieve and maintain 
competitiveness in an uncertain challenging environment (Dodgson, 1991), such 
that innovative learning reduces uncertainty and shifts the dynamics of competition 
in favour of the innovative firm (Han et al., 1998). Through experimental innovative 
learning, firms can maneuver in a more effective and efficient manner and enhance 
their ability to respond to the uncertain environmental situation (Grant, 1995; 
Nonaka, 1994). Firms with greater capacity for innovative learning will develop 
knowledge-based resource capabilities that are required to improve their long-term 
performance and to achieve a sustained competitive advantage (Hurley & Hult, 
1998). Innovativeness represents a generative learning orientation and the 
foundational element that leads to a long-lasting competency (Calantone et al., 
2002; Sinkula et al., 1997). 
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According to organisational learning theory and the competency-based approach to 
competition, innovative intra-organisational learning is placed at the core of the 
learning process (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Zahra et al., 1999). Derived from the 
evolutionary perspective of the firm, innovative learning allows firms to develop 
and deploy unique resources, which are necessary to ensure organisational survival 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). Firms that are high in innovative learning continuously 
develop new products and services that allows them to develop new competencies 
and to sustain their developed competencies. Thus, to survive firms must 
continuously engage in innovative learning (Day, 1994; Zahra et al., 1999).  
 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) state that R&D investments and the learning process 
through innovativeness is a costly process, in that its cost of learning is ‘immediate’ 
and are offset by the benefits in the ‘long-term’ (Dodgson, 1993). Since 
innovativeness requires investing heavily in R&D, it is resource-intensive. Thus, 
innovativeness entails a large expenditure of resources in the short-run (Li & 
Atuahene-Gima, 2001). This means that innovative behaviours are costly in the 
early stages of investment due to the up-front costs of R&D expenditure and would 
jeopardise the possibility of a firm meeting its short-term obligations (Kreiser et al., 
2013). The initial period in R&D and innovative learning was described by Cheng 
and Van de Ven (1996) as a ‘chaotic and complex’ process, but the chaos is then 
reduced as the innovative learning process becomes more structured. 
 
Based on the EO-as-Experimentation, innovativeness aligns with exploratory 
learning and involves the search to develop new products or technological processes 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). From insights into organisational learning theory, 
innovation is vital for enhancing a firm’s existing competencies and acquiring new 
domains of activities (Zahra et al., 1999). Based on organisational learning theory, 
we hypothesised that innovativeness represents a behaviour that generates new 
knowledge flows into its existing knowledge bases and is a long-term investment in 
intangible assets (Dodgson, 1991, 1993). Innovativeness would improve the market 
value of the firm even though it is expensive to generate in the short-run (Lin et al., 
2006). Thereby, this thesis posits based upon the EO-as-Experimentation, 
innovativeness develops new competencies that are crucial for building a 
competitive advantage, yet such a trial and error strategic orientation results in 
upfront high costs to develop such resource intensive behaviours (Cohen & 
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Levinthal, 1989; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). The EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective predicted a bright and a dark side to the dimensions of EO (Patel et al., 
2015), in which this effect would be shown when the time factor is included. Thus, 
even though innovativeness is costly at its initial investment, such investment would 
materialise across time (Cheng & Van de Ven, 1996). We hypothesised based on 
organisational learning theory, that innovativeness has a negative impact on the 
failure rate of a business as high-technology firms must continuously innovate to 
renew themselves in a changing environmental context (Zahra, 1996; Zahra et al., 
1999). The continuous generation of new knowledge flows through innovative 
learning is vital for developing and sustaining core competencies (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1990).Over time innovativeness would ensure the ability of the firm to 
adapt to changes and remain viable (Danneels, 2002). Furthermore, according to 
organisational learning theory, when examining the effects of different levels of 
innovativeness, the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs at high levels of 
innovativeness (Fiol & Lyles, 1985).  Thus, this thesis hypothesised based on 
organisational learning theory and the EO-as-Experimentation perspective that: 
 
H6a: Innovativeness has a negative effect on short-term firm performance (ROA).  
H6b: Innovativeness has a positive effect on long-term firm performance (Tobin’s 
Q).   
H6c: Innovativeness has a negative effect on firm failure. 
 
3.7.2 Proactiveness 
 
Proactive learning, according to organisational learning theory, involves firms 
taking the initiative to change their current way of operating and challenging the 
status quo instead of adapting or reacting to current environmental changes (Perez 
Lopez et al., 2005; Sinkula, 1994). Thus, proactive firms favour generative learning 
(Garcia-Morales & Llorens-Montes, 2006) and are actively affecting and aiming to 
control the external environment in which they learn (Dodgson, 1993). 
Proactiveness represents an opportunity-seeking component of EO and seeks to 
anticipate future demand to instil changes in its current strategies in response to the 
market needs (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Venkatraman, 1989). By anticipating the 
changes in the marketplace, proactive firms can adjust in accordance to its customer 
needs and increase its receptiveness to the latent market signals (Crant, 2000; 
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Hughes & Morgan, 2007; Morgan & Berthon, 2008). Through being more 
responsive rather than being reactive to the future trends in the market, firms can 
introduce new products and improve their strategies to seize new opportunities in 
the market and seize more market share ahead of the competition (Hamel & 
Prahalad, 1991; Lumpkin & Dess, 2001). Thereby, proactiveness has been viewed in 
the literature as a competitive advantage yielding firm-level behaviour; it has been 
shown that it is beneficial on short-term measures of firm performance (sales growth 
and profitability measures) (Hughes & Morgan, 2007 Wright et al., 1995). In this 
sense, a growing body of literature reveals that proactiveness leads to positive 
outcomes, yet they have not tested the effect of proactive learning on long-term 
outcomes and over time.  
 
March (2006) explains that firms use “technologies of rationality” or “rational-based 
model logic” to determine whether they engage in explorative or exploitative 
learning. This model-based assessment involves rational techniques (abstractions, 
data and decision rules) to assess alternative strategies as a response to external 
environmental opportunities. Firms engage in proactive learning as a result of 
expected values and probability of possible future outcomes (Barnett & Burgelman, 
1996). That is, firms engage in proactive learning to exert their control over their 
environment in a way that allows gaining of new resources to prepare them for 
future challenges (Strauss & Parker, 2018). The process for proactive learning 
differs from the process of innovative learning. Using insights from prospect theory 
and cybernetic control perspective, firms engage in proactive behaviours or learning 
by comparing their current situation to a reference value in order to control the 
possible future outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 
2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).  
 
Proactive learning or behaviours are intended to reduce the discrepancy between the 
current performance level of the firm to a reference value or desired state of 
achieving higher performance returns (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996; Fiegenbaum & 
Thomas,1988). Yet, the process through which firms engage in the process of 
proactive learning by using technologies of rationality can lead to disastrous 
outcomes as firms can possibly mis-specify situations and as such rational 
technologies may not produce the desirable outcomes that they were intended to 
(Albin & Foley, 1998). 
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Although proactiveness generally involves reducing the discrepancy between the 
current situation and future desired reference value, there are different outcomes 
from proactive behaviours depending on achieving either an ideal reference value in 
the present or an expected future reference value (Boldero & Francis, 2000; Crant, 
2000). Thus, proactive behaviours are considered to be exploratory learning 
behaviours that focus on management of resources to be either utilised to achieve a 
desired state in the present or to accumulate/commit further resources in order to 
achieve a future reference value in anticipation of uncertain market opportunities 
(Slater & Narver, 1995). As Hughes and Morgan (2007, p. 653) stated the aim or 
proactiveness is twofold: “to secure first-mover advantage in the short term and 
shape the direction of the market environment in the long term. A proactive 
behaviour in the short-run that aims to decrease the discrepancy between the current 
state and a reference value that is present focused and salient with ‘already-known 
threats’ would be less risky in comparison to future-accumulation oriented proactive 
behaviour, which relies on uncertain predictions of future markets (Boldero & 
Francis, 2000; March, 1991; Strauss & Parker, 2018). As stated by Pennington and 
Roese (2003, p. 572) “temporal distance affords greater opportunity for taking 
risks”. In this sense, prospect theory predicts that proactiveness would enhance 
short-term profitability but would negatively impact a firm’s long-term performance 
and increase the risk of failure over time. 
 
According to organisational learning theory, proactiveness does not merely entail 
anticipating future demand, but also acting upon that forecasted changes in the 
market (Bateman & Crant, 1993). Based on the EO-as-Experimentation, since 
proactiveness is characterised by taking long-term gambles to predict future market 
needs, this might not materialise into successful outcomes as futuristic market trends 
cannot be predicted accurately based on the current market needs (Barnett & 
Burgelman, 1996; Patel et al., 2015). Firms in the high-technology context are 
forced to continuously and aggressively innovate and invest in external 
opportunities to stay ahead of competitors (Rauch et al., 2009). By re-investing in 
the business for investing in future markets, the firm might miss the investment 
opportunities in the current market (Atuanhene-Gima et al., 2005).There is a trade-
off between the ability to leverage internal resources and the misallocation of 
resources as a result of being proactive (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996)). Furthermore, 
recent evidence has shown that firms that talk less about the future in their annual 
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reports offer higher returns for their stock portfolio (Karapandza, 2016). 
Proactiveness would not fuel future growth in earnings and is associated with 
‘inefficient empire building’ (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000). This is because it is 
associated with focusing on unknown information about the predicted state of the 
future market (Levinthal & March, 1993). Drawing insights from agency theory, 
proactiveness might fuel managerial expansion in the business rather than benefit 
shareholders as retaining earnings is more of an attractive incentive for managers 
than issuing stocks or paying dividends (Jensen, 1986).  
 
In accordance to organisational learning theory, proactiveness is an exploratory 
learning behaviour and is involved in attending to latent market needs by seeking 
future opportunities (Dodgson, 1993;March, 1991; Sinkula, 1994). Furthermore, 
proactiveness requires a firm to take futuristic gambles on its internal resources that 
may lead to negative outcomes in the long-run (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996). 
Proactiveness involves predicting future market needs by observing the current 
market and conducting market experiments.  
 
In summary, according to prospect theory, proactive learning that aims to decrease 
the discrepancy between a desired state in the present and the current situation 
would be less risky and generate certain profits in the short-run (Boldero & Francis, 
2000). Furthermore, concerning the impact of proactiveness on long-term 
performance and risk of failure, according to organisational learning theory and 
prospect theory, proactiveness carries risks of negatively affecting a firm’s long-
term performance as well as its survival because the firm focuses on unknown and 
forecasted information and this might hinder the development of its existing ‘core 
competencies’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 2000; Levinthal & March, 1993;  
March, 1991; ). Proactiveness is predicted to have a double-edged nature based on 
the EO-as-Experimentation perspective and as such the ‘dark side’ of proactiveness 
would not be shown unless tested across time (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). 
Furthermore, drawing insights from organisational learning theory, the negative 
outcomes of proactiveness are likely to be maximised at higher levels of 
proactiveness (March, 1991). Thereby, based on the organisational learning theory 
and prospect theory, it is hypothesised that:  
 
H7a: Proactiveness has a positive effect on short-term firm performance (ROA).  
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H7b: Proactiveness has a negative effect on long-term firm performance (Tobin’s 
Q).  
H7c: Proactiveness has a positive effect on firm failure. 
 
3.7.3 Risk Taking 
 
Risk-taking behaviours are opportunity seeking, explorative in nature, and involve 
the process of making extreme changes in current strategies and a re-orientation in 
the expectation of achieving higher profits (Baird & Thomas, 1990; Hambrick & 
D’Aveni, 1988; March, 1991). Risk taking requires from firms to make timely 
strategic decisions. In fast-paced high-velocity technology-oriented environments, 
risk taking behaviours coupled with fast strategic decision making helps firms to 
keep up the pace with the changes in the environment and has been linked to an 
improved firm performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, a degree of risk taking is 
required by firms in the high-technology context to avoid being passive or 
conservative to rapid changes in the market, adhering to current strategies, and 
being in a state of inertia (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Risk taking, a dimension of EO, is defined as taking bold moves (rather than 
incremental moves) and venturing into new markets that may lead to uncertain 
outcomes (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Miller, 1983). This risk is termed unsystematic 
or idiosyncratic risk; it is unattributed to the industry and is represented by the 
fluctuations in the share prices of firms (Fama, 1968). When firms engage in risky 
behaviours, they have an inherent tolerance for ambiguity and as such position 
themselves at a higher probability of failure (Begley & Boyd, 1987). 
 
The relationship between risk and return has received great attention following the 
risk-return paradox by Bowman (1980) (Bromiley, 1991; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 
1988). Bowman (1980) termed the risk and return relationship as a paradox since 
conventional economic and finance theories and previous empirical studies 
considered that there is a positive association between risk and return (e.g. Fisher & 
Hall, 1969). Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) found a positive association between 
risk and returns for above-average performance firms and a negative association 
between risk and returns for firms with below-average performance. This finding 
corroborates the concept of Bowman’s (1980) risk-return paradox, in which 
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Bowman (1980) identified a negative relationship between risk and average returns 
based on accounting measures of performance, and the predictions set within 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Support for the predictions set within 
prospect theory for the risk-return relationship have been found to extend to non-US 
samples (Jegers, 1991; Sinha, 1994) and in updated 20-year samples (Chou et al., 
2009). Thus, in this thesis we use insights from prospect theory to explain the risk 
and return paradox relationship (Nickel & Rodriguez, 2002). 
 
Prospect theory considers that risk preferences or attitudes of firms are determined 
based on a target or reference point of value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
According to prospect theory, with increasing levels of risk within strategic decision 
making, the probability of successful outcomes decreases (Singh, 1986). The risk-
return paradox predicts that high levels of risk taking are more likely to lead to 
negative accounting performance (return on equity) outcomes (Bowman, 1980). As 
such, we suggest according to prospect theory and the risk-return paradox, the risk-
return relationship is non-linear (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988). Past authors have 
suggested that the risk-return paradox can be explained from predictions set within 
prospect theory (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988). Risk taking behaviours improve 
returns up to a threshold, after which there are decreasing returns to increasing 
levels of risk taking (Bromiley, 1991). Begley and Boyd (1987, p. 89), noted that 
“risk-taking has a positive effect on ROA up to a point. Beyond that point, increases 
in risk-taking begin to exert a negative effect on ROA.” Risk taking behaviours lead 
to immediate financial returns. Yet, due to the risk-return paradox there are limits to 
the benefits of the risk taking dimension of learning. 
 
Risk taking is the dimension of organisational learning that is interlinked with the 
myopia and the hazards associated with explorative learning (Levinthal & March, 
1993). Insights from behavioural theory of the firm and prospect theory can explain 
the outcomes predicted from risk taking (Argote & Greve, 2007; Miller & Leiblein; 
1996). That is, similar to proactive learning, risk taking operates through the concept 
of aspiration or target levels of performance, in which organisational decision 
making is risk averse in the domain of gains (i.e. the performance is above the target 
reference level), whereas organisational decision making is risk seeking in the 
domain of losses (performance is below the reference level) (Fiegenbaum & 
Thomas, 1988; Lant et al., 1992; Singh, 1986). 
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Risk taking behaviours affect firm-level outcomes based on reducing the 
discrepancy between the current state and desired current wealth level or future 
aspired state (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988). Risk taking behaviours allow firms to 
take advantage and to seize market opportunities by making decisions in a timely 
manner, which places risky firms at an edge over firms that ‘miss the window’ 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Yet, unlike proactive behaviours, risk taking entails higher costs 
with increasing levels of risk in the short-run (Bowman, 1980). Furthermore, firms 
that perform poorly are susceptible to be more risk seeking in their investment 
strategies and decision making (Singh, 1986). Poorly performing firms take risks 
similar to taking gambles in that with more risk taking, there is a higher likelihood 
of future lower performance values. Thereby, increasingly taking risks in the long-
run is likely to not pay-off for firms (Bromiley, 1991; March, 1991).  
 
As Lumpkin and Dess (1996) stated, risk taking if excessive in certain contexts 
might be detrimental to a firm’s performance. Risk taking is likely to be counter-
productive for some firms as it might affect the viability of such firms (Levinthal & 
March, 1993). Thus, risk taking carries high costs which outweigh its benefits in the 
short-run (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). Unlike innovativeness, risk taking has more 
of a focus on the short-term profitability (Lumpkin et al., 2010). In the literature, it 
has been shown that risk taking has an inverse U-shaped relationship with short-
term firm performance. With increasing levels of risk, there is a greater likelihood 
that risk taking would decrease the firm’s short-term returns (Kreiser et al., 2013). 
When controlling for the effects of innovativeness and proactiveness, risk taking has 
been shown to negatively affect a firm’s performance (Hughes & Morgan, 2007).  
 
Learning can negatively influence performance when firms must discard their 
known practices for new methods of operation which is risky (Levitt & March, 
1988). Drawing theoretical insights from organisational learning theory, risk taking 
is associated with behaviours that are characterised with uncertainty and 
experimentation and can carry with it the costs of failure (Levinthal & March, 
1993). Based on the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, a risky orientation requires 
firms to undertake behaviours that have ambiguous and uncertain returns, which 
would have a high probability in resulting in losses across time and hasten 
organisational death( Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Organisational decline triggers 
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the learning process that emphasises risk taking; risk taking only accelerates the 
organisational decline over time (March, 1981; Singh, 1986; Staw et al., 1981). 
 
The learning process of risk taking behaviours involves the use of decision 
heuristics and biases, which are simple strategies and decision rules that firms use 
when faced with an uncertain environment to assist with the decision-making 
process (Busentiz & Barney, 1997). Firms use decision heuristics as it requires the 
implementation of timely risky decisions under conditions of uncertainty 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). That is, the learning process of risk taking pressurises firms to 
make large commitments to resources before assessment of alternative actions to be 
taken (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Miller & Friesen, 1978). 
 
In summary, based on prospect theory and organisational learning theory, a risky 
orientation is characterised by having contrasting effects, i.e. firms undertake risky 
behaviour to ensure financial returns, yet across time such a risky orientation leads 
to higher probability of loss rather than positive financial returns (Bromiley, 1991). 
The high costs to the risk taking dimension are revealed at higher levels of risk, 
which is explained by the risk-return paradox (Alvarez, 2007; Bowman, 1980)). 
Thus, this thesis hypothesised based on organisational learning theory and prospect 
theory that: 
 
H8a: Risk taking has an inverse U-shaped effect on short-term firm performance 
(ROA).  
H8b: Risk taking has a negative effect on long-term firm performance (Tobin’s Q).   
H8c: Risk taking has a positive effect on firm failure. 
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3.8 Chapter Conclusion 
 
The purpose for outlining the EO-as-Experimentation perspective is to answer the 
ambiguity and guide the research questions and relevant hypotheses. After outlining 
the role of organisational learning theory and prospect theory to examine the role of 
EO on firm performance and failure, the section that follows explains the methods 
that were undertaken to examine the EO/EO dimensions and firm performance/risk 
of failure relationships. The above hypotheses H1 to H8 respond to the over-arching 
research aims of testing the effect of EO and its dimensions on firm performance 
and on risk of failure. Study 1 tested hypotheses H1, H2a and H2b, H3a and H3b, 
H6a, H6b, H7a, H7b, H8a, and H8b. Study 2 tested hypotheses H4, H5, H6c, H7c, 
and H8c.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Research Philosophy and Design 
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4.1 Introduction to the Chapter  
 
The purpose of the chapter is to describe the philosophical underpinnings of this 
research (ontology and epistemology). The researcher’s underlying philosophical 
beliefs, which are grounded in organisational learning and prospect theory, have 
guided this research. The chapter aims to achieve a philosophical grounding and 
describe the variables included in the overall thesis. The beginning of the chapter 
consists of describing the research philosophy as well as the research design and the 
research methodology undertaken. The chapter also describes the sample chosen and 
the reasoning behind such selection.  
 
The next section will outline the philosophical positioning of this research (i.e. 
ontology and epistemology). 
  
4.2 Research Philosophical Position   
 
The following section considers the ontology and epistemological assumptions 
underlying this thesis. The beginning of the section will introduce the importance of 
setting one’s ontology and epistemology and then introduce the thesis’s ontological 
followed by the epistemological positioning. 
 
4.2.1 Introduction: Locating Ontology and Epistemology in Research 
Endeavours 
 
This section outlines the researcher’s beliefs and ontological and epistemological 
underpinnings of the research. The following section aims to set the stage for the 
philosophical design by reinforcing the link between the thesis theoretical grounding 
and its philosophical positioning.  
 
Theory forms the building blocks to inform research since researchers need to have 
a theoretical foundation to guide their research to understand the social world (May, 
2011). Thus, one should consider the link between the theoretical foundations of the 
research and the research philosophy and design as there is a mutual 
interdependence between research and theory in which concepts are shaped and 
made meaningful by theory (Bryman, 2015; Della Porta & Keating, 2008). There 
are two types of theories: grand and middle range theories (Merton, 1976). Grand 
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theories are abstract in nature, which makes them of limited usability in social 
research (Bryman, 2015). Middle range theories, on the other hand, aim to explain a 
limited scope within social life, which makes them common among social 
researchers (Pinder & Moore, 2012). To guide the research questions and research 
endeavour, the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, which is derived from 
organisational learning theory and prospect theory, was used. In this research, the 
middle range theory described above is concerned with looking at the macro-level 
organisational behaviour.  
 
There are two approaches to research, either an inductive or a deductive strategy. 
The choice of hypothetico-deductive strategy, which is in line with a quantitative 
inquiry, falls naturally from a positivist approach (Bryman, 2015; Della Porta & 
Keating, 2008; Sarantakos, 2012). The alternative approach is inductive strategy, 
which is often associated with qualitative data collection methods whereby the 
interpretivist or constructionist researcher aims to construct theory from 
observations and data findings (Bryman, 2015; Sarantakos, 2012). Thus, researchers 
who adopt the inductive approach modify their research design as they progress 
throughout their research. Whereas, those who adopt the deductive approach clearly 
define and operationalise the investigated constructs and develop the hypotheses to 
be tested (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). After systematically identifying the 
theories in this research, the next step was to generate hypotheses, which would be 
empirically tested. This is consistent with theory-guided deductive line of reasoning 
(Blaikie, 2009; May, 2011). 
 
Following questions on ‘what to research?’ and ‘how to research?’, the ‘why to 
research?’ is as important and entails the underlying theoretical grounding (Remenyi 
et al., 1998). The ‘what to study’ is the ontological question, concerning the social 
phenomenon under investigation, in which it sets the stage for the research. The 
conceptualisation of the theoretical constructs is important before addressing the 
other questions (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). The ‘how to obtain knowledge’ is 
the epistemological question and is associated with the choice of the methodology. 
Lastly the ‘why to study’ is concerned with the hypotheses of the research (Della 
Porta & Keating, 2008). The philosophical paradigm is the building blocks of the 
research rather than the methodology itself (Holden & Lynch, 2004). The 
philosophical paradigm gives rise to the methodological choice (Bryman, 2015). 
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When selecting a research methodology, one must first consider the philosophical 
paradigm behind the research’s methodology; that is the ontological and 
epistemological stance (Bryman, 2015; Grix, 2002; Leitch et al., 2009). Thus, this 
thesis is research-led by the research questions rather than method-led (Grix, 2002). 
Thus, the philosophical positioning of the research must guide the choice of the 
methodology (Grix, 2002; Leitch et al., 2009).  
 
Social scientists tend to examine abstract concepts that are representations of the 
social world (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). Thus, for social scientists it is vital to 
have clarity on the epistemological and ontological assumptions about the social 
entities under investigation. The researcher’s ontological stance, the starting point of 
any research, affects their epistemological stance, which in turn affects their 
methodological choice, and their research methods and choice of sources of data 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Grix, 2002; Holden & Lynch, 2004). Thereby, the core 
components of research to consider include the ontological and epistemological 
underpinnings as well as the methodology (Grix, 2002). These three components are 
defined as the research paradigm, which guides the research endeavour (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994; Morgan, 2007; Punch, 2013).    
 
Ontology refers to the theory of reality or of social entities (Blanche et al., 2006; 
Bryman, 2015; Punch, 2013). In social research, ontological underpinnings aim to 
answer questions on ‘what is the nature of social reality that is to be investigated?’ 
(Hay, 2002, p. 63). Thus, ontology is concerned with the beliefs and assumptions 
that are made about the nature of social entities (Blaikie, 2007). The researcher’s 
ontological assumption of reality dictates all other assumptions she/he makes; 
whereas the second assumption the researcher makes is the epistemological stance 
(Holden & Lynch, 2004).  
 
Epistemology aims to answer questions on ‘what and how can we know about a 
construct?’ (Grix, 2002, p. 175). Thereby, epistemology is concerned with the 
relationship between the researcher and what can be known as knowledge (Blanche 
et al., 2006; Bryman, 2015; Punch, 2013). Thereby, epistemology is considered as 
the nature of knowledge and its possibility, limitations, and sources (Hamlyn, 1995) 
and ultimately refers to the theory of all knowledge.  
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The methodology, a researcher’s approach, would be used to gain knowledge 
following the researcher’s ontological and epistemological position (Holden & 
Lynch, 2004). Research methodology and research methods are related, yet not the 
same concepts. The methodology is the logic of scientific inquiry whereas the 
research methods refer to the tools and techniques used to acquire the data and 
analyse it. Thus, the methodology aims to answer the question on ‘how to acquire 
knowledge?’ whereas the research methods aim to answer the question on ‘what are 
the procedures and techniques of analysis required to acquire that knowledge?’ 
(Hay, 2002, p. 64). Following the research methodology and research methods, the 
researcher then makes the choice of which sources of the data are needed to 
represent the underlying constructs (Grix, 2002).   
 
The next section will outline the ontological positioning of this research and outlines 
the various ontological beliefs in social research.  
 
4.2.2 Ontological Position 
 
Main ontological research approaches are divided into subjectivism and objectivism 
(Bryman, 2015; Remenyi et al., 1998; Sarantakos, 2012).  
 
The objectivist approach exists on one end of the continuum (Morgan & Smircich, 
1980). The objectivist approach was born as a result of social researchers employing 
the methods of natural sciences to examine a social phenomenon (Bryman, 2015; 
Grix, 2002; Holden & Lynch, 2004). Thus, the objectivist approach to social science 
indicates that social sciences should adapt the principles from the natural sciences, a 
view endorsed by Durkheim and Comte, since social phenomenon is under social 
and behavioural laws just as physical phenomenon is under physical laws (Bailey, 
2008; Della Porta & Keating, 2008). The objectivist’s ontological stance considers 
that reality is concrete and that the social world predates human existence. Thus, the 
world will still exist independent of human cognitive processes whether human 
beings perceive an external reality or not (Gill & Johnson, 1997; Holden & Lynch, 
2004). Accordingly, the social phenomena are objective and have an autonomous 
existence or reality that is independent of human interpretation (Corbetta, 2003) and 
the task of the researcher is to analyse this reality (Bryman, 2015; Della Porta & 
Keating, 2008).  
123 
 
On the other end, lies the subjectivist ontological perspective. It considers that there 
is no such thing as concrete reality because it is a product of the social scientist’s 
imagination (Della Porta & Keating, 2008; Holden & Lynch, 2004; Sarantakos, 
2012). That is, social phenomenon can only be derived from social actors (Bryman, 
2015). Thus, reality does not exist outside the realms of one’s own mind (Morgan & 
Smircich, 1980). Not only do social actors construct reality, but they continuously 
construct and reconstruct such reality (Bryman, 2015; Sarantakos, 2012).  
 
In this research, the ontological belief is that social behaviour can be explained and 
tested empirically through the premise that its causes and effects can be 
approximately measured and made identifiable (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). Thus, 
objectivism is the ontological stance adopted in this research. The advantage of the 
objectivist approach is that it is able to test hypotheses using large samples 
(Bryman, 2015; Holden & Lynch, 2004; May, 2011). It is the researcher’s belief that 
valid knowledge about the constructs can only be achieved through appropriate 
measurement that is independent of the social actors that inhabit the organisation. 
As such, the concern in this research is in the property or exhibition of a firm-level 
behaviour EO, in which the units of analysis are the firms in the sample.  
 
The constructs under investigation are objectively measured at the organisational 
macro-level, devoid of managerial interference, in the form of variables. Thus, this 
thesis is a variable-based research whose interest is in generating parsimonious 
explanations to reach an ‘unadorned’ form of truth (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). 
Objectivists are usually more concerned with the language of variables than cases, 
and they are interested in the properties of cases rather than the cases themselves. 
Thereby, in variable-based research the cases are made anonymous and transformed 
into variables (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). Social scientists that employ a 
variable-based research ensure that most variables are included to account for all the 
possible variations. With the increase in the number of variables, it is of precedence 
to ensure that there are many observations included to conduct statistical analysis 
(Della Porta & Keating, 2008).  
 
Subjectivists argue that researchers cannot distant themselves fully from the 
observations made as meanings do not exist beyond the realms of the human mind 
(Sarantakos, 2012). Thus, subjectivists focus on the meaning attained behind the 
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relationships of the constructs rather than the measurement of those constructs 
(Holden & Lynch, 2004). Critics of the objectivist approach consider that complex 
phenomena of social nature cannot be examined using natural science measurements 
and that applying a subjectivist approach is more appropriate in the social sciences 
(Guba & Linclon, 1994; Holden & Lynch, 2004). However, subjectivism is not 
flawless since it has its shortcomings, being characterised by the lack of 
replicability/reliability and lack of absolutism (Holden & Lynch, 2004). By adopting 
an objectivist approach, the researcher can separate from the investigated 
construct(s) and avoid the possibility of contaminating the data by his/her subjective 
views (Della Porta & Keating, 2008).  
 
Admittedly, even statistical evidence generated through data collected by way of 
appropriate objective measures is still open to a degree of interpretation (Bailey, 
2008). The difference with respect to subjectivism, however, is that the researcher 
accepts only the measurement of constructs that can be clearly defined and 
measured as reality, i.e. without the biases of managers that lead to inaccurate 
measurements of the constructs. Subjective bias and the risk of error therein are 
minimised in objectivist approaches to research (Bailey, 2008; Creswell, 2013; 
Sarantakos, 2012).  
 
The next section will consider the epistemological positioning of this research.  
 
4.2.3 Epistemological Position 
 
The main paradigms representing alternative epistemological positions are 
positivism on the one end and constructionism/interpretivism on the other end 
(Bernard, 2012; Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Grix, 2002; Remneyi et al., 1998).  
 
The positivist stance states that valid knowledge can only be obtained through 
observation and measurement (Leitch et al., 2009; Morgan & Smircich, 1980). 
Positivism is a natural science epistemology, which advocates the use of natural 
‘hard’ science methods in the examination of reality in the social sciences (Blaikie, 
2007; Bryman, 2015; Della Porta & Keating, 2008). The main principle of 
positivism is that only constructs that are confirmed by the senses and are 
observable can be considered as genuine (Bryman, 2015). Thus, the researcher can 
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objectively analyse the object under investigation, in a neutral manner, separate 
from the mind of the researcher (Della Porta & Keating, 2008).  
 
According to positivism, social science can be conducted in a way that is value free 
and objective (Holden & Lynch, 2004; Leitch et al., 2009; Punch, 2013). However, 
many social scientists have refrained from taking a full positivist epistemological 
stance as it does have its limitations. Some social scientists have termed it 
superficial or reductionist, since human behaviour and social constructs are too 
complex to be reduced into naturalistic representations (Bhaskar, 2013; Blaikie, 
2007; Holden & Lynch, 2004).  
 
On the other hand, interpretivism or constructionism considers that knowledge is 
relative and can only be subjectively attained (Punch, 2013). Interpretivism is an 
epistemological position, which considers that a social scientist must take into 
account the meanings that social actors bring along to situations (Bryman, 2015; 
Punch, 2013). Constructionism considers that social phenomenon is accomplished 
and continually constructed by its social actors (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Punch, 
2013). Thus, they both share the view that social constructs cannot be subjected to 
the methods of natural sciences (Sarantakos, 2012). The origin to such 
epistemological positions, which are naturally anti-positivist in nature, is 
phenomenology (Bryman, 2015). Phenomenology is concerned with how social 
actors make sense of the world, which considers that social reality is meaningful to 
its social actors. Thus, subjectivists investigate social reality from their point of 
view, such that humanistic interpretation is the core of all knowledge (Bryman, 
2015; Della Porta & Keating, 2008; Sarantakos, 2012). In comparison to positivists, 
interpretivists/constructionists consider that social science is an interpretative 
science which searches for meaning, rather than a natural or experimental science 
(Della Porta & Keating, 2008).  
 
Based on the research questions and the researcher’s belief about the nature of 
reality as being objective, I lean towards a positivist epistemological position 
(Holden & Lynch, 2004; Leitch et al., 2009; Punch, 2013). The philosophical 
position guides the methodology as being quantitative in nature and entails the use 
of objective measures to resemble the underlying constructs, which are firm-level 
entrepreneurial orientation and organisational outcomes (Blanche et al., 2006; 
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Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Punch, 2013). According to positivists or 
‘experimentalists’, social science should lend itself to examining social constructs or 
behaviours that are measurable in terms of variables and aim to deconstruct complex 
phenomenon to their independent components and examine them separately. Thus, 
this research aims to deconstruct the EO complex construct to its dimensions by 
objectively capturing them (Della Porta & Keating, 2008).  
 
Management research should originate from the researcher’s beliefs of the social 
phenomenon under examination and of social reality (Keat & Urry, 2011). Thus, 
there should be more of a focus on the philosophical underpinnings of the research 
in the management literature rather than just the choice of the methodology 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012; Leitch et al., 2009). Thus, adopting methodologies, 
which are successful in natural sciences does not make them particularly successful 
in management and entrepreneurship literatures (Lawson, 2008).  
 
Social scientists cannot be fully positivist in nature due to the complexity of social 
constructs that have underlying mechanisms that cannot be observed by the naked 
eye (Dogan, 2013; Keat & Urry, 2011). Thus, an acceptance of the limitations of a 
positivist approach is needed. To this end, post-positivist scientific realism was born 
to counter the criticisms against positivism (Dogan, 2013). Unlike positivism, 
scientific realism accounts for the possibility of having unobservable constructs that 
exist within the realms of science and that can be expressed in theoretical terms 
(metaphysical phenomenon) (Bhaskar, 2013; Greenough & Lynch, 2006). In that 
retrospect, such underlying complex constructs, which cannot be observed, can be 
quantified in terms of their effects (Bhaskar, 2013; Dogan, 2013). Thereby, 
scientific realism is considered as a branch of the ontological positioning of 
objectivism (Stockman, 2013).  
 
Due to the limitations of a full positivist position, this research adopts the view of 
scientific realism, which is considered a logical positivist position (Dogan, 2013). 
This is consistent with this research considering that entrepreneurial orientation and 
its dimensions as well as firm-level outcomes are complex constructs, which might 
not be observable but could be quantified for examining their effects (Bhaskar, 
2013; Greenough & Lynch, 2006). Furthermore, unlike positivism, which starts with 
observation or experimentation, scientific realism considers that theory is a 
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prerequisite to research (Bhaskar, 2013). Thus, this research adopts scientific 
realism since it falls in line with the deductive approach to research. This approach 
entails the examination of the complex constructs that was preceded by the 
theoretical underpinnings (Bhaskar, 2013; Dogan, 2013). Unlike positivists, 
scientific realists acknowledge that there is a difference between the reality that they 
are observing and their depiction of it (Bhaskar, 2013; Bryman, 2015; May, 2011).  
 
Scientific realism, however, shares some features with positivism (Bailey, 2008; 
Bhaskar, 2013). Scientific realism uses the same methods as natural sciences to 
social sciences; however, unlike positivism or ‘naïve realism’, it considers that 
absolute knowledge cannot be reached through humanistic perceptions of reality 
(Bhaskar, 2013; Hunt, 2005). This is a view that was initially endorsed by Weber, 
who considered that scientific realism is not a strictly positivist approach (Bailey, 
2008).  Thus, scientific realism accepts that social reality does not have to be 
directly observable but inferable through indirect measurements (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2012). 
 
The next section will discuss the research methodology and research design 
undertaken in the overall thesis.  
 
4.3 Research Design and Methodology 
 
This section will outline the research design types with a focus on the research 
design of this thesis, followed by the research methodology and the time dimension. 
 
4.3.1 Research Design  
 
Social science research involves either theory testing, which is in line with 
deductive reasoning, or theory generation, which involves inductive reasoning 
(Popper, 2002). Research designs are classified according to the researcher’s 
purpose in the expectation that they would reduce uncertainty about the underlying 
constructs (Zikmund et al., 2013).  
 
Research designs are categorised into exploratory or confirmatory designs (Blaikie, 
2009; Zikmund et al., 2013). Confirmatory research designs can be considered 
either descriptive or experimental (i.e. explanatory or causal) (Zikmund et al., 
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2013). Thereby, a researcher chooses between three possible research designs: 
exploratory, descriptive, or experimental designs.  
 
Exploratory research is considered the starting point of theory building (Zikmund et 
al., 2013). Confirmatory research is considered applicable when the researcher 
detects or formulates a gap or a problem in the literature and with the guidance of an 
existing theory sets to answer the research questions in support of the theories in the 
literature (the intent being to support, extend, challenge or debunk existing theory) 
(Zikmund et al., 2013).  
 
The start of any research is through exploratory research with the expectation that it 
will set the stage for descriptive research, which would then establish the 
appropriateness of causal/experimental research (Bryman, 2015; Zikmund et al, 
2013).  
 
The purpose of a researcher conducting exploratory research designs tends to 
involve clarifying an ambiguous situation, however, it does not provide conclusive 
results (Zikmund et al., 2013). Exploratory research tends to be highly unstructured 
and usually conducted in the early stages of research when there is high uncertainty 
about the construct(s).  
 
Exploratory research involves a preliminary inquiry about a phenomenon that has 
not been explored in the literature, so it follows a flexible and an open ended 
inductive approach (Blaikie, 2009; Blanche et al., 2006).  
 
Descriptive research tends to be conducted in later stages when the researcher is 
aware of the problem, but needs to probe around one or more research questions to 
attain more knowledge regarding the constructs and develop a better understanding 
of the relationships between the variables (Zikmund et al., 2013). Thus, descriptive 
research aims to describe a phenomenon accurately that follows from a more 
rigorous approach whereby the researcher has a clear set of research questions to 
guide the research (Blaikie, 2009; Blanche et al., 2006). Descriptive research tends 
to entail a focus on the representativeness of the sample, and validity and reliability 
of the measured relationships (Blanche et al., 2006).  
Lastly, experimental research designs, which tend to be used to test causal 
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relationships, are appropriate when the problem is clearly defined, and the 
researcher knows or predicts the causes and effects of the relationships under 
examination (Blanche et al., 2006; De Vaus, 2001; Zikmund et al., 2013).  
 
Each research design attains different results, but also serves different purposes. 
Exploratory research, a discovery oriented form of research, can be considered as 
the most productive since it yields many ideas to generate a new theory. However, it 
is speculative in nature since such ideas need to be tested and put into a structure 
(Stebbins, 2001; Zikmund et al., 2013). Descriptive research designs describe 
relationships between variables. Thus, descriptive research produces confirmatory 
structured results. Descriptive studies explain what relationships look like, but do 
not explain why such relationships exist. Yet, having a clear description of the 
underlying relationships paves the way for investigating the explanation of such 
relationships (Punch, 2013). Causal research, can be considered as the most 
structured or tightly controlled research design, which explains why the investigated 
relationships exist and allows the production of confirmatory conclusive results. 
However, it is limited in usability because researchers must be able to tightly 
manage all variables in a controlled environment (Blanche et al., 2006; Zikmund et 
al., 2013). 
 
The choice of which research design to adopt depends on the goals of the researcher 
and the researcher’s purpose, research questions, and the philosophical position 
(Blanche et al., 2006; Zikmund et al., 2013). According to Newman and authors 
(2003) the researcher’s purpose is more significant than the research questions as it 
is at a fundamental level which guides the research questions.  
 
The purpose of this research is to add to the knowledge base on the entrepreneurial 
orientation construct by measuring the effect of EO and each of its dimensions on 
firm-level outcomes, using organisational learning theory and prospect theory. This 
is consistent with the descriptive design (starting with a theoretical framework and 
developing hypotheses to support or debunk that theory).  
 
A descriptive design is selected in this thesis because the research purpose is 
centered on describing the relationships between firm-level EO and its dimensions 
and firm performance/failure. The research questions are centered on investigating 
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the effects of each of EO and its dimensions on firm performance/failure. It is rare 
in the social sciences to conduct experimental research designs, which are mostly 
utilised in the natural sciences. Thereby, large-N (number of cases/observations) 
samples and statistical tools are used to approximate the experimental design and to 
infer cause-effect relationships rigorously (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). Such 
forms of studies that cover many observations are considered to provide significant 
and valid inferences. Brady et al. (2004) consider that a mainstream tool that is used 
by social scientists is regression analysis, which is used to infer causal relationships. 
By using regression multivariate analysis, causal modelling is achieved through 
examining the effects of several variables (main and control variables) on the 
dependent variables as well as approximating the ‘concomitant variations’ between 
the predictor and dependent variables in the form of regression coefficients (Della 
Porta & Keating, 2008).  
 
The next section will outline an overview of various research methodologies and the 
methodology adopted in this thesis.  
 
4.3.2 Research Methodology 
 
Quantitative methodologies have been mostly identified with the deductive strategy 
whereas qualitative methodologies in exploratory designs have been identified with 
the inductive strategy (Bernard, 2012; Blanche et al., 2006).  
 
Qualitative investigations focus on examining constructs in depth and provide a lot 
of rich data and nuanced details that quantitative methods cannot provide (Blanche 
et al., 2006; Taylor, 2005; Zikmund et al., 2013). Thus, a qualitative methodology is 
appropriate for exploratory research designs, which are utilised by interpretivists 
and constructionists, and can be suitable for descriptive research designs when the 
intent is to show in detail how a phenomenon appears to operate with the purpose of 
building theory (Blanche et al., 2006). However, qualitative research can be limited 
in its ability to test research questions and hypotheses due to its lack of 
intersubjective explicability (i.e. different researchers using the same tools to come 
to same conclusions) and researcher dependency (Zikmund et al., 2013).  
 
Quantitative investigations are more objective than qualitative methods since they 
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involve numerical data and empirical analysis, in which the researcher is detached 
from the data generation and analysis process (Blanche et al., 2006; Taylor, 2005; 
Zikmund et al., 2013). Quantitative investigations, mostly utilised by positivist 
researchers, are appropriate when the research design is either descriptive or 
experimental. Quantitative methods mostly involve a set of testable hypotheses 
whereby the intent is to test theory and quantify underlying relationships between 
regressed variable(s) and a dependent variable with the inference of a causal 
sequencing effect (Blanche et al., 2006; Creswell, 2013; Della Porta & Keating, 
2008).  
 
The notion that quantitative methods are concerned only with theory testing and 
qualitative methods with theory generation is an oversimplification (Bryman & Bell, 
2015). In fact, quantitative methodologies are concerned with generating theories 
just as qualitative methodologies are associated with testing theories or hypotheses 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015; Punch, 2013). For instance, the analysis of quantitative data 
based on social surveys is more exploratory in nature and can generate theories 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015).  
 
Following the ontological underpinnings of this research (i.e. objectivism), and the 
epistemological position (i.e. scientific realism), the research design chosen was 
descriptive in nature. The intent of this research was to test theories, organisational 
learning theory and prospect theory, using testable hypotheses explaining the EO-
firm performance/failure relationship. Thereby, the research methodology of this 
thesis is a quantitative method (whilst allowing room for interpretation) (Bryman, 
2015; Dogan, 2013).  
 
The next section will introduce the time dimension in this thesis.  
 
4.3.3 Time Dimension 
 
The time dimension is an important characteristic of any research to consider, in 
which the choice of the time dimension depends on the research purpose and 
questions (Blaikie, 2009). There are several types of research, which differ on the 
time dimension: either cross-sectional (at one point in time), historical (in the past), 
or longitudinal (extended at several points in time). Longitudinal research refers to 
132 
 
the emphasis of the aspect of change (Ployhart & Vandenburg, 2010). There are 
different types of longitudinal research studies. Such types are classified as either 
time series (conducted at different points in time), panel (examining the same firms 
or people over time combining time series and cross-sectional forms of data), or 
cohort (examining the same categories of people or organisations, who share similar 
characteristics and experience a common type of event, over time) (Blaikie, 2009).  
 
Longitudinal studies allow for the explanation and understanding of the 
relationships between variables and their interactions (Blaikie, 2009). It is surprising 
that most of the research in the social sciences, which involves theory testing, is 
conducted using cross-sectional designs that examine variables at only one point in 
time (Ployhart & Vandenburg, 2010). However, variables in cross-sectional studies 
are static such that cross-sectional designs cannot indicate how a variable varies 
over time (Maxwell & Cole, 2007). The adoption of a longitudinal design is more 
advantageous, since it allows the researcher to test how the relationship between the 
constructs of interest changes and shows how the strength of that relationship varies 
over time (Blaikie, 2009; Bryman, 2015). The strength of causal inference can be 
increased when a descriptive research design is made longitudinal (multiple time 
periods) over and above cross-sectional designs (single period) (Blaikie, 2009). 
Longitudinal studies would allow the researcher to evaluate and track the changes in 
relationships of the same entities over time (Blaikie, 2009). By utilising a 
longitudinal design then a causal relationship can be empirically tested and shown 
instead of mistakenly considering an association or correlation for spurious 
causation in a cross-sectional dataset (Della Porta & Keating, 2008).  
 
This doctoral research is theory-driven and most theories in organisational sciences 
are developed to explain phenomenon that occur consistently at more than one point 
in time (Ployhart & Vandenburg, 2010). A longitudinal form is favoured in this 
thesis so that the long-term effects of EO and its dimensions on firm-level outcomes 
over time can be considered, whether effects are delayed or ‘lagged’ in nature, and 
what effects arise for firm performance and when, and how these might change over 
time and across various time periods (Blaikie, 2009). By adopting a longitudinal 
design, we were able to overcome the limitations of cross-sectional studies 
dominating the body of knowledge on EO (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010; Rauch et 
al., 2009).  
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In this thesis a longitudinal panel, from the pre-crisis (fiscal year 2000) until the 
post-crisis period (fiscal year 2014), was used to investigate the long-term effects of 
EO and its dimensions on the long-term firm value and firm failure/survival. One 
prominent type of a longitudinal study is a panel, which examines the same entities 
of interest over a significant period (Blaikie, 2009). Thus, panel data, which 
involves examining multiple variables across multiple time periods, will account for 
firm heterogeneity. Panel data using secondary data sources also avoids common 
method bias, which is characteristic of survey studies, since it allows the collection 
of data from different sources (Rauch et al., 2009).  
 
4.4 Concluding Comments for Philosophical Position and Methodology 
 
The purpose of this section was to re-emphasise and reiterate the researcher’s 
ontological and epistemological positioning and the research method undertaken. 
For the purposes of this research, a quantitative investigation was adopted so that 
causal inferences are validly made to best understand the relationships among EO 
and its dimensions and firm performance/failure. The inferences that were drawn 
from this research; however, are dependent on the research sample and the period 
included (Della Porta & Keating, 2008).  
 
A quantitative approach usually follows a deductive approach starting with theory 
and developing hypotheses to test theory. Furthermore, a deductive approach, is 
emphasised in research leaning towards positivism (Bailey, 2008; Blanche et al., 
2006). In positivist research, cause-effect relationships between variables could be 
empirically tested (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). Following this research’s 
deductive approach to theory testing and the objectivist ontological position and 
epistemological position based on scientific realism, the research methodology 
selected for this doctoral research endeavour is quantitative and secondary data was 
prioritised to obtain objective data on EO and firm performance measures. This 
research is in the form of a longitudinal large-scale panel, since the use of archival 
data enables researchers to use large sample over several periods of time. The use of 
secondary data avoids the costs of longitudinal studies, and allows for a more 
rigorous test of hypotheses in comparison to cross-sectional studies (Blaikie, 2009; 
Bryman, 2015). Furthermore, the use of objective data avoids problems of social 
desirability bias associated with primary data collection methods, which 
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contaminate the data analysis (Haynes et al., 2014).  
 
The next section will outline the research sample selection criteria.  
 
4.5 Research Site and Sample 
 
The purpose of this section, which applies to Study 1 and Study 2, is to provide 
reasoning behind the inclusion of the sample chosen as well as the sample size in 
relation to the main constructs under examination.  
 
The research sample consisted of a sufficient number of firms pursuing an 
entrepreneurial orientation and operating in the high-technology industry. The 
choice of this industry is in accordance with the EO-as-Experimentation perspective 
and thus would provide insights on the effect of EO on firm-level outcomes 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Most importantly, the choice of the industry is 
reasoned for and evidenced through the mean values of EO in the technology-
oriented industry versus the excluded sample of firms, which will be shown below 
in section 4.6.  
 
Technology-based firms operating in the high-technology industry were chosen for 
this research, since entrepreneurial orientation involves experimenting with new 
technologies (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). When examining the long-term effect of 
EO it is relevant to utilise the context of technology-oriented firms. Essentially firms 
belonging to the high-technology industry, which is constantly a changing growth 
oriented industry, are forced from the competitive pressures of such an industry into 
adopting an entrepreneurial orientation (Patel et al., 2015). Firms that face high 
technological changes are more likely to be more entrepreneurially oriented by 
exploring new technologies (Uotila et al., 2009). This is in line with the definition 
put forth by Lumpkin and Dess (1996). Thus, perhaps firms in the high-technology 
industry face a higher need for adopting EO (Rauch et al., 2009). Previous 
researchers examining EO have focused on the technology industry (e.g. Engelen et 
al., 2015; Hughes & Morgan, 2007; Patel et al., 2015). However, none have put 
forward the Wiklund and Shepherd’s (2011) call for examining the effect of EO or 
its dimensions on firm failure, using insights from the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective. This is where the contribution of this research comes in. 
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The widely accepted Fama and French (1997) industrial classifications were used to 
classify the firms into their respective industrial categories. The firms were 
classified into 12 industrial groups since the Fama and French (1997) 12 industrial 
classifications allows for a wider array of firms within each industry, rather than the 
finer 48 industrial classification of Fama and French, and would still give reliable 
results of industry effects (Fama & French, 1997). The 12 industrial classifications 
were extracted from the Fama and French website (Fama & French, 1997).  
 
Financial industries (SIC codes 6000 to 6999) were excluded because they might 
hold cash to satisfy capital requirements (Bates et al., 2009), and may have faced 
dramatic change in regulation over the past 10 years particularly over the period of 
the financial crisis (Knights & McCabe, 2015). Furthermore, Fama and French 
(1992) have indicated that a financial firm’s high leverage is not comparable to that 
of a non-financial firm, in which a non-financial firm’s high leverage can indicate 
financial distress. Utilities firms (SIC codes 4900 to 4949) were also excluded, 
because they are subject to government regulation and are under state ownership, 
which is irrelevant to this research (Hoberg & Parabhala, 2009). This means that the 
utilities and financial firms are not comparable to firms from other industries, hence 
they were excluded (Baker & Wurgler, 2004; Hoberg &Parabhala, 2009). 
 
The overall industrial classification of Fama and French (1997) were further refined 
to include only certain industrial codes to analyse the EO and firm performance 
relationship in a sample of high-technology-based firms. The classification of the 
high-technology industry was based on four-digit SIC (industrial classification 
codes) from Loughran and Ritter (2004). Thus, firms were coded as belonging to the 
high-technology industry as a dummy variable equal to one. The reason for 
choosing the four-digit classification of Loughran and Ritter (2004) is that at the 
three-digit SIC classification, some firms that are non-technology oriented might be 
included in the technology classification. For instance, the three-digit SIC=357 
classification (i.e. computer hardware) contains office machines (SIC=3579). 
However, office machines, under the three-digit classification of computer 
hardware, are not considered technology-oriented firms (Oakey et al., 2010). By 
using the three-digit SIC classification, the boundaries of technology classification 
of firms become arbitrary (Oakey et al., 2010). Previous researchers have also used 
the Loughran and Ritter (2004) high-technology industrial classification (e.g. Gao et 
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al., 2015; Hoberg & Parabhala, 2009). Thus, the high-technology industrial 
classification is: Computer Hardware (SIC=3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578), 
Communication Equipment (SIC= 3661, 3663, 3669), Electronics (SIC= 3671, 
3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679), Navigation Equipment (SIC= 3812), 
Measuring and Controlling devices (such as lab analytical devices) (SIC= 3823, 
3825, 3826, 3827, 3829), Medical Instruments (such as surgical instruments) (SIC= 
3841, 3845), Telephone Equipment (SIC= 4812, 4813), Communications Services 
(SIC= 4899), and Software (SIC= 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379).  
 
A further sample criterion is firm size. Only large firms, defined as greater than 500 
employees were selected (Rauch et al., 2009), since larger firms have more slack 
resources and market dominance to strategically pursue more entrepreneurial 
endeavours to sustain and grow their wealth and to resist competition from others in 
the industry and new entrants (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Hughes & Morgan, 2007; 
Wales et al. 2013c; Zahra & Garvis, 2000). This is not to undermine that other 
researchers have indicated that smaller organisations are more flexible and able to 
adapt and cease opportunities in their environments (Rauch et al., 2009). The use of 
large public organisations rather than small private firms is of relevance to the 
research context since it is more likely to find reliable data on large publicly-listed 
organisations. Large organisations have reporting obligations and data that is 
accessible publicly as part of their public listing status (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2011). Furthermore, having only large firms provides a conservative setting for 
examining the effect of EO on firm-level outcomes, since smaller firms have been 
shown to have negative outcomes from adopting EO (Wales et al., 2013c). Thereby, 
most importantly the criteria of only including large firms was applied to provide us 
with a neutral setting to examine the double-edged nature of EO. As a further 
refinement, the chosen firms should have R&D spending since R&D constitutes one 
of the main measures for EO.  Firms with no R&D spent (i.e. R&D=0) were 
excluded before the computation of the variables.  
 
The context of the research is important to consider (e.g. US or UK context, for 
example). To this end, the US context is more relevant to EO, since it has been 
shown that US firms generally exhibit higher levels of EO than those in other 
countries (Kemelgor, 2002). Moreover, the focus on US firms was because the 
emphasis of this research was not examining cross-country effects, but rather on a 
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context that would provide theoretical insights (Wales, 2016). In certain non-US 
contexts, it has been shown that EO does not have a significant effect on firm 
outcomes because of cultural and structural constraints (Kraus et al., 2012). Lastly, 
there is more data available on publicly traded US companies. 
 
For this thesis, the total number of firm-year observations is 5,011, utilising a 
sample of 742 firms, along a span of 15 years from 2000 until 2014. Thus, when 
examining the EO construct objectively, many observations were included for 
empirical analysis, in which the time dimension could be utilised to increase the 
number of observations in longitudinal studies (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). Few 
researchers have examined the longitudinal effects of EO or any of its dimensions 
on firm performance or failure even though EO is manifest through sustained 
entrepreneurial behaviour (Covin & Miller, 2014; Covin & Slevin, 1991; Miller, 
2011). Thus, there is a need to have a substantial longitudinal timeframe when 
examining the effect of EO and its different dimensions on firm-level outcomes 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). It is insightful to examine the long-term effect of EO 
from the pre-crisis to post crisis period, which reasons for the inclusion of sufficient 
number of years prior to the crisis and following the crisis.  
 
Having a large sample size of firms is a requirement in quantitative studies to allow 
for sufficient data collection and analysis and consequently for the testing of the 
research questions and hypotheses. Most importantly, in the case of abstract 
concepts such as EO, there should be a significant number of cases that are 
examined (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). Large sample sizes decrease sampling 
errors and improve external validity (Murphy et al., 2014; Scandura & Williams, 
2000; Yang et al., 2006). Positivists tend to choose large number of aggregated 
cases (i.e. firms in this research) to enhance generalisability (Della Porta & Keating, 
2008). Sample size affects the statistical significance of the results, and in turn 
affects the statistical validity of the research (Scandura & Williams, 2000). In this 
thesis a sample of 742 firms was used to examine the EO/EO dimensions and firm 
performance/failure relationship. The minimum sample size required for ensuring 
statistical power when testing hypotheses in this research was calculated to be 231 
firms (as explained below).  
 
It is imperative to refer to statistical power analysis using effect size (ES) and 
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significance level alpha to determine the minimum required size for regression 
analysis (Haynes et al., 2014). Accordingly, the significance level  was set to 0.05, 
in which  refers to probability of making a type I error of rejecting the null 
hypothesis (H0) when the null hypothesis is true (Kim et al., 2004; Murphy et al., 
2014). Setting  at 0.05 rather than 0.01 is commonly used since a more lenient 
statistical significance level would improve the statistical power of the hypothesis 
testing (Murphy et al., 2014).  refers to the probability of making a type II error of 
failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is false or the alternative hypothesis (H1) 
is true (Cohen, 1992; Murphy et al., 2014). Cohen (1992) recommended that  be 
equal to , thereby  is set at 0.05 (Kim et al., 2004). The  probability is relevant to 
the research’s statistical power. The statistical power is calculated as 1-=0.95 
(Cohen, 1992; Murphy et al., 2014). The statistical power refers to the probability of 
avoiding a type II error because of sampling error (Cohen, 1992; Murphy et al., 
2014). Lastly, the effect size (i.e. size of difference between the null or the 
population mean and alternative hypothesis or the sample mean) is set to a medium 
(F-test for regression or f2 ratio=0.15) (Cohen, 1992), in which most social sciences 
set the effect size to be medium to ensure that the difference between the population 
mean and sample mean is large enough to be detectable (Cohen, 1992; Haynes et al., 
2014; Kim et al., 2004; Murphy et al., 2014). Small effect size means that the effect 
is not visible whereas large effect size indicates something is easily visible (Cohen, 
1992; Murphy et al., 2014).  
 
The sample size requirement of the overall thesis is calculated as follows. The effect 
size (f2=0.15), =0.05, power=0.95, and the number of predictor variables 
(including year dummies and controls) is 22; thereby, the recommended sample size 
is 231 (Haynes et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2004). With the estimated effect size, the 
sample needed to ensure statistical power is below the sample size of the thesis’s 
research studies. Thereby, this ensures that the thesis would result in valid 
conclusions when testing hypotheses (Haynes et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2004). 
However, missing data needs to be accounted for thereby it would result in an 
unbalanced panel (Haynes et al., 2014).   
 
The use of secondary data from well-established and cited databases such as 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) gives the researcher greater freedom in 
139 
 
using a larger sample size to test the research questions and hypotheses (e.g. Chen et 
al., 2015; Haynes et al., 2014). Previous researchers in the field of firm-level 
entrepreneurship have used secondary data from databases in WRDS to conduct 
their studies (Haynes et al., 2014; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). WRDS gives 
access to several databases such as Compustat and Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). Compustat-North America is a financial database that includes 
financial data on more than 30,000 Canadian and US firms. CRSP contains market 
data and share prices and returns of equities. To merge the datasets (Compustat and 
CRSP) and code for the data and access the variables that are needed for this 
doctoral research, Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) was used. The use of SAS 
allows for large data acquisition and merging of datasets. Furthermore, SAS 
software is quick in sorting large datasets and for running models through coding. 
The advantage of SAS is that it is clear in reporting possible bugs in coding in any 
step the researcher runs thereby minimizing the risk of programming error in the 
acquisition, sorting and analysis of data.  
 
In summary, the research sample chosen was appropriate for providing the context 
for examining the EO/EO dimensions and firm performance/failure relationship. 
The sample size was reasoned by the effect size to improve the statistical power of 
the hypothesis testing. The use of secondary data allowed for more inclusion of 
firms. With a greater sample size, the statistical power (i.e. by decreasing sampling 
errors) of the thesis was improved (Murphy et al., 2014). 
 
The next section will outline the mean values of EO in the sample of firms in the 
high-technology industry versus the mean values of EO among the sample of firms 
that were excluded from the analysis. This provides validation for the choice of the 
high-technology industry to examine the EO and firm performance relationship. 
 
4.6 EO Mean values for High-technology versus Excluded Sample 
 
The examination of the entrepreneurial orientation and firm performance 
relationship was conducted in the context of the high-technology industry since it 
demonstrates more entrepreneurial orientation than a non-technology oriented 
industry (Covin et al., 1990; Patel et al., 2015).  
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The operationalisation and definitions of the EO construct as well as its dimensions 
are presented in chapter 5, Study 1 of this thesis. The information regarding their 
definition, measurement, and source of data are summarised in table 5.1 in chapter 
5. 
 
Below are descriptive statistics of the overall set of firms from the Compustat-CRSP 
merged file, from 2000 until 2014, among the high-technology firms versus firms 
not included in the Study. As can be shown in table 4.1, the high-technology 
industry mean statistics of EO is 0.46 whereas the excluded sample of firms had a 
mean value of -0.29. This indicates that the examination of EO and its main 
dimensions’ relationship with firm performance is relevant in the high-technology 
industry as EO constitutes the main variable under examination in this overall thesis.  
 
The results that the mean value of EO is higher in the high-technology industry 
provides support for part of the hypothesis H5 of this thesis, that high-technology 
firms are more entrepreneurially oriented. 
 
Interestingly, the mean of proactiveness among firms that belong to the high-
technology industry was -0.14, which is below the mean of proactiveness among the 
excluded sample of firms. This indicates that firms in the high-technology industry 
are being less proactive i.e. retaining less. By examining the overall gestalt EO 
construct, one would not be able to realise that proactiveness, one of the main 
dimensions of EO, was lower in firms belonging to the high-technology industry in 
comparison to excluded sample of firms. Concerning the other dimensions of EO, 
the mean values of innovativeness and risk taking were higher among the firms in 
the high-technology industry. 
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Table 4.1: Mean Values of EO and its Dimensions in High-technology Firms 
versus Excluded Sample of Firms 
 
Standardised 
Variables 
High-
technology 
Firms 
Excluded 
sample 
EO 0.46 -0.29 
Innovativeness 0.48 -0.28 
Proactiveness -0.14 0.08 
Risk taking 0.16 -0.09 
 
4.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
The significance of this chapter is to indicate the guidance of the research 
philosophical position (i.e. ontology: objectivism and epistemology: scientific 
realism), the methodology (quantitative), the methods chosen (SAS software coding 
of variables), as well as the sources of data (WRDS platform secondary data). The 
theoretical underpinnings guided the inclusion of variables and their computations. 
This research in turn followed a deductive strategy (starting with theory and testing 
hypotheses based on the theoretical foundations of the research). This doctoral 
research is thereby research-led.  
 
The next chapter will describe Study 1: (examining the effect of EO and its 
dimensions on firm performance measures among surviving and failed firms), in 
which the reasoning behind the variables’ selection is based on the theory of this 
doctoral research (organisational learning and prospect theory).  
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Chapter 5 
 
 Research Methodology for Study 1: 
 Examining EO and its Dimensions and Firm Performance 
Relationship 
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5.1 Introduction to the Chapter  
 
This chapter describes the main variables (predictor, dependent, and control 
variables) that were included in Study 1. In Study 1, the focus was on the EO-firm 
performance relationship. It sought to answer the research question: What is the 
longitudinal effect of EO and each of its dimensions on the short-term and long-term 
firm performance? In Study 2, the focus was on the EO-firm failure relationship. 
The same measures of EO and some of the control variables that were utilised in 
Study 1 were also used in Study 2. The EO-as-Experimentation perspective guided 
the hypotheses that were generated referring to the EO and firm performance/failure 
relationship. The EO-as-Experimentation perspective considers that EO would not 
only lead to higher performance among surviving firms, as the literature 
predominantly agrees, but would increase chances of failure among non-surviving 
firms as well (Revilla et al., 2016; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Non-surviving 
firms, that were identified based on the status alert (STALT item) in Compustat, 
were also included and had undergone a separate analysis from the surviving firms. 
The firms had a unique identifier in the panel dataset (i.e. gvkey) and each firm had 
several observations, thus the form of the dataset was a panel, which included a 
cross-sectional and a time-series dimension.  
 
Each dimension of EO (innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking) was 
operationalised independently and this is consistent with the multi-dimensional 
conceptualisation of EO in this research. This thesis also acknowledges the multi-
dimensional view of organisational performance (Gupta & Wales, 2017; Ketchen et 
al., 2006; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Rauch et al., 2009). Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam (1986) identified the dimensionality of firm performance as consisting 
of financial (such as growth, accounting and stock market returns) and non-financial 
measures (such as organisational effectiveness and operational performance). Most 
of the entrepreneurship literature has focused on the financial aspect of firm 
performance due to the theoretical and conceptual argument that EO has a 
considerable effect on financial performance (Rauch et al., 2009). However, the 
literature agrees on the positive effect of EO on financial firm performance (Rauch 
et al., 2009; Zahra & Covin, 1995). Study 1 focused on financial and market-based 
performance measures when examining the effect of EO on firm performance in 
each of the surviving and failed or inactive firms to challenge the EO-as-Advantage 
144 
 
perspective.  
 
The inclusion of the variables in the overall thesis is based upon the theoretical 
foundation of organisational learning and prospect theory. The following section 
will first outline the measurement of the dependent variables, organisational 
performance measures (Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets). Subsequently, it will 
present each of the predictor variables (EO dimensions) and the control variables. It 
will also outline a description of the regression model and its assumptions chosen 
for Study 1. Study 1 has been designed to test hypotheses H1, H2a and H2b, H3a 
and H3b, H6a, H6b, H7a, H7b, H8a, and H8b.  
 
5.2 Variables for Study 1 
 
This section will start by outlining the firm performance measures followed by the 
measurement of each of the EO dimensions, and lastly focus on the control 
variables. It will also outline the reasoning behind the inclusion of the variables, 
their sources, and computations. The computations of each of the EO dimensions 
are constructed to be consistent with their definitions. The computations of the 
variables refer to the data items that are outlined in the appendix. It is noteworthy to 
point that all the variables tested in the regression were winsorized to eliminate the 
effect of outliers (i.e. the transformation of extreme values below the 1st percentile 
and above the 99th percentile to their respective 1st and 99th percentiles) and 
standardized (i.e. converting variables to have a mean of zero and standard deviation 
of 1) (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011).  
 
5.2.1 Dependent Variables: Firm Performance Measures 
 
The purpose of this section is to identify the different firm performance measures 
that were included and their opertionalisation. 
 
The financial performance measures of interest to this research were profitability 
(represented by accounting returns or return on assets (ROA)), and stock market 
returns (Tobin’s Q). There are major differences between the accounting-based and 
market-based measures of firm performance. The reason for including both is to 
have a better representation of the multi-dimensionality characterisation of firm 
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performance (Gupta & Wales, 2017; Haynes et al., 2014).  
 
Market-based measures of firm performance were the main firm performance 
measures chosen for Study 1 since accounting-based measures are more inclined to 
be manipulated by executives (Haynes et al., 2014). Furthermore, scholars have 
advocated the use of market-based measures, such as Tobin’s Q, rather than 
accounting-based measures of firm performance such as ROA, ROE (return on 
equity), and ROI (return on investment) (Dalton & Aguinis, 2013; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006). As such the Tobin’s Q measure can signify growth prospects as well 
(Lang & Stulz, 1994). Even though most of the studies on EO have used 
accounting-based measures when assessing outcomes of EO (Rauch et al., 2009), 
Dalton and Aguinis (2013) noted that such measures suffer from contamination and 
deficiency since they do not convey the direct benefit to shareholders. Market-based 
measures of firm performance represent the long-term firm value and the investor’s 
valuation of firm performance (Haynes et al., 2014). Yet, it is better to include both 
measures of firm performance (Gupta & Wales, 2017). Thus, to capture the multi-
dimensional nature of firm performances, ROA was also included in Study 1. Such 
performance measures were obtained from Compustat.  
 
5.2.1.1 First Firm Performance Measure 
 
The first measure of performance represents long-term firm performance, which was 
measured by Tobin’s Q. 
 
Tobin’s Q: Tobin’s Q is a common measure of firm performance used in the 
entrepreneurship literature (Andrews & Welbourne, 2000), which assesses the 
valuation of the firm’s stock market value relative to the replacement cost of its 
assets (Mehran, 1995). Tobin’s Q is considered as an indicator of a firm’s long-term 
performance (Lin et al., 2006). Unlike short-term measures of firm performance, 
Tobin’s Q signifies risk and return components (Lin et al., 2006). The reason that 
Tobin’s Q has been used commonly in the entrepreneurship literature is that it can 
represent the market reaction to the firm’s innovation (Gao et al., 2015). Such a ratio 
represents the ratio of the firm’s market value to book value of assets (Adams & 
Santos, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). The advantage of Tobin’s Q is that 
it captures the value of EO within capital markets (Gupta et al., 2016). Tobin’s Q 
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represents a ‘parsimonious measure’ of valuation that has been long used in the 
economics literature and is grounded in economic theory (Montgomery & 
Wernerfelt, 1988). It is a forward-looking measure that adjusts and accounts for the 
risk, it encompasses short and long-term aspects of performance (Gupta et al., 2016; 
Uotila et al., 2009), includes an assessment for expected outcomes of the firm’s 
performance in future markets (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006), and is not likely to be 
manipulated by managers (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981). Market-based measures have 
been frequently used in research that encompasses a long-time horizon (e.g. Lin et 
al., 2006; Uotila et al., 2009).  
 
Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2011) computed Tobin’s Q as such: (common shares 
outstanding  calendar year closing price) + (current liabilities−current assets) + 
long-term debt + liquidating value of preferred stock)/ by total assets. Thus, 
according to Compustat items, it was computed as: (CSHO*PRCC_C) +(LCT-ACT) 
+DLTT+PSTKL)/AT. The data was obtained from Compustat.       
 
5.2.1.2 Second Firm Performance Measure 
 
The second measure of firm performance was the short-term firm performance 
(ROA). 
                                                                                                                
Short-term firm performance: Short-term firm performance (ROA) is a 
profitability accounting-based measure of a firm’s financial performance. It is an 
indicator of the firm’s degree of efficiency in utilising its current assets (Carpenter 
et al., 2001). It was computed as net income before extraordinary items (IB)/total 
assets (AT) (Haynes et al., 2014; Klein, 2002) from Compustat. 
 
The next section will outline the independent variables that were used starting with 
the EO dimensions and the EO construct followed by the control variables. 
 
5.2.2 EO Dimensions 
 
This section outlines the EO dimensions that were included in the overall thesis (i.e. 
the main dimensions of EO, which include innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk 
taking). EO was measured using proxies, since they are quantitative indirect 
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measures of EO in contrast to the classic Covin and Slevin (1989) psychometric 
subjective scale (Miller, 2011). Archival data has been long used to develop proxy 
measures to represent theoretical concepts. Proxy variables represent a latent, 
unobservable construct (Ketchen et al., 2013). Each of the dimensions of EO was 
examined independently. Previous researchers, even those who have used proxies to 
convey EO (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011), have combined the EO dimensions 
into an EO index. This in turn masks the independent effects of each of the EO 
dimensions on firm-level outcomes (Hughes & Morgan, 2007; Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996). Thus, it is vital to examine each of these proxies of EO independently.  
 
5.2.2.1 Innovativeness 
 
The following section presents the different measurements that were used in the 
Study to measure innovativeness. Measurement 1 and 3 represent the inputs into the 
innovation or R&D-based process, whereas measurement 2 represents the outputs of 
innovativeness (Swift, 2016). 
 
5.2.2.1.1 First Measurement of Innovativeness 
 
Firms that invest more in R&D are inclined to be more innovative (Hall et al., 2005; 
Lee & O’Neill, 2003). The innovativeness dimension of EO has been defined as 
technological experimentation through investing in R&D (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; 
Miller, 1983). Thus, innovativeness was computed as R&D expenditure divided by 
the total assets. The source of the data was from Compustat. The measurement 
based on Compustat items was XRD/AT. This measure of innovativeness is termed 
R&D intensity (Hall et al., 2005). R&D intensity as represented by R&D 
expenditure divided by total assets was used instead of R&D expenditure divided by 
total sales since the latter has been used to proxy firm growth opportunities 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Ketchen et al. (2013) noted that there are issues with 
associating the innovativeness dimension of EO with greater spending in R&D. 
R&D expenditures consider the expenses incurred in both the research and 
development phases. However, it is important to consider the research productivity 
as well by examining patent data.  
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5.2.2.1.2 Second Measurement of Innovativeness 
 
Patent data captures research productivity (Seru, 2014) and signals the success of 
the R&D of the firm to outside investors (Seru, 2014). A patent has an application 
date (the date the patent was applied for) and a grant date (the date that it was 
eventually granted). Since patent application date is better in capturing the actual 
time of innovation, then it was used to count the patent number for each firm (Hall 
et al., 2005). That is, the patent count is the number of filed patent applications that 
were granted.  
 
Patent data, however, has its own imperfections. There is a truncation bias, since 
towards the end of the sample there is an average lag of two to three years between 
the time the patent was applied for until the patent is granted (Dass et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, the USPTO (US patent office) releases the patent applications only 
after the patent has been granted (Dass et al., 2017).  To adjust for this truncation 
bias, Dass and authors (2017) aimed to test the methods in the literature to adjust for 
truncation bias by comparing the NBER dataset until 2006 with the updated 
extended patent dataset until 2010 by Li et al. (2014). The findings of Dass et al. 
(2017) showed that the methods used to adjust for the truncation bias (Hall et al., 
2005) are not sufficient to exclude the bias. Thereby, it was shown that one should 
exclude the last three to five years from the patent dataset to have a truncation bias 
free patent dataset. This shows that the Li and authors (2014) dataset that was 
extended until 2010 fairly has a truncation bias free sample until 2006 when 
compared with the NBER patent dataset. When counting the patent applications, 
Study 1 dataset excluded patent information from years 2007 until 2010.  
 
The patent data that was used was that of utility patents (i.e. inventions) (Kogan et 
al., 2012; Li et al., 2014). The NBER patent project database contains data on 
patents that were merged with Compustat (i.e. firm identifier gvkey) from years 
1975 until 2006. This patent dataset was extended by Kogan et al. (2012) and Li et 
al. (2014).  
 
Patent yield was measured by the number of patents at application date divided by 
R&D (Hall et al., 2005). However, this research is not interested in the importance 
of the output or the patent quality so patent citations were not collected, and patent 
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count sufficed for the underlying research. This research did not distinguish between 
radical or incremental innovation (Gao et al., 2015). The patent data was then 
merged with Compustat/CRSP merged file from 2000 until 2006 based on the CRSP 
identifier Permno, which was supplied by Kogan et al. (2012). 
 
5.2.2.1.3 Third Measurement of Innovativeness 
 
Another important measure of innovativeness is resource intangibility, which has 
been measured as R&D expenditure divided by total number of employees 
(XRD/EMP) (Campbell et al., 2012). The reason for measuring R&D per employee 
is that innovation endeavours require more labour (Holmstorm, 1989). Furthermore, 
such a variable is important to compute, since firms with greater level of intangible 
resources allow their CEOs to have greater latitude of action and engage in 
opportunistic behaviour (Campbell et al., 2012). Thus, agency costs become higher 
in the firm as level of resource intangibility increases. The computation of this 
measure of innovativeness based on Compustat items was XRD/EMP. 
 
5.2.2.2 Proactiveness 
 
Proactiveness or proactive engagement was represented by the percentage of annual 
earnings reinvested in the company, which is retained earnings divided by total 
assets (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). The source of proactiveness measure was 
from Compustat. Based on the Compustat items, the measurement was RE/AT. The 
measurement of proactiveness was consistent with its definition (anticipating future 
demand and retaining resources to ensure the firm’s market positioning) (Miller, 
1983). The use of this measure, instead of an immediate specific investment, is 
useful since it symbolises a firm’s overall proactiveness of building up its business 
on the long run rather than just anticipating current moves (Kaplan & Zingales, 
1997). However, it does have its limitations, in which the nature of the investments 
cannot be known. Regardless, taking several firms along a longitudinal period was 
appropriate to compute proactiveness (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). 
 
5.2.2.3 Risk taking 
 
Risk taking dimension of EO represents the unsystematic risk or idiosyncratic risk 
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(portion unattributed or unexplained by the industry) of the firm. The daily stock 
return file was used from CRSP when computing the idiosyncratic risk, which 
represents the risk in terms of equity. Idiosyncratic risk is measured as the standard 
deviation of residuals from the regression of running the daily stock returns (raw 
returns minus the risk-free rate) on the value weighted market returns (value-
weighted returns minus the risk-free rate) (Hoberg & Parabhala, 2009; Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2011). The idiosyncratic risk was re-adjusted based on fiscal year. 
The measurement of the risk taking dimension is consistent with its definition as 
being firm-specific and is associated with the fluctuations in the firm’s share prices. 
Miller and Le Breton-Miller’s (2011) construction of unsystematic risk reflects 
management’s tendency to pursue risky endeavours (Kreiser et al., 2013). The 
source of the risk taking measure of EO was from CRSP. 
 
5.2.3 EO Construct 
 
In addition to examining the independent effects of each of the EO dimensions on 
firm performance, this research investigated the overall effect of EO on firm 
performance measures. The standardised values of the EO dimensions were added 
to compute an EO index to corroborate the stream of research on the EO-firm 
performance relationship (Miller, 2011; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011).  
 
The next section will indicate the firm-related control variables that were included 
when examining the EO and firm performance relationship. 
 
5.2.4 Firm-Level Control Variables 
 
The purpose of this section is to signify the importance of controlling for certain 
variables that may influence the variables, which are EO and firm performance. 
Some variables are known to influence firm performance (e.g. investment 
opportunity, leverage, liquidity) whereas some variables are known to affect the EO-
firm performance relationship (e.g. systematic risk, firm age, firm size). Thus, 
relevant control variables were included in order to measure the effect of each of the 
EO dimensions on firm performance measures while protecting against alternative 
explanations for any relationships that emerge. 
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5.2.4.1 Investment opportunity 
 
Investment opportunity has been shown to influence firm value (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Harford et al., 2008). From an agency perspective, investment opportunity 
must be controlled as weakly-governed firms and managers who seek personal 
wealth might seek more investments and capital expenditures. This might affect the 
firm value negatively (Harford et al., 2008). Harford and Li (2007) have shown that 
investments increase CEO wealth and compensation, but decrease firm value. Thus, 
investment should be controlled as it influences firm performance measures. 
Investment was calculated as capital expenditures (CAPX) divided by lagged or 
beginning of year long-term assets (equipment, property, and plant) (Lagged 
PPENT) (Campbell et al., 2011; Malmendier & Tate, 2005). This is an accounting-
based measure of investment opportunity. The source of investment opportunity was 
from Compustat.  
 
5.2.4.2 Firm age 
 
Firm age was included since it has been shown to affect the EO and firm 
performance relationship (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011; Rauch et al., 2009). 
Two different measurements of firm age were included in the Study. 
 
5.2.4.2.1 First Measurement of Firm age 
 
Firm age was computed as the difference between the observation year and the 
firm’s listing year in CRSP (Bebchuk et al., 2011; Huang & Ramirez, 2010). It has 
been argued that listing age has more economical meaning than founding year, since 
the listing year is a significant time in a company’s life and affects ownership and 
governance structure, and improves the firm’s opportunities for growth (Bebchuk et 
al., 2011). Thus, it is of relevance to compute firm’s listing age in this research. The 
firm age was computed as the year the firm was first listed on CRSP subtracted from 
the observation year. The lowest allowed value of firm age was zero since the firm’s 
observation in Compustat might occur before the listing year in CRSP. Negative 
values of firm age were set to zero.  
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5.2.4.2.2 Second Measurement of Firm age 
 
To ensure the robustness of the measure, an alternative measure of firm age was 
used based on the founding date of the firm. The source of the founding dates is not 
available in Compustat, so the founding dates of firms was obtained from Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) dataset available on 12,719 firms, with the CRSP identifier, from 
1975-2016 (which has been updated until February 2017). The dataset was merged 
with the Compustat/CRSP merged file using the CRSP firm identifier. The missing 
values of the founding dates of some of the firms were obtained from company 
websites. The firm age measures based on the listing year and the founding year 
were logged.  
 
5.2.4.3 Firm size 
 
Firm size was included since it can affect the EO and firm performance relationship 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011; Rauch et al., 2009; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). 
Firm size was computed as the log value of the number of employees (EMP) 
(Wooldridge, 2015), which is in line with the definition of firm size outlined in 
Chapter 4 (i.e. large firms were classified based on the number of employees (more 
than 500 employees) (Rauch et al., 2009). The source of firm size was from 
Compustat.  
 
5.2.4.4 Liquidity 
 
Liquidity influences a firm’s performance as well as the EO-firm performance 
relationship as the availability of slack resources can promote EO (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2005). It was computed as cash and short-term investments divided by 
total assets (CHE/AT) (Harford et al., 2008). The source was from Compustat. 
 
5.2.4.5 Leverage 
 
Leverage has been shown to affect a firm’s performance. Thus, it was included as a 
control variable. It was computed as short-term and long-term debt divided by total 
assets (DLC/DLTT) (Harford et al., 2008). The source was from Compustat. 
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5.2.4.6 Systematic Risk 
 
Systematic risk (market risk or Beta) was also included in the analysis to control its 
effect on the risk taking behaviour of firms (the risk taking component of EO) 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). The systematic risk variable was computed 
through two alternative measurements.  
 
5.2.4.6.1 First Measurement of Systematic Risk 
 
The first measurement of systematic risk represents the value-weighted market 
returns (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). The market risk measure was computed 
from the stock file in CRSP similar to the unsystematic risk (Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2011).  
 
5.2.4.6.2 Second Measurement of Systematic Risk 
 
The alternative measure of systematic risk was based on the standard deviation of 
the regression used to predict unsystematic risk (Hoberg & Parabhala, 2009).  
 
5.2.5 Section Conclusion 
 
This section emphasised the operationalisation of the different dimensions of EO as 
well as their sources. The reasoning behind the measurement of each of the EO 
dimensions: risk taking (unsystematic risk), proactiveness (RE/total assets), and 
innovativeness (R&D intensity and patent yield) was based on their definitions. 
Contrary to most studies, which opertionalise EO as an overall index; this thesis 
opertionalised EO into its different dimensions. However, for the sake of 
comparison, the EO dimensions were also combined into a single EO construct. The 
reason for doing so is to indicate that when EO dimensions are combined into an EO 
index, the independent effects of each of the dimensions are masked.  
 
This research relied on market-based measures of firm performance rather than 
accounting-based measures of firm performance, as the latter might be subject to 
managerial manipulation. Having dependent variables such as Tobin’s Q would give 
an unbiased conservative setting. However, this is not to disregard the applicability 
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of other financial measures of firm performance, which were used to represent the 
multi-dimensional nature of firm performance as well (i.e. ROA).  
 
Control variables were also included in Study 1 when examining the EO and firm 
performance relationship as certain variables were shown in the literature to affect 
the EO and firm performance relationship.  
 
The next section will outline the time measurement of the predictor and dependent 
variable of the regression.  
 
5.3 Time Measurement of Variables 
 
This section indicates how the different variables (dependent and predictor 
variables) were measured. Measuring the variables using the objective data and at 
different times avoids common method bias and cross-sectional bias, issues 
common in cross-sectional survey designs (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010). This 
was achieved in this thesis through the panel longitudinal design (a time-series cross 
sectional form of data). The main predictor variables, EO and its various 
components (innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking) were measured at time 
T. Whereas the dependent variables (Tobin’s Q and ROA) were measured at time T 
to examine the effect of entrepreneurial orientation on firm performance. This was 
done to identify the causal effect of EO on firm performance. Through this thesis, 
we were able to test the long-term effect of EO on firm performance in a panel 
longitudinal design.  
 
Even though the longitudinal form of the dataset would enable the inference of 
cause-effect relationships, there is an issue of the risk of endogeneity or reverse 
causality. The next section 5.3.1 will address this issue further.  
 
5.3.1 Issues of Endogeneity  
 
Endogeneity bias can arise either from an omitted variable bias or a simultaneous 
causality problem. An omitted variable bias occurs when there is an endogenous 
predictor variable regressor (x) in the model, which is related to other overlooked 
unobserved variables not included in the regression model. This results in a 
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correlation between the error term in the regression and the predictor variable x 
(Antonakis et al., 2014). Theory is the guidance to the research and this is the best 
guarantee for mitigating the problem of an omitted variable bias (Antonakis et al., 
2014).  
 
The endogeneity problem of an omitted variable bias can be tested through a 
Hausman endogeneity test (Hausman, 1978), which tests for the appropriateness of 
the regression model (panel fixed effect versus random effect model). A fixed effect 
regression can control for any overlooked variables that are constant throughout 
time and that are not included in the model. By using a fixed effect regression, we 
could control for an omitted variable bias if the variables that were overlooked in 
the model are constant throughout time (e.g. industry) (Wooldridge, 2015). The 
effect of the variables on the outcome (firm performance) could be studied by 
controlling for any overlooked variables (Haynes et al., 2014; Hilary & Hsu, 2011).  
Most EO researchers have assumed the cause-effect relationship between EO and 
firm performance, without examining such a relationship in the right setting 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Thus, there is a problem of endogeneity within EO 
research (Miller, 2011). Endogeneity problems represent critical issues in the 
management literature when examining cause-effect relationships, yet it has 
received limited attention among management scholars (Zaefarian, 2017). The 
omitted variable bias is mitigated through the fixed effect within-group estimator 
that controls for fixed variables over time.  
 
Simultaneity, whereby the dependent variable and independent variables cause each 
other (Wooldridge, 2010) could bias the results. In Study 1, simultaneity problems 
might arise if good performance may cause or facilitate EO as well (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2011). Thus, to eliminate the issue of endogeneity, the Sargan-
Hansen test (Hansen, 1982; Sargan, 1958) was used and the lagged values of EO 
were used as an instrument. The results of the endogeneity test will either indicate 
that EO is exogenous (when the null hypothesis of exogeneity is accepted) or 
endogenous. If the test indicates that EO is exogenous then the fixed effect 
regression’s Betas are consistent. The endogeneity tests are shown in sections 7.10 
and 8.8 of chapter 7 and 8, respectively.  
 
The next section will consider the statistical methods chosen for Study 1 and the 
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regression model adopted.  
 
5.4 Synopsis to the Regression Model of Study 1 
 
This section provides a brief description of the analysis method chosen for Study 1. 
SAS was used to compute the Study variables and merge the datasets (Compustat, 
CRSP). SAS can handle different datasets at once and is powerful in data 
management. However, STATA was used to run regressions due to the ease of its 
usage and its powerful regression aspect compared to SAS. STATA software is a 
statistical package tool used to analyse data mostly for regressions (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2010).   
 
The form of the data was a panel longitudinal design, in which the firm-level data 
was structured as multiple variables across multiple years (2000-2014). The time 
factor (T= 15 years) is less than the N factor (sample size = total of 341 survived 
firms and 401 inactive firms).  
 
To test the appropriateness of the model, a fixed versus random effect regression 
model was tested through a Hausman test. A fixed effect regression generates 
consistent estimators whereas a random effect regression generates efficient 
estimators. If there is an endogeneity problem of an omitted variable bias (i.e. there 
is a correlation between x and the error term), then the efficient estimators are not 
consistent or biased. Thus, the random effect regression would be rejected 
(Antonakis et al., 2014; Wooldridge, 2015).  
 
The next section will consider the steps to test for the appropriateness of the fixed 
effect model. 
 
5.5 Fixed Effect Regression Appropriateness Test 
 
The steps of the test for the appropriateness of the fixed effect regression model is 
shown in figure 5.1. The F-test examines the appropriateness of the fixed effect 
regression when faced with the choice of whether to use a pooled OLS model or a 
panel model. The panel fixed effect regression has several advantages over a pooled 
OLS as it accounts for the heterogeneity in the firms and can also deal with the issue 
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of a fixed omitted variable bias. To show that a fixed effect is more appropriate than 
the pooled OLS, the F-test indicates the significance of the fixed effect regressors 
from zero. If the F-test is significant then this means that the regression parameters 
vary across the sample of firms and that the fixed effect model is a better model than 
the pooled OLS (Wooldridge, 2015).  
 
The Breusch-Pagan LM test (Langrange Multiplier) is then conducted to show 
whether a panel random effect model or a simple OLS model better fits the data 
(Breusch and Pagan, 1980). That is, the LM test, similar to the F-test, indicates 
whether the variance across the firms in the dataset is zero or if there are significant 
effects to the firm observations (i.e. a panel effect). The LM test is conducted after 
running a random effect model. The null hypothesis of the LM test is that the 
variance of the random effect is zero. When the null hypothesis of the LM test is 
rejected, the panel random effect is shown to be a better model. Then, the choice 
falls into either a panel fixed or a random effect regression model, which is tested by 
the Hausman test (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Wooldridge, 2015).   
 
For estimating ‘ceteris paribus’ effects, the fixed effect regression is more desirable 
or consistent than the random effect estimator since it allows correlation with the 
fixed component of the error term and eliminates or controls for the fixed effects 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Wooldridge, 2015).  
 
Hausman (1978) constructed a test that would allow researchers to determine 
whether a panel fixed effect or a random effect regression is more appropriate. 
However, the Hausman test is not enough to conclude that a fixed effect regression 
model is more appropriate. Rather, it is also important to test the assumptions of the 
fixed effect estimator (Baltagi, 2013). The null hypothesis of the Hausman test 
considers that the variation among the observations is random and that the 
unobserved individual heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). The rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman 
test means that the key assumption of the random effect estimator, explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with the unobserved effect, is violated (Wooldridge, 
2015).  
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Since the Hausman test assumes that the panel random effect regression is fully 
efficient, then a cluster-robust version of the Hausman test, which is robust to within 
firm autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, is also conducted after running a robust 
random effects model. 
 
The next section outlines the assumptions of the regression model of Study 1.  
 
5.6 Fixed Effect Regression Model Specification and Assumptions  
 
The following section considers the regression model or equations that are tested in 
Study 1. After outlining the regression models, the regression assumptions are 
considered.  
 
5.6.1 Fixed Effect Regression Equations 
 
The regression models which examine the effects of the predictor variables against 
the dependent variables are outlined below. Below, there are two regression models, 
in which one considers the effects of the EO dimensions and the other equation 
considers the effect of the overall EO construct on firm-level outcomes (Tobin’s Q 
or ROA).  
 
a) Tobin’sQ/ROAgvkey,time=B1Innovativenessgvkey,t+B2Proactivenessgvkey,t+B3Risk 
takinggvkey,t+B4Systematic riskgvkey,t+B5Investment Opportunitygvkey,t+B6Firm 
sizegvkey,t+B7Firm agegvkey,t + B8Leveragegvkey,t+ B9Liquiditygvkey,t +∑t-1 σjTj+Ugvkey,t 
 
b) Tobin’sQ/ROAgvkey,time= B1EOgvkey,t+B2Systematic riskgvkey,t+B3Investment 
Opportunitygvkey,t+B4Firm sizegvkey,t+B5Firm agegvkey,t + B6Leveragegvkey,t 
+B7Liquiditygvkey,t +Σt-1σjTj+Ugvkey,t. 
 
In the first equation above (5.6.1 a), the main predictor variables are the EO 
dimensions: innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking (unsystematic risk) and 
the rest of the variables are the control variables. An accounting measure of firm 
performance (ROA) and a market measure of firm performance (Tobin’s Q) were 
included as the dependent or predicted variables. Most importantly, the EO 
dimensions were run in separate regressions to eliminate the effect of 
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multicollinearity between the three dimensions of EO on the statistical results. 
The second regression equation (5.6.1 b) considers the overall effect of EO on both 
measures of firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA). The variables that were 
included in the model are variables that vary over time and across firms since the 
coefficient of a time-invariant variable would not be estimated in a fixed effect 
model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Since none of the explanatory variables are 
constant over time, then a fixed effect regression was considered.  
 
As shown in the above equations, Beta are the coefficients of the regressors. 
Thereby, the relationship between the regressors and the dependent variable is 
assumed to be linear. The assumptions of the fixed effect regression, such as 
linearity, were tested in subsequent sections to ensure the fitness of the model. 
 
The remainder of the error in the above regression models, which is called the 
idiosyncratic error represented by U is the time-varying component of the error and 
represents time-varying unobservable variables that influence the dependent 
variable (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Wooldridge, 2015). The idiosyncratic errors are 
represented by residuals that are estimated from the sample of firms. The residuals 
characterise the deviation of the observed values of the variables from the estimated 
values of the regression (Wooldridge, 2015).     
 
A panel regression differs from cross-sectional or time-series regression in that it 
accounts for both the variability in individuals (individual-level effects) as well as 
the variability over time (time-specific effect) (Baltagi, 2013). As in the two models 
above (5.6.1 a and b), it was shown that for each variable there was a time factor for 
the time-series dimension and gvkey or the firm identifier for the cross-sectional 
dimension. There was also a time effect that was included in the regression 
equation, hence the model is called two-way fixed and time effect model. Thus, the 
model accounts for both the unobservable fixed individual effects and the time 
effects (Baltagi, 2013; Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). The time effect was included as it 
was shown by the regression testing that the time effect had a significant effect on 
the firm performance measures, which will be shown in chapters 7 and 8. In a two-
way panel fixed effect model there is no intercept, the constant term reported from 
STATA captures the time average of the average fixed individual effects. 
 
160 
 
The fixed effect regression essentially computes the change across time in the 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the outcome variable within each 
cross-sectional observation or firm. Thus, the fixed effect estimator is also called the 
‘within-transformation’ in which the fixed effect estimator is calculated by mean 
differencing of each variable within each firm (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; 
Wooldridge, 2015). The fixed effect regression is desirable since it controls for the 
individual specific unobservable heterogeneity or explanatory variables which are 
time-invariant such as the industry (Hsiao, 2014; Wooldridge, 2015). Thereby, an 
endogeneity problem of an omitted variable bias was not of a concern in the 
regressions that were conducted.  
 
The next section will consider the fixed effect regression assumptions.  
 
5.6.2 Fixed Effect Regression Assumptions  
 
According to Wooldridge (2015), there are six essential assumptions when running 
a fixed effect regression. That firstly, the sample is a random sample. The sample of 
the high-technology large firms was randomly drawn from the Compustat-CRSP 
merged database from WRDS. A fixed effect regression also assumes, similar to an 
OLS regression, that the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
regressors is a linear relationship.  
 
The second assumption is that the explanatory variables vary over time and that 
there is no perfect linear relationship among the variables (i.e. multicollinearity). 
The reason why variables should vary over time in a fixed effect regression is that 
the fixed effect regression would cancel out the effect of the variables that are fixed 
over time. Multicollinearity was tested through the VIF (variance inflation factor) of 
each of the explanatory variables. The importance of the VIF is setting a cut-off 
point above which multicollinearity would be an issue. Most researchers consider 
above the value of 10 to be an issue of multicollinearity (Wooldridge, 2015). 
Multicollinearity was also tested by the regression correlation coefficients. If the 
correlation coefficient between two regressors is higher than 0.8, then 
multicollinearity would potentially be an issue (Gujarati, 2003). 
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The third assumption of the fixed effect regression is the exogeneity assumption, 
which states that the time-varying unobserved characteristics for each of the firms 
included are exogenous to the firm. This means that they should not be correlated 
with the other firm characteristics included in the analysis. Thereby, the explanatory 
variables and the idiosyncratic errors should not be correlated. However, the fixed 
effect regression allows for correlation or endogeneity between the unobserved 
fixed time-invariant component of the error and the explanatory variables (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2010; Wooldridge, 2015). Thus, the fixed effect regression allows one to 
control for endogeneity issues between the explanatory variables and the time-
invariant component of the error term.  
 
The fourth assumption is that the idiosyncratic errors are homoscedastic (meaning 
that the idiosyncratic unobserved errors have the same constant variance given all 
the explanatory variables for each firm). If the variance of the error term changes 
with any of the explanatory variables then heteroscedasticity is present (Wooldridge, 
2015).  
 
The last important assumption is that the idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated. 
However, in the case of panel data, the OLS standard errors would be biased due to 
cross-sectional dependence, in which each period is not independent of previous 
periods (Drukker, 2003).  
 
Under all these assumptions the fixed effect estimator is the best linear unbiased 
estimator. Thereby, the 6th assumption which is the normality assumption of the 
idiosyncratic errors is unnecessary as the other assumptions (Wooldridge, 2015).  
 
The central limit theorem or asymptotic theory states that as the sample size or 
number of observations increases, then the distribution of the sample becomes 
closer to a normal distribution. Since the thesis included a large sample size of 742 
firms and 5,011 observations, the panel fixed effect estimators are asymptotically 
normal implying that they are close to a normal distribution given the large sample 
size (Wooldridge, 2015).  
 
The next section will consider the assessment for the fitness of the regression model. 
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5.6.3 Fitness of the Regression Model 
 
The fitness of the regression model is based upon the adjusted R-squared value and 
the F-test of the regression. The R-squared value of the regression is called the 
coefficient of determination. It is the ratio of the squared variation that is explained 
by the regression (explained sum of squares or SSE) divided by the total variation 
(total sum of squares or SST). It is a value between zero and one (Wooldridge, 
2015). The R-squared shows how well the predictor variables explain the dependent 
variable and thus represents the variation in Y that is explained by the X variables. 
The R-squared value is a measure of goodness of fit (Wooldridge, 2015). Yet, too 
much emphasis should not be placed on the R-squared for evaluating a regression 
equation, as a small R-squared does not mean that the regression equation is useless 
(Wooldridge, 2015). Most importantly, the R-squared is biased since every time a 
predictor is added onto the model it increases. Thereby the R-squared should be 
adjusted for the number of predictors and number of firms in the model.  
 
The F-test assesses the appropriateness of the model and examines the overall 
significance of the regression model. This is important to consider rather than 
simply assessing the regression model based on the R-squared (Wooldridge, 2015). 
To test the fitness of the fixed effect regression model, the F-test (which is 
automatically reported after running a fixed effect regression) shows the probability 
that all coefficients in the fixed effect regression is equal to zero (i.e. null hypothesis 
of all the regression coefficients is zero). The test of poolability of the data arises 
when one is dealing with panel data (Baltagi, 2013). 
 
The next section will consider the test of the significance of the time in the panel 
regression model. 
 
5.6.4 Time Effect Test 
 
To test whether time dummies are necessary to include in the regression models, 
then the significance of the time effect was tested in the Study’s regression models. 
If the probability of the time effect test of all the time dummies is jointly equal to 
zero, then one fails to reject the null hypothesis. If otherwise the null hypothesis is 
rejected, then time dummies are required to include in the regression models. To 
create the time dummies then a dichotomous variable with either a value of zero or 1 
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is created for each fiscal year. The time dummies are included in the regression 
(excluding one fiscal year dummy to avoid the dummy-variable trap) (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2010). 
 
The next section will consider the reasoning behind conducting regression analysis 
among the sample of firms that are surviving separately from the set of firms that 
have failed.  
 
5.7 Separation of Analysis among Surviving and Failed Firms 
 
The fixed effect regression analysis of the EO and its dimensions and the firm 
performance relationship of Study 1 was conducted among the dataset of the 
surviving firms separately from the failed firms (analysis chapter 7 conducted 
among the sample of surviving firms and analysis chapter 8 among the sample of 
failed firms). The following section will consider the reasoning behind the 
separation of the surviving and failed firms. 
 
5.7.1 Reasoning for Separation of Datasets 
 
The type of the panel of this thesis is a short micro panel since there are few time 
periods spanning the years 2000 until 2014 (T=15) relative to the large number of 
surviving firms (N=341) and inactive firms (N=401) (Baltagi, 2013). Panel datasets 
can be either balanced or unbalanced. The panel dataset(s) of both the surviving and 
failed firms are unbalanced, meaning that there are no full observations of firms 
across all the years. In an ideal situation, all the observations would have data for all 
the years included. However, missing data is inevitable, in which there are some 
missing values for some observations or firms and the missing values were random 
according to the datasets from Compustat and CRSP in WRDS.  
 
The reason for having an unbalanced panel (i.e. missing values) is due to 
randomness and not systematic reasons. The separation of surviving and failed firms 
and conducting separate analysis in each of the chapters 7 and 8 ensures that there is 
no attrition bias in the data that would affect the results of this chapter. Thus, the 
inclusion of both surviving and failed firms in the same dataset would introduce 
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bias, since failed firms would have less number of observations in comparison to 
surviving firms and this is due to their failure and not randomness.  
 
Fixed effect panel regression analysis was conducted on each of the surviving and 
failed firms in separate datasets in STATA to exclude panel attrition bias (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2010). Furthermore, all firms with missing or zero R&D were excluded 
from the final dataset. This is because R&D is used to compute innovativeness and 
if it were to be missing, then it would cause many firms to have missing values for 
one of the main dimensions of EO. Thereby, such procedures were done to ensure 
that there is no attrition bias when conducting the regression analysis.  
 
5.8 Chapter Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the chapter presented the measurement and sources of data of the EO, 
the control variables, as well as the firm performance variables. The inclusion of the 
variables was based on the EO-as-Experimentation perspective. This reiterates the 
deductive strategy, which involves starting with theory and testing for theory. The 
guidance of this research was based on theoretical grounding (Antonakis & Dietz, 
2011). Furthermore, the control variables (investment opportunity, firm age, firm 
size, liquidity, leverage, and systematic risk) were considered since they affect the 
EO and firm performance relationship. This research involved the use of secondary 
data to generate the objective proxies. The use of proxies to reflect the complex 
constructs of this thesis is in line with the objectivist ontological positioning and the 
scientific realist epistemological positioning.  
 
The first analysis chapter will describe the results of Study 1. The interpretation of 
those results and the testing of Study 1 underlying hypotheses was based on 
organisational learning and prospect theory.  
 
The next chapter will outline the method of Study 2.  
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Figure 5.1: Panel Data Steps  
 
 
Source: adopted from Park (2011: 16) 
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Table 5.1: Study 1 Variables’ Definitions and Measurements  
 
 Definition  Measurement  Source and data items 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Tobin’s Q Valuation of a firm’s 
market value 
represented by the 
ratio of the firm’s 
market value to book 
value of assets 
(common shares 
outstanding  
calendar year 
closing price) + 
(current 
liabilities−current 
assets) + long-term 
debt + liquidating 
value of preferred 
stock)/ by total 
assets 
Compustat: 
(CSHO*PRCC_C) 
+(LCT-ACT) 
+DLTT+PSTKL)/AT 
ROA A profitability 
accounting-based 
measure of a firm’s 
financial 
performance 
Net income before 
extraordinary items 
/total assets  
Compustat: IB/AT 
Independent Variables 
 
EO The exhibition of 
firm-level 
behaviours: 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, and 
Risk taking  
Standardised values 
of the EO 
dimensions were 
summed into an EO 
index 
Compustat and CRSP 
Innovativeness Technological 
experimentation 
through investing in 
R&D 
1)R&D expenditure 
divided by the total 
assets 
 
2) Alternative: 
Patent yield was 
measured by the 
number of patents at 
application date 
divided by R&D 
1)Compustat: XRD/AT 
 
 
 
2)Patent data from Kogan 
et al. (2012) and Li et al. 
(2014) (merged with 
Compustat/CRSP merged 
file based on CRSP 
identifier Permno) 
Proactiveness Anticipating future 
demand and 
retaining resources 
to ensure the firm’s 
positioning in the 
market 
Percentage of annual 
earnings reinvested 
in the company, 
which is retained 
earnings divided by 
total assets 
Compustat: RE/AT 
Risk taking Involves taking bold 
decisions and actions 
by venturing into 
new or emerging 
markets or by 
borrowing heavily 
and being willing to 
tolerate the 
uncertainty  
Unsystematic risk or 
the portion of risk 
that is unattributed 
or unexplained by 
the industry 
CRSP: Measured as the 
standard deviation of 
residuals from the 
regression of running the 
daily stock returns on the 
value weighted market 
returns  
Control Variables  
 
Firm Age Listing Age: The age 
of the firm since it 
was listed on CRSP 
 
1)Computed as the 
difference between 
the observation year 
in Compustat/CRSP 
1)Compustat and CRSP  
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Founding age: The 
age of the firm since 
it was first founded 
merged file and the 
firm’s listing year in 
CRSP 
 
2)Alternative: 
Computed as the 
difference between 
observation year in 
Compustat and 
founding date 
 
 
 
 
 
2)Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) data on founding 
age and company 
websites 
Firm Size The classification of 
firm size based on 
number of 
employees  
Log value of number 
of employees 
Compustat: Log(EMP) 
Systematic Risk Market risk 
represented by the 
industry  
The value-weighted 
market returns  
CRSP 
Leverage The percentage of 
total debt from a 
firm’s total assets 
Short-term and long-
term debt divided by 
total assets 
Compustat: 
DLC+DLTT/AT 
Liquidity The availability of 
liquid assets or cash 
and short-term 
investments from the 
firm’s total assets 
Cash and Short-term 
investments divided 
by total assets 
Compustat: CHE/AT 
Investment 
Opportunity  
Degree to which is 
spent on long-term 
assets 
Capital expenditures 
divided by 
beginning of year 
long-term assets 
(equipment, 
property, and plant)  
Compustat: 
CAPX/Lagged PPENT 
 
Time Dummies  Fiscal year time 
dummies 
(dichotomous 
variables with value 
zero or 1 for each 
fiscal year) 
Compustat 
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Chapter 6 
Research Methodology for Study 2: 
 
Examining EO and its Dimensions and Firm Failure Relationship 
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6.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
 
This chapter describes the measurement of the independent variable EO, and the 
dependent variables, failure rate of firms. The chapter links to the research question: 
What is the effect of EO and each of its dimensions on the risk of failure/financial 
distress?   
 
The issue of why some firms fail and others survive has become a fundamental 
concept in organisational research (Josefy et al., 2017).  Firm failure is widely and 
narrowly viewed as the death or the shutdown of a business (Hughes et al., 2010). 
This thesis considers firm failure to be more complex than just the shutdown of a 
business and additionally includes the discontinuity of ownership, liquidation, 
bankruptcy, and privatisation (Josefy et al., 2017).  
 
Failure is not only limited to represent an outcome, but could also reflect the 
decisions and strategic activities of the business (Josefy et al., 2017; Revilla et al., 
2016). Firm failure is the ‘quintessential’ factor of firm performance (Josefy et al., 
2017). The contributing factor to why some firms fail, while others survive is due to 
a ‘performance threshold’ or a minimum performance level, which is firm-specific 
and is dependent on the firm’s characteristics (Gimeno et al., 1997; Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011). Firm failure often results in direct and indirect financial and non-
financial costs to various stakeholders involved (Altman, 1968; Revilla et al., 2016). 
Thus, the interest in prediction models of failure or financial distress has grown 
especially following major corporate collapses in the global financial crisis. This 
thesis focuses on the contributing factor EO on the probability of financial distress.  
 
In addition to the accounting and market-based measures of firm performance, firm 
failure as a dependent variable was also assessed based on the status of the firm in 
Compustat. The Cox (1972) proportional hazard model was used to empirically 
assess the effect of the main variables (EO and its separate dimensions) on the 
probability of failure of the sample of firms. The survival analysis was conducted in 
SAS since SAS has comprehensive features for conducting survival analysis 
(Allison, 2010). Hazard models have long been used in the literature to analyse firm 
failure (Cefis & Marsili, 2005).  
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In this chapter, it is important to advance Study 1, which focused on the effect of 
EO on firm performance, by also considering the effect of EO on the risk of firm 
failure. The significance of this work lies in the disentanglement of the different 
outcomes of EO ranging from financial and market performance to continuation of 
ownership and operations (Josefy et al., 2017).  In accordance with Wiklund and 
Shepherd (2011), most of the literature has studied the effect of EO on firm 
performance only amongst surviving firms (e.g. Rauch et al. 2009). The significance 
of this thesis is that not only did it examine the EO-firm performance relationship in 
the sample of surviving firms and failed firms separately, but it also considered the 
effect of EO on the risk of firm failure in the overall sample of firms. This is 
relevant, since according to the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, EO results in 
higher performance variance and leads to higher risk of business failure (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011). Thus,  firms with higher EO levels have more of a likelihood to 
fail (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the Cox proportional hazard regression 
models that are tested and to outline the assumptions of the regression. Study 2 has 
been designed to test hypotheses H4, H5, H6c, H7c, and H8c. 
 
The next section will outline the relevance of conducting survival analysis in this 
research. 
 
6.2 Data Analysis Methods: Relevance of Conducting Survival Analysis  
 
The purpose of this section is to outline the reason for choosing survival analysis 
and its appropriateness for the thesis dataset. By conducting survival analysis, then 
the effect of EO and its dimensions on the risk of firm failure can be examined.   
 
Survival analysis is a statistical method that examines the occurrence of events. This 
statistical technique has not been adopted in the entrepreneurship literature as much 
as in industrial economics studies.  Previous studies have examined factors, such as 
firm size and firm age, that affect the survival of firms (Cefis & Marsili, 2005). 
Recently, in the strategic management literature, it has been noted, that the effect of 
certain factors on the failure rate of firms differs among firms in different 
developmental stages (i.e. among new ventures versus mature large and established 
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firms) (Josefy et al., 2017). For instance, although innovation is vital for firm 
survival among mature firms (Mezias & Mezias, 2000), it was found that innovation 
also accelerates the rate of failure among new ventures (Hyytinen et al., 2015). 
Thus, this chapter only focuses on the failure rate in established large firms, which 
is the main dataset that the thesis utilised. 
 
Survival analysis is appropriate to conduct since such an analytical approach was 
intended for longitudinal data. The overall thesis was longitudinal in nature with a 
sample of 742 firms in total from the pre-crisis period (fiscal year 2000) to the post-
crisis period (fiscal year 2014) resulting in 5,011 observations. The overall sample 
of this thesis was a random sample that has been extracted from the Compustat and 
CRSP merged database. Thus, the sample showed the actual failure rate of high-
technology large firms in the specified timeframe. The use of a random sample was 
better than a matched choice based sample, which equivalates the characteristics of 
surviving and failed firms, because a matched sample selection introduces a 
selection bias (LeClere, 2005).  
 
The risk of a firm being in financial distress or of failing is a significant firm 
outcome. It has not been examined until recently in the entrepreneurship literature 
(Revilla et al., 2016). Studies have mostly resorted to cross-sectional studies and to 
relying on short-term metrics or assessments of EO. This thesis uses insights from 
organisational learning and prospect theory, thus it is of relevance to examine the 
risks associated with EO and its dimensions on the failure rate of firms.  
 
After outlining the relevance of conducting survival analysis, the next section will 
consider the advantages of using survival analysis as an analytical tool in this 
research.  
 
6.3 The Advantage of Survival Analysis 
 
The purpose of this section is to state the advantages of utilising survival analysis in 
comparison to running a regression analysis.  
 
The main advantage of survival analysis is its ability to handle censored 
observations since the duration of the following research is limited. Observations 
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are termed censored when there is incomplete information on their survival time. 
Censoring occurs for different reasons.  
 
The type of censoring in this Study is termed right censoring, the common type of 
censoring. In the sample there are surviving firms that have survived even after the 
last year of observation in the thesis (i.e. fiscal year 2014) and that did not 
experience the event of failure during the allocated timeframe (Josefy et al., 2017). 
This means that the observations for the surviving firms would be terminated before 
the occurrence of the event of failure. Thus, these observations must be censored to 
account for the fact that they did not experience an event of failure in comparison to 
failed firms. On the other hand, left censoring occurs when a sample of firms 
experienced the event of failure at the start of the study. Left censoring was not 
needed in this Study as all the firms in the sample were surviving at the start date 
(i.e. fiscal year 2000). Survival analysis has an advantage over a linear regression. 
The latter is biased because it does not account for censoring and does not include a 
time element. Survival analysis would provide more insight into the failure of firms 
across time. Thus, survival analysis was used in this Study since it allows us to 
include the surviving firms in the analysis by accounting for the censoring of their 
observations. If we chose to adopt a linear logistic regression, then we would not be 
able to include their observations in the regression. Furthermore, a logistic 
regression considers the dependent variable as a binary outcome (e.g. Swift, 2016), 
whereas by using survival analysis we could measure the dependent variable as an 
interaction between time and the status of the firm.  
 
Treating the outcome of failure as a binary outcome has been scrutinised in the 
literature (Josefy et al., 2017). One would not be able to measure the risk of failure 
and its interaction with time by considering firm failure a binary dummy variable 
(Josefy et al., 2017). Survival analysis, using the Cox proportional hazard model, 
will be able to measure the probability of failure of a firm in a particular year given 
that it has survived until that point. Furthermore, survival analysis accounts for time 
by using the time-series data on the firms to measure their hazard of failure 
(Campbell et al., 2011).  
 
By utilising survival analysis, this research could examine the effect of the main 
predictor variables (EO and its dimensions) on the risk of failure (being bankrupt or 
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insolvent, no longer filing with the SEC, or entering a financial distress situation) at 
a certain point in time across a longitudinal timeframe.   
 
The next section will consider the key functions that are employed in survival 
analysis.  
 
6.4 The Key Functions in Survival Analysis 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline the two functions (survival and hazard 
function) used in survival analysis. The focus of the thesis is on the hazard function, 
which measures the hazard or risk of failure of the main constructs under 
investigation.  
 
Survival analysis has two key mathematical functions, the survival function and the 
hazard function (Allison, 2010).  
 
6.4.1 Survival Function 
 
The survival function measures the probability for a failed firm of surviving beyond 
time (t). This means that it measures the probability of a failed firm experiencing the 
event at time (T), on the condition that the event time (T) is greater than a given 
time (t). Thus, the survival function can be written as:  
S(t)=pr(T>t) (Equation 1)  
 
6.4.2 The Hazard Function  
 
The hazard function on the other hand measures the probability of failure for a 
surviving firm within the period. Thus, it measures the risk of firm failure at time (t) 
of an event that occurs at time (t+1) (Revilla et al., 2016). This means that the event 
time (T=t+1) is higher than a given time (t). The hazard can be considered as the 
change in the log of the survival function (Allison, 2010). For this thesis, the hazard 
function was used since the concern was to measure the effect of EO and its 
dimensions on the risk of the failure rate of the surviving firms.  
 
In the below equation 2, which represents the hazard function, time (T) is the time 
of the occurrence of the event of failure for a given firm, whereas (t) represents the 
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time of the firm observation. The hazard function equation measures the risk that the 
event of failure would occur at time (t) for a firm. Since time is continuous, 
essentially the equation quantifies the risk in a time interval between time (t) and 
time (t and ∆t), conditional that the firm is still alive at time (t). Thus, the hazard 
function is also called the hazard rate since it specifies the rate of failure per time 
unit in the interval of time (t, t and ∆t) (Allison, 2010). The only restriction imposed 
on the hazard rate is that it is non-negative.    
 
The hazard function is defined as: 
H(t)=lim∆t→0
𝑝𝑟(𝑡≤𝑇 <𝑡+∆𝑡│𝑥(𝑡),𝑇≥𝑡)
∆𝑡
≥0 (Equation 2) 
 
This section has outlined the survival analysis functions (survival and hazard 
functions). Since this Study utilises the hazard function, then the next section will 
consider the hazard regression equation(s). 
 
6.4.3 The Hazard Function Regression Equation(s) 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline the hazard function regression equations, 
which are derived from the hazard function.  
 
The hazard function depends on a set of covariates. The hazard function indicates 
how changes in the covariates (e.g. EO and its dimensions) would change the hazard 
rate. The assumption of the Cox proportional hazard regression is that the hazard is 
constant over time. This implies that the hazard has an exponential relationship with 
time as can be shown in the below equation 3 (Allison, 2010).  
 
According to the below equation 3, the hazard for a surviving firm to enter a 
financial distressed situation at time (t) is the product of the baseline hazard h0(t) 
and the linear function of the set of covariates, which are exponentiated. The 
baseline hazard can be considered as the hazard rate for a firm that has all values of 
zero for each of the variables. Thus, it is equivalent to the intercept term in a 
multiple regression equation.  
 
There are two types of variables included in the Cox proportional hazard regression: 
time-varying and time invariant variables. The hazard function at time (t) for time-
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varying covariates means that the hazard depends on their values at time (t). The 
values for the time-varying covariates would be the yearly observations since the 
data is in a panel form. For time-invariant variables, it means that the hazard 
depends on their values irrelevant of the time factor. Thus, the proportional hazard 
regression equation is written as: 
 
H(t)=h0(t)exp(B1X1it+B2X2i….+BkXik) (Equation 3) 
 
The log of the hazard ratio is essentially the hazard function divided by the baseline 
hazard, which is a linear function of the regressors. Thus, by taking the log of both 
sides of equation 3, the proportional hazard regression equation can be rewritten as 
the below equation 4: 
 
LogH(t)= Logh0(t)+ B1X1it+B2X2i….+BkXik (Equation 4) 
 
After outlining the proportional hazard regression equation(s), the next section will 
present the regression equations 4.1 and 4.2 (in the form of equation 4) including the 
main variables (predictor and control variables), which are used in this Study. 
 
6.5 The Study’s Regression Model(s) 
 
The purpose of this section is to present the proportional hazard regression 
equations including EO and its dimensions, similar to Study 1. 
 
Equations 4.1 and 4.2 are the proportional hazard regression equations of the Study. 
In the equation(s), the time-invariant variables with only the suffix of the firm 
variable (i or gvkey, the firm identifier) are the industry-specific dummy variables 
for the high-technology industry. The rest of the variables are the time-varying 
variables. The logh0(t) is the unspecified arbitrary baseline hazard (LeClere, 2000).   
 
In this chapter, there are two sets of Cox proportional hazard regression equations, 
in which equation 4.1 examines the EO dimensions as the predictors and equation 
4.2 examines the main predictor variable (EO). Most importantly, similar to Study 
1, each EO dimension is run in separate regressions to eliminate the effect of 
multicollinearity among the EO dimensions on the statistical results. 
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The proportional hazard regression equation(s) of this Study are written as: 
 
Equation 4.1:  
Logh(t)= Logh0(t)+B1innovativenessgvkey,t+B2proactivenessgvkey,t+B3unsystematic 
riskgvkey,t+B4systematic riskgvkey,t+B5firm sizegvkey,t+B6firm 
agegvkey,t+B7leveragegvkey,t+B8organisational slackgvkey,t+ B9Tobin’sQ+ 
B10IndustryDummiesgvkey +B11FinancialCrisis 
 
Equation 4.2:  
Logh(t)= Logh0(t)+B1EOgvkey,t+B2systematic riskgvkey,t+B3firm sizegvkey,t+B4firm 
agegvkey,t+B5leveragegvkey,t+B6organisational slackgvkey,t+ B7Tobin’sQ + B8 
IndustryDummiesgvkey +B9FinancialCrisis 
 
Similar to chapter 5 of Study 1, the next section will present the definition and 
operationalisation of the dependent variable of the proportional hazard regression 
equations (4.1 and 4.2) and the computation and reasoning behind the inclusion of 
the control variables. 
 
6.6 Variables in the Cox Proportional Hazard Regression 
  
The purpose of this section is to outline the variables, dependent and controls, used 
in the proportional hazard regression equations (4.1 and 4.2), their 
operationalisation, and the relevance of including the control variables in the 
regression equations.  
 
6.6.1 Dependent Variable  
 
The dependent variable, the log of the hazard function in the Cox proportional 
hazard regression equation(s) 4.1 and 4.2, is the interaction between the length of 
time, from the first year examined until the last firm(s’) observation, and the status 
of the firm(s) (surviving or failed). The scale in which the length of time is 
measured is the number of months. For surviving firms, the length of time would be 
the number of months from the start of the time included (fiscal year 2000) until the 
month of the last observation (i.e. fiscal year 2014). The time to event for failed 
firms would be the number of months from year 2000 until the month of death, 
according to the delisting date ‘DLDTE’ in Compustat. The status of the firms that 
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is used in the Cox proportional hazard regression are the censored firms. Thus, the 
Cox proportional hazard regression model would estimate the probability that a 
surviving firm at time (t) would experience the event of failure in the next few time 
periods included in the timeframe of the thesis.  
 
Firms are delisted in Compustat for several reasons, as classified by ‘reason for 
deletion’ variable, which is a two-digit delisting code. The reasons for delisting 
include merger and acquisition (M&A), bankruptcy, liquidity, and no longer filing 
with the SEC (privatisation). As outlined in chapter 3, this thesis considers firm 
failure to encompass discontinuity of ownership (M&A), bankruptcy or liquidity, 
and privatisation (Josefy et al., 2017). The first classification of failure, which was 
due to discontinuation of ownership (by mergers or acquisitions), is listed in 
Compustat as delisting code 01. The second classification of failure, which was due 
to bankruptcy is listed in Compustat as delisting code 02. The third classification of 
failure, which was due to discontinuation of operations or asset liquidation is 
constructed as delisting code 03. Lastly, the last classification was defined as failure 
due to other reasons, such as no longer having SEC files, and is listed in Compustat 
as code 09 or 10.  
 
This thesis considered discontinuity of ownership as a type of failure, in which the 
successful exited firms were separated from the unsuccessful exits by Altman’s 
(1968) Z-score of financial distress. This was done to determine whether a firm that 
exited due to a merger or acquisition would have went bankrupt had it not been for 
the merger or acquisition (Josefy et al., 2017; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). 
Altman’s Z-score has several firm-level indicators such as firm size, leverage, 
liquidity, and performance to characterise firms that enter a financial distress 
situation. The Z-score was computed as such: (earnings before interest and 
taxes/total assets*3.3) + (sales/total assets*0.99) + (market value of equity/total 
liabilities*0.6) + (working capital/total assets*1.2) +(retained earnings/total 
assets*1.4). Firms that had a Z-score less than three had experienced a financial 
distress situation. As a result, 268 firms were left from 401 firms and were 
considered as failed.  
 
The next section will outline the control variables that are included in the regression 
equations (4.1 and 4.2). 
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6.6.2 Control Variables 
 
This section outlines the control variables that are included in the survival analysis 
regression equations. The control variables are: performance measures, firm age, 
firm size, organisational slack, leverage, systematic risk, and the high-technology 
industry dummies.  
 
6.6.2.1 Performance Variables 
 
The control variable Tobin’s Q was included in the regression. Market-based 
measures of firm performance (Tobin’s Q) influence the failure or survival rate of a 
firm. The more likely that a firm has higher stock returns or profits the less likely it 
would experience failure. Conversely, if a firm is performing poorly, it is more 
likely to enter into financial distress (Levinthal, 1991; Opler & Titman, 1994). 
Thereby, it is expected that a higher Tobin’s Q would have a negative effect on firm 
failure. The computation is similar to that presented in chapter 5, yet it was industry 
adjusted to compare the performance of each firm with its respective competitors in 
the same industry. The industry adjusted variable was computed by subtracting the 
value of Tobin’s Q of each firm in each fiscal year from the industry average (using 
Fama and French (1997) 12 industrial classifications) of the value of Tobin’s Q 
during that fiscal year.  
 
6.6.2.2 Firm age 
 
Firm age was included as a control variable since firm age has been shown to affect 
the firm’s standing. According to the liability of newness and adolescence, the 
relationship of firm age with the failure rate of a firm is non-linear. This means that 
young firms with a liability of newness are more likely to suffer from a deficiency in 
resources and capabilities than older firms (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990). Older firms 
that exhibit a liability of adolescence also have a higher likelihood of failure due to 
their inability to adapt to changes in the competitive environment (Thornhill & 
Amit, 2003). Thereby, it is expected that firm age would have a U-shaped 
relationship with firm failure. Its computation was similar to that presented in 
chapter 5. 
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6.6.2.3 Firm size 
 
Firm size was included as a control variable since firm size has been shown to affect 
the failure rate of firms (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004). According to the liability of 
smallness, smaller firms are susceptible to be affected by market shocks and don’t 
have the necessary resources to counteract such shocks (Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Thereby, it is expected that firm size would have a 
negative effect on firm failure. Its computation was similar to that presented in 
chapter 5. 
 
6.6.2.4 Organisational Slack 
 
Liquidity in the form of organisational slack, which is the current liquidity ratio, 
represented by current assets divided by current liabilities, influences the failure rate 
of a firm. A firm with more liquid assets, that can pay off its short-term debt 
obligations, is less likely to enter financial distress (Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). This 
ratio has been shown to affect EO (Hughes et al., 2015). The availability of slack 
resources seems to enable EO, while their absence might stifle EO (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2005). Covin and Lumpkin (2011) call slack resources innovation-
facilitating resources. Thereby, it is expected that liquidity would have a negative 
effect on firm failure. The liquidity ratio was represented by the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) (ACT/LCT). The source 
was from Compustat.  
 
6.6.2.5 Leverage 
 
Leverage, the ratio of total debt to total assets, is also important to consider as a 
variable that influences firm survival/failure (Charitou et al., 2004). Financial 
distressed firms tend to use more leverage than healthy firms as the increasing use 
of debt would increase the risk of failure (Altman, 1968). Thereby, it is 
hypothesised that leverage would have a positive relationship with firm failure. Its 
computation was similar to that presented in chapter 5. 
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6.6.2.6 Market or Systematic Risk 
 
Systematic risk, which is the market risk, would have a significant positive effect on 
firm failure. Financial widespread losses, evidenced by the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis, negatively impacted firm survival (Acharya et al., 2016). Its computation was 
similar to that presented in chapter 5. 
 
6.6.2.7 High-technology Industry Dummies 
 
The separate high-technology industries are included in the Cox proportional hazard 
regression excluding one high-technology dummy to avoid the dummy-variable trap 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). The computation was based on a dichotomous variable 
with values of either 1 or zero for each high-technology industry.  
 
6.6.2.8 Financial crisis 
 
The financial crisis was accounted for through time dummies coded as 1 for the 
fiscal years 2007, 2008, and 2009.  
 
The next section will outline the Cox proportional hazard regression assumptions. 
Similar to the fixed effect regression, the assumptions of the proportional hazard 
regression must be tested.  
 
6.7 The Proportional Hazard Model Assumptions 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline the proportional hazard regression 
assumptions, which is the proportionality and the linearity assumption. 
 
6.7.1 Proportionality Assumption 
 
The assumption of the Cox proportional hazard regression model is that the hazard 
is constant over time. This means that hazard for any firm is a fixed proportion of 
the hazard of another firm (Cox & Oakes, 1984). Thus, this explains the name of the 
regression model as the proportional hazard model. In such a model, the ratio of the 
hazard rates of each of the firms are proportional and independent of time (i.e. do 
not vary with time). However, the name is misleading as it does allow for non-
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proportional hazards by including the time interaction with variables that violate 
such an assumption (Allison, 2010). 
 
To assess the proportionality assumption of the hazard of the time-varying variables, 
three methods were used. First, graphs based on the Schoenfeld residuals as a 
function of time were used to visually assess proportionality assumption of the 
hazard of the time-varying variables (Schoenfeld, 1982). If the slopes of the graphs 
were shown to be significantly fluctuating from zero, this indicates that the 
proportionality assumption does not hold (Allison, 2010). Second, the variables 
were also tested by the proportionality test of the hazard. Third, the variables that 
were shown to be significant by the proportionality test (i.e. their Schoenfeld 
residuals were significantly varying from zero) were refitted in the Cox proportional 
hazard regression model by including their interaction with time (usually in log 
form). This was done to account for the non-proportionality or dependence of their 
hazard with time (Allison, 2010; Keele, 2010; Revilla et al., 2016). If the variable-
time interaction coefficient was shown to be significant, then it validated that the 
proportionality assumption was violated (Allison, 2010, Revilla et al., 2016). The 
third assessment is also the remedy of the violation of the assumption of 
proportionality of the hazard.  
 
6.7.2 Linearity Testing of the Predictor Variables 
 
The functional form of the variables was tested similar to a fixed effect regression. 
This was done by the martingale residual scatter plots. The martingale residual was 
generated from a null model (without the covariates) first and then the regressor 
variables were plotted against the martingale residual to test their functional form. If 
the scatterplot is non-linear this is evidence of non-linearity of the variable. It is 
important to test the functional form of a variable first because a non-linear variable 
might show as a non-proportional hazard (Keele, 2010).  
 
The functional forms of the variables were assessed, and the non-linear variables 
were adjusted by adding a squared term onto the Cox proportional hazard 
regression. The squaring was conducted on the standardised variables. 
Similar to Study 1, the presence of extreme observations or outliers would have a 
significant effect on the statistical results, thereby the variables were winsorized to 
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their respective 1st and 99th percentiles. Furthermore, each of the variables was 
standardised (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011).  
 
The next section will outline the assessment of the Cox proportional hazard 
regression, which involves the model fit statistics and the global test.  
 
6.8 Assessment of the Proportional Hazard Model 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline the assessment of the proportional hazard 
regression, based on the model fit statistics and the global test. This was done in 
Chapter 5 of Study 1, in which the fixed effect regression was assessed based on the 
adjusted R-squared value and the F-test.  
 
Model fit statistics are produced after running the Cox proportional hazard 
regression(s). The model fit statistics table has measures to assess the model fit 
(Akaike’s information criterion and Schwartz’s Bayesian criterion statistics). In this 
table, such statistics compare the model with no predictors to the model with the 
predictors and they penalise models with more covariates. The model with the 
predictors is a better fit if the model fit statistics with the predictors is less than 
those without the predictors (Allison, 2010). The Cox proportional hazard 
regressions that were run showed that the model fit statistics were lower among the 
models with the covariates. This indicates that the model with the variables is a 
better model than the one without the selected variables. 
 
The global test, which is similar to the F-test in the fixed effect panel regressions, 
tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables are all equal to zero. In 
accordance to the test, if the null hypothesis is rejected, then this indicates that at 
least one of the covariates included in the Cox proportional hazard regression has an 
influence on the failure rate of the firms or that one of the coefficients is not zero 
(Allison, 2010). The global test includes the Wald test, the likelihood ratio test, and 
the score test. The Wald test is the mostly cited among researchers (e.g. Revilla et 
al., 2016). 
 
The next section will present the estimation method that is used in the Cox 
proportional hazard regression. 
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6.9 Estimation Method of the Proportional Hazard Model 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline the estimation method of the proportional 
hazard regression model, which is the partial likelihood estimation.  
 
To estimate the hazard function there are parametric and non-parametric methods. 
The Cox proportional hazard semi-parametric model was chosen. This model 
utilises the partial likelihood estimation method, (Cox, 1972). The partial likelihood 
function of the proportional hazard model can be considered as a function that only 
depends on the Beta coefficients disregarding the baseline hazard. Similar to 
maximum likelihood estimation, the partial likelihood produces consistent estimates 
and is asymptotically normal in large sample sizes (Allison, 2010). Thus, the non-
parametric part of the Cox proportional hazard regression equation is the baseline 
hazard probability distribution, which is left unspecified. The advantage of using a 
Cox proportional hazard regression is that one does not need to make assumptions 
on how the baseline hazard depends on time (Keele, 2010). This was not of a 
concern for this Study. 
 
Cox (1972) proposed the partial-likelihood estimation method of the conditional 
probability of failure of firms, while assuming that there are no tied events. Tied 
events means that two events occur at the same time. However, there is a possibility 
that two firms might have experienced the same time of failure. Efron (1977) 
modified the function to include tied events. The Efron approximation is better than 
the default Breslow approximation by SAS as the Breslow approximation 
deteriorates as the number of ties increases (Farewell & Prentice, 1980).  
 
The next section will outline the overview to analysing the proportional hazard 
regression results.  
 
6.10 Synopsis to the Analysis and Statistics Results   
 
The following section introduces the interpretation of the Cox regression results 
before the outline of the survival analysis chapter.  
 
The coefficients of the Cox proportional hazard regression were interpreted such 
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that coefficients greater than zero or hazard ratios greater than 1 indicate that the 
variables increase the risk of firm failure. Conversely, hazard ratios less than 1 
indicate that the variable reduces the risk of firm failure. The percentage of the 
reduction of the risk of failure is computed as (1-hazard ratio). Hazard ratios equal 
to 1 indicate that the variables have no effect on the failure rate of the sample of 
surviving firms. The hazard ratios were presented in the tables of the survival 
analysis chapter in parentheses.   
 
The survival graphs of each of the separate EO dimensions were also presented to 
compare the survival rate of firms high in the EO dimensions versus the rest of the 
sample. Even though the Cox proportional hazard regression was used to estimate 
the effect of each of the EO dimensions on the failure rate of firms, survival curves 
were also used to preliminary compare survival functions of the different EO 
dimensions. Survival analysis often initially presents the survival curves through 
non-parametric methods before outlining the Cox proportional hazard regression 
results (Wagner & Cockburn, 2010).  
 
Non-parametric methods are desirable because they make no assumptions on the 
survival or hazard functions. To achieve this, we use the Kaplan Meier product-limit 
estimates to compare the survival function of firms high in EO/EO dimensions to 
the overall sample of the Study (Kaplan & Meier, 1958). This was done to test the 
null hypothesis, which is that the survival functions are the same between the 
different groups of firms (Allison, 2010; Wagner & Cockburn, 2010).  
 
In the results section, the survival figures show the number of censored surviving 
firms that are at risk of failure at each period (Allison, 2010). The censored 
observations are shown in the graphs as plus signs or tick marks. The 95% 
confidence interval limits around the survivor functions are shown in the graphs to 
indicate the 95% confidence limits of the probability of survival of the failed firms 
in the specified time (Allison, 2010).  The graphs show the comparison of the 
survival functions of two groups and the log-rank test was utilised to test the null 
hypothesis of the difference between two requested groups.  
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6.11 Chapter Conclusion 
 
The following chapter has shown the reasoning behind conducting survival analysis 
in addition to the panel regression analysis of the performance effects of EO and 
each of its dimensions. The proportional hazard regression was used, and its 
functions and regression equations were outlined in the chapter. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of the control variables in the proportional hazard regression models was 
reasoned based on the effects of the variables on the failure rate of firms. The 
assumptions of the regression as well as its assessment criteria were outlined.  
 
The next chapter will introduce the synopsis to the first two analysis chapters, which 
are the fixed effect regression results of the effects of EO and each of its dimensions 
in the sample of surviving firms and failed firms. The following will present the 
results of the fixed effect regression in the sample of the surviving followed by the 
failed firms. Lastly, chapter 9 will present the results of the survival analysis.  
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Table 6.1: Study 2 Variables’ Definitions and Measurements  
 
 Definition  Measurement  Source 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Failure Failed firms: 
M&A, 
Bankruptcy, 
Liquidity, and no 
longer filing with 
SEC 
Coded as 1 for 
failed firms that 
faced a financial 
distress based on 
the Z-score 
Compustat/CRSP 
merged file 
 
Independent Variables 
 
EO Refer to Study 1 
 
 
Innovativeness Refer to Study 1 
Proactiveness Proactiveness was industry adjusted to assess the percentage of 
profits reinvested in the firm in each year in comparison to rivals 
in the same industry (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). 
Risk taking Refer to Study 1 
 
Control Variables  
 
Firm Age Refer to Study 1 
Firm Size Refer to Study 1 
Systematic Risk Refer to Study 1 
Tobin’s Q Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q 
Leverage  Refer to Study 1 
Organisational Slack  Current liquidity 
ratio 
Current 
assets/Current 
Liabilities 
Compustat: 
ACT/LCT 
High-technology Dummies  Coded as 1 for each 
high-technology 
dummy 
(dichotomous 
variable) 
Compustat 
Financial Crisis Dummy  Coded as 1 for 
fiscal year 2007 
2008 and 2009 
Compustat 
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Synopsis to Chapters 7 and 8 
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S.1 Synopsis to Analysis Chapter 7 and 8 
 
The following represents a synopsis to the analysis chapters of the panel fixed effect 
regressions on each of the surviving and failed firms. This section covers a 
comparison of the mean values, along with the standard deviations, of the main 
variables EO and its dimensions (innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking) 
among surviving and failed firms in the different high-technology industries 
included.  
 
The following section presents results on the testing of the first hypothesis of this 
thesis outlined in chapter 3, which states: 
 
H1:  Failed firms are more entrepreneurially oriented in comparison to surviving 
firms. 
 
Table S.1: Mean Values and Standard deviations in each High-technology 
Industry among Surviving and Failed Firms 
 
 EO Innovativeness Proactiveness Risk taking 
Industry Active 
Firms 
Failed 
Firms 
Active 
Firms 
Failed 
Firms 
Active 
Firms 
Failed 
Firms 
Active 
Firms 
Failed 
Firms 
Computer 
Hardware 
0.59 
(1.27) 
1.33 
(1.48) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.7) 
-0.28 
(0.95) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.04   
(0.02) 
Electronics 0.57 
(1.22) 
1.04 
(1.55) 
0.1 
(0.08) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.24 
(2.44) 
-0.47 
(1.58) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Software 0.43 
(1.36) 
0.8  
(2.76) 
0.1 
(0.08) 
0.12 
(0.09)   
-0.22 
(1.47) 
-0.94   
(3.95) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.04    
(0.02) 
Communication 
Services 
-0.39 
(1.08) 
-0.41 
(1.49) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.01   
(0.02) 
-0.26 
(0.58) 
-1.14 
(1.36) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
Communication 
Equipment 
-0.38 
(3.35) 
0.82   
(1.15) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
-1.24 
(5.47) 
-0.17 
(0.91) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Telephone 
Equipment 
-0.56 
(1.31) 
0.54 
(1.66) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.34 
(0.79) 
-1.49 
(1.88) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
Navigation 
Equipment 
-0.66 
(0.77) 
0.18   
(1.93) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.3 
(0.26) 
0.13 
(0.41) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Measuring and 
Controlling 
Devices 
0.18 
(0.86) 
0.5 
(1.11) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
0.21 
(0.52) 
0.12 
(0.47) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Medical 
Instruments 
-0.17 
(0.71) 
0.35 
(1.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.04) 
0.11 
(0.67) 
-0.02 
(0.85) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Overall Mean  0.2669 0.804 0.086 0.105 -0.093 -0.434 0.025 0.033 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses  
 
 
The above table presents a comparison of the mean values of EO and its dimensions 
among surviving and failed firms in the specific high-technology industries. 
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Among the surviving firms, the highest EO value (mean value of 0.59) was 
exhibited among firms in the computer hardware industry followed by firms that 
belong to the electronics industry and the software industry. As for the EO 
dimensions, innovativeness was highest (mean value of 0.1) in the firms belonging 
to the electronics and software industries. Proactiveness was highest (mean value of 
0.3) among firms that belong to the navigation equipment industry followed by 
measuring and controlling devices and medical instruments. Lastly, risk taking was 
generally the same among the industries with either a mean value of 0.02 or 0.03.  
 
Among failed firms, the highest value of EO (mean value of 1.33) was among the 
computer hardware industry, followed by the electronics industry (mean value of 
1.04), and the communication equipment industry (mean value of 0.82). 
Innovativeness was highest (mean value of 0.12) among the firms that belong to the 
electronics and software industries. Proactiveness was highest with a mean value of 
0.13 among firms that belong to the navigation equipment industry, followed by 
measuring and controlling devices with a mean value of 0.12. Lastly, risk taking 
was generally the same with either a mean value of 0.03 or 0.04.  
 
Failed firms exhibited higher values of EO (highest mean value of 1.33) in 
comparison to the surviving firms (highest mean value of 0.59). This supported the 
above hypothesis (H1) of the thesis.  
 
Among the high-technology industries, there were higher mean values of EO among 
the failed firms, except for the communication services industry. Furthermore, 
innovativeness was higher among the failed firms’ high-technology industries, 
except for communication services industry. In the case of proactiveness, it was 
higher among the surviving firms’ high-technology industries except for the 
communication and navigation equipment industries. Lastly, risk taking was higher 
among the failed firms’ high-technology industries except for the communication 
equipment and electronics industries, in which the surviving and failed firms 
belonging to such industries exhibited the same mean values of risk taking.  
 
On average failed firms were more innovative, with an overall mean value of 0.105, 
and more risk taking, with an overall mean value of 0.033, and less proactive, with 
an overall mean value of -0.43, in comparison to the surviving firms, which had an 
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overall mean innovativeness value of 0.086, overall mean value of proactiveness of 
the value -0.093, and overall mean value of risk taking dimension of EO of the value 
of 0.025. The overall mean value of EO was higher among the sample of the failed 
firms, in which the overall mean value of EO among the sample of firms was 0.8 
among failed firms and 0.26 among surviving firms. If the separate mean values of 
each of the EO dimensions were not examined, then one would assume that the 
sample of failed firms had higher values for each of the EO dimensions reflecting 
the higher overall value of the EO construct. Yet, these independent results for each 
of the EO dimensions aligned with the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of EO 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  
 
The next chapter 7 will outline the panel fixed effect regression results among the 
surviving firms, followed by chapter 8, which will outline the regression results 
among the failed firms.  
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Chapter 7 
 
The Relationship of EO and Firm Performance among Surviving 
Firms 
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7.1 Introduction to the Chapter  
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present the effects of each of the EO 
dimensions and the overall effect of the EO construct on firm performance (market 
based represented by Tobin’s Q as well as an accounting measure represented by 
short-term firm performance or ROA) among surviving firms. Thus, this chapter is 
detailing only the results from the surviving firms’ dataset. The same procedure 
outlined in this chapter will be conducted on the failed firms in chapter 8. For the 
purpose of this study, a sample of 341 surviving high-technology firms from fiscal 
year 2000 until 2014 was selected with a total of 3,148 observations. Secondary 
measures of each of the main and control variables were developed. The surviving 
firms were identified based upon the Compustat code for surviving firms.  
 
The sequence of the chapter is as follows: the descriptive statistics of the variables, 
the pre-analytical procedure of testing the panel fixed effect regression assumptions, 
time-series figures of the main dependent and predictor variables, the panel fixed 
effect regression results, different EO values effects on firm performance, and 
finally the robustness checks sequentially. As such, the first required step before 
outlining the results from the regressions was to test the assumptions of the panel 
fixed effect regression to indicate whether the panel fixed effect regression was 
appropriate.  
 
In the methodological chapter 5 of Study 1, each of the dependent variables and 
regressors that were included were based upon their effect on firm performance and 
the EO-firm performance relationship according to the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective. The effects of each of the EO dimensions/overall EO construct on the 
firm performance measures were empirically tested. STATA software was used to 
run the panel regressions on the EO dimensions as predictor variables and firm 
performance measures as the predicted variables. This chapter aims to answer the 
below hypotheses. The hypotheses, outlined in the theoretical chapter 3, that were 
tested in this chapter are: 
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7.1.1 Hypotheses: EO Construct and Firm Performance 
 
H2: The relationship between EO and (a) short-term and (b) long-term firm 
performance among surviving firms is an inverted U-shaped relationship. 
 
7.1.2 Hypotheses: EO Dimensions and Firm Performance 
 
H6a: Innovativeness has a negative effect on short-term firm performance (ROA).  
H6b: Innovativeness has a positive effect on long-term firm performance (Tobin’s 
Q).   
H7a: Proactiveness has a positive effect on short-term firm performance (ROA).  
H7b: Proactiveness has a negative effect on long-term firm performance (Tobin’s 
Q).  
H8a: Risk taking has an inverse U-shaped effect on short-term firm performance 
(ROA).  
H8b: Risk taking has a negative effect on long-term firm performance (Tobin’s Q).   
 
The next section will outline the descriptive statistics of the predictor and the 
dependent variables.  
 
7.2 Descriptive Statistics for Predictor and Dependent Variables among 
Surviving Firms 
 
The following section outlines the descriptive statistics for each of the variables that 
are included in this Study. The statistics include the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum levels, and the skewness and kurtosis.  
 
The first table 7.1 presents the statistics for the predictor variables and the second 
table 7.2 presents the statistics for the dependent variables. 
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Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Predictor Variables 
 
Predictor Variables 
(winsorized) 
Mean S.D. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
EO 0.2669 1.583 -21.773 8.674 -4.638 59.556 
Innovativeness (R&D 
intensity or R&D 
divided by total assets) 
0.086 0.0614 0.0032 0.293 1.0207 3.8407 
Innovativeness (R&D 
divided by total 
number of employees) 
0.037 0.036 0.0004 0.177 1.63 5.85 
Innovativeness (patent 
yield or number of 
patents divided by 
R&D) 
0.386 0.424 0.0087 2.243 2.224   8.676 
Proactiveness -0.0932 1.04 -6.668 1.133 -1.670 6.202 
Risk taking  0.025 0.012 0.0079 0.072 1.374 5.285 
Systematic Risk 1.323 0.548 0.155 3.0037 0.681 3.515 
Investment opportunity 0.339 0.251 0.045 1.444 1.9 7.5 
Firm size (number of 
employees) 
9285.23 18948.
61 
517 117300 0.7609 2.899 
Firm age Listed 17.592 13.482 0 59 -0.073 3.438 
Firm age Founded 33.78 25.39 3 182 0.315 3.04 
Leverage 0.143 0.154 0 0.623 1.002 3.275 
Liquidity 0.272 0 .175 0.0083 0.726  0.552 2.598 
 
 
Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
(winsorized) 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Tobin’s Q 1.728 1.472 0.0083 7.989  1.927 7.321 
ROA 0.0216 0.136 -0.649 0.2687 -2.336 10.944 
 
 
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 represent the values of the variables when winsorized by 
changing the outliers to the respective variables’ 1st and 99th percentile (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2011), yet for the panel regressions all the variables were 
standardised as well (Engelen et al., 2015). The values of the standardised variables 
were not presented in these tables since the standardised variables have a mean of 
zero and standard deviation of 1.  
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The skewness and kurtosis of the variables are also outlined in the tables. Skewness 
(which is a measure of symmetry) indicates how well the data is symmetrical and 
kurtosis (which is a measure of the tailedness of the distribution) is a measure of 
whether the data is heavy tailed or light tailed in comparison to a normal 
distribution. In the case of the predictor variables, firm size, firm age, that were 
logged in the regressions, the skewness and kurtosis values were of the logged 
variables. The variables that were of a wide range were log transformed (i.e. firm 
size and firm age) when running regressions with each of Tobin’s and ROA, as the 
dependent variables. 
 
In the table of the predictor variables 7.1, as previously outlined in chapter 5, EO is 
the sum of the standardised values of its dimensions. The average value of the main 
measure of innovativeness (R&D/total assets) in the sample of firms was 0.086, 
which indicates that the firms are being innovative around 8.6 %. The alternative 
mean value of innovativeness based on patent yield was 0.38. The mean value of 
proactiveness, proxied by retained earnings divided by total assets since 
proactiveness is a forward-looking behaviour, was -9 %, which indicates that on 
average the surviving firms in the sample have accumulated deficit during the 
period of the Study (fiscal year 2000 till 2014). The average value for risks (which 
was calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals of the daily stock returns on 
the value weighted market returns) was 0.025.  
 
As for the control variables, the systematic risk or value weighted market return in 
the sample of firms on average was 1.32. The alternative value of systematic risk 
which is the standard deviation of the regression used to predict unsystematic risk 
was not used due to a high correlation with the unsystematic risk dimension of EO 
(Hoberg & Parabhala, 2009).  
 
Investment opportunity on average (represented by capital expenditures divided by 
long term assets) was 33.9 % in the sample of firms. The firm size indicated that on 
average firms have about 9,285 employees. The firm age on average was 17.6 years 
keeping in mind that the firm age resembles the time when the firm was first listed. 
Also, the lowest value of firm age was zero because such firms were listed either 
during or after the first year of interest in the Study (i.e. fiscal year 2000). The firm 
age based on the founding date of the firms on average was 33.7 years, with the 
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lowest being 3 years. Most importantly, when firm age based on founding date was 
used in the main regression results, the results did not change. Leverage, which is 
total debt divided by total assets, for the sample of firms on average was 0.14 or 14 
% (less than 50%) meaning that less than half of the firms’ assets were financed by 
debt. Liquidity or cash holding ratio, measuring the portion of assets represented in 
cash, had a mean of 27.2 % in the sample of firms.  
 
In the table of the dependent variables 7.2, the average value of the ratio of market 
value to book value of assets or Tobin’s Q in the sample of firms was 1.72. A ratio 
of Tobin’s Q higher than 1 indicates that the market value of the firm is more than 
the replacement cost of the firm’s assets. Finally, the ROA mean value in the sample 
of firms was 2.1 %. ROA indicates how profitable firms are relative to their total 
assets and the higher the ratio, the more desirable it is for firms since it indicates that 
they are utilising their asset base efficiently. Thus, a ratio of 2.1 % is considered to 
be relatively low.  
 
Normally distributed variables have a skewness ranging from -1.96 to 1.96 and 
kurtosis ranging from -3 to 3 (Gurjarti, 2003; Wooldridge, 2015). Most of the 
variables were within the skewness range except for EO. As for the kurtosis, most of 
them were slightly above the range except for EO and proactiveness indicating that 
their distribution was heavy-tailed. The panel fixed effect regression model 
consistently estimates the variables without having the normality of the variables 
with a large N (number of observations) and a fixed T (small time in comparison to 
the number of observations) (Wooldridge, 2015). However, as previously stated 
what is more important is not the distribution of the variables or the data, but of the 
residuals, yet even the distribution of the residuals is not an essential assumption of 
the panel fixed effect regression (Wooldridge, 2015). Thus, addressing issues of 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity is more of a necessity 
because they would affect the regression results (Lumley et al., 2002).  
 
The next section 7.3 will outline the pre-analysis procedure of the appropriateness of 
the panel fixed effect regression through the F-test, Breusch-Pagan LM-test 
(Langrange Multiplier), and the Hausman tests. Then  the linearity, 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation tests are presented. 
 
197 
 
7.3 Pre-analysis Procedure among Surviving Firms 
 
The following section represents a pre-analysis procedure before running the fixed 
effect regressions. First, we tested the appropriateness of the fixed effect regression. 
The next step was to test the assumptions of the fixed effect regression if the fixed 
effect regression was shown to be appropriate. 
 
7.3.1 Testing for the Appropriateness of the Fixed Effect Regression 
   
The pre-analysis procedure is essential to conduct before running the regression 
analysis to test the assumptions of the panel fixed effect regression. Since there are 
separate regressions (ROA or Tobin’s Q, EO/EO dimensions), the panel fixed effect 
regression assumptions should be tested separately on the four regression equations, 
which are Tobin’s Q /ROA as the dependent variables and the main EO 
dimensions/overall EO construct as the predictor variables.  
 
The panel fixed effect regression appropriateness was determined through the F-test, 
Breusch-Pagan LM-test, and the Hausman tests sequentially starting with the F-test 
(refer to figure 5.1 in chapter 5). The testing of the regression assumptions is in 
accordance with Wooldridge (2015), in which the tests of the panel fixed effect 
regression involve linearity, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation 
and normality of the residuals.  
 
Table 7.3: F-test of the Regression Models 
 
Regressions F-test Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO F (291, 2205) = 12.69 Prob>F= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
F (291, 2203) =12.06 Prob>F= 0 
ROA and EO F (291, 2208) =6.21 Prob>F= 0 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
F (291, 2206) = 3.04 Prob>F= 0 
 
 
The F-test examines whether a panel fixed effect regression is more appropriate than 
a simple pooled OLS regression, which ignores the panel structure of the data. As 
shown in table 7.3 above, the null hypothesis that the panel fixed effect regression 
coefficients are equal to zero was rejected in each of the four regressions, thereby 
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indicating that a panel fixed effect regression is more appropriate. Furthermore, the 
F-test examines the overall significance of the regression and this is important rather 
than just assessing the regression based on the R-squared (Wooldridge, 2015).  
 
The next step was to test whether a panel random effect regression is more 
appropriate than a pooled OLS regression through the LM-test. The difference 
between the panel random and fixed effect regression, is that the random effect 
regression considers that the variation among the firm-year observations are random 
and that the unobserved firm heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. However, the fixed effect regression allows for correlations between the 
unobserved fixed firm-level variables and the explanatory variables, in which the 
fixed effect regression would control for fixed variables over time (Wooldridge, 
2015).  
 
The next section will outline the LM-test of the four regressions of this Study. 
 
Table 7.4: Breusch-Pagan LM-test of the Regression Models 
 
Regressions LM-test Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO Chibar2(01) = 2287.64 
 
Prob>chibar2= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
Chibar2(01) = 1995.47 
 
Prob>chibar2= 0 
ROA and EO Chibar2(01) = 623.76 
 
Prob>chibar2= 0 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
Chibar2(01) = 150.2 
 
Prob>chibar2= 0 
 
 
As a result of running the Breusch-Pagan LM-test (Langrange Multiplier), as shown 
in table 7.4 above, the null hypothesis was rejected in the four regressions. The 
rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the panel random effect regression is 
more appropriate than the pooled OLS regression (Park, 2011). 
 
As a summary of applying both tests rigorously, it was shown that a panel fixed 
effect regression was better than a pooled OLS by the F-test and that a panel random 
effect regression was better than the pooled OLS by the LM-test. After the results 
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showed that the pooled OLS was rejected, then the choice fell into either a panel 
fixed effect or a random effect regression, which was tested by the Hausman test. 
Thus, the next section will outline the Hausman test results. 
 
Table 7.5: Hausman Test of the Regression Models 
 
Regressions Hausman test Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO Chi2(7) = 77.04 
 
Prob>chi2= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
Chi2(9)= 117.79 
 
Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO Chi2(7) = 137.39 
 
Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
Chi2(9) =80.18 
 
Prob>chi2= 0 
 
 
In STATA, a fixed effect regression was first instructed, and the results were stored 
in the STATA software. Similarly, a random effect regression was instructed, and 
the results were stored. Afterwards a Hausman test was conducted to indicate which 
regression is more appropriate (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).  
 
According to the results of the Hausman test, as shown in table 7.5 above, the null 
hypothesis was rejected meaning that a fixed effect regression is more appropriate 
and consistent (Wooldridge, 2015).  
 
The Hausman test considers that the random effects estimator is fully efficient. Yet, 
there can be violations to this assumption in the presence of autocorrelation and 
cross-sectional dependence (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Thereby, the next section 
will outline the results of a robust Hausman test, which was conducted after running 
a random effect regression with clustered robust standard errors.  
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Table 7.6: Robust Hausman Test of the Regression Models 
 
Regressions Robust Hausman test Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO Chi2(7) = 70.052 
 
Prob>chi2= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
Chi2(9) = 111.239 
 
Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO Chi2(7) = 144.29 Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
Chi2(9) = 44.112 
 
Prob>chi2= 0 
 
 
The robust Hausman test, as outlined in table 7.6 above, showed that the null 
hypothesis was rejected in the four regressions reiterating that the fixed effect is 
more appropriate than the random effect regression (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; 
Wooldridge, 2002).  
 
The next section will outline the testing of the assumptions of the fixed effect 
regression after it was shown that it was appropriate.  
 
7.3.2 Testing the Assumptions of the Fixed Effect Regression 
 
The following section represents the testing of the fixed effect regression 
assumptions starting with the linearity, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and normality testing.  
 
7.3.2.1 Linearity Testing 
 
After the robust version of the Hausman test showed that a fixed effect regression 
was appropriate, then the next step was to test the assumptions of a fixed effect 
regression. The first test to conduct was the linearity assumption of the regression, 
then the multicollinearity testing, followed by heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
tests.  
 
The linearity testing of the four regressions was done separately, in which the results 
of the Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable regressions will be outlined first. Then 
the results of ROA as the dependent variable regression models will follow.  
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The first regression to be tested in each of the regressions (of Tobin’s Q and ROA as 
the dependent variables) was the regression of the control variables, then the 
regression of EO as the predictor variable, and finally the regression with the EO 
dimensions as the regressors.  
 
The linearity testing was run after each regression on the individual regressors. The 
linearity testing was also accompanied by scatterplots of the residuals of the 
regression against the tested predictor variables to validate the linearity test and 
have a visual representation of the residuals of the regression against the predictor 
variables.  
 
Below the linearity testing of the regression of Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, 
against the control variables will be outlined first. 
 
7.3.2.1.1 Linearity Testing of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and ROA and the 
Control Variables 
 
The following section represents the linearity testing of the control variables in the 
regression of Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variables. The regression 
containing the control variables was run and the linearity test results were obtained. 
The scatterplots of the residuals against the tested predictor variables were run as 
well. The beginning of this section will outline the results from the regression of 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable followed by ROA as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 7.7: Linearity Test of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and Control variables 
 
Control Variables Linearity Test 
Systematic Risk Prob>F= 0.213 
Investment opportunity Prob>F= 0.186 
Firm size (logged) Prob>F= 0.355 
Firm age (logged) Prob>F= 0.4001 
Leverage Prob>F=0.0009 
Liquidity Prob>F=0.858 
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Figure 7.1: Residual Figure of Tobin’s Q and Leverage 
 
 
 
 
The above table 7.7 shows the linearity test of the control variables with Tobin’s Q 
as the dependent variable. As can be shown in table 7.7, the linearity test of the 
control variables (except for leverage (p-value=0.0009)) were insignificant, which 
indicates that they have a linear relationship with Tobin’s Q since they did not reject 
the null hypothesis of linearity.  
 
Yet, according to the scatterplot of the residuals of the regression against leverage as 
shown in figure 7.1 above, the relationship between Tobin’s Q and leverage was 
fairly linear, in which the residuals seemed to be centered around zero (Tarling, 
2008).  
 
The next section represents the linearity test of the control variables in the 
regression of ROA as the dependent variable.  
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Table 7.8: Linearity Test of the Regression of ROA and Control variables 
 
Control Variables Linearity Test 
Systematic Risk Prob>F= 0.383 
Investment opportunity Prob>F= 0.0007 
Investment opportunity (logged) Prob > F = 0.29 
Firm size (logged) Prob>F= 0.037 
Firm age (logged) Prob>F= 0.447 
Leverage Prob>F=0.102 
Liquidity Prob>F=0.824 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Residual Figure of ROA and Firm size 
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Figure 7.3: Residual Figure of ROA and Investment Opportunity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Residual Figure of ROA and Logged value of Investment 
Opportunity 
 
 
 
 
The linearity test of the regression of ROA, as the dependent variable, with the 
control variables as outlined in table 7.8 above showed that the control variables had 
a linear relationship with ROA except for firm size (p-value=0.037<0.05) and 
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investment opportunity (p-value=0.0007<0.05). Yet, the relationship between ROA 
and firm size was linear as can be revealed in figure 7.2. Lastly, according to the 
residual scatterplot figure 7.3 of the residuals against investment opportunity, it 
showed non-linearity in the shape of an inverse U-shaped relationship. However, for 
this Study it was not of a concern to add a squared term of a control variable onto 
the regression. Accordingly, in the regression with ROA as the dependent variable, 
investment opportunity was log transformed. After the log transformation, it passed 
the linearity test (p=0.29). As can be shown in figure 7.4, the linear relationship 
between ROA and investment opportunity improved after the log transformation of 
investment opportunity. 
 
The next section will outline the linearity test of the regression of EO, as the 
independent variable, with each of Tobin’s Q and ROA, as the dependent variables. 
 
7.3.2.1.2 Linearity Testing of the Regressions of Tobin’s Q and ROA and the 
EO Construct  
 
The following section shows the linearity test of the EO construct, as the predictor 
variable, in each of the regressions of Tobin’s Q and ROA, as the dependent 
variables. The section will first outline the linearity test of the EO construct 
followed by a graphic representation of the relationship of EO with the dependent 
variable Tobin’s Q represented by table 7.9 and figure 7.5. Similarly, the linearity 
test of the EO construct will be done in the regression of ROA as the dependent 
variable represented by table 7.10 and figure 7.6.  
 
Table 7.9: Linearity Test of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO 
 
Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO 
Linearity test Prob > F=0.013 
U-test to test the presence of an Inverse U-shaped 
(H0=monotone) 
P>|t|=0.0013 
Extreme point -7.595 
Interval {-21.773, 8.674}    
Slope {0.1214, 8.674} 
t-value {3.019, -3.3907} 
Prob>│t│ {0.0013, 0.00039} 
90% Fieller interval for extreme point {-12.1808, -3.422} 
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Figure 7.5 of the Two-way Function of the Regression of Tobin’s and EO 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.10: Linearity Test of the Regression of ROA and EO 
 
Regression of ROA and EO 
Linearity test Prob>F= 0.016 
U-test to test the presence of an Inverse U-
shaped (H0=monotone) 
Prob>│t│=0.0048 
Extreme point -12.873 
Interval {-21.773, 8.674}    
Slope {0.262, -0.635} 
t-value {2.609, -10.674} 
Prob>│t│ {0.0048, 5.78e-23} 
90% Fieller interval for extreme point {-17.43, -10.027} 
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Figure 7.6 of the Two-way Function of the Regression of ROA and EO 
 
 
 
 
When running the regression equations of EO with the control variables against 
Tobin’s Q as well as ROA as the dependent variables, EO rejected the null 
hypothesis of linearity, as can be shown in tables 7.9 and 7.10 above. Thereby, the 
next step was to test whether EO had a quadratic relationship with each of Tobin’s 
Q and ROA. The squaring was conducted on the standardised variable. The test of 
identifying a U-shaped relationship or an inverse U-shaped relationship was done 
after introducing a quadratic term of EO into the regression. The test indicated that 
EO had an inverse U-shaped relationship with each of Tobin’s Q and ROA since it 
rejected the null hypothesis of a monotone relationship. Also, to validate that it was 
an inverse U-shaped relationship, the slope at the lower bound was positive and 
significant at the 1 % level, whereas the slope at the upper bound was negative and 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
Furthermore, the extremum point (the maximum point in an inverse U-shaped 
relationship) was within the Fieller 90 percent confidence interval, which provides 
the robust cut-off points for the rejection of the null hypothesis in the presence of 
non-normality (Haans et al., 2016; Lind & Mehlum, 2010). Thereby, the regression 
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equation(s) above, when EO is the predictor variable, would be modified to include 
a quadratic term of EO as well.  
 
The U-test in tables 7.9 and 7.10 and the figures 7.5 and 7.6 showed the relationship 
between ROA/ Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variables and EO, as the independent 
variable, to be an inverse U-shaped relationship (Hamilton, 2012). Thereby, this 
validates hypothesis H2a and H2b, on the effect of EO on short-term and long-term 
performance among surviving firms. 
 
The next steps were to test the linearity assumption in the regressions of Tobin’s 
Q/ROA, as the dependent variables, and the EO dimensions, as the predictor 
variables. The next table will outline the linearity testing results of the regression of 
Tobin’s Q and the EO dimensions. 
 
7.3.2.1.3 Linearity Testing of the Regressions of Tobin’s Q and ROA and the 
EO Dimensions  
 
The following section shows the linearity test of the EO dimensions, as the predictor 
variables, in the regression of Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 7.11: Linearity Test of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO Dimensions 
 
EO Dimensions Linearity Test U-test to test the presence 
of a U shaped 
(H0=monotone) 
Innovativeness Prob > F= 0.448 N.A. 
Proactiveness Prob > F= 0.003 Prob>│t│= 0.108 
 
Risk taking Prob>F=0.601 N.A. 
 
 
Each of the EO dimensions with the control variables were run in regressions 
against Tobin’s Q and then were tested for the linearity assumption, as can be shown 
in the table 7.11 above. The EO dimensions innovativeness (p=0.448) and risk 
taking (p=0.601) were found to have a linear relationship with Tobin’s Q. 
Proactiveness, on the other hand, had a non-linear relationship with Tobin’s Q 
(p=0.003).  
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According to the U-test, the relationship of proactiveness with the dependent 
variable Tobin’s Q was not quadratic, in which proactiveness failed to reject the null 
hypothesis of a monotonic relationship. Thus, this indicates that the relationship 
between proactiveness and Tobin’s Q is monotonic. Thereby, proactiveness was 
transformed by a logarithmic transformation in the regressions with Tobin’s Q as 
the dependent variables. However, since proactiveness had negative values it was 
log transformed by an alternative equation that preserved the sign of proactiveness: 
sign(proactiveness) * log (absolute value(proactiveness) + 1). After the log 
transformation, proactiveness passed the linearity test.   
 
The next section shows the linearity test of the EO dimensions, as the predictor 
variables, in the regression of ROA as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 7.12: Linearity Test of the Regression of ROA and the EO Dimensions 
 
EO Dimensions Linearity Test U-test to test 
the presence of 
a U shaped 
(H0=monotone) 
Innovativeness Prob > F= 0.106 N.A. 
Proactiveness Prob > F= 0.014 Extremum 
outside interval- 
trivial to reject 
H0 
 
Risk taking Prob > F= 0.0 Extremum 
outside interval 
- trivial failure 
to reject H0 
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Figure 7.7 of the Relationship of ROA and Risk Taking 
 
 
 
Each of the EO dimensions with the control variables were run in regressions 
against ROA, as the dependent variable, and then were tested for the linearity 
assumption, as can be shown in the tables 7.12 above. In table 7.12, the EO 
dimension innovativeness (p=0.106) was found to have a linear relationship with 
ROA. Proactiveness, on the other hand, showed to have a non-linear relationship 
with ROA (p=0.014).  
 
According to the U-test, the relationship of proactiveness with ROA was not 
quadratic, in which the extremum point of proactiveness (the maximum point in an 
inverse U-shaped relationship or the minimum point in a U-shaped relationship) was 
outside the data range of proactiveness. Thus, this indicates that the relationship 
between proactiveness and ROA is monotonic. This is the case even though the 
squared term of proactiveness was significant at the 5% level. Thereby, 
proactiveness was transformed by a logarithmic transformation similar to the 
regression of Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. After the log transformation, 
proactiveness passed the linearity test.   
 
Table 7.12 also outlines the results of the regression of ROA with risk taking. The 
linearity testing of the risk taking dimension of EO showed that it has a non-linear 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
-2 0 2 4
Standardized values of risk taking     
Fitted values Standardized values of ROA     
211 
 
relationship with ROA. Yet, according to the U-test the relationship between ROA 
and risk taking, the extremum point was outside the interval.  
 
The figure 7.7 confirms that the relationship between risk taking and ROA was not 
linear, in which there seemed to be a decreasing concave relationship in the residual 
plot, and the residuals were not centered around zero.  
 
This provides support for hypothesis H8a, as the relationship between risk taking 
and ROA was shown not to be linear. 
 
When running the regression equation of the dependent variable ROA and risk 
taking dimension of EO as the main predictor variable, the regression equation was 
altered to only include the squared term of risk taking. The squaring was conducted 
on the standardised variable. After including the squared term, the squared term of 
risk taking passed the linearity test. The next section will outline the 
multicollinearity testing of the regressions. 
 
7.3.2.2 Multicollinearity Testing 
 
The following section represents multicollinearity testing of the predictor variables 
through the variance inflation factor (VIF) and the correlation coefficients of the 
predictor variables in each of the regressions. 
 
7.3.2.2.1 Multicollinearity Test through VIF 
 
This section will test multicollinearity through the VIF values in each of the 
regressions. The beginning of this section will outline the VIF values in the 
regression of Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable followed by the regression of 
ROA, as the dependent variable.  
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Table 7.13: Variance Inflation Factor of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
EO 1.75     0.57 
EO squared 1.64     0.609 
Firm size 1.37     0.731 
Firm age 1.27     0.787 
Liquidity 1.23     0.815 
Leverage 1.15     0.869 
Systematic risk 1.13     0.887 
Investment opportunity 1.09     0.917 
Mean VIF 1.33  
 
 
According to the table 7.13 above, there are no issues of multicollinearity as the VIF 
for each of the explanatory variables was less than 10 and the tolerance value 
(1/VIF) for the variables was above 0.1 (Wooldridge, 2015). The highest VIF value  
for EO was 1.75 and the mean VIF was 1.33. Furthermore, the lowest tolerance 
value was 0.57. 
 
Table 7.14: Variance Inflation Factor of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Risk taking 1.59     0.628 
Firm size 1.45     0.687 
Proactiveness 1.41     0.707 
Firm age 1.37     0.727 
Innovativeness 1.34     0.745 
Liquidity 1.32     0.759 
Systematic risk 1.26     0.794 
Leverage 1.23     0.813 
Investment opportunity 1.09     0.913 
Mean VIF 1.34  
 
 
Concerning the regressions of Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, and the EO 
dimensions, as the independent variables, in table 7.14 above, the highest VIF was 
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for risk taking dimension of EO which was 1.59 and the mean VIF was 1.34. 
Furthermore, the lowest tolerance value was 0.63. Thereby, there are no issues of 
multicollinearity.  
 
Table 7.15: Variance Inflation Factor of the Regression of ROA and EO 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
EO  1.75     0.57 
EO squared 1.64     0.608 
Firm size 1.37     0.732 
Firm age 1.26     0.792 
Liquidity  1.22     0.816 
Leverage 1.15     0.867 
Systematic risk 1.13     0.887 
Investment opportunity 1.06     0.939 
Mean VIF 1.32  
 
 
According to table 7.15 above, when running the regression of ROA, as the 
dependent variable, against EO as the predictor variable, the highest VIF was for EO 
which was 1.75 and the mean VIF was 1.32. Furthermore, the lowest tolerance value 
was 0.57, which is above 0.1. Thus, there are no issues of multicollinearity.  
 
Table 7.16: Variance Inflation Factor of the Regression of ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Proactiveness  1.36 0.735 
Firm size  1.35 0.739 
Innovativeness  1.34 0.744 
Firm age  1.32 0.756 
Liquidity 1.30 0.768 
Leverage 1.23 0.813 
Systematic risk  1.16 0.864 
Risk taking 1.13 0.881 
Investment opportunity 1.08 0.921 
Mean VIF 1.25  
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For the regression of ROA, as the dependent variable, and the EO dimensions, as the 
independent variables, as shown in table 7.16 above, the highest VIF was for the 
proactiveness dimension of EO, which was 1.36 and the mean VIF was 1.25. 
Thereby, this indicated that there are no problems of multicollinearity in each of the 
four regressions. 
 
In the next section, multicollinearity was also tested by the regressions’ correlation 
coefficients. If the correlation coefficient between two regressors was higher than 
0.8, then multicollinearity would potentially be an issue (Gujarati, 2003). The 
sequence of the multicollinearity testing was done on the regression of Tobin’s Q, as 
the dependent variable, and EO and its dimensions as the predictor variables, 
followed by ROA, as the dependent variable, and EO and its dimensions, as the 
independent variables.  
 
7.3.2.2.2 Multicollinearity Testing through Correlation Matrix 
 
The following section represents the multicollinearity testing through the correlation 
coefficients in each of the regressions of Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent 
variables and the EO/EO dimensions as the predictor variables. The correlation of 
the estimated coefficients of each of the regressions, and not the variables 
themselves were generated as a result of the variance co-variance matrix. The p 
values were not included because the vce, corr command used to generate the 
correlation coefficients in STATA does not produce p-values. 
 
Table 7.17: Correlation Matrix of the Coefficients of the Regression of Tobin’s 
Q and EO 
 
Variables               EO           EO^2     SysRisk   FirmSize  FirmAge  Investment  Liquidity  Leverage  
EO                        1                                                                                  
EO^2                      0.612        1                                                                       
Sys risk                 0.173        0.078        1                                                              
Firm size             -0.024        0.101        0.0048        1                                                    
Firm age               0.281        0.033        0.074        -0.446      1                                          
Investment          -0.158      -0.1509     -0.206        -0.292      0.085     1                                
Liquidity              0.344        0.132        0.018        -0.077     0.203      0.1205         1                      
Leverage             -0.057      -0.063       -0.107         0.054      0.028    -0.03           -0.191        1            
Note: systematic risk was abbreviated as ‘SysRisk’ 
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Table 7.18: Correlation Matrix of the Coefficients of the Regression of Tobin’s 
Q and EO Dimensions 
 
Note: innovativeness was abbreviated as ‘innov’, proactiveness as ‘proac’, and risk taking 
as ‘risk’, systematic risk as ‘SysRisk’ 
 
 
Table 7.19: Correlation Matrix of the Coefficients of the Regression of ROA 
and EO  
 
Variables              EO         EO^2     SysRisk    FirmSize   FirmAge  Investment  Liquidity  Leverage  
EO                        1                                                                                 
EO^2                      0.235         1                                                                        
SysRisk                -0.144       -0.159         1                                                         
FirmSize              -0.027       -0.233        -0.025         1                                                    
FirmAge               0.311         0.271        -0.131        -0.451       1                                          
Investment            0.278         0.334        -0.155       -0.028        0.29       1                                
Liquidity               0.316        -0.009       -0.194         0.188        0.182     0.193         1                      
Leverage               0.053         0.055       -0.132         -0.099       0.171     0.186        -0.126        1       
 
  Note: systematic risk was abbreviated as ‘SysRisk’  
 
 
Table 7.20: Correlation Matrix of the Coefficients of the Regression of ROA 
and EO Dimensions 
 
Variables   Risk^2   Innov        Proac   SysRisk   FirmSize   FirmAge  Investment  Liquidity   
Leverage    
Risk^2         1                                                                                                      
Innov         -0.179       1                                                                                       
Proac          -0.018      0.256        1                                                                       
Sys risk       0.066      -0.021        0.0004     1                                    
FirmSize    -0.0981    -0.103       -0.149     -0.176      1                                    
FirmAge      0.174      -0.061        0.007       0.024    -0.448     1                                   
Investment   0.189       0.078       -0.128     -0.085    -0.073     0.295        1                             
Liquidity      0.062       0.141        0.311     -0.127    -0.039     0.193        0.066          1               
Leverage     -0.214       0.416      -0.134     -0.117     0.022      0.044        0.134        -0.133        1     
Note: innovativeness was abbreviated as ‘innov’, proactiveness as ‘proac’, and risk taking 
as ‘risk’, systematic risk as ‘SysRisk’ 
Variables        Innov    Risk    Proac    SysRisk   FirmSize   FirmAge   Investment Liquidity Leverage       
Innov                1                                                                                            
Risk                 -0.084     1                                                                                  
Proac                0.628     0.187     1                                                                       
SysRisk            0.169     0.082     0.055         1                                                              
FirmSize         -0.198     0.043    -0.235       -0.029        1                                                   
FirmAge         -0.051     0.388     0.0906       0.012       -0.382       1                                          
Investment      -0.148    -0.165    -0.146       -0.155       -0.258       0.103        1                                
Liquidity          0.261     0.025     0.2204       0.026       -0.136       0.122         0.0503        1                      
Leverage          0.293    -0.074    0.214        -0.0513      0.018       -0.0013     -0.026        -0.052    1           
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In table 7.17, the highest correlation of running the regression of Tobin’s Q, as the 
dependent variable, and EO, as the independent variable, was between firm size and 
firm age being -0.45 (the correlation between EO and the squared value of EO is 
0.61, which is expected between a variable and its squared term, yet it is less than 
0.8). 
 
The highest correlation, as shown in table 7.18, after running the regression of 
Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, and the EO dimensions, was between 
proactiveness and innovativeness, the two main dimensions of EO, which was 0.6. 
Thereby, it is important to run separate regressions for each of the EO dimensions. 
Furthermore, the second highest correlation was between risk taking and firm age 
being 0.39.  
 
In table 7.19, the highest correlation of running the regression of ROA, as the 
dependent variable, and EO was between firm size and firm age being -0.45, similar 
to the regression of Tobin’s Q and EO. The second highest correlation was between 
investment opportunity and the squared term of EO being 0.33.  
 
Lastly, in table 7.20, the highest correlation of running the regression of ROA, as 
the dependent variable, and the EO dimensions, as the predictor variables, was 
between firm size and firm age being -0.45. The second highest correlation was 
between innovativeness and leverage being 0.41. Thereby, this indicates that there 
were no issues of multicollinearity between the regression coefficients in each of the 
four regressions. 
 
The next section will outline the heteroscedasticity testing of the regression models. 
 
7.3.2.3 Heteroscedasticity Testing 
 
The next step was to test for heteroscedasticity after multicollinearity testing 
(Wooldridge, 2015). To test for heteroscedasticity in the fixed effect regressions, the 
modified Wald test was run after each of the four panel regressions as shown below. 
The assumption of the fixed effect regression was that the residuals (unobserved 
errors) have a constant variance. If they did not have a constant variance, this 
indicates that heteroscedasticity is present.  
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Table 7.21: Heteroscedasticity Tests of the Regression Models 
 
Regressions Heteroscedasticity 
tests 
Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO Chi2(292) =1.2e+35 Prob>chi2= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
Chi2(292) =7.1e+35 Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO Chi2(292) =3.3e+35 Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
Chi2(292) =1.1e+34 Prob>chi2= 0 
 
 
The test rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity or constant variance of the 
idiosyncratic errors in each of the four regressions of EO/EO dimensions, as the 
independent variables, and Tobin’s Q/ROA, as the dependent variables, as shown in 
table 7.21 above. Thus, this is a clear indication that heteroscedasticity was present 
and to remedy the biased OLS standard errors, robust and clustered errors were 
requested by the variance estimator (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).  
 
The next section will outline autocorrelation testing of the regression models. 
 
7.3.2.4 Autocorrelation Testing 
 
After heteroscedasticity was tested, the next step was to test for autocorrelation or 
cross-sectional dependence of the error term in each of the regressions (Wooldridge, 
2015). The assumption of the fixed effect regression is that the there is no cross-
sectional dependence. This section will present the autocorrelation test in each of the 
regression models. 
 
Table 7.22: Autocorrelation Tests of the Regression Models 
 
Regressions Autocorrelation tests Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO F(1,  237) = 50.365 Prob>F= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
F(1,  237) = 45.762 
 
Prob>F= 0 
ROA and EO F(1, 237) =  25.624 
 
Prob>F= 0 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
F(1,  237) = 89.881 
 
Prob>F= 0 
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It is shown that the null hypothesis was rejected in each of the regressions in table 
7.22 above. To solve for the issue of autocorrelation of the error term, adjustment 
should be made by requesting robust clustered errors (Baltagi, 2013; Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2010). Thus, clustering at the firm level was done to account for the 
autocorrelation among the firms and this ensures the fitness or goodness of the 
regression. 
 
The last assumption to be tested is the normality assumption, which is achieved 
through the kernel density graphs of the residual distribution.  
 
7.3.2.5 Normality Testing of the Regressions  
 
The following section represents the normality testing through the kernel density 
graph of the residuals.  
 
This was done for each of the regressions as will be shown below in figures 
7.8,7.9,7.10, and 7.11 below. Firstly, the fixed effect regression was run and then 
the residuals were generated, but only instructing the idiosyncratic error, which 
refers to the true residual or error component (Baum, 2006). Consequently, the 
kernel density graphic representation of the distribution of the residuals was derived. 
The figures compare the distribution of the residuals to a normal distribution. 
 
Figure 7.8: Normality Test of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO  
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Figure 7.9: Normality Test of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO Dimensions 
 
  
 
 
Figure 7.10: Normality Test of the Regression of ROA and EO 
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Figure 7.11: Normality Test of the Regression of ROA and EO Dimensions 
 
 
 
 
The figures of the residual distributions above are fairly symmetrical (no major 
issue of skewness). There was not much of a major departure from the normal 
distribution curve, however there was moderately high kurtosis. The figures indicate 
that the normality assumption was not fulfilled. Yet, when there were a lot of 
observations, non-normality became trivial and from the regression one could rely 
on asymptotic inference (Omre & Amagata, 2006).  
 
According to central limit theorem, one can rely on asymptotic inference when there 
is a relatively high number of observations. In a panel setting with many 
observations and a large sample size, normality is not as essential as issues of 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation in the fixed effect 
regression.   
 
There are 3,148 observations and a sample of 341 surviving firms. Thereby, in 
accordance with central limit theorem, the assumption of normality of the residuals 
(deviation of the observed or actual values from predicted or fitted values) of an 
OLS regression became trivial in comparison to issues such as heteroscedasticity 
and multicollinearity, which would then affect the coefficient estimates and hence 
affect the statistical inference (Lumley et al., 2002).  
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As the sample size increases, a matter more pressing than normality should be 
addressed, which is the presence of outliers. Thereby, all the variables (predictor and 
dependent) were winsorized by converting the variable’s outliers to the variable’s 
1st or 99th percentile, respectively (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011) so that the 
white noise or volatility in residuals was reduced. The shape of the distribution of 
the residuals improved as a result of the winsorization. 
 
The skewness and kurtosis of the variables improved after winsorization as well. For 
instance, the kurtosis value of proactiveness improved from a value of 149.08 to 
20.9 after winsorization. Furthermore, the skewness and the kurtosis of each of the 
variables after the log transformations was enhanced, for instance the kurtosis value 
for the winsorized proactiveness variable, which was 20.9 improved to a value of 
6.2 after the log transformation. Furthermore, in the regression in which ROA was 
the dependent variable, investment opportunity was logged, in which its kurtosis 
value improved from a value of 7.5 to a value of 2.94 as a result of being logged.  
 
Lastly, after winsorization, all the variables were standardised as well to ensure 
comparability of the effects of the predictors on the outcome variables. 
Standardisation involves transforming the data into z scores by subtracting each 
variable from the mean and dividing by the standard deviation (Wooldridge, 2015). 
Standardising the variables would remove multicollinearity problems and ensure 
that the coefficients are more interpretable. Furthermore, the data should be 
standardised as the STATA panel regressions do not provide the standardised Beta 
coefficients. 
 
Most importantly, bootstrapping, which provides valid estimations of the regression 
coefficients in presence of non-normality of the residuals, was conducted by 
instructing 500 bootstraps based on cluster of firms and showed that the results of 
the regression were consistent (Alejo et al., 2015).  
 
According to the F-test, LM-test, and the Hausman tests, the fixed effect was shown 
to be appropriate. Then, the assumptions of the fixed effect regression were tested. 
The next step will outline the results of time effect test, in which the significance of 
the time dummies is tested in the regressions.  
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7.4 Test of the Time Effect among Surviving Firms 
 
The following section outlines the test of the significance of the time dummies in 
each of the regressions. If the probability of the test of the time effect is significant, 
then this indicates that time dummies are necessary to include in the regression.  
 
Table 7.23: Time Effect Test of the Regression Models 
 
Regressions F-test Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO F( 12,   291) =   31.58 Prob>chi2= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
F( 12,   291) =   29.35 Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO F( 12,   291) =    3.16 Prob>chi2= 
0.0003 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
F( 12,   291) =    6.01 Prob>chi2= 0 
 
 
According to the results as shown in table 7.23, the null hypothesis was rejected in 
the four regressions. Thereby, time dummies should be included in the fixed effect 
regression excluding one-time dummy to avoid the ‘dummy-variable trap’ (t-1 
dummies) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Thus, the fixed effect estimator would be a 
two-way fixed estimator accounting for both fixed firm and time effects as shown in 
the regression equation(s) earlier.   
 
The following tests described above are necessary as the fixed effect regression 
assumptions must be tested before running the regression and obtaining the 
regression results. As was shown above, even though the fixed effect regression 
might be desirable as it controls for variables that are fixed over time, the Hausman 
test determines the appropriateness of a fixed effect regression (Wooldridge, 2015). 
 
After conducting the time effect test, the following section will outline the time-
series figures of the variations in the main variables (predictors and dependent 
variables) from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period throughout the research 
timeframe. 
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7.5 Time-Series Figures of the Main Variables among Surviving Firms 
 
The time-series figures, which show the time variability of the mean of the main 
predictor variables (EO and its dimensions) and dependent variables (Tobin’s Q and 
ROA) for the sample of firms from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period can 
provide insight into the change of the main variables across time. The first figure 
will outline Tobin’s Q, followed by ROA, EO, innovativeness, proactiveness, and 
finally risk taking.  
 
Figure 7.12: Mean Value of Tobin’s Q Time-Series Figure 
 
 
 
 
As can be shown in the figure 7.12 above, the dependent variable Tobin’s Q was at 
its highest peak during year 2000. From year 2000 to 2002, it decreased 
significantly. Yet, from year 2002 to 2007, it increased to its second highest point. 
From year 2007 to 2008, it decreased significantly by the time of the financial crisis 
(year 2008). This indicates that Tobin’s Q was increasing during the pre-crisis 
period and then decreased to its lowest point, less than 1 during the financial crisis. 
Yet, from year 2008 to 2010 it started to increase slightly. From year 2011 to 2015, 
it was increasing steadily as well.  
 
  
1
1
.5
2
2
.5
3
M
e
a
n
 T
o
b
in
q
2000 2005 2010 2015
Data Year - Fiscal
224 
 
Figure 7.13: Mean Value of ROA Time-Series Figure 
 
 
 
 
For the dependent variable ROA as shown in figure 7.13 above, it decreased 
significantly from year 2000 until 2001 to its lowest point. After year 2001, it 
increased and remained steady until year 2007. From year 2007 to 2008 it decreased 
to its second lowest point. After year 2008 to 2010 it increased to its highest point. 
Yet after year 2010, it started decreasing again. Thus, similarly to Tobin’s Q, ROA 
was soaring during the pre-crisis period. Yet during the financial crisis, ROA 
decreased similar to Tobin’s Q.   
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Figure 7.14: Mean Value of EO Time-Series Figure 
 
 
 
 
Concerning EO in figure 7.14 above, it was at its highest peak during 2001, after 
which it decreased significantly to year 2007. Interestingly it increased significantly 
in year 2008 to its second highest peak, but then decreased significantly in year 
2010, after which it started increasing slightly. This means that during the financial 
crisis, EO was present mostly and this is interesting since EO has always been 
considered to be advantageous for firms (Rauch et al., 2009).  
 
This brings questions into the nature of EO and its possibility of affecting a firm’s 
standing. The figure could mean either two possibilities. It could mean either that an 
increase of EO was the result of the financial distress situation, in which firms 
sought to increase their EO in response to the crisis. The second explanation is that 
the increase of EO might have contributed to the financial crisis itself (Slevin & 
Terjesen, 2011). To test which option aligns most with the actual events,  the panel 
regressions were conducted to test the effects of EO and its dimensions on firm 
performance. The effect of EO was also examined on firm failure in chapter 9. 
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Figure 7.15: Mean Value of Innovativeness Time-Series Figure 
 
 
 
 
In the case of innovativeness as shown in figure 7.15 above, it was at its highest 
point in year 2001 until it decreased significantly in year 2007 to its lowest point. 
From year 2007 to 2008, it increased to its third highest peak. Yet from year 2008 to 
2010, it decreased again. After year 2010, it started to increase with a significant 
spike.  
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Figure 7.16: Mean Value of Proactiveness Time-Series Figure 
 
 
 
 
Proactiveness, as shown in figure 7.16 above, was at its highest peak during year 
2000. From year 2000 until 2004, it decreased significantly. From year 2004 until 
2007, it continued to increase until it reached its second highest peak during year 
2007. From year 2007 until 2008, it decreased and continued to decrease 
significantly until year 2009. From year 2011 until 2013 it started to increase 
slightly, yet after year 2013 it started to decrease again. 
 
The above figure of proactiveness shows a different time variation from the figure 
of EO and innovativeness, in which proactiveness was decreasing during the 
financial crisis. 
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Figure 7.17: Mean Value of Risk Taking Time-Series Figure 
 
 
 
 
In the case of risk taking, as shown in figure 7.17, it was at its highest point in year 
2001, after which it decreased significantly to year 2007. From year 2007 until 
2008, it increased to its second highest peak. Yet, after year 2008, it decreased 
significantly to its lowest point in year 2010. From year 2010 until 2011, it 
increased slightly, but after which it decreased again.  
 
Interestingly, similar to EO, risk taking and innovativeness (except for 
proactiveness) as shown from the figures increased during the financial crisis 
period. The financial innovation that soared during the financial crisis was spreading 
the risk further and could entail that the innovation that was present during the 
financial crisis aligned with the dark side or the alternative view of EO as the “EO-
as-Experimentation perspective”, which considers EO as a double-edged sword 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
Most importantly, the different time variation of proactiveness from the rest of the 
EO dimensions might signal that the EO dimensions are independent and have 
different effects as postulated by Lumpkin and Dess (1996).  
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Lastly, it was shown that the time effect was significant to include in the 
regressions. Thus, time dummies (including the financial crisis) were included in the 
regressions. 
 
Before outlining the main regression results, the next section will outline the 
discrepancy between the R-squared and adjusted R-squared value. 
 
7.6 Fitness of the Fixed Effect Regression Model among Surviving Firms 
 
The reported within transformation R-squared of the fixed effect regression is 
incorrect since it subtracts all fixed effects; essentially giving a low value for the R-
squared. Thereby, the R-squared from the OLS regression (fixed for firm and 
industry effects) is reported instead by creating dummies for the firm, industry, as 
well as time (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Thus, in section 7.8, which outlines the 
main regression results,  the adjusted R-squared value is presented instead of the R-
squared value.  
 
Table 7.24: R-squared Value of the Regression Models 
 
Regressions R-Squared Adjusted R-Squared 
Tobin’s Q and EO 0.718 0.677 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
0.721 0.681 
ROA and EO 0.562 0.499 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
0.591 0.532 
 
 
Accordingly, as shown in table 7.24 above, the adjusted R-squared of the regression 
of Tobin’s Q and EO/EO dimensions in the regressions, including dummies for 
industry, firm, and time was 0.68.  This showed that 68% of the changes in Tobin’s 
Q is explained by the variables in the regressions of Tobin’s Q and EO/EO 
dimensions (whereas the R-squared value is 0.72). Thus, the full regression has a 
strong explanatory power. Finally, the adjusted R-squared value of ROA and EO 
was 0.5 and showed that 50% of the changes in ROA was explained by the variables 
in the full regression of ROA and EO. Lastly, in the regression of ROA and the EO 
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dimensions, the R-squared was 0.53, which indicated that 53% of the changes in 
ROA was explained by the regression.  
 
The next section will outline the synopsis to the fixed effect regression results 
section. 
 
7.7 Synopsis to the Panel Fixed Effect Regression Results among Surviving 
Firms 
 
The coefficients of the regression were interpreted in terms of how much the 
dependent variable changes in standard deviation terms with one standard deviation 
change in the predictor variable(s).  However, the variables which were log 
transformed (e.g. firm size and firm age) were interpreted in percentage terms. This 
would indicate how much the dependent variable changed in a percentage with one 
standard deviation change in x.  
 
For the hypothesis testing, the two-tail p-value test was used, in which it tests 
whether each coefficient of the explanatory variables is significantly different from 
zero. To reject this null hypothesis, the t-value should be higher than 1.96 or p-value 
should be lower than 0.05 within the 95% confidence interval. Yet, in the tables of 
the regression results, variables with p-values lower than 0.1 were marked. The 
lower the p-value or the higher the t-value, the more significant effect the 
explanatory variable(s) had on the dependent variable.  
 
The next section will outline the main regression results. 
 
7.8 Regression Analysis Results among Surviving Firms 
 
In this chapter, the fixed effect regression method was employed (with robust 
clustered standard errors). To examine the relationship between Tobin’s Q/ROA and 
the main variables of the EO dimensions as well as EO.  
 
The below tables 7.25 and 7.26 represent the result of the fixed effect regression of 
each of the dependent variables (Tobin’s Q and ROA) with the main explanatory 
and control variables. The different regression models are in the below tables. 
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Model 1 indicates the relationship between the dependent variables and the controls 
only. 
 
Model 2 shows the relationship between the dependent variables and EO.  
 
Model 3 shows the relationship between the dependent variables and the EO 
dimensions (innovativeness, proactiveness, risk taking) in separate models. Model 
3a shows the results of the model including innovativeness only. Model 3b shows 
the results of proactiveness only.  
 
Lastly, model 3c shows the results of risk taking. Splitting the EO dimensions was 
important since proactiveness and innovativeness were shown to be highly 
correlated with a correlation of 0.62 in the regression of Tobin’s Q.  
 
Below there are two tables each outlining the results of models 1, 2, and 3a, 3b, and 
3c. The first table 7.25 below shows the results of the effects of EO and its 
dimensions on Tobin’s Q with the time dummies. The second table 7.26 outlines the 
results of the regression of the effects of EO and its dimensions on ROA whilst 
including time dummies.  
 
The last table 7.27 shows the summary results of the regressions of EO and its 
dimensions on Tobin’s Q and ROA, with the time dummies included. 
 
In the below tables 7.25 and 7.26, the coefficients are under the column B and the 
robust standard errors are under the column labelled as RSE. The t-values are 
presented in parentheses, under the coefficients. Innovativeness has been 
abbreviated as ‘innov’, proactiveness as ‘proac’, risk taking as ‘risk’, systematic risk 
as ‘sys risk’. Furthermore, the number of observations, with the cluster of firms in 
parentheses, were abbreviated as N, the adjusted R-squared as Adj. R^2, and the F-
test as F.
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Table 7.25: Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effects of EO and its Dimensions on Tobin’s Q with Time dummies 
Tobin’s Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c 
Predictors  B RSE B RSE  B RSE B RSE B RSE 
Sys Risk 0.122**** 
(4.88) 
0.025 0.126**** 
(5.01) 
0.0252 0.126**** 
(5.09) 
0.0249 0.122**** 
(4.9) 
0.025 0.144**** 
(5.75) 
0.025 
Investment 
Opportunity 
0.076**** 
(3.52) 
0.021 0.0739*** 
(3.37) 
0.0219 0.081**** 
(3.79) 
0.021 0.0802**** 
(3.72) 
0.021 0.0705*** 
(3.23) 
0.021 
Firm size -0.251*** 
(-2.99) 
0.0839 -0.265*** 
(-3.09) 
0.0858 -0.212** 
(-2.6) 
0.0817 -0.22*** 
(-2.65) 
0.083 -0.276** 
(-3.23) 
0.085 
Firm age -0.029 
(-0.36) 
0.079 -0.027 
(-0.34) 
0.0825 -0.035 
(-0.46) 
0.0787 -0.025 
(-0.32) 
0.079 -0.049 
(-0.6) 
0.082 
Leverage  -0.113**** 
(-3.72) 
0.0305 -0.113**** 
(-3.66) 
0.0308 -0.108**** 
(-3.69) 
0.0295 -0.12**** 
(-4.16) 
0.028 -0.106*** 
(-3.49) 
0.03 
Liquidity 0.068* 
(1.83) 
0.037 0.063 
(1.66) 
0.038 0.078** 
(2.13) 
0.0368 0.071* 
(1.95) 
0.036 0.057 
(1.57) 
0.036 
EO   -0.007 
(-0.23) 
0.0312       
EO^2   -0.0028** 
(-2.5) 
0.0011       
Innov     0.115** 
(2.39) 
0.048     
Proac       -0.054 
(-0.88) 
0.0618   
Risk          -0.074** 
(-2.61) 
0.028 
Constant  0.269*** 
(3.42) 
0.078 0.3*** 
(3.5) 
0.085 0.263*** 
(3.4) 
0.077 0.282**** 
(3.54) 
0.079 0.355**** 
(4.3) 
0.082 
Time 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.67 0.677 0.679 0.677 0.678 
N 2545(295) 2504(292) 2545(295) 2544(294) 2505(293) 
F 27.85 24.41 25.81 26.58 25.52 
Prob(F) 0 0 0 0 0 
t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001
233 
 
Table 7.25 above shows the results of the models of the effects of EO and its 
dimensions on Tobin’s Q whilst including the time dummies. This table tests for 
H2b on the effect of EO on long-term performance and for H6b, H7b, and H8b on 
the effect of the EO dimensions (innovativeness, proactiveness, risk taking) on long-
term performance. Model 2, which includes EO tested for hypothesis H2b. Model 
3a, which includes innovativeness, tested for hypothesis H6b. Model 3b, which 
includes proactiveness, tested for hypothesis H7b. Model 3c, which includes risk 
taking, tested for hypothesis H8b.  
 
In model 1, which includes the control variables, systematic risk (t=4.88) and 
investment opportunity (t=3.52) had a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q at the 
1% level. Firm size (t=-2.99) and leverage (t=-3.72) had a significant negative effect 
on Tobin’s Q at the 1 % level. The model with the time dummies explained 67% of 
the changes in Tobin’s Q.  
 
Model 2, which includes EO and its squared term, revealed that the squared term of 
EO had a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q at the 5% level (t=-2.5). It is 
important to note that without the time dummies both the linear and quadratic term 
of EO were shown to be negative and significant. The EO and Tobin’s Q 
relationship was predominantly a negative inverse U-shaped relationship. The 
quadratic relationship was validated by figure 7.5. Thereby, hypothesis H2b was 
supported. As for the control variables, systematic risk and investment opportunity 
had a significant positive effect at the 1% level. Firm size and leverage had a 
significant negative effect on Tobin’ Q at the 1 % level. The model explained 67.7 
% of the changes in Tobin’s Q. 
 
Model 3a, which includes only innovativeness, revealed that innovativeness (t=2.39) 
had a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q at the 5% level confirming hypothesis 
H6b. Systematic risk and investment opportunity had a significant positive effect at 
the 1 % level. Firm size had a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q at the 5% 
level. Leverage had a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q at the 1% level. 
Lastly liquidity (t=2.13) had a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q at the 5% 
level. The adjusted R-squared was 0.679, which means that by including 
innovativeness, the model explained 67.9 % of the changes in Tobin’s Q. 
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Model 3b, which includes proactiveness only, showed that proactiveness had an 
insignificant effect on Tobin’s Q. Thereby, hypothesis H7b was not supported. 
Systematic risk and investment opportunity had a significant positive effect at the 1 
% level. Firm size and leverage had a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q at the 
1% level.  The model explained 67.7 % of the changes in Tobin’s Q.  
 
Model 3c, which includes only risk taking, revealed that risk taking (t=-2.61) had a 
significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q at the 5% level, confirming hypothesis H8b. 
Systematic risk and investment opportunity had a significant positive effect at the 1 
% level. Leverage was shown to have a negative effect on Tobin’s Q at the 1% 
level. Firm size had a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q at the 5% level. The 
model explained 67.8 % of the changes in Tobin’s Q. 
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Table 7.26: Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effects of EO and its Dimensions on ROA with Time dummies 
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c 
Predictors  B RSE B RSE  B RSE B RSE B RSE 
Sys Risk -0.076** 
(-2.35) 
0.0327 -0.0128 
(-0.39) 
0.0329 -0.095*** 
(-3.14) 
0.03 -0.079** 
(-2.51) 
0.031
6 
-0.034 
(-1.15) 
0.029 
Investment 
Opportunity 
0.203**** 
(8.58) 
0.0237 0.18**** 
(7.8) 
0.023 0.189**** 
(8.08) 
0.023 0.171**** 
(7.29) 
0.023 0.164**** 
(6.77) 
0.024 
Firm size -0.152 
(-1.63) 
0.0938 -0.2** 
(-2.17) 
0.092 -0.306*** 
(-3.32) 
0.092 -0.396**** 
(-4.47) 
0.088 -0.176* 
(-1.91) 
0.092 
Firm age 0.318**** 
(3.71) 
0.0859 0.211*** 
(2.68) 
0.079 0.347**** 
(4.02) 
0.086 0.292*** 
(3.34) 
0.087 0.126 
(1.57) 
0.080 
Leverage  -0.148*** 
(-3.41) 
0.0436 -0.14*** 
(-3.35) 
0.0419 -0.167*** 
(-3.49) 
0.047 -0.094** 
(-2.04) 
0.046 -0.109*** 
(-2.67) 
0.040 
Liquidity 0.15**** 
(3.73) 
0.04 0.1** 
(2.51) 
0.039 0.108*** 
(2.7) 
0.04 0.123*** 
(3.11) 
0.039 0.123*** 
(3.18) 
0.038 
EO   -0.325**** 
(-8.75) 
0.037       
EO^2   -0.013**** 
(-5.45) 
0.0024       
Innov     -0.46**** 
(-7.04) 
0.065     
Proac       0.435**** 
(5.82) 
0.074   
Risk^2         -0.117**** 
(-7.67) 
0.015 
Constant  -0.286*** 
(-3.11) 
0.0919 0.167* 
(1.86) 
0.089 -0.264*** 
(-2.95) 
0.089 -0.387**** 
(-4.28) 
0.09 -0.068 
(-0.8) 
0.085 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.45 0.499 0.49 0.475 0.494 
N 2548(295) 2507(292) 2548(295) 2547(294) 2508(292) 
F 13.22 20.39 14.44 13.28 17.18 
Prob(F) 0 0 0 0 0 
t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.1 ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001
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Table 7.26 above outlines the results of the models, in which the effect of EO and its 
dimensions was tested against ROA, whilst including time dummies. The regression 
models in the above table tested for H2a on the effect of EO on short-term 
performance and for H6a, H7a, and H8a on the effect of the EO dimensions 
(innovativeness, proactiveness, risk taking) on short-term performance. Model 2, 
which includes EO tested for hypothesis H2a. Model 3a, which includes 
innovativeness, tested for hypothesis H6a. Model 3b, which includes proactiveness, 
tested for hypothesis H7a. Model 3c, which includes risk taking, tested for 
hypothesis H8a.  
 
In model 1, which includes the control variables, systematic risk (t=-2.35) had a 
significant negative effect on ROA at the 5 % level. Investment opportunity (t=8.58) 
and firm age (t=3.71) had a significant positive effect on ROA at the 1% level. 
Leverage (t=-3.41) had a negative effect at the 1 % level. Lastly, liquidity (t=3.73) 
had a significant positive effect at the 1% level. The model explained 45 % of the 
changes in ROA. 
 
Model 2, which includes EO (t=-5.45), revealed  a significant, predominantly 
negative, inverse U-shaped relationship between EO and ROA at the 1% level, 
confirming hypothesis H2a. The quadratic relationship was validated by figure 7.6. 
Investment opportunity and firm age had a positive effect significant at the 1% 
level. Firm size (t=-2.17) had a significant negative effect on ROA at the 5% level. 
Leverage had a significant negative effect at the 1 % level. Liquidity had a 
significant positive effect on ROA at the 5% level. The model explained 49.9 % of 
the changes in ROA. 
 
Model 3a, which includes only innovativeness, revealed that innovativeness (t=-
7.04) had a significant negative effect on ROA at the 1% level, confirming 
hypothesis H6a. Systematic risk (t=-3.14) had a significant negative effect at the 1 
% level. Investment opportunity, firm age, and liquidity had a significant positive 
effect at the 1 % level. Firm size and leverage had a significant negative effect on 
ROA at the 1 % level. The model explained 49 % of the changes in ROA. 
 
Model 3b, which includes proactiveness, showed that proactiveness (t=5.82) had a 
significant positive effect on ROA at the 1 % level, confirming hypothesis H7a. 
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Systematic risk had a significant negative effect on ROA at the 5 % level. 
Investment opportunity, firm age, and liquidity had a significant positive effect at 
the 1 % level. Firm size (t=-4.47) had a significant negative effect at the 1 % level. 
Leverage had a significant negative effect on ROA at the 5% level. The model 
explained 47.5 % of the changes in ROA.  
 
Model 3c, which includes risk taking, revealed that risk taking (t=-7.67) had a 
concave decreasing relationship with ROA significant at the 1 % level, providing 
support for hypothesis H8a. The quadratic relationship was validated by figure 7.7.  
Investment opportunity and liquidity had a significant positive effect on ROA at the 
1 % level. Leverage had a significant negative effect at the 1 % level. The model 
explained 49.4 % of the changes in ROA. 
 
The next section will outline the summary table of the main results of the effects of 
EO and its dimensions, whilst including the time dummies in the full model.  
 
Table 7.27: Summary of Regression Results with Time dummies among 
Surviving firms 
 
Main Variables Tobin’s Q ROA 
EO Inverse U-shaped significant 
at 5% level (in support of 
H2b) 
Inverse U-shaped 
significant at 1% 
level (in support of 
H2a) 
Innovativeness Positive significant at 5% level 
(in support of H6b) 
Negative significant 
at 1% level (in 
support of H6a) 
Proactiveness Insignificant (negative) 
(does not support of H7b) 
Positive significant 
at 1% level 
(in support of H7a) 
Risk taking Significant negative at 5% 
level (in support of H8b) 
Inverse U-shaped 
significant at 1% 
level (in support of 
H8a) 
 
 
The following table 7.27 summarises the results of the panel fixed effect regressions 
of the effects of EO and its dimensions on each of Tobin’s Q and ROA. The results 
of the regression aligned with the initial consideration by Lumpkin and Dess (1996) 
that each of the EO dimensions have distinct effects on the measures of firm 
performance (short-term and long-term performance) and even distinctive when 
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considering their individual effects on each measure of firm performance. Thereby, 
it was important to consider their separate effects rather than combining them into 
the overall gestalt construct EO. The discussions section will discuss the 
significance of these results further.  
 
EO was shown to have a significant inverse U-shaped relationship with both 
measures of firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA) confirming hypotheses H2a 
and H2b. Innovativeness was shown to have a negative effect on short-term 
performance (ROA), confirming hypothesis H6a. Furthermore, innovativeness had a 
positive effect on long-term performance (Tobin’s Q), confirming hypothesis H6b. 
In contrast to innovativeness, proactiveness was shown to have a significant positive 
effect on ROA, confirming hypothesis H7a; yet it had an insignificant effect on 
Tobin’s Q, thus not supporting hypothesis H7b. Risk taking was shown to have a 
quadratic negative effect on ROA, confirming hypothesis H8a and was shown to 
have a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q, confirming hypothesis H8b. 
 
The next section will outline the results of the effects of the different values of EO 
on the examined measures of firm performance.  
 
7.9 Effects of Low and High Values of EO on Tobin’s Q and ROA among 
Surviving Firms 
 
The following section examines the effects of different values of EO on both 
measures of firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA). The results of the different 
assigned margins of EO (from -10 to 10) are shown in table 7.28 These results were 
generated after running the regression of Tobin’s Q/ROA against the EO and the 
control variables to examine the effect of EO and its dimensions on firm 
performance. The figures 7.18 and 7.19 demonstrate the effects.  
 
This section presents the effects of the different values of EO on firm performance, 
to further test hypotheses H2a and H2b. The testing draws insights from 
organisational learning and prospect theory, which consider that higher values of 
EO can be detrimental for a firm.  
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The above results in tables 7.25 and 7.26 showed that EO had a significant inverse 
U-shaped relationship with short-term and long-term firm performance. Thereby, it 
was important to extend the regression results and examine the effects of the 
different ranges of values of EO on firm performance as well.    
 
Table 7.28: Effect of Different Values of EO on Tobin’s Q/ROA 
 
EO Tobin’s Q ROA 
Margin 1(EO=10) -0.696*** -3.566**** 
Margin 2 (EO=5) -0.3708*** -1.722**** 
Margin 3 (EO=0) -0.045**** 0.122**** 
Margin 4(EO=-5) 0.279** 1.966**** 
Margin 5(EO=-10) 0.604** 3.811****    
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
 
Figure 7.18: Marginsplot of Tobin’s Q and EO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1
-.
5
0
.5
1
L
in
e
a
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
-10 -5 0 5 10
EO
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
240 
 
Figure 7.19: Marginsplot of ROA and EO 
 
 
 
 
As indicated earlier, the U-test of the effect of EO on firm performance measures in 
tables 7.9 and 7.10 showed a significant non-linear EO-firm performance 
relationship. It was also important to examine the effects of the different values of 
EO on Tobin’s Q and ROA. EO values ranged from -21.77 to 8.67.  
 
The results of the different assigned margins of EO are shown in table 7.28 above, 
which were generated after running the regression of Tobin’s Q/ROA against the 
EO and the control variables. The results indicated that EO at lower values had a 
significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q/ROA whereas values of EO at higher levels 
had a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q/ROA. Furthermore, the higher EO 
values had a stronger negative effect on firm performance. For instance, in the 
regression of Tobin’s Q, EO=10 had a B=-0.69 whereas EO=5 had a B=-0.37. The 
graphic representation of the effect of EO on Tobin’s Q/ROA are shown in figures 
7.18 and 7.19 above, in which the lower EO values had a positive effect on Tobin’s 
Q and ROA and the higher EO values had a negative effect on Tobin’s Q/ROA. 
Thereby, according to the marginsplots and table 7.28, the results showed that the 
higher the value of EO, the greater its negative effect on firm performance. Thereby, 
hypothesis H2a and H2b were supported. 
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The next section will outline the robustness tests of the effects of EO and its 
dimensions. Then, lastly a section will present the effects of the different forms of 
innovativeness that were used.  
 
7.10 Robustness Check: Endogeneity Checks of the Effect of EO and its 
Dimensions on Firm Performance among Surviving Firms 
 
This section outlines the results of the endogeneity tests, as a robustness check, of 
each of the main predictor variables of EO and its dimensions (innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and risk taking) by using their lagged values (t-1, and t-2 years 
lagged) as the instrument on Tobin’s Q and ROA and clustering by firm-level. In the 
literature, authors have utilised the fixed effect regression since it controls for 
endogeneity issues and issues of reverse causality (Gupta & Gupta, 2015). Yet, this 
research has moved a step forward by testing for endogeneity. 
 
This section will first outline the results from the effect of EO on Tobin’s Q and 
ROA regressions, followed by innovativeness, proactiveness, and lastly risk taking. 
If endogeneity is shown to be present, by rejecting the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity, then the effect of the lagged value of the predictor variables (EO and its 
dimensions) is tested on the dependent variables (firm performance measures) to 
validate the results from the main fixed effect regressions.  
 
7.10.1 Robustness of the Effect of EO on Firm Performance  
 
This section outlines the results of the endogeneity test of the effect of EO on the 
firm performance measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA). 
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Table 7.29: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of EO on Firm Performance including Time Dummies 
 
EO Tobin’s Q ROA 
Endogeneity Test  0.615 
(0.433) 
0.09 
(0.764) 
Under-identification 
Test 
12.077 
(0.002) 
12.073 
(0.002) 
Sargan-Hansen Statistics 
(Over-identification 
0.955 
(0.328) 
1.017 
(0.313) 
p-value in parentheses  
 
 
The following table 7.29 represents results from the Sargan-Hansen test (Hansen, 
1982; Sargan, 1958) and endogeneity test. The tests are conducted based on an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation of the panel fixed effect regressions.  These 
tests determine whether the main EO construct was endogenous with firm 
performance, in the form of reverse causality. The Under-identification tests the null 
hypothesis that the equation is under-identified, and the instruments used are 
uncorrelated with the endogenous regressors. The results of the under-identification 
test showed that the null hypothesis of the under-dentification test was rejected, 
which means that the equation was identified, and the instruments were relevant.  
 
The Sargan-Hansen test (Hansen, 1982; Sargan, 1958) of over-identifying 
restrictions tests the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid and uncorrelated 
with the error term. The results of the Sargan-Hansen test (Hansen, 1982; Sargan, 
1958) showed that the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Finally, the 
endogeneity test tested the null hypothesis that the EO construct is considered to be 
exogenous. According to the results of the endogeneity test, we failed to reject the 
null hypothesis, which means that there were no issues of endogeneity when 
examining the EO and firm performance relationship. Thereby, the fixed effect 
regression results of the EO-firm performance relationship without the IV 
estimation were valid. This validated hypotheses H2a and H2b on the effect of EO 
on short-term and long-term performance among surviving firms. 
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The next section will present the endogeneity test results from the effect of 
innovativeness on firm performance. 
 
7.10.2 Robustness of the Effect of Innovativeness on Firm Performance  
 
This section represents the results of the endogeneity test of the effect of 
innovativeness on firm performance. 
 
Table 7.30: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of Innovativeness on Firm Performance including Time Dummies 
 
Innovativeness Tobin’s Q ROA 
Endogeneity Test  2.013 
(0.156) 
24.886 
(0.0) 
Under-identification 
Test 
52.018 
(0.0) 
19.768 
(0.0001) 
Sargan-Hansen 
Statistics (Over-
identification 
3.59 
(0.058) 
0.211 
(0.646) 
p-value in parentheses  
 
 
The above table 7.30 shows the results of the endogeneity test of the effect of 
innovativeness dimension on firm performance measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA). In 
the case of Tobin’s Q as the firm performance measure, innovativeness passed the 
exogeneity assumption. Thereby, the results of the fixed effect regression of 
innovativeness dimension of EO on the long-term measure of firm performance, 
Tobin’s Q, were valid as there was no endogeneity issue. However, using ROA as 
the dependent variable, the endogeneity test of the innovativeness dimension 
rejected the null hypothesis of exogeneity. Thereby, the results of the lagged values 
of innovativeness on ROA are presented below in table 7.31. By testing the lagged 
values of innovativeness on ROA, this would address the endogeneity issues. 
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Table 7.31: Robustness of the Lagged Effect of Innovativeness on ROA 
 
ROA Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Innovativeness 0.136***  
(3.00) 
0.23**** 
(5.02) 
0.196**** 
(3.69) 
Systematic Risk   -0.078**   
(-2.31) 
-0.05 
(-1.58) 
0.02 
(0.65) 
Investment opportunity 0.212**** 
(8.47)   
0.185**** 
(6.9) 
0.164**** 
(6.27) 
Firm size -0.107    
(-1.10) 
-0.126 
(-1.24) 
0.03 
(0.34) 
Firm age 0.296*** 
(3.42)   
0.286** 
(2.16) 
0.07 
(0.62) 
Leverage  -0.148*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.127*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.187**** 
(-4.27) 
Liquidity 0.15**** 
(3.86) 
0.129*** 
(3.11) 
0.121*** 
(2.86) 
Constant  -0.276***  
(-2.99) 
-0.126* 
(-1.78) 
0.121** 
(2.28) 
 
N 2502(292) 2210(263) 1949(242) 
t statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
 
The above table 7.31 shows the lagged results of innovativeness on ROA. The 
results indicated that the lagged value of innovativeness by 1 year (t-1) had a 
significant positive effect on ROA at the 1% level (p-value=0.003<0.01). This was 
even more significant when lagged by 2 years (t-2) (p-value=0.000<0.001) and was 
still significant when lagged backwards by 3 years (p=0.000<0.001). The results 
indicated that a one standard deviation increase in innovativeness (at t-1) led to a 
13.6 standard deviation increase in ROA (at t). This is different from the non-lagged 
value of innovativeness, in section 7.7, which showed a significant negative effect 
on ROA.  
 
The results of the lagged values of innovativeness aligned with the results of the 
effect of innovativeness on Tobin’s Q. The significant positive effect of the lagged 
values of innovativeness on ROA indicated that over time innovativeness led to a 
positive firm performance. 
 
The above results showed that hypothesis H6a, on the effect of innovativeness on 
short-term performance, was not supported due to endogeneity. H6b on the effect of 
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innovativeness on long-term performance was still supported due to lack of 
endogeneity.  
 
The next section will outline the robustness check of the effect of the proactiveness 
dimension of EO on firm performance.  
 
7.10.3 Robustness of the Effect of Proactiveness on Firm Performance  
 
This section presents the endogeneity test results of the proactiveness dimension on 
firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA).  
 
 
Table 7.32: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of Proactiveness on Firm Performance including Time Dummies 
 
Proactiveness Tobin’s Q ROA 
Endogeneity Test  5.231 
(0.022) 
33.59 
(0.0) 
Under-identification Test 52.332 
(0.0) 
56.084 
(0.0) 
Sargan-Hansen Statistics 
(Over-identification 
1.49 
(0.222) 
7.379 
(0.06) 
p-value in parentheses  
 
 
The above table 7.32 shows that the proactiveness dimension of EO was 
endogenous with both measures of firm performance. Thereby, the lagged values of 
the proactiveness dimension was tested on both measures of firm performance as 
will be shown in the tables below.  
 
The first table will present the effect of the lagged values of proactiveness on 
Tobin’s Q followed by the effect of its lagged values on ROA. 
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Table 7.33: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of Proactiveness on Tobin’s Q including Time Dummies 
 
Tobin’s Q Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Proactiveness -0.132*** 
(-3.34) 
-0.099** 
(-2.28) 
-0.033 
(-0.57) 
Systematic Risk  0.125**** 
(4.93) 
0.101**** 
(4.02) 
0.134 
(5.45) 
Investment opportunity 0.078**** 
(3.63) 
0.052*** 
(2.7) 
0.037* 
(1.98) 
Firm size -0.176** 
(-2.1) 
-0.135* 
(-1.7) 
-0.19** 
(-2.1) 
Firm age  -0.042 
(-0.53) 
-0.041 
(-0.41) 
0.0103 
(0.07) 
Leverage  -0.123**** 
(-4.16) 
-0.12**** 
(-4.11) 
-0.121 
(-3.57) 
Liquidity 0.067* 
(1.83) 
0.035 
(0.98) 
0.0304 
(0.82) 
Constant   0.308**** 
(3.88) 
-0.178 
(-2.86) 
0.297**** 
(4.75) 
N 2499 (292) 2207(263) 1946(242) 
t statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
 
The above table 7.33 shows the results of the regression model that includes only 
the proactiveness dimension of EO (by lagging backwards proactiveness by 1 year, 
2 years, and 3 years). The results indicated that proactiveness after a one-year lag (t-
1) had a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q at the 1% level. The results also 
indicated that one standard deviation increase in proactiveness led to 13.2 standard 
deviation decrease in Tobin’s Q. 
 
This is quite different from the non-lagged value of proactiveness, which did not 
have a significant effect on Tobin’s Q. The negative effect of proactiveness on 
Tobin’s Q was still significant after 2-year lags (t-2) (p<0.05).  
 
The above results supported evidence for hypothesis H7b, on the effect of 
proactiveness on long-term performance.  
 
The below table will present the effect of the lagged values of proactiveness on 
ROA. 
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Table 7.34: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of Proactiveness on ROA including Time Dummies 
 
ROA Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Proactiveness -0.513**** 
(-7.20) 
-0.594**** 
(-9.23) 
-0.367**** 
(-6.81) 
Systematic Risk  -0.0729**   
(-2.10) 
-0.047 
(-1.49) 
0.02 
(0.69) 
Investment opportunity 0.219**** 
(8.37) 
0.153**** 
(5.87) 
0.141**** 
(5.5) 
Firm size 0.179    
(1.63) 
0.191* 
(1.81) 
0.192** 
(2.11) 
Firm age 0.283***  
(3.19) 
0.255** 
(2.11) 
0.055 
(0.52) 
Leverage  -0.196**** 
(-4.99) 
-0.157**** 
(-4.32) 
-0.189**** 
(-4.73) 
Liquidity 0.155**** 
(4.14) 
0.142**** 
(3.61) 
0.137*** 
(3.21) 
Constant  -0.136    
(-1.43) 
0.023 
(0.32) 
0.195**** 
(3.66) 
N  2502(292) 2210(263) 1949(242) 
t statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
 
The above table 7.34 shows the results of the effect of the lagged values of 
proactiveness on ROA. As the table reveals, the lagged value of proactiveness by 1 
year (t-1) showed a significant negative effect on ROA (p-value=0.000<0.001). This 
was still significant and negative when lagged by 2 years (t-2) (p-
value=0.000<0.001) and when lagged backwards by 3 years (p=0.000<0.001). 
 
The results of the 1-year lag of proactiveness are interpreted as such: the lagged 
value of proactiveness at t-1  leads to a 51.3 % decrease in ROA. When lagged by 2 
years, proactiveness leads to 59.4 % decrease in ROA. When lagged by 3 years at t-
3 proactiveness leads to 36.7 % decrease in ROA.  
 
The results of the lagged values of proactiveness were quite different from the non-
lagged value of proactiveness on ROA, which was shown to have a significant 
positive effect on ROA. The effects of the lagged values of proactiveness aligned 
with the effect of proactiveness on Tobin’s Q, which was shown to be negative. 
Thereby, this shows that over time proactiveness had a negative effect on firm 
performance.  
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The above results indicated that hypothesis H7a, on the effect of proactiveness on 
short-term performance, was not supported due to endogeneity.  
 
The next section will present the results from the endogeneity test of risk taking, 
dimension of EO. 
 
7.10.4 Robustness of the Effect of Risk taking on Firm Performance  
 
This section presents the endogeneity test results of risk taking on firm performance 
measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA).  
 
Table 7.35: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of Risk taking on Firm Performance including Time Dummies 
 
Risk taking Tobin’s Q ROA 
Endogeneity Test  0.001 
(0.97) 
1.112 
(0.291) 
Under-identification Test 19.127 
(0.0001) 
19.002 
(0.0001) 
Sargan-Hansen Statistics 
(Over-identification 
3.499 
(0.061) 
2.211 
(0.137) 
p-value in parentheses  
 
The above table 7.35 shows the results of the endogeneity test of the effect of risk 
taking on the firm performance measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA). The endogeneity 
test results of risk taking on both measure of firm performance indicated that there 
was no endogeneity issue. Thereby, the fixed effect results of risk taking without the 
IV estimation provided valid results. 
 
The above results showed that hypothesis H8a and H8b, on the effect of risk taking 
on short-term and long-term performance, were validated.  
 
The next section will outline the robustness check from the different measures of the 
innovativeness dimension of EO that were used instead of the main innovativeness 
measure as R&D intensity (R&D/total assets).  
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7.11 Robustness Check: Alternative Forms of Innovativeness among Surviving 
Firms 
 
The following section shows the robustness check from the alternative measures of 
innovativeness. The first measure termed intangible innovation was used to account 
for a measure of innovation independent of a firm’s business cycle and spurious 
effects from asset sales. The second measure is termed patent yield and measures 
the ratio of the number of patents at application date divided by R&D expenditure. 
This section reveals the different results that were found using the different 
measures of innovativeness.  
 
Table 7.36: Effect of Alternative Forms of Innovativeness on Tobin’s Q/ROA 
 
 Tobin’s Q ROA 
Innovativeness (R&D/EMP) -0.173** 
(-2.55) 
-0.459**** 
(-4.24) 
Innovativeness (Patents/R&D) 0.055 
(1.21) 
0.092 
(1.03) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
 
There were alternative forms of the dimension of EO (innovativeness) that were 
used in the Study. One alternative measure was the ratio of R&D to number of 
employees. This alternative measure of innovativeness had a significant negative 
effect on Tobin’s Q at the 5% level (t=-2.55) and a significant negative effect on 
ROA at the 1% level (t=-4.24) in the full model whilst including time dummies. 
Whereas the measure of the number of patent applications to R&D was insignificant 
on both Tobin’s Q and ROA as can be shown in table 7.36 above. 
 
7.12 Chapter Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, the hypotheses of the effect of EO and its dimensions on firm 
performance measures were tested in the sample of surviving firms. The fixed effect 
regression revealed that, after considering endogeneity or reverse causality, EO had 
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an inverse U-shaped effect on ROA and Tobin’s Q, thus supporting hypotheses H2a 
and H2b.  
 
It was shown that innovativeness had a positive effect on long-term performance 
supporting hypothesis H6b. Proactiveness had a negative effect on long-term 
performance in support of hypothesis H7b. Finally, risk taking was shown to have a 
concave negative effect on short-term performance and a negative effect on the 
long-term performance, supporting hypotheses H8a and H8b, respectively.  
 
The next section will outline the results from the failed firms’ dataset. Then the next 
chapter 9 will present the results from the survival analysis. 
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Chapter 8 
 
The Relationship of EO and Firm Performance among Failed Firms 
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8.1 Introduction to the Chapter  
 
The following chapter will outline the results of the fixed effect regression models 
among failed firms. Specifically, the chapter will present the effects of each of the 
EO dimensions and the overall EO construct on firm performance measures 
(Tobin’s Q and ROA). A sample of 401 failed firms from year 2000 until 2014 and 
a total of 1,863 observations were in the sample. The failed firms represent firms 
that have failed according to the delisting code of Compustat, in which failure could 
be due to merger and acquisitions, bankruptcy, liquidation, or privatisation (no 
longer filing with the SEC).  
 
The chapter will sequentially outline the descriptive statistics of the predictor and 
dependent variables, the pre-analytical procedure of testing the fixed effect 
regression assumptions (which are the same as those in chapter 7), time-series 
figures of the predictor and dependent variables, the fixed effect regression results, 
effect of different values of EO on firm performance measures, and finally 
robustness checks of the fixed effect regression results. 
 
This chapter aims to answer the following hypotheses. The hypotheses were 
outlined in the theoretical chapter 3. Thus, the hypotheses that were tested are: 
 
8.1.1 Hypotheses: EO and Firm Performance 
 
H3: The relationship between EO and (a) short-term and (b) long-term firm 
performance among failed firms is negative. 
  
8.1.2 Hypotheses: EO Dimensions and Firm Performance  
 
H6a: Innovativeness has a negative effect on short-term firm performance (ROA).  
H6b: Innovativeness has a positive effect on long-term firm performance (Tobin’s 
Q).   
H7a: Proactiveness has a positive effect on short-term firm performance (ROA).  
H7b: Proactiveness has a negative effect on long-term firm performance (Tobin’s 
Q).  
H8a: Risk taking has an inverse U-shaped effect on short-term firm performance 
(ROA).  
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H8b: Risk taking has a negative effect on long-term firm performance (Tobin’s Q).   
 
The next section will outline the descriptive statistics of the predictor and the 
dependent variables.  
 
8.2 Descriptive Statistics for Predictor and Dependent Variables among Failed 
Firms 
 
The following section will outline the descriptive statistics of each of the variables 
included in the regression models. Table 8.1 outlines the descriptive statistics, along 
with the skewness and kurtosis of the predictor variables. Table 8.2 presents the 
statistics of the dependent variables. The descriptive statistics include the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of the variables.  
 
Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Predictor Variables 
 
Predictor 
Variables 
(winsorized) 
Mean  S.D.  Min  Max Skewness Kurtosis 
EO 0.8047 2.129 -28.809 8.749   -4.606 66.216 
Innovativeness 
(R&D/total 
assets) 
0.105 0.0728 0.0025 0.348 1.184 4.5803 
Innovativeness 
(R&D/total 
employees) 
0.034 0.030 0.0003 0.143 1.448 5.144 
Innovativeness  
(number of 
patents/R&D) 
0.337 0.48 0.0081 2.96 3.119 14.618 
Proactiveness -0.434 1.307   -7.117 0.976 -2.998 13.416 
Risk Taking 0.033 0.016 0.0084 0.0807 1.129 3.8 
Systematic Risk 1.42 0.672 0.107 3.248 0.631 3.286 
Investment 
Opportunity 
0.358 0.287 0.038 1.518 1.832 6.786 
Firm size 3,845.859 9848.856 510 97,000 1.327 4.699 
Firm age Listed 12.142 10.668 0 54 -0.51 2.696 
Firm age 
Founded 
25.523 16.274 4 79 1.266 4.39 
Leverage  0.126 0.177 0 0.742 1.66 5.304 
Liquidity  0.296 0.183 0.009 0.738 0.444 2.42 
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Table 8.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables  
 
Dependent 
Variables 
Mean S.D. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Tobin’s Q 1.5 1.274 -0.0087 7.755 2.375 10.356 
ROA -0.0549 0.226 -1.053 0.244 -2.629 10.717 
 
 
The above tables represent the values of the variables when winsorized, that is the 
extreme values of the variables or outliers were transformed to the variables 1st and 
99th percentiles (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011). Furthermore, all variables were 
standardised (i.e. with a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1) before running 
the regression in STATA (e.g. Engelen et al., 2015). 
 
In table 8.1, the mean value of EO was 0.8, which is higher than the mean value of 
EO among surviving firms (i.e. 0.26). Innovativeness on average was 10.5 %, which 
was higher than the average of innovativeness in the surviving firms dataset (i.e. 8.6 
%). This means that on average failed firms were more innovative in comparison to 
the survived firms. This could be a response to avoid their failure, or could reflect 
the possibility that firms that were successfully innovating were then acquired. The 
mean proactiveness was – 43.4 %, whereas the mean of proactiveness among the 
surviving firms was -9%. Thus, this means that failed firms were being less 
proactive. It has been shown in the literature that retained earnings to total assets 
ratio is one of the most crucial indicators of financial distress. Thus, firms with less 
retained earnings are at a higher probability of being in a financial distress situation 
(Altman, 1968; Pindado et al., 2008). The average value of risk was 0.033, whereas 
among the surviving firms it was 0.025. 
 
As for the control variables, the mean of firm size was 3,845 employees, which was 
less than the mean value of firm size in the surviving firms sample (i.e. 9,285). The 
failed firms were on average 12 years of age, which is less than the average value of 
the firms age among the surviving dataset (i.e. 17.6 years). The firm age that was 
used in the regression was the listing age, however, age based on the year the firms 
were founded did not make a difference in the regression results. The age of firms 
since founding on average was 25.5 years, which was lower than the founding age 
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of surviving firms (i.e. 33.7 years). Leverage on average was 12.6 %, which was 
less than that among the surviving firms (i.e. 14 %). Liquidity was 29.6 % on 
average, which was more than the liquidity value among surviving firms being 27%. 
Investment opportunity on average was 35.8 %, whereas among the surviving firms 
it was 33.9 %.  Lastly, systematic risk was 1.42 on average, which was higher than 
the value of systematic risk among surviving firms (i.e. 1.32).  
 
In the table of the dependent variables 8.2, the average value of Tobin’s Q was 1.5, 
whereas in the surviving firms sample it was 1.72. The failed firms still had a 
relatively high Tobin’s Q.  This means that the firms’ stocks were overvalued or 
more expensive than the replacement cost of their assets. Thus, this could be a 
signal of the attractiveness of the firms to be acquired. Finally, the ROA mean value 
in the sample of firms was -5.4 %. The surviving firms had a mean ROA of 2.1 %. 
This indicates that firms in the failed firms sample were acquiring losses.  
 
The next section will logically sequence the pre-analysis procedure for choosing the 
fixed effect regression (F-test, LM-test, and the Hausman test) as the appropriate 
regression and outline the tests (linearity, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, and normality assumptions) of the fixed effect regression 
assumptions.  
 
8.3 Pre-analysis Procedure among the Failed Firms 
 
The assessment of the four regression models (effect of EO on Tobin’s Q, effect of 
EO dimensions on Tobin’s Q, effect of EO on ROA, and effect of EO dimensions 
on ROA) was done based on the F-test, the LM-test, the Hausman test, and the 
robust Hausman test to reveal whether the fixed effect regression was more 
appropriate than a simple OLS or a panel random effect regression as will be shown 
below (Kennedy, 2003; Wooldridge, 2015).  
 
Then a pre-analysis procedure was conducted on the four separate fixed effect 
regression models (of combinations of the predictor variables EO/EO dimensions 
and the dependent variables Tobin’s Q/ROA) before running the regression results. 
This was done to ensure that the relationships between each of the independent 
variables and the dependent variables was linear, that there are no issues of 
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multicollinearity, and that the residuals from the regression are homoscedastic, 
uncorrelated, and normally distributed (Wooldridge, 2015). The sequencing of the 
testing of the regression assumptions are in accordance to Wooldridge (2015), in 
which the first assumption is the linearity assumption, and the last assumption is the 
normality assumption. Thus, the tests of the fixed effect regression involved 
linearity, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and normality testing 
of the variables of the regression.  
 
Finally, time dummies were also tested to determine whether they should be 
included in the regression models.  
 
8.3.1 Testing the Appropriateness of the Fixed Effect Regression  
 
The testing of the appropriateness of the fixed effect regression as will be shown 
below is done by using the F-test, LM-test, and followed by the Hausman tests. 
 
Table 8.3: F-test of the Regression Models 
 
Regression Models F-test Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO F(299, 1082) = 5.35 Prob>F= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
F (299, 1080) = 5.4 Prob>F= 0 
ROA and EO F(299, 1086) = 4.58 Prob>F= 0 
ROA and EO Dimensions F (299, 1084) = 3.02 Prob>F= 0 
  
 
The F-test examines the significance of the panel fixed effect regression. To test the 
fitness of the panel fixed effect regression, the F-test shows the probability that all 
coefficients in the fixed effect regression is equal to zero (i.e. null hypothesis of all 
the regression coefficients is zero).  
 
In each of the four regression models, as shown in table 8.3, the F-test was 
significant or the null hypothesis was rejected, indicating that a panel fixed effect is 
better than a Pooled OLS regression. Furthermore, the F-test indicated that the 
regression was significant and thereby had strong explanatory power because 
without it the regression coefficients would be interpreted with caution.  
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After the F-test indicated that a panel fixed effect regression is better than a simple 
OLS regression, the LM-test was conducted to show whether a panel random effect 
is better than an OLS regression (Table 8.4).  
 
Table 8.4: LM-test of the Regression Models 
 
Regression Models LM-test Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO   Chibar2(01) = 1007.48 
 
Prob>chibar2= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
Chibar2(01) = 922.73 
 
Prob>chibar2= 0 
ROA and EO Chibar2(01) = 174.54 Prob>chibar2= 0 
ROA and EO Dimensions Chibar2(01) = 42.63 Prob>chibar2= 0 
 
 
The results in table 8.4 showed that a panel random effect regression was better than 
a simple OLS. 
 
The next section will outline the Hausman test results. After the LM-test and the 
previous F-test showed that a panel fixed effect regression was better than a pooled 
OLS regression, the Hausman test was conducted to investigate whether a panel 
fixed effect or a random effect regression was more appropriate. 
 
Table 8.5: Hausman Test of the Regression Models 
 
Regression Models Hausman test Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO Chi2(7) = 28.38 
 
Prob>chi2= 0.0002 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
Chi2(9) = 54.98 
 
Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO Chi2(7) = 58.34 
 
Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO Dimensions Chi2(9) = 112.42 
 
Prob>chi2= 0 
 
 
According to the results of the Hausman test, as shown in table 8.5, the null 
hypothesis (under the null hypothesis the random effect regression is preferred and 
considered to be fully efficient) was rejected meaning that a panel fixed effect 
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regression was more appropriate and consistent than the panel random effect 
regression. 
 
The next section will outline the robust Hausman test results to validate that a fixed 
effect regression is better than a random effect regression. 
 
Table 8.6: Robust Hausman Test of the Regression Models 
 
Regression Models Robust Hausman test Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO Chi2(7)= 24.909   Prob>chi2= 0.0008 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
Chi2(9)=35.278   Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO Chi2(7)= 43.991 Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO Dimensions Chi2(9)=82.762 Prob>chi2= 0 
 
 
As shown in table 8.6, the null hypothesis was rejected in the four regression 
equations, which reinforces that the fixed effect was more appropriate than the 
random effect regression. These results indicated that the fixed effect regression was 
more appropriate.  
 
The next section will outline the testing of the panel fixed effect regression. 
 
8.3.2 Testing the Assumptions of the Fixed Effect Regression  
 
After revealing that a fixed effect regression fits the data, the next step was to test 
the assumptions of the fixed effect regression. The first assumption of the fixed 
effect regression to be tested was the linearity assumption, which was done through 
a joint Wald test. Followed by multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and 
autocorrelation tests. 
 
8.3.2.1 Linearity Testing 
 
The following section represents the linearity testing of the regressors with the 
dependent variables in each of the regressions. The linearity testing results from the 
regression of Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, will be shown.  Then the results 
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from the regression of ROA, as the dependent variable, will be presented. Testing 
the linearity assumption of the control variables, with Tobin’s Q and ROA as the 
dependent variables, is outlined first. Then, testing the linearity assumption of the 
main predictor variables (EO and its dimensions) is presented.  
 
The linearity diagnostic tests will be complemented with residual scatterplots to 
have a visual inspection of the relationship of the predictor variables with the 
dependent variable(s) as a validation of the linearity test. 
 
Below the linearity testing results of Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, and the 
control variables regression will be outlined first as shown in table 8.7 and figure 
8.1 and 8.2. 
 
8.3.2.1.1 Linearity Testing of the Regression of Tobin’s Q/ROA and the Control 
Variables 
 
The following section outlines the linearity testing results of the control variables in 
each of the regressions of Tobin’s Q and ROA, as the dependent variables. The 
section will first outline the results from the regression of Tobin’s Q, followed by 
ROA as the dependent variable.  
 
Table 8.7: Linearity Test of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and Control variables  
 
Regressors  Linearity Test 
Systematic risk Prob > F = 0.889 
Investment opportunity Prob > F = 0.047 
Firm size (logged) Prob > F = 0.526 
Firm age (logged) Prob > F = 0.045 
Leverage  Prob > F = 0.0709 
Liquidity  Prob > F = 0.138 
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Figure 8.1: Residual Figure of Tobin’s Q and Investment Opportunity 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Residual Figure of Tobin’s Q and Firm age 
 
 
 
 
In table 8.7, the results of the linearity testing indicated that the control variables 
had a linear relationship with the dependent variable Tobin’s Q (except for 
investment opportunity and the logged value of firm age). The linearity test of 
investment opportunity showed a P-value=0.047 and firm age showed a P=0.045, 
both close to P=0.05. To further examine the relationship between the two variables 
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and Tobin’s Q, the residual graph was requested. As shown above in figures 8.1 and 
8.2 of the scatterplot of the residuals of the regression against standardised values of 
the tested variables, investment opportunity and firm age showed that they had a 
linear relationship with Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, in which the residuals 
were centered around zero (Tarling, 2008). Thereby, the residual graphs provide 
evidence that the linearity assumption was satisfied.  
 
The next table and scatterplots will show the linearity testing results of the 
regression of the control variables with ROA, as the dependent variable. 
 
 
Table 8.8: Linearity Test of the Regression of ROA and Control variables 
 
Regressors  Linearity Test 
Systematic risk Prob > F = 0.2403 
Investment Opportunity Prob > F = 0.006 
Prob > F = 0.158 
Firm size (logged) Prob > F = 0.575 
Firm age (logged) Prob > F = 0 
Leverage  Prob > F = 0.077 
Liquidity  Prob > F = 0.961 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Residual Figure of ROA and Firm age 
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Figure 8.4: Residual Figure of ROA and Investment Opportunity 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8.5: Residual Figure of ROA and Investment Opportunity Logged 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
In table 8.8, the results of the linearity testing indicated that the control variables 
had a linear relationship with the dependent variable ROA (except for investment 
opportunity and the logged value of firm age as well). However, as shown above in 
figure 8.3, firm age had a linear relationship with ROA, in which the figure was 
similar to the residual graph of firm age with Tobin’s Q. As for investment 
opportunity, after the log transformation it passed the linearity testing and the 
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difference could be noticed from figure 8.4 to 8.5. In figure 8.4, the residual plot 
showed a non-linear quadratic relationship in the form of an inverse U-shaped 
relationship, in which the residual graph had a concentration of more points above 
the zero line. The relationship improved to a linear relationship after the log 
transformation as shown in figure 8.5. Furthermore, after the log transformation the 
kurtosis value of investment opportunity improved from a value of 6.78 to a value of 
2.85. 
 
The next sections will outline the linearity testing results of the main predictor 
variable EO with each regression equation of Tobin’s Q and ROA, as the dependent 
variables. 
 
8.3.2.1.2 Linearity Testing of the Regression of Tobin’s Q/ROA and the EO 
Construct 
 
The following section represents the linearity test of the regression of EO as the 
predictor variable, with Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variables. The 
linearity test of EO in the regression of Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable is 
outlined first followed by ROA.  
 
Table 8.9: Linearity Test of the Regression of Tobin’s Q/ROA and EO 
 
Regressor: EO Linearity Test 
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q Prob > F = 0.477 
Dependent variable: ROA Prob > F = 0.056 
 
 
According to table 8.9, EO, as the predictor variable, was shown to pass the linearity 
testing, with both Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variables.  
The next tables and scatterplots will show the linearity testing results of the 
regression of the EO dimensions, as the predictor variables, with Tobin’s Q and 
ROA as the dependent variables.  
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8.3.2.1.3 Linearity Testing of the Regression of Tobin’s Q/ROA and the EO 
Dimensions 
 
The following represents the linearity testing of the EO dimensions as the predictor 
variables against Tobin’s Q and ROA. The beginning of the section will outline the 
testing of the regressors against Tobin’s Q followed by ROA. 
 
Table 8.10: Linearity Test of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO Dimensions 
 
EO Dimensions Linearity Test 
Innovativeness Prob > F = 0.496 
Proactiveness Prob > F = 0.098 
Risk taking Prob > F = 0.449 
 
 
According to table 8.10, the separate EO dimensions were shown to pass the 
linearity testing with the dependent variable Tobin’s Q. The following section will 
outline the linearity testing of the predictor variables, the EO dimensions, against 
ROA. 
 
Table 8.11: Linearity Test of the Regression of ROA and EO Dimensions 
 
EO Dimensions Linearity Test U-test to test the presence of a U 
shaped (H0=monotone) 
Innovativeness Prob > F = 0.089 N.A. 
Proactiveness Prob > F = 0 Extremum outside interval - trivial 
failure to reject H0 
Risk taking Prob > F = 0.0001 P>|t|   = 0.451 
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Figure 8.6 of the Relationship of ROA and Risk taking 
 
 
 
 
According to table 8.11, innovativeness passed the linearity test with ROA, but 
proactiveness did not. After conducting the U-test to test whether the relationship is 
quadratic, the results indicated that the relationship between ROA and proactiveness 
is monotonic. Thereby, instead proactiveness was log transformed. Furthermore, 
after the log transformation the kurtosis value of the proactiveness variable 
improved from a value of 13.4 to a value of 4.5. 
 
As for the risk taking dimension of EO, it was shown by the linearity test in table 
8.11 that the risk taking dimension of EO was not linear with the dependent variable 
ROA. Yet, after conducting the U-test, it was shown that the relationship was not 
significant; even though the squared term and its linear term were both significant at 
the 1 % level. According to figure 8.6, it was shown that the relationship between 
ROA and risk taking was a decreasing concave relationship similar to results in 
chapter 7. This provided support for hypothesis H8a on the effect of the risk taking 
dimension on short-term performance.  
 
Thereby, when running the regression equation of the dependent variable ROA and 
risk taking dimension of EO as the main predictor variable, the regression equation 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
Standardized values of Risk taking     
Fitted values Standardized values of ROA     
266 
 
was altered to include the squared term of risk taking only, which was generated by 
squaring the standardised variable.  
 
After the linearity assumption was tested, the next step was to test for 
multicollinearity, which will be outlined in the next section. 
 
 
8.3.2.2 Multicollinearity Testing 
 
The second assumption is that there is no perfect linear relationship (i.e. 
multicollinearity) between the regressor variables. This assumption was tested 
through the VIF (variance inflation factor), which should not exceed 10. It was also 
tested through the regression correlation coefficients, which should not exceed 0.8 
(Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2015). The regression correlation matrices were 
generated for the four regression equations.  
 
8.3.2.2.1 Multicollinearity Test through VIF 
 
The following section will test multicollinearity through the VIF. The 
multicollinearity testing will begin with outlining the VIF testing results of the 
regression of Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, and EO as the predictor variable, 
following the results of Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, and the EO 
dimensions, as the predictor variables.  
 
The results of the regression of EO with the dependent variable ROA will be 
presented next followed by the results from the regression of the EO dimensions, as 
the predictor variables, with the dependent variable ROA.  
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Table 8.12: Variance Inflation Factor of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Firm age 1.24 0.803 
Liquidity  1.22 0.818 
Firm size 1.22 0.819 
Systematic risk 1.13 0.887 
Leverage 1.12    0.892 
EO 1.09 0.919 
Investment Opportunity 1.06 0.943 
Mean VIF 1.15  
 
 
According to table 8.12 above, the highest VIF value of running the regression of 
EO as the predictor variable against Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, was firm 
age with a VIF of 1.24 and the mean VIF value was 1.15. These are far below the 
threshold for concern. Furthermore, the lowest tolerance value (tolerance value is 
inverse VIF) was 0.8, far above 0.1. This indicated that there were no issues of 
multicollinearity.  
 
Table 8.13: Variance Inflation Factor of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Risk taking 1.54 0.649 
Firm age  1.40 0.714 
Innovativeness 1.33   0.754 
Firm size 1.32 0.755 
Proactiveness 1.32 0.757 
Leverage 1.27 0.785 
Liquidity 1.26 0.796 
Systematic risk 1.20 0.835 
Investment Opportunity 1.08 0.928 
Mean VIF 1.3  
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According to table 8.13, the highest VIF value of running the regression of EO 
dimensions as the predictor variables against Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, 
was risk taking dimension of EO with a VIF of 1.54 and the mean VIF value was 
1.3. The lowest tolerance value was 0.649, which is above 0.1. This indicated that 
there were no issues of multicollinearity.  
 
 
Table 8.14: Variance Inflation Factor of the Regression of ROA and EO 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Firm age 1.24 0.806 
Liquidity  1.23 0.815 
Firm size 1.22 0.818 
Systematic risk 1.13 0.886 
Leverage 1.12 0.8902 
EO 1.09 0.9201 
Investment Opportunity 1.05 0.955 
Mean VIF 1.15  
 
According to table 8.14, the highest VIF value of running the regression of ROA, as 
the dependent variable, and EO, as the predictor variable, was firm age with a VIF 
of 1.24 and the mean VIF value was 1.15, similar to the regression of EO against the 
dependent variable Tobin’s Q. This indicated that there were no issues of 
multicollinearity.  
 
 
Table 8.15: Variance Inflation Factor of the Regression of ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Proactiveness  1.52 0.658 
Firm age 1.39 0.719 
Innovativeness  1.34 0.747 
Leverage  1.31 0.76 
Firm size  1.29 0.773 
Liquidity 1.25 0.797 
Risk taking squared  1.19 0.84 
Systematic Risk 1.13 0.886 
Investment Opportunity 1.06 0.943 
Mean VIF 1.28  
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According to table 8.15, the highest VIF value of running the regression of ROA, as 
the dependent variable, and EO dimensions, as the predictor variables, was 
proactiveness with a VIF of 1.52 and the mean VIF value was 1.28. Thus, there 
were no issues of multicollinearity.  
 
The next section will outline the multicollinearity testing results of the regression 
coefficients following the same sequence of the VIF test results.  
 
8.3.2.2.2 Multicollinearity Test through Correlation Matrix 
 
The following section represents the correlation matrices of the estimated regression 
coefficients of each regression of Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, followed by 
ROA, as the dependent variable.  
 
 
Table 8.16: Correlation Matrix of the Coefficients of the Regression of Tobin’s 
Q and EO 
 
Variables               EO           SystematicRisk     FirmSize   FirmAge    Investment   Liquidity  Leverage  
EO                        1                                                                                  
SystematicRisk    -0.184         1                            
FirmSize              -0.074        -0.118                 1                                                                
FirmAge                0.451         0.035                 -0.072            1                 
Investment           -0.077        -0.036                 -0.323           -0.075       1                     
Liquidity               0.116        -0.1569                0.4377           0.098       0.1607         1 
Leverage               0.0569       0.1468                0.197            -0.116       0.015          -0.038            1 
 
 
Table 8.17: Correlation Matrix of the Coefficients of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and 
EO Dimensions 
 
Variables   Innov   Proac        Risk          SysR      FirmSize     FirmAge Investment Liquidity  Leverage  
Innov          1 
Proac          0.543       1          
Risk           -0.389      0.001      1                                                                                          
SysR          -0.0051   -0.1909   -0.179       1                       
FirmSize    -0.0217   -0.134      0.0548    -0.141       1                                               
FirmAge      0.162      0.5248    0.4558     0.0216     -0.129          1 
Investment -0.1219   -0.122     -0.056      -0.0604    -0.301         -0.0898      1       
Liquidity     0.172       0.239      0.0782    -0.1369     0.381           0.128        0.102          1 
Leverage     0.472       0.5447   -0.3028     0.1004    -0.0204         0.0557     -0.054         0.0349   1                                        
 
Note: innovativeness was abbreviated as ‘innov’, proactiveness as ‘proac’, and risk taking 
as ‘risk’, systematic risk as ‘SysR’. 
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Table 8.18: Correlation Matrix of the coefficients of the Regression of ROA 
and EO 
 
Variables               EO           SystematicRisk   FirmSize FirmAge   Investment   Liquidity  Leverage 
EO                        1                                                                                  
SystematicRisk     0.0136       1                            
FirmSize              -0.138        0.029                  1                                                                
FirmAge                0.567        0.132                 -0.316            1                 
Investment            -0.183      -0.025                 -0.0004         -0.0465             1                     
Liquidity              0.272        -0.114                  0.402             0.1634             0.2088      1 
Leverage               0.117        -0.319                -0.0992          -0.0885           -0.0123      0.1164       1                
 
 
Table 8.19: Correlation Matrix of the Coefficients of the Regression of ROA 
and EO Dimensions 
 
Variables   Innov   Proac     Risk^2     SysR    FirmSize    FirmAge  Investment  Liquidity   Leverage  
Innov          1 
Proac          0.229     1                
Risk^2         0.129      0.011     1                                                                  
SysR           0.133     -0.055     0.273      1  
FirmSize   -0.105     -0.432    -0.176      0.356      1         
FirmAge     0.092      0.043     0.019     -0.014     -0.412       1 
Investment  0.078     -0.052    0.071      0.013      -0.096       0.077        1 
Liquidity     0.069    -0.175    -0.069     -0.154      0.191        0.179         0.216       1 
Leverage     0.032     0.436    -0.239     -0.306      -0.378       0.004         0.092       0.014          1 
 
Note: innovativeness was abbreviated as ‘innov’, proactiveness as ‘proac’, and risk taking 
as ‘risk’, systematic risk as ‘SysR’.  
 
 
In table 8.16 above, which represents the regression of EO against the dependent 
variable Tobin’s Q, the highest correlation was exhibited between firm age and EO 
being 0.45, followed by firm size and liquidity with a correlation coefficient of 
0.437. The lowest correlation was among investment opportunity and leverage with 
a correlation coefficient of 0.015. 
 
In table 8.17, which represents the correlation results of running the regression of 
the EO dimensions against the dependent variable Tobin’s Q, the highest correlation 
was exhibited between leverage and proactiveness being 0.544, followed by 
innovativeness and proactiveness with a correlation coefficient of 0.543. Thus, 
because of the relatively high correlation between innovativeness and proactiveness, 
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it is important to run regression models separately among the EO dimensions 
instead of including all of the EO dimensions in the same regression.  
 
In table 8.18, representing the regression of EO against the dependent variable 
ROA, the highest correlation was among firm age and EO being 0.56, followed by 
firm size and firm age with a correlation coefficient of -0.3. The correlation between 
firm age and EO was higher than 0.5, however, it was still lower than 0.8. 
Furthermore, another proxy for firm age was used based on the founding date. It 
was shown that even with that proxy the correlation between EO and firm age was 
0.51. The lowest correlation was among firm size and investment opportunity with a 
correlation of almost zero. Thereby, this indicated that there were no issues of 
multicollinearity.  
 
In table 8.19, outlining the regression of the EO dimensions as the predictor 
variables against ROA, the highest correlation was between leverage and 
proactiveness being 0.436 followed by proactiveness and firm size with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.43, and finally firm size and firm age with a correlation 
of -0.41.  
 
After multicollinearity was tested, heteroscedasticity of the error term was tested on 
the four regression models (Wooldridge, 2015). 
 
8.3.2.3 Heteroscedasticity Testing 
 
The assumption of constant variance of the residuals or the assumption of 
homoscedasticity was tested in each of the four regressions. If the null hypothesis 
was rejected, this indicates that the assumption of constant variance or 
homoscedasticity of the residuals of the fixed effect regression was not satisfied. 
Thereby, the robust clustered errors would be used instead of the standard errors.  
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Table 8.20: Heteroscedasticity Tests of the Regression Models 
 
Regression Models Heteroscedasticity 
tests 
Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO chi2 (300) = 2.3e+34 Prob>chi2= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
chi2 (300) =   4.6e+34 Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO chi2 (300) =   3.8e+35 Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
chi2 (300) =   2.5e+36 Prob>chi2= 0 
 
One must test for the homoscedasticity assumption of the error term in the 
regression. The modified Wald test was used after each of the four panel regression 
models as shown above in table 8.20. The tests were shown to reject the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity or constant variance of the idiosyncratic errors. This 
was a clear indication that heteroscedasticity was present. To remedy the biased 
OLS standard errors, robust and clustered errors were used (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2010; Wooldridge, 2015). 
 
After heteroscedasticity was tested, the next step was to test for autocorrelation of 
the error term in each of the regression models (Wooldridge, 2015).  
 
8.3.2.4 Autocorrelation Testing 
 
The following section represents autocorrelation testing as the fixed effect 
regression considers that there is no cross-sectional dependence of the error term. If 
the null hypothesis of the autocorrelation test was rejected, this indicates that there 
is cross-sectional dependence and that robust clustered errors should be used instead 
of the standard errors similar to the heteroscedasticity test. 
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Table 8.21: Autocorrelation Tests of the Regression Models 
 
Regression Models Heteroscedasticity tests Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO F (1, 197) = 8.904 
            
Prob > F = 0.0032 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
F (1, 197) =12.137 
            
 
Prob > F = 0.0006 
ROA and EO F (1, 198) =12.840 
            
 
Prob > F = 0.0004 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
F (1, 198) = 42.566  Prob > F = 0 
 
 
To test for within panel serial correlation, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
was run for each of the four regression models as shown above in table 8.21. The 
null hypothesis considers that there is no serial correlation. It is shown that the null 
hypothesis was rejected. To solve the issue of autocorrelation of the error term, 
adjustment should be made by requesting robust clustered errors as well (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 2010). Thus, clustering at the firm level was done to account for the 
autocorrelation among the sample of firms. 
 
The last assumption of the fixed effect regression to be tested was the normality 
assumption (Wooldridge, 2015), which will be shown in the below section.  
 
8.3.2.5 Normality Testing 
 
This section represents the normality testing of the regressions. To test for the 
normality of the residuals, the representation of the residuals was used as shown in 
figures 8.7, 8.8, 8.9, and 8.10 below. The fixed effect regression was run and then 
the residuals were generated. Consequently, the kernel density or the graphic 
representation of the distribution of the residuals was derived. The figures show the 
distribution of the residuals in comparison to a normal distribution.  
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Figure 8.7: Normality Test of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.8: Normality Test of the Regression of Tobin’s Q and EO Dimensions 
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Figure 8.9: Normality Test of the Regression of ROA and EO 
  
 
 
 
Figure 8.10: Normality Test of the Regression of ROA and EO Dimensions 
 
 
 
 
Similar to chapter 7, there was an issue of non-normality with the residuals of each 
of the regression models, yet there was a pressing matter of multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2015). These were tested in 
earlier sections . Furthermore, bootstrapping was used as a robustness test, as it is a 
resampling method that does not require the normality assumption of the 
distribution of the residuals (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Longhi & Nandi, 2014). 
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Bootstrapping test showed that the regression results did not differ. The 
bootstrapping was done by instructing 500 bootstrap replications based upon the 
cluster of firms (Alejo et al., 2015).  
 
After the fixed effect regression was found to be appropriate and the regression 
assumptions were tested, the next step was to test whether the time effect was 
significant in each of the regression models. Thus, the following section will outline 
the test of the time effect in each of the regression models.  
 
8.4 Test of the Time Effect among Failed firms 
 
To test whether time dummies are necessary to include in the regression, the 
significance of the time effect was tested in the four regression models. If the 
probability of the test that all the time dummies are jointly equal to zero, then one 
fails to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Table 8.22: Testing of the Time Effect of the Regression Models 
 
Regression Models F-test Probability 
Tobin’s Q and EO F (12, 299) = 18.59 Prob>chi2= 0 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
F (12, 299) = 18.01 Prob>chi2= 0 
ROA and EO F (12, 299) = 1.33 Prob>chi2= 0.2028 
ROA and EO Dimensions F (12, 299) = 2.6 Prob>chi2= 0.0026 
 
 
Based on the results shown in table 8.22, the null hypothesis (of insignificant time 
effect) was rejected in three of the four regression models. Thereby, time dummies 
should be included in the fixed effect regression excluding one-time dummy in the 
regression models. Thus, the fixed effect estimator would be a two-way fixed 
estimator accounting for both fixed firm and time effects in the regression models. 
However, in the regression of ROA and EO, the time dummies failed to show a 
significant effect on ROA.  
 
The following actions (or tests) described above are necessary before running the 
fixed effect regression as one cannot run a regression without testing that its 
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assumptions are fulfilled, and the econometric model is correct. A fixed effect 
regression might be desirable as it controls for variables that are fixed over time but 
might not be appropriate according to the Hausman test. Even if a fixed effect 
regression was shown to be appropriate, it is vital that one tests for the assumptions 
of the regression before conducting the results (Wooldridge, 2015).  
 
The next section will present the time-series figures of the mean values of the main 
predictor and dependent variables among the sample of failed firms. It is of 
relevance to examine among the sample of failed firms the average fluctuations of 
the variables from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis period, as this is a longitudinal 
timeframe Study. Thus, the next section will start with the graphic representation of 
the mean value changes in the main dependent variables Tobin’s Q and ROA, 
followed by EO and its dimensions, the predictor variables, across the timeframe.  
 
8.5 Time-series Figures of the Main Variables among Failed Firms 
 
This section shows the time series figures from the pre-crisis to the post-crisis 
period of the fluctuations of the mean values of the main predictor variables (EO 
and its dimensions) and dependent variables (Tobin’s Q and ROA) in the sample of 
failed firms across the Study’s timeframe. 
 
Figure 8.11: Mean Tobin’s Q Time-Series  
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The above figure 8.11 shows the time variation from year 2000 until 2010 of the 
dependent variable Tobin’s Q. The mean value of Tobin’s Q decreased significantly 
from year 2000 until 2002, in which it reached lower than 1. By the time of the 
financial crisis (year 2008), it decreased to a lower point than it did in year 2002 to 
less than 1. Then it increased slightly up to year 2010.  
 
The Tobin’s Q figure among the surviving firms in chapter 7 also had its lowest 
point in year 2008, in which Tobin’s Q decreased to less than 1. This indicates that 
during the financial crisis both surviving and failed firms had higher cost of 
replacement of their assets in comparison to their market value.  
 
Figure 8.12: Mean ROA Time-Series  
 
 
 
The above figure 8.12 shows the time variation of dependent variable ROA. As 
shown, ROA decreased significantly from year 2000 until 2001.  Then it decreased 
from year 2006 until 2008. Then it increased up until year 2010. The results are also 
similar to those in chapter 7, in which ROA had its lowest point in year 2001, 
followed by year 2008.  
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Figure 8.13: Mean EO Time-Series  
 
 
 
The figure 8.13 above shows that similar to the time-series figure of EO among the 
surviving firms, the mean value of EO among the failed firms was not consistent 
across time. EO was highest in year 2001, but it decreased significantly until 2006. 
From 2006 an increase in EO was observed which was sustained until the year 2008. 
In 2008, EO was relatively high similar to 2001. Then it decreased from 2008 until 
year 2010. This means that during the financial crisis, EO was relatively high. 
Interestingly EO dropped suddenly after the financial crisis (2008).  
 
The sample of firms that failed due to merger and acquisition were excluded and the 
sample of firms that failed due to bankruptcy, liquidity, or privatisation also showed 
a similar time-series figure to the above figure 8.13.  
 
The time-series figure of EO among the failed firms was similar to the figure of EO 
among surviving firms in chapter 7, in which it was shown that EO among the 
surviving firms was highest in year 2001; yet it was at its second highest peak 
during the financial crisis, after which it decreased in year 2010. Contrastingly, the 
surviving firms witnessed a slight increase in EO after year 2010.  The time-series 
figures of EO in the sample of surviving and failed firms revealed that EO was not 
the same across the timeframe of the Study, and that there was a sudden drop in EO 
after the financial crisis. The increase of EO during the financial crisis could entail 
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that firms sought solace by increasing their EO. When faced with the risk of failure, 
firms were more likely to increase their reliance on risky entrepreneurial behaviours, 
in accordance with organisational learning theory and prospect theory (March 1991; 
Swift, 2016).  
 
 
 
Figure 8.14: Mean Innovativeness Time-Series 
  
 
 
Innovativeness as shown in figure 8.14 above, was significantly high in year 2000 
until it decreased in the year 2004, but increased significantly from year 2005 until 
2008. In 2008, it was even at a higher point than the year 2000. However, from year 
2008 until 2010, it decreased significantly. Thus, during the pre-crisis period (two 
years prior to 2008), innovativeness was increasing until it reached its highest point 
during the crisis. The post-crisis period evidenced a significant drop in 
innovativeness.  
 
In the surviving firms dataset in chapter 7, innovativeness was at its highest peak 
during the year 2001, and followed by 2012. The third highest peak was during 
2008. However, among the failed firms as shown in the above figure 8.14, the 
highest peak was during the financial crisis (2008). This might suggest that firms 
may have sought to increase innovation, but possibly they could not sustain it or 
reverted to their old strategy after the period subsided (March, 2006).  
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Figure 8.15: Mean Proactiveness Time-Series  
 
 
 
 
Proactiveness, as shown in figure 8.15 above, was at the highest point in year 2000. 
It decreased significantly from year 2000 until 2002. From year 2002 until 2004 it 
increased slightly. From year 2004 until 2006, it decreased to its second lowest 
point. From 2006 until 2008, it decreased to its lowest point in 2008. After 2008, 
proactiveness increased.  
 
The above figure is also similar to the time-series plot of proactiveness among the 
surviving firms, which was at its highest point in year 2000, but then decreased 
significantly to its lowest point in year 2009.  
 
This means that in opposition to innovativeness and EO, during the pre-crisis period 
proactiveness was decreasing until it reached the lowest point during year 2008. In 
the post-crisis period, it started to increase. Thus, this reinforces the independence of 
the EO dimensions and is in support of the multi-dimensionality conceptualisation 
of EO (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996) and reveals the dynamic nature of EO. 
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Figure 8.16: Mean Risk Taking Time-Series  
 
 
 
Risk taking, as shown in figure 8.16 above, was at the highest point in year 2001. It 
decreased significantly from 2000 until 2006. From 2006 until 2008, it increased 
significantly until it reached its peak during year 2008. From 2008 until 2010 it 
decreased significantly. This means that during the pre-crisis period (two years prior 
to 2008), it was increasing until year 2008. During the post-crisis period, it started to 
decrease. The above figure of risk taking is also similar to the figure of risk taking 
among the surviving firms, which also had its highest peak in year 2001, and its 
second highest peak in year 2008.  
 
The time-series figure of risk taking is similar to innovativeness and EO. This 
means that innovativeness and risk taking might have shared aspects, rather than 
proactiveness and innovativeness as some of the literature has argued (e.g. Anderson 
et al., 2015). This entails new theoretical and conceptual insights into the different 
effect of proactiveness from innovativeness and risk taking dimensions that was 
shown among the samples of surviving and failed firms.  
 
Before outlining the main regression results in section 8.7, the next section 8.6 will 
outline the importance of using the adjusted R-squared value when reporting the 
main regression results.  
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8.6 Fitness (Explanatory Power) of the Fixed Effect Regression among Failed 
Firms 
 
The adjusted R-squared is presented for each of the four regression models by 
running an OLS regression with firm, industry, and time dummies since the fixed 
effect R-squared does not account and cancels effects that are fixed such as industry 
and firm effects.  
 
This section will begin with outlining the adjusted R-squared of each of the 
regression models in table 8.23 below. As stated earlier, the adjusted R-squared 
should be reported since the R-squared is biased and it increases with the number of 
predictors and number of firms included and this will be shown below. This 
reinforces the use of the adjusted R-squared in the main regression results. Thus, in 
section 8.7, the adjusted R-squared is reported instead of the R-squared value. The 
change in the adjusted R-squared, in section 8.7, can be seen when comparing the 
different regression models.  
 
Even though the adjusted R-squared will be presented in the main regression results 
as well, it is important to reveal the discrepancy between R-squared and the adjusted 
R-squared and the importance of using the adjusted R-squared before outlining the 
main regression results similar to chapter 7.  
 
 
Table 8.23: Adjusted R-squared value of the Regression Models 
 
Regression Models R-Squared Adjusted R-Squared 
Tobin’s Q and EO 0.6745 0.577 
Tobin’s Q and EO 
Dimensions 
0.684 0.589 
ROA and EO 0.67 0.5719 
ROA and EO 
Dimensions 
0.701 0.612 
 
 
According to table 8.23 above, the adjusted R-squared value of the regression of 
Tobin’s Q, as the dependent variable, and EO/EO dimensions, as the predictor 
variables, in the full models of dummies for industry, firm, and time was 0.58 (the 
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R-squared value was much higher, i.e. 0.67). Thus, 58% of the changes in Tobin’s Q 
was explained by the variables in the full model. In chapter 7, which outlines the 
regression results of the surviving firms, the regression of EO and its dimensions 
against the dependent variable Tobin’s Q had a higher explanatory power (i.e. 0.68). 
The adjusted R-squared of the regression of ROA, as the dependent variable, and 
EO, as the predictor variable, was 0.57 and showed that 57% of the changes in ROA 
was explained by the regression, whereas in the surviving firms’ dataset it was 0.5. 
The regression of the EO dimensions against ROA as the dependent variable 
adjusted R-squared was 0.61, whereas in the surviving firms dataset it was 0.53. 
 
The next section will outline the main regression results of the regression models 
starting with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable and then followed by ROA, as the 
dependent variable. There are two tables, in which the first table outlines the results 
of the main regression with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable, and the second 
table with ROA as the dependent variable.  
 
8.7 Regression Analysis Results among Failed Firms  
 
The fixed effect regression was used (with robust clustered standard errors) to 
examine the relationship between Tobin’s Q/ROA, as the dependent variables, and 
the main variables of the EO and its dimensions, as the predictor variables.  
 
The below tables 8.24 and 8.25 represent the results of the fixed effect regression of 
each of the dependent variables (Tobin’s Q and ROA) with the explanatory 
variables. The different models of the regression results are outlined in the below 
tables.  
 
Model 1 shows the relationship between the dependent variables and the controls 
only. Model 2 shows the relationship between the dependent variables and EO. 
Model 3 shows the relationship between the dependent variables and the main 
predictor variables in separate models. Model 3a outlines the results of 
innovativeness only, model 3b shows the results of proactiveness, and finally model 
3c outlines the results of the risk taking dimension only.  
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It is important to reiterate the importance of splitting the EO dimensions since 
proactiveness and innovativeness were shown to have a relatively high correlation, 
with a correlation above 0.5 in the regression of Tobin’s Q as the dependent 
variable, and a correlation of the value 0.4 in the regression of ROA as the 
dependent variable.  
 
The first table 8.24 outlines the results of the effects of EO and its dimensions on 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable including the time dummies in the four 
regression models.  
 
The second table 8.25 outlines the results of the regression of the effects of EO and 
its dimensions on ROA. In table 8.25, model 2, which outlines the effect of EO on 
ROA, the time dummies are absent due to the insignificant results of the time 
dummies in the regression, as was shown in section 8.4. Thereby, no time dummies 
were needed to be included in the regression of ROA and EO. 
 
The last table 8.26 shows the summary results of the regression models. 
 
In the below tables 8.24 and 8.25, the coefficients are under the column B and the 
robust standard errors are labelled as RSE. The t-values are in parentheses, under the 
coefficients. Innovativeness has been abbreviated as ‘Innov’, proactiveness as 
‘proac’, risk taking as ‘risk’, systematic risk as ‘sys risk’. Furthermore, the number 
of observations with the cluster of firms were abbreviated as N, the adjusted R-
squared as Adj. R^2, and the F-test as F.
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Table 8.24: Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effects of EO and its Dimensions on Tobin’s Q with Time Dummies 
Tobin’s Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c 
Predictors  B RSE B RSE  B RSE B RSE B RSE 
Sys Risk 0.084*** 
(3.07) 
0.027 0.096*** 
(3.32) 
0.029 0.086*** 
(3.14) 
0.0275 0.086*** 
(3.19) 
0.027 0.097*** 
(3.31) 
0.029 
Investment 
Opportunity 
0.0817**** 
(3.61) 
0.022 0.082**** 
(3.55) 
0.023 0.085**** 
(3.76) 
0.0226 0.084**** 
(3.58) 
0.023 0.084**** 
(3.66) 
0.023 
Firm size -0.15* 
(-1.66) 
0.095 -0.131 
(-1.32) 
0.098 -0.135 
(-1.41) 
0.096 -0.032 
(-0.32) 
0.1003 -0.172* 
(-1.71) 
0.1006 
Firm age 0.086 
(1.05) 
0.082 0.044 
(0.51) 
0.086 0.089 
(1.08) 
0.082 0.033 
(0.39) 
0.085 0.052 
(0.62) 
0.084 
Leverage -0.058* 
(-1.84) 
0.031 -0.054 
(-1.65) 
0.032 -0.049  
(-1.62) 
0.03 -0.093*** 
(-2.89) 
0.032 -0.04 
(-1.2) 
0.035 
Liquidity -0.014 
(-0.38) 
0.037 -0.013 
(-0.34) 
0.039 -0.003 
(-0.08) 
0.037 -0.007 
(-0.19) 
0.037   -0.014 
(-0.37) 
0.039 
EO   -0.029** 
(-2.29) 
0.012       
Innov     0.102** 
(2.29) 
0.045     
Proac       -0.185*** 
(-3.37) 
0.054   
Risk          -0.057 
(-1.52) 
0.037 
Constant  0.253*** 
(3.31) 
0.076 0.284*** 
(3.5) 
0.081 0.248 
(3.24) 
0.076 0.237 
(3.12) 
0.076 0.296 
(3.5) 
0.084 
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.575 0.577 0.578 0.584 0.574 
N 1430(301) 1389(300) 1430(301) 1423(301) 1396(300) 
F 21.14 19.72 20.01 20.35 19.72 
Prob(F) 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001
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Table 8.24 above outlines the results of the regression models whilst including the 
time dummies, in which Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable under investigation. 
The regression models in the above table tested for H3b on the effect of EO on long-
term performance among failed firms and for H6b, H7b, and H8b on the effect of 
the EO dimensions (innovativeness, proactiveness, risk taking) on long-term 
performance. Model 2, which includes EO tested for hypothesis H3b. Model 3a, 
which includes innovativeness, tested for hypothesis H6b. Model 3b, which includes 
proactiveness, tested for hypothesis H7b. Model 3c, which includes risk taking, 
tested for hypothesis H8b. 
 
In model 1, which includes the control variables, systematic risk (B=0.084) and 
investment opportunity (B=0.08) had a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q at 
the 1% level. The regression with the time dummies explained 57.5 % of the 
changes in Tobin’s Q.  
 
Model 2 includes EO and revealed that it had a significant negative effect on 
Tobin’s Q at the 5% level (t=-2.29) confirming hypothesis H3b. Systematic risk and 
investment opportunity had a positive effect significant at the 1% level. The 
regression explained 57.7 % of the changes in Tobin’s Q. 
 
Model 3a, which includes only innovativeness, revealed that innovativeness (t=2.29) 
had a significant positive effect on Tobin’s Q at the 5% level confirming hypothesis 
H6b. Systematic risk and investment opportunity had a significant positive effect at 
the 1 % level. The adjusted R-squared was 0.578, which means that innovativeness 
explained 57.8 % of the changes in Tobin’s Q. 
 
Model 3b, which includes proactiveness, showed that proactiveness (t=-3.37) had a 
significant negative effect at the 1 % level confirming hypothesis H7b. Systematic 
risk and investment opportunity had a significant positive effect at the 1 % level. 
Leverage (t=-2.89) had a significant negative effect at the 1 % level. The regression 
explained 58.4 % of the changes in Tobin’s Q.  
 
Model 3c, which includes risk taking, revealed that risk taking had an insignificant 
effect on Tobin’s Q, not supporting hypothesis H8b. However, in the regression 
excluding the time dummies revealed that risk taking had a significant negative 
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effect on Tobin’s Q at the 1% level (t=-4.81). Systematic risk and investment 
opportunity had a significant positive effect at the 1 % level. The regression 
explained 57.4 % of the changes in Tobin’s Q. 
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Table 8.25: Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effects of EO and its Dimensions on ROA with Time Dummies 
ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c 
Predictors  B RSE B RSE B RSE B RSE B RSE 
Sys Risk -0.0928* 
(-1.84) 
0.050
5 
0.028 
(0.86) 
0.032 -0.108** 
(-2.57) 
0.042 -0.096** 
(-2.09) 
0.046 -0.073 
(-1.47) 
0.026 
Investment 
Opportunity 
0.125**** 
(3.89) 
0.032 0.1006*** 
(3.36) 
0.029 0.103**** 
(3.79) 
0.027 0.109**** 
(4.21) 
0.026 0.107*** 
(3.35) 
0.032 
Firm size -0.172 
(-1.25) 
0.138 0.032 
(0.31) 
0.105 -0.347*** 
(-2.9) 
0.119 -0.628**** 
(-4.1) 
0.153 -0.131 
(-0.9) 
0.145 
Firm age 0.616**** 
(4.57) 
0.134 0.166* 
(1.66) 
0.1001 0.6004**** 
(4.91) 
0.122 0.668**** 
(4.63) 
0.144 0.454**** 
(3.52) 
0.129 
Leverage  -0.213**** 
(-3.93) 
0.054 -0.207**** 
(-4.1) 
0.0506 -0.275**** 
(-5.73) 
0.048 -0.069 
(-1.21) 
0.057 -0.156*** 
(-2.79) 
0.056 
Liquidity 0.125** 
(2.43) 
0.051 0.093* 
(1.86) 
0.049 0.045 
(1.02) 
0.0449 0.0816* 
(1.69) 
0.048 0.141*** 
(2.74) 
0.051 
EO   -0.27**** 
(-5.58) 
0.049       
Innov     -0.745**** 
(-9.6) 
0.077     
Proac       0.79**** 
(6.98) 
0.113   
Risk^2          -0.131**** 
(-5.05) 
0.026 
Constant  -0.004 
(-0.06) 
0.080
3 
0.22**** 
(5.17) 
0.042 0.023 
(0.3) 
0.078 -0.096 
(-1.16) 
0.082 0.145* 
(1.79) 
0.081 
Time dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.48 0.57 0.583 0.55 0.508 
N 1434 (301) 1393(300) 1434 (301) 1427(301) 1400 (300) 
F 6.96 12.4 12.51 9.79 6.79 
Prob(F) 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
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Table 8.25 above outlines the results of the regression models, in which ROA is the 
dependent variable and time dummies are included. The regression models in this 
table tested for H3a on the effect of EO on short-term performance and for H6a, 
H7a, and H8a on the effect of the EO dimensions (innovativeness, proactiveness, 
risk taking) on short-term performance. Model 2, which includes EO tested for 
hypothesis H3a. Model 3a, which includes innovativeness, tested for hypothesis 
H6a. Model 3b, which includes proactiveness, tested for hypothesis H7a. Model 3c, 
which includes risk taking, tested for hypothesis H8a. 
 
In model 1, which includes the control variables, investment opportunity (t=3.89) 
and firm age (t=4.57) had a significant positive effect on ROA at the 1% level. 
Liquidity (t=2.43) had a significant positive effect at the 5% level. Leverage (t=-
3.93) had a negative effect at the 1 % level. The regression explained 48 % of the 
changes in ROA. 
 
Model 2, which includes EO, revealed that it had a significant negative effect on 
ROA at the 1% level (t=-5.58) confirming hypothesis H3a. Investment had a 
positive effect significant at the 1% level. Leverage had a significant negative effect 
at the 1 % level. The model explained 57 % of the changes in ROA. 
 
Model 3a, which includes only innovativeness, revealed that innovativeness (t=-9.6) 
had a significant negative effect on ROA at the 1% level confirming hypothesis 
H6a. Systematic risk (t=-2.57) had a significant negative effect at the 5 % level. 
Investment opportunity and firm age had a significant positive effect at the 1 % 
level. Firm size and leverage had a significant negative effect on ROA at the 1 % 
level. The regression explained 58.3 % of the changes in ROA. 
 
Model 3b, which includes proactiveness, showed that proactiveness (t=6.98) had a 
significant positive effect on ROA at the 1 % level confirming hypothesis H7a. 
Systematic risk had a significant negative effect on ROA at the 5 % level. 
Investment opportunity and firm age had a significant positive effect at the 1 % 
level. Firm size (t=-4.5) had a significant negative effect at the 1 % level. The 
regression explained 55 % of the changes in ROA.  
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Model 3c, which includes risk taking, revealed that risk taking (t=-5.05) had a 
decreasing concave relationship with ROA significant at the 1 % level confirming 
hypothesis H8a. Investment opportunity and firm age had a significant positive 
effect at the 1 % level. Liquidity (t=2.74) had a significant positive effect on ROA at 
the 1% level. Leverage had a significant negative effect at the 1 % level. The 
regression explained 50.8 % of the changes in ROA. 
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Table 8.26: Summary of Regression Results with Time Dummies among Failed 
Firms 
 
Main Predictor Variables Dependent: Tobin’s Q Dependent: ROA 
EO Negative significant effect at 
the 5% level (supporting 
hypothesis H3b) 
Negative significant at 1% level 
(in support of hypothesis H3a) 
Innovativeness Positive significant at 5% 
level (supporting H6b) 
Negative significant at 1% level 
(supporting H6a) 
Proactiveness Negative significant at 1 % 
level (supporting H7b) 
Positive significant at 1% level 
(supporting H7a) 
Risk taking Insignificant (not supporting 
H8b) 
Inverse U-shaped significant at 
1% level (supporting H8a) 
 
 
The following table 8.26 summarises and illustrates the results of the fixed effect 
regression models with each of Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variables. 
Similar to chapter 7, it was shown that each of the EO dimensions had differential 
effects on firm performance that were even distinctive when considering their 
effects on different measures of firm performance.  
 
EO was shown to have a significant negative effect on firm performance measures 
(ROA and Tobin’s Q) confirming hypothesis H3a and H3b.  
 
Innovativeness was shown to have a negative effect on immediate returns (ROA) 
confirming hypothesis H6a, however a positive effect on long-term returns (Tobin’s 
Q) confirming hypothesis H6b.  
 
In contrast to innovativeness, proactiveness was shown to have a significant a 
positive effect on ROA in support of hypothesis H7a, yet negative effect on Tobin’s 
Q supporting hypothesis H7b.  
 
Risk taking was shown to have a significant negative quadratic effect on ROA 
confirming hypothesis H8a. It was also shown to have a significant negative effect 
on Tobin’s Q without the time dummies at the 1% level, yet with the time dummies 
included it had an insignificant effect, not supporting hypothesis H8b.  
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The next sections will outline the robustness tests of the effects of the main 
predictor variables EO and its dimensions and the different forms of innovativeness 
that were utilised.  
 
8.8 Robustness Check: Effect of EO and its Dimensions on Firm Performance 
among Failed Firms 
 
This section tests the results of the fixed effect regression results by testing for 
endogeneity of the regressors as a robustness check by using the lagged values of 
the main predictor variables (by t-1, t-2, and t-3) as instruments on Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. Thus, the instruments of the predictor variables are the predictor variables 
lagged backwards compared to the dependent variables by 1 year, two years, and 
three years. This section will first outline the results from the effect of EO on 
Tobin’s Q and ROA regressions. Then subsequently, the section will outline the 
robustness results of innovativeness, proactiveness, and lastly risk taking. If the null 
hypothesis of lack of endogeneity is accepted, then this entails that the fixed effect 
regression results are valid. Otherwise, the effect of the lagged values of the 
predictor variables (EO and its dimensions) is tested on the dependent variables 
(firm performance measures). 
 
8.8.1 Robustness of the Effect of EO on Firm Performance  
 
The following section represents the endogeneity test of the effect of EO on firm 
performance. 
 
Table 8.27: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of EO on Tobin’s Q and ROA including Time Dummies 
 
EO Tobin’s Q ROA 
Endogeneity Test  2.379 
(0.123) 
3.003 
(0.083) 
Under-identification Test 8.847 
(0.012) 
8.946 
(0.011) 
Sargan-Hansen Statistics 
(Over-identification 
0.387 
(0.534) 
0.559 
(0.454) 
p-value in parentheses  
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In the above table 8.27, the results of the endogeneity test of the regressor EO with 
both performance measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA) accepted the null hypothesis of 
the exogeneity of the regressor EO. The under-identification test tests the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the regressor and are not 
relevant. The rejection of its null hypothesis at the 5% level indicates that the 
instruments used are relevant. Furthermore, the overidentification test tests the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid and uncorrelated with the error term. 
Thereby, the fixed effect regression results of the effect of EO on Tobin’s Q and 
ROA were valid.  
 
The above endogeneity test results revealed that hypothesis H3a and H3b, on the 
effect of EO on short-term and long-term firm performance in the sample of failed 
firms, were supported due to the lack of endogeneity.  
 
The next section will outline the robustness check of the effect of the innovativeness 
dimension of EO on firm performance.  
 
8.8.2 Robustness of the Effect of Innovativeness on Firm Performance  
 
This section outlines the robustness results of the EO dimension innovativeness on 
firm performance.  
 
Table 8.28: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of Innovativeness on Tobin’s Q and ROA including Time Dummies  
 
Innovativeness Tobin’s Q ROA 
Endogeneity Test  0.885 
(0.347) 
6.47 
(0.011) 
Under-identification Test 20.889 
(0) 
9.734 
(0.007) 
Sargan-Hansen Statistics 
(Over-identification 
0.005 
(0.942) 
0.149 
(0.699) 
p-value in parentheses  
 
 
The above table 8.28 shows the results of the endogeneity test of the effect of 
innovativeness on firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA). The endogeneity test of 
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Tobin’s Q as the firm performance measure, innovativeness passed the exogeneity 
assumption. Thereby, the results of the fixed effect regression of innovativeness on 
Tobin’s Q were valid as there was no endogeneity issue. However, with ROA as the 
dependent variable, the endogeneity test of innovativeness rejected the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity (p-value=0.011<0.05). Thereby, the results of the lagged 
values of innovativeness on ROA are presented below in table 8.29. By testing the 
lagged values of innovativeness on ROA, it would deal with the endogeneity issue.  
 
 
Table 8.29: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of Innovativeness on ROA including Time Dummies  
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
 
The lagged value of innovativeness by two years (at t-2) showed to have a 
significant effect on ROA (at t) (p<0.05). The lagged value at t-2 was thereby more 
significant than the lagged value at t-1. The results are similar to the results of 
chapter 7 of the lagged values of innovativeness.  
 
The results indicated that a one standard deviation increase in innovativeness (at t-2) 
led to a 22 % increase in ROA (at t). This is quite different from the non-lagged 
ROA Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Innovativeness 0.173* 
(1.84) 
0.22** 
(2.19) 
0.093 
(1.19) 
Systematic Risk  -0.103** 
(-2) 
-0.058 
(-0.98) 
0.004 
(0.09) 
Investment opportunity 0.123**** 
(3.77) 
0.134*** 
(3.36) 
0.11** 
(2.61) 
Firm size -0.0438 
(-0.31) 
0.085 
(0.56) 
0.184 
(1.15) 
Firm age 0.556**** 
(4.21) 
0.668**** 
(3.61) 
0.478** 
(2.48) 
Leverage  -0.194*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.206*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.223**** 
(-3.85) 
Liquidity 0.145*** 
(2.71) 
0.129** 
(2.37) 
0.121* 
(1.91) 
Constant  0.011 
(0.15) 
-0.013 
(-0.18) 
0.068 
(1.09) 
N 1391(298) 1097(244) 865(207) 
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value of innovativeness, which showed, in section 8.7, to have a significant negative 
effect on ROA.  
 
The above results revealed that hypothesis H6a, on the effect of innovativeness on 
short-term performance, was not validated due to the presence of endogeneity. H6b, 
on the effect of innovativeness on long-term performance, was supported due to 
lack of endogeneity.  
 
The next section will outline the robustness check of the effect of the proactiveness 
on firm performance.   
 
8.8.3 Robustness of the Effect of Proactiveness on Firm Performance  
 
This section outlines the robustness results of proactiveness on firm performance.  
 
 
Table 8.30: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of Proactiveness on Firm Performance including Time Dummies  
 
Proactiveness Tobin’s Q ROA 
Endogeneity Test  1.950 
(0.162) 
35.867 
(0.0) 
Under-identification Test 12.823 
(0.001) 
24.133 
(0.0) 
Sargan-Hansen Statistics 
(Over-identification 
0.085 
(0.770) 
2.808 
(0.093) 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
 
The above table 8.30 outlines the endogeneity test of the proactiveness dimension of 
EO and shows that the results of the fixed effect regression of proactiveness on 
Tobin’s Q were valid as there were no issues of endogeneity. However, 
proactiveness was shown to be endogenous with ROA. Thereby, the lagged values 
of the proactiveness dimension is tested on ROA as will be shown in the table 8.31 
below.  
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Table 8.31: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of Proactiveness on ROA including Time Dummies  
 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
The lagged value of proactiveness by 1 year (at t-1), in the above table 8.31, had a 
significant negative effect on ROA (p<0.001). This is also quite contrasting from the 
non-lagged value of proactiveness, in section 8.7, that had a significant positive 
effect on ROA.  
 
The lagged value by two years (p<0.001) and lagged value by three years of 
proactiveness (p<0.05) also had a significant negative effect on ROA.  
The lagged value of proactiveness at t-1 led to a 68 % decrease in ROA, the lagged 
value at t-2 leads to a 48 % decrease, and the lagged value at t-3 led to a 17.7 % 
decrease in ROA.  
 
The above results revealed that hypothesis H7a, on the effect of proactiveness on 
short-term performance, was not supported due to endogeneity. H7b, on the effect 
of proactiveness on long-term performance, was validated due to lack of 
endogeneity.  
ROA Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 
Proactiveness -0.68**** 
(-5.66) 
-0.482**** 
(-4.02) 
-0.177** 
(-2.26) 
Systematic Risk  -0.079 
(-1.65) 
  -0.0304 
(-0.55) 
0.018 
(0.34) 
Investment opportunity  0.108*** 
(3) 
0.095** 
(2.37) 
0.096** 
(2.25) 
Firm size 0.351** 
(2.36) 
0.303** 
(2) 
0.254 
(1.48) 
Firm age 0.345*** 
(2.8) 
0.479*** 
(2.64) 
0.396* 
(1.95) 
Leverage  -0.267**** 
(-3.98) 
-0.227**** 
(-3.73) 
-0.226**** 
(-3.93) 
Liquidity 0.14*** 
(2.83) 
0.122** 
(2.33) 
0.125* 
(1.96) 
Constant  0.134 
(1.46) 
0.1009 
(1.49) 
0.127** 
(2) 
N 1384(298) 1091(244) 860(207) 
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The next section will present the robustness results of the effect of the risk taking 
dimension of EO on firm performance.  
 
8.8.4 Robustness of the Effect of Risk taking on Firm Performance  
 
This section presents the endogeneity test results of risk taking on firm performance 
(Tobin’s Q and ROA).  
 
 
Table 8.32: Robustness Check of Fixed Effect Regression Results of the Effect 
of Risk taking on Firm Performance including Time Dummies 
 
Risk taking Tobin’s Q ROA 
Endogeneity Test  0.209 
(0.64) 
0.085 
(0.77) 
Under-identification Test 13.096 
(0.001) 
13.274 
(0.001) 
Sargan-Hansen Statistics 
(Over-identification 
0.227 
(0.633) 
0.559 
(0.454) 
p-value in parentheses  
 
 
The above table 8.32 shows the results of the endogeneity test of the effect of risk 
taking on the firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA). The endogeneity test results 
of risk taking on firm performance indicated that there was no endogeneity issue. 
Thereby, the fixed effect results of risk taking on firm performance measures were 
valid. 
 
The above results revealed that hypothesis H8(a and b), on the effect of risk taking 
on the short-term and long-term performance, was supported due to the lack of 
endogeneity.  
 
The next section will outline the robustness check from the different measures of the 
innovativeness dimension of EO that were used instead of the main innovativeness 
measure as R&D intensity.  
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8.9 Robustness Check: Alternative Forms of Innovativeness among Failed 
Firms 
 
The following brief section shows the robustness check of the results from the 
alternative measures of innovativeness that were used. The first measure termed 
intangible innovation was used measured as R&D/number of employees. The 
second measure is termed patent yield and measures the ratio of the number of 
patents at application date divided by R&D expenditure. This section shows the 
different results using the alternative measures of innovativeness.  
 
Table 8.33: Effect of Alternative Forms of innovativeness on Tobin’s Q/ROA 
 
 Tobin’s Q ROA 
Innovativeness 
(R&D/employees) 
-0.1205** 
(-2.04) 
-0.616**** 
(-4.74) 
Innovativeness (Number of 
Patents/R&D) 
-0.088 
(-1.19) 
0.15** 
(1.98) 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
Similar to chapter 7, the alternative form of innovativeness in the form of the ratio 
of R&D expenditures to number of employees had a negative effect on Tobin’s Q at 
the 5 % level (t=-2.04) and ROA at the 1 % level (t=-4.74). The second form of 
innovativeness, which was represented by the ratio of the number of patents to R&D 
expenditure had an insignificant effect on Tobin’s Q, yet a significant positive effect 
on ROA at the 5% level (t=1.98).   
 
8.10 Chapter Conclusion 
 
The chapter’s fixed effect regression results revealed that EO had a significant 
negative effect on short-term and long-term performance among the sample of 
failed firms, supporting H3a and H3b.  
 
With regards to the EO dimensions, innovativeness had a positive effect on long-
term performance in support of H6b. Proactiveness had a significant negative effect 
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on long-term performance supporting H7b. Lastly, risk taking was shown to have a 
significant negative concave effect on short-term performance supporting H8a and 
an insignificant effect on long-term performance, not supporting H8b. 
 
It is important to note that in both chapters 7 and 8, endogeneity was present when 
testing the effect of the EO dimensions, innovativeness and proactiveness, on ROA. 
Thereby, when testing for their effects on recent performance, their lagged values 
were used instead to address the endogeneity problem. After adjusting for 
endogeneity, their lagged values on ROA were similar to the results of their effects 
on Tobin’s Q.  
 
The next chapter is the survival analysis chapter. Survival analysis will be used to 
examine the effect of EO and its dimensions on the failure rate of firms. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Survival Analysis of EO and its Dimensions and Firm Performance  
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9.1 Introduction to the Chapter  
 
This chapter examines the effect of EO on the failure rate of firms. The Cox 
proportional hazard model was used to empirically assess the effect of the main 
variables (EO and its separate dimensions) on the probability or risk of failure of the 
sample of firms. The survival analysis was conducted in SAS since SAS has 
comprehensive features for conducting survival analysis (Allison, 2010). Hazard 
models have long been used in the literature to analyse firms’ failure (Cefis & 
Marsili, 2005).  
 
EO has been ubiquitously viewed in the literature as advantageous on firm 
performance (Rauch et al., 2009). In chapter 7, it was shown that among the sample 
of surviving firms, EO has an inverse U-shaped relationship with short-term and 
long-term measures of firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q). In chapter 8, among 
the sample of failed firms, it was shown that EO had a significant negative 
relationship on both measures of firm performance. The results of the fixed effect 
panel regressions aligned with the EO-as-Experimentation perspective.  
 
In this chapter, it is important to advance the results from the previous chapters 7 
and 8, which focus on the effect of EO on firm performance, by also considering the 
effect of EO on the risk of firm failure. According to Wiklund and Shepherd (2011), 
most of the literature has studied the effect of EO on firm performance only 
amongst surviving firms (e.g. Rauch et al. 2009). The significance of this thesis is 
that not only it considers the EO-firm performance relationship in the sample of 
surviving firms and failed firms separately, but also considers the effect of EO on 
the risk of firm failure in the overall sample of firms. This is of relevance since 
according to the EO-as-Experimentation perspective, EO results in higher 
performance variance and might lead to higher risk of business failure (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011).  
 
The first section of this chapter will outline the survival figures of the sample of 
high-technology firms to test hypothesis H5, followed by the pre-analysis procedure 
of testing the assumptions of the Cox regression (linearity and the proportionality 
assumption testing followed by multicollinearity testing). The chapter will finally 
outline the survival analysis regression results and the survival graphs of firms high 
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in EO and its dimensions.  
 
The following chapter aims to answer the below hypotheses. The hypotheses were 
outlined in the theoretical chapter 3. Thus, the hypotheses that were tested in this 
chapter are: 
 
9.1.1 Hypotheses: EO and Firm Failure 
 
H4:  The relationship between EO and the risk of firm failure is positive over time. 
H5: High-technology industry is more entrepreneurially oriented and has a lower 
survival probability in comparison to other industries. 
 
9.1.2 Hypotheses: EO Dimensions and Firm Failure 
 
H6c: Innovativeness has a negative effect on firm failure. 
H7c: Proactiveness has a positive effect on firm failure. 
H8c: Risk taking has a positive effect on firm failure. 
 
9.2 The Survival Figures of the Sample of High-technology Firms 
 
Before outlining the pre-analysis procedure of checking the assumptions of the Cox 
regression, this section will outline the survival figures of the sample of the high-
technology firms included in the Study. 
 
The following section outlines the survival figures of the sample of high-technology 
firms (the sample of the thesis). The first figure 9.1 will outline the survival 
probability of the sample of high-technology firms versus the excluded sample. The 
latter sample of firms was not included in the classification of high-technology firms 
(by the industrial classification (four-digit SIC codes) of Loughran and Ritter 
(2004)). The second figure will outline the survival trend of the high-technology 
firms.  
  
This section aims to test the hypothesis that the high-technology industry has a 
lower survival probability in comparison to other industries. 
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Figure 9.1: Survival Figure of High-technology versus Excluded Firms 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.1 shows the survival probability of high-technology firms versus 
the excluded sample of the firms across the period of the 15 years (from fiscal year 
2000 until fiscal year 2014). The high-technology firms were coded as 1 and 
coloured red whereas the rest of the firms were coloured blue. The figure indicates 
that the high-technology firms had a lower survival probability in comparison to 
firms from other industries and this was significant, by utilising the log-rank test, at 
the 1% level (p-value<0.0001). Thereby, hypothesis H5, on the effect of the high-
technology industry on the survival probability of firms, was confirmed.  
 
The survival of the high-technology firms was significantly lower in comparison to 
firms that do not belong in the high-technology industrial classification. This clearly 
shows that the high-technology firms, which are faced by the competitive intensity 
of the high-technology industry, are at the risk of a lower probability of survival. 
This indicates that the high-technology dummy variables must be included in the 
Cox regression. The high-technology dummies were included in the regressions as 
was shown in the methodology chapter 6 (equations 4.1 and 4.2).  
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Figure 9.2: Survival Figure of High-technology Firms  
  
 
 
 
 
Summary of Number of Censored and Uncensored Values 
Total Observations Failed Censored Percent 
Censored 
5,011 810 4201 83.84 
 
 
The above figure 9.2 shows the overall survival of the sample of firms in the high-
technology industry. As shown in the table of the figure, there was a total of 5,011 
observations of which 810 were observations of failed firms. The figure shows the 
number of firms that were at risk of failure at each period. At time zero there were 
5,011 observations in total. At time month 50, there were 2,435 observations of 
surviving firms. Thereby, by time 50 months or 4 years and two months, more than 
half of the firms had failed. By time 150 months, 321 observations of firms were 
found. By 200 months, the above figure indicated zero observations since by the end 
of this Study’s timeframe, the observations for the firms ended. 
 
The next section will outline the pre-analysis procedure of testing the proportional 
hazard regression assumptions before presenting the regression results. 
306 
 
9.3 Pre-analysis Procedure: Testing Assumptions of the Cox Regression  
  
The assessment of the two Cox regression equations in Chapter 6, in the case of the 
regression of EO as the predictor variable and the EO dimensions as the main 
predictor variables, was done through the functional form or linearity test followed 
by the proportionality assumption test of the Cox regression. Furthermore, 
multicollinearity was tested through the VIF and the correlation matrix of the 
regressors.  
 
The first of this section will outline the functional form test of the regressors 
(control variables followed by EO and its dimensions). Subsequently, it will outline 
the proportionality test results of the time-varying regressors (the control variables 
followed by the main predictor variables EO and its dimensions). Lastly, this section 
will test for multicollinearity, similar to chapter 7 and 8, through the VIF and the 
correlation coefficients. 
 
9.3.1 Functional Form Test of Regressors 
 
The following section outlines the figures that were used to assess the linearity of 
the variables. The martingale residuals were generated to test the functional forms 
of the variables of the Cox regression (Therneau et al. 1990). In the below figures, 
the loess fit plot with scatterplot smoother was applied to show whether the 
relationships were linear or quadratic. If the smoother plot was non-linear this was 
an indication of a non-linear covariate. The martingale residuals were defined as 
observed values minus the expected values (Therneau et al. 1990). Values above the 
loess line indicate that the observed events were greater than those expected by the 
model. Hence, this either indicates that the observed events (i.e. in this case the 
event is failure) are in excess to the predicted model or that the observed failure 
occurred before the model prediction. Conversely, large negative values either 
indicated that the failure events were deficient to the predicted events or that the 
observed failure occurred after the model prediction (Wilson, 2013). Thus, this 
shows that firms with large positive values of the residuals means experienced the 
event of failure soon and in contrast those with large negative values means 
survived too long. Some researchers do not check the functional form of the 
covariates before testing the proportional hazard assumption (e.g. Revilla et al., 
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2016). This would mistakenly result in a false negative impact on the proportional 
hazard assumption, when in fact it is a functional form misspecification (Wilson, 
2013). The below presents the figures of each of the variables against the martingale 
residuals to test the linearity assumption of the covariates.  
 
The functional form test will first outline the figures of the control variables 
followed by the figures of EO and its dimensions. 
 
9.3.1.1 Functional Form Test of the Control Variables 
 
The following section represents the functional form test of the control variables of 
the Cox regression by presenting the martingale residual scatterplots to assess the 
linearity assumption of the covariates.  
 
Figures 9.3: The Residual Scatterplots of Systematic Risk 
 
The following represents the linearity testing of the control variable systematic risk 
through the martingale residual scatterplots. 
 
Figure 9.3.1: The Martingale Residual Scatterplot of Systematic Risk 
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Figure 9.3.2: The Martingale Residual Scatterplot of Systematic Risk Squared 
 
 
 
 
The above figures of systematic risk against the martingale residuals indicates that 
the relationship is not linear (in the form of a quadratic relationship) between 
systematic risk and the martingale residuals. Thereby, the systematic risk variable 
was squared, and the squared version of the variable was plotted against the 
martingale residuals. The second figure 9.3.2 indicates that the squared version of 
the variable was the true functional form. 
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Figure 9.4: The Martingale Residual Scatterplot of Firm Size 
 
 
 
 
The following represents the functional form test of the control variable firm size 
using the martingale residual scatterplot. The above figure 9.4 of firm size against 
the martingale residuals indicates that the relationship was linear between firm size 
and the martingale residuals. The large negative values in residual plot 9.4 indicate 
that the observed values of firm size occurred after the predicted model. Thus, as 
predicted from the theoretical explanation, firm size affected firm failure by 
prolonging firm failure. 
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Figure 9.5: The Martingale Residual Scatterplot of Firm Age 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.5 of firm age against the martingale residuals indicates that the 
relationship appeared to be mostly linear between firm age and the martingale 
residuals. However, as hypothesised a squared term of firm age should be added 
onto the regression to account for the quadratic relationship of firm age with firm 
failure.  
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Figure 9.6: The Martingale Residual Scatterplot of Leverage 
 
 
 
 
The following represents the functional form test of the control variable leverage by 
using the martingale residual scatterplot. The above figure 9.6 of leverage against 
the martingale residuals indicates that the relationship was linear between leverage 
and the martingale residuals. Thereby, leverage satisfied the assumption of linearity 
of the Cox regression. 
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Figure 9.7: The Martingale Residual Scatterplot of Organisational Slack 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.7 of organisational slack against the martingale residuals 
indicates that the relationship was linear between organisational slack and the 
martingale residuals. The large negative values showed that the observed values of 
organisational occurred after the predicted model. Thus, organisational slack 
affected firm failure by prolonging firm failure and this was expected based on its 
theoretical explanation in chapter 6.  
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Figure 9.8: The Martingale Residual Scatterplot of Tobin’s Q 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.8 of Tobin’s Q against the martingale residuals indicates that the 
relationship was linear between Tobin’s Q and the martingale residuals. Thus, the 
linearity assumption holds.  
 
 
9.3.1.2 Functional Form Test of the Main Predictor Variables EO and its 
Dimensions 
 
The following section represents the functional form test of the main predictor 
variables. The section will first outline the martingale residual scatterplot of 
innovativeness dimension, followed by the proactiveness, risk taking dimensions 
and finally the EO construct.  
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Figure 9.9: The Martingale Residual Scatterplot of Innovativeness  
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.9 loess fit plot of the variable innovativeness against the 
martingale residuals indicates that the relationship was linear between the variable 
innovativeness and the martingale residuals. Thereby, the variable innovativeness 
had the correct functional form.  
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Figures 9.10: The Residual Scatterplots of Proactiveness 
 
The following represents the functional form test of the proactiveness dimension of 
EO. 
 
Figures 9.10.1: The Martingale Residual Scatterplots of Proactiveness 
 
 
 
 
Figures 9.10.2: The Cumulative Residual Scatterplots of Proactiveness 
 
 
The above figures of proactiveness against the martingale residuals indicate that the 
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relationship was not linear between proactiveness and the martingale residuals (the 
null hypothesis of linearity was rejected as shown in the second graph of the 
cumulative martingale residual scatterplot). Thereby, the variable proactiveness was 
transformed into a categorical variable, which equals to 1 if values of proactiveness 
were higher than zero and a value of zero for values that were lower than zero.  
 
Figure 9.11: The Martingale Residual Scatterplot of Risk taking 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.11 of risk taking against the martingale residuals indicates that 
the relationship was linear between risk taking and the martingale residuals. 
Thereby, the variable risk taking had the correct functional form.  
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Figures 9.12: The Residual Scatterplots of EO 
 
The following section represents the linearity testing of the EO construct.  
 
Figure 9.12.1: The Martingale Residual Scatterplot of EO 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.12.2: The Cumulative Martingale Residual Scatterplot of EO 
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To validate the linearity testing, the second figure 9.12.2 showed that EO had the 
correct functional form, which uses the cumulative sum of martingale residuals 
against the values of the variable EO (Lin et al., 1993). Based on 1,000 random 
simulations of the residual pattern, it indicates the observed martingale residuals did 
not deviate from the simulated residual patterns and the null hypothesis of linearity 
was accepted.  
 
The next section will outline the proportionality testing of the regressors, starting 
with the control variables followed by the EO dimensions and lastly the EO 
construct.  
 
9.3.2 Proportional Hazard Assumption Test of Regressors 
 
The figures based on the Schoenfeld residuals as a function of time were utilised to 
assess the proportionality hazard assumption of the predictor variables. The 
Schoenfeld residuals are considered to have a different characteristic to other 
residuals by having a separate value for each covariate for each firm or observation 
included (Allison, 2010). The Schoenfeld residuals are the difference between the 
covariate value of a specific observation or firm and the average value of the 
observations at risk (i.e. failed firms). Thus, the average value of the Schoenfeld 
residuals would indicate the change of a specific covariate with time (Grambsch & 
Therneau, 1994). If the average change of the covariate with time is zero, then this 
indicates that the proportionality assumption holds. Conversely, if the slopes of the 
figures were shown to be significantly fluctuating from zero, then this indicates that 
the proportionality assumption does not hold since they depend on time (Allison, 
2010). The loess smoother was used as well to smooth the plot.  
 
The below section first outlines the hazard proportionality test, which shows the 
significance of the variables. The null hypothesis is that the variables are 
proportional with time. If the null hypothesis is rejected, this indicates that the 
variables violate the proportionality assumption. Subsequently, the section will 
present the figures of each of the variables against the Schoenfeld residuals. 
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Table 9.1: Proportionality Assumption Testing of Time-varying Variables 
 
Predictor 
Variables 
Ρ Chi2 Df Prob>chi2 
Innovativeness -0.026 0.47 1 0.493 
Proactiveness 0.036 1.07 1 0.299 
Risk Taking -0.115 9.00 1 0.002 
EO -0.124 21.23 1 0.0 
Systematic Risk -0.026 0.54 1 0.463 
Leverage  0.016 0.20 1 0.653 
Organisational 
Slack 
-0.06 3.54 1 0.06 
Firm Age -0.029 0.56 1 0.456 
Firm size -0.015 0.20 1 0.654 
Tobin’s Q 0.068 2.88 1 0.089 
 
 
The above table 9.1 presents the proportionality test results of each of the time-
varying predictor variables after running separate cox regression equations of the 
control variables, EO, and lastly of the separate EO dimensions. The results of the 
proportionality test from STATA validated the results of the Schoenfeld residual 
graphs from SAS. It was found that EO and its dimension risk taking violated the 
proportional hazard assumption (p<0.01). Thus, to remedy this, their interaction 
with time was included in the regression.   
 
The next section will outline the residual scatterplots of the Schoenfeld residuals.  
 
9.3.2.1 Proportional Hazard Assumption Test of Control Variables 
 
The following represents the proportionality hazard test of the control variables by 
using the Schoenfeld residual scatterplots.  
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Figure 9.13: The Schoenfeld Residual Scatterplot of Systematic Risk Squared 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.13 of the fit plot of systematic risk Schoenfeld residual with time 
indicates that the variable was proportional with time since the smooth plot did not 
vary from zero. Furthermore, its interaction with time was added onto the cox 
regression, which showed that it was not significant with time. Thus, this indicates 
that the hazard proportionality assumption holds for systematic risk.  
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Figure 9.14: The Schoenfeld Residual Scatterplot of Firm Size 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.14 of the fit plot of the Schoenfeld residuals of firm size with 
time shows that it was proportional with time since the smooth plot did not vary 
much from zero. Furthermore, its interaction with time was added onto the cox 
regression, which showed that it was not significant with time. Thus, this indicates 
that the hazard proportionality assumption holds.  
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Figure 9.15: The Schoenfeld Residual Scatterplot of Firm Age 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.15 of the fit plot of the Schoenfeld residuals of the control 
variable firm age with time shows that the variable was proportional with time since 
the smooth plot did not vary significantly from zero. Furthermore, its interaction 
with time was included in the cox regression, which showed that it was not 
significant with time. Thus, this indicates that firm age is independent of time or 
proportional with time.  
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Figure 9.16: The Schoenfeld Residual Scatterplot of Leverage 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.16 of the fit plot of the Schoenfeld residuals of the variable 
leverage with time shows that it was proportional with time since the smooth plot 
did not vary much from zero. Furthermore, the variable’s interaction with time was 
added onto the cox regression, which showed that it was not significant with time.  
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Figure 9.17: The Schoenfeld Residual Scatterplot of Organisational Slack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The above figure 9.17 of the fit plot of the Schoenfeld residuals of organisational 
slack with time shows that it was proportional with time since the smooth plot did 
not vary much from zero. Furthermore, the variable’s interaction with time was 
added onto the cox regression, which showed that it was not significant with time. 
Thus, this indicates that organisational slack did not depend on time and was 
proportional with time. 
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Figure 9.18: The Schoenfeld Residual Scatterplot of Tobin’s Q 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The above figure 9.18 of the fit plot of the Schoenfeld residuals of Tobin’s Q with 
time shows that it was proportional with time since the smooth plot did not vary 
with time. Furthermore, the variable’s interaction with time was added onto the cox 
regression, which showed that it was not significant with time.  
 
The next section will outline the Schoenfeld residual scatterplots of the main 
predictor variables. 
 
 
9.3.2.2 Proportional Hazard Assumption Test of Predictors 
 
The following section outlines the hazard proportionality assumption tests of the 
main predictor variables EO and its dimensions. The section will first outline the 
test of the innovativeness dimension, followed by proactiveness, and risk taking. 
Lastly, the Schoenfeld residual scatterplot of EO will be outlined.  
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Figure 9.19: The Schoenfeld Residual Scatterplot of Innovativeness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.19 of the Schoenfeld residuals of innovativeness with time 
indicates that innovativeness was proportional with time since the smooth plot was 
flat at zero. Thus, this indicates that innovativeness variable was independent of 
time. The hazard proportionality assumption holds for the variable innovativeness. 
Furthermore, the interaction with time was added onto the cox regression, which 
showed that the coefficient was insignificant. This further validated the results of 
the figure. 
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Figure 9.20: The Schoenfeld Residual Scatterplot of Proactiveness  
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.20 of the residuals of the categorial variable proactiveness with 
time indicates that proactiveness seemed to be proportional with time since the 
smooth plot did not vary much from zero. The interaction with time was added onto 
the cox regression, which showed that it was not significant with time. Thus, this 
indicates that the hazard proportionality assumption holds for the variable 
proactiveness.  
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Figure 9.21: The Schoenfeld Residual Scatterplot of Risk taking 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.21 of the fit plot of the risk taking residual with time indicates 
that the variable risk taking was not proportional with time since the smooth plot 
varied significantly from zero. Furthermore, the interaction of the variable with time 
was added onto the cox regression, which showed that it was significant with time. 
Thus, this indicates that the hazard proportionality assumption did not hold for risk 
taking. This means that risk taking depends on time. 
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Figure 9.22: The Schoenfeld Residual Scatterplot of EO  
 
 
 
The above figure 9.22 of the fit plot of the residuals of EO with time indicates that it 
seemed to be proportional with time since the smooth plot did not vary significantly 
from zero. However, the interaction of EO with time was added onto the cox 
regression, which showed that it was significant with time. Thus, this indicates that 
the hazard proportionality assumption did not hold for EO.  
 
The next section will outline multicollinearity testing of the regressors of the Cox 
regression before outlining the results of the Cox regression.  
 
9.3.3 Multicollinearity Test of Regression Equations  
 
The following section presents the assessment of multicollinearity in the two separate 
Cox regressions (EO/EO dimensions). This was similarly conducted among the panel 
regressions in chapters 7 and 8. The assessment of the multicollinearity is through the 
VIF and the regression correlation coefficients.  
 
9.3.3.1 Multicollinearity Test through the VIF 
 
The following section represents the multicollinearity testing through the variance 
inflation factor (VIF). The first table will outline the VIF values of the regression of 
EO as the predictor variable followed by the EO dimensions. If the VIF values were 
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below 10 and regression correlation coefficients were below 0.8 then this indicates 
that there were no issues of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
Table 9.2: Variance Inflation Factor of the Cox Regression of EO  
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Firm age  1.58 0.634 
Firm size  1.49 0.671 
Firm age squared  1.28 0.779 
Organisational Slack  1.13 0.883 
Leverage  1.10 0.907 
EO 1.10 0.911 
Systematic Risk 1.06 0.941 
Tobin’s Q 1.05 0.955 
Mean VIF 1.22  
 
 
Table 9.3: Variance Inflation Factor of the Cox Regression of the EO Dimensions 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Firm age  1.71 0.585 
Firm size  1.65 0.606 
Risk taking 1.65 0.607 
Proactiveness 1.31 0.765 
Firm age squared 1.29 0.777 
Innovativeness 1.25 0.799 
Leverage 1.20 0.833 
Systematic Risk  1.19 0.842 
Organisational Slack 1.18 0.847 
Tobin’s Q 1.09 0.917 
Mean VIF 1.35  
 
 
In table 9.2, the highest VIF value was for firm age which was 1.58 and the mean 
VIF was 1.22, which were below 10. Furthermore, the lowest tolerance value was 
0.634, which was above 0.1.  
 
In table 9.3, the highest VIF value was for firm age as well, which was 1.71 and the 
mean VIF was 1.35, which were below 10. Furthermore, the lowest tolerance value 
was 0.585, which was above 0.1. Thereby, this indicates that there were no issues of 
multicollinearity.   
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The below section will present the multicollinearity testing through the correlation 
coefficients of the variables of the Cox regression.  
 
9.3.3.2 Multicollinearity Test through the Correlation Matrix 
 
The following section will present the correlation matrix of the regressors to test for 
multicollinearity. The first table will present the correlation coefficients of the 
regression of EO as the predictor variable followed by the EO dimensions. It is 
important to note that for firm age, the correlation between the interaction term of 
firm age and its squared term is reduced by centering the firm age variable before 
squaring it (e.g. Haynes et al., 2014). 
 
 
Table 9.4: Correlation Matrix of the Coefficients of the Regression of EO 
 
Variables     EO         SysR     FirmSize     FirmAge   FirmAge^2   Lev     OrgSlack   Tobin’s Q     
 
EO               1       
 
SysR          -0.137     1                                      
 
FirmSize     0.257      0.061        1                                                 
 
FirmAge     -0.006     0.123       -0.318            1                                                     
 
FirmAge^2    -0.101   -0.018       -0.196            0.688         1                                                         
 
Lev              -0.018   -0.048      -0.131             0.042         0.07            1 
  
OrgSlack      0.116     0.117       0.122             -0.074       -0.169         0.244        1 
 
Tobin’s Q    -0.043     0.04       -0.003              0.072         0.067          0.009        0.126          1 
 
Note: systematic risk was abbreviated as SysR, leverage as Lev, organisational slack as 
OrgSlack. 
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Table 9.5: Correlation Matrix of the Coefficients of the Regression of EO 
Dimensions 
 
Variables   Innov   Proac    Risk   SysR   FirmSize  FirmAge  FirmAge^2  Lev   OrgSlack  Tobin’sQ  
 
Innov        1    
 
Proac       -0.148        1 
 
Risk         -0.153      -0.127     1  
 
SysR         0.092       0.001    -0.35     1 
  
FirmSize   0.239       0.113     0.302  -0.044     1 
 
FirmAge  -0.053       0.198     0.091   0.072    -0.27      1 
 
FirmAge^2  0.022       0.081   -0.151   0.011    -0.219    0.657     1 
 
Lev            0.121      -0.181   -0.322   0.08      -0.232   -0.055     0.095       1 
 
OrgSlack   0.059        0.09      0.188   0.052     0.185   -0.022    -0.175       0.138       1 
 
Tobin’sQ -0.132        0.123     0.110  -0.026     0.038    0.102     0.04        -0.064       0.155     1 
 
 
Note: systematic risk was abbreviated as SysR, leverage as Lev, organisational slack as 
OrgSlack, innovativeness as innov, proactiveness as proac, and risk taking as risk. 
 
 
The above tables 9.4 and 9.5 outline the correlation of the regression coefficients of 
the two Cox regressions, in which the main predictor variable in the first Cox 
regression is EO and in the second regression are the EO dimensions. 
 
In table 9.4, the highest correlation was between firm size and firm age being -0.3. 
The variables firm size and EO had the second highest correlation being 0.25. 
Thereby, there were no issues of multicollinearity.  
 
In table 9.5, the highest correlation was between risk taking, dimension of EO, and 
systematic risk being -0.35. The second highest correlation was between leverage 
and risk taking being -0.32. Thereby, this indicates that there were no issues of 
multicollinearity. Even though the correlations between the dimensions of EO were 
low, since proactiveness was transformed into a categorical variable, yet the EO 
dimensions were run in separate regressions similar to chapters 7 and 8. 
 
The next section will outline the regression results of the effect of EO and each of 
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its dimensions on the risk of failure in the sample of the 268 failed firms. 
 
9.4 Cox Regression Full Failure Model Results 
 
The following section outlines the Cox regression results including the main 
predictor variables of each of the EO dimensions as well as the aggregate EO 
construct. The below table 9.6 presents the results from the full failure model.  
 
In table 9.6, model 1 shows the results of the control variables only. Model 2 shows 
the results of EO as well as the control variables. Model 3 shows the results of the 
innovativeness dimension of EO only. Model 4 shows the results of the 
proactiveness dimension of EO. Model 5 shows the results of the risk taking 
dimension of EO.  
 
The results from the full failure model were conducted whilst requesting robust 
standard errors. Since this is a sample of heterogenous firms from different high-
technology industries, then this heterogeneity might produce misleading estimations 
of the hazard function and thus produce biased standard errors in the cox regression 
model. Furthermore, since this is a panel data format, observations of each firm are 
correlated and pooling these observations without taking the dependence of the 
observations into account might lead to biased standard errors. To ensure robustness 
of the main results, then the robust standard errors were requested.  Thus, this 
accounts for the dependence of the observations by aggregating the observations of 
each firm in the panel based on their firm identifier ‘gvkey’. This technique is 
referred to as the population-averaged method. This technique is preferred since it 
does not make any assumptions about the nature of the dependence of the 
observations (Allison, 2010).  
 
This technique is similar to the robust clustered variance estimator that was used in 
chapters 7 and 8. By requesting the robust standard errors the sandwich chi-square 
statistics, used to test the null hypothesis that all the covariates coefficients are equal 
to zero, would be much lower than the model based Wald statistics since they 
correct for dependence. 
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Table 9.6: Cox Regression Full Failure Model Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Systematic Risk 0.267*** 
(1.307) 
0.250*** 
(1.284) 
0.260*** 
(1.298) 
0.240*** 
(1.272) 
0.106 
(1.112) 
Firm age -0.704**** 
(0.494) 
-0.810**** 
(0.445) 
-0.708**** 
(0.493) 
-0.623**** 
(0.536) 
-0.760**** 
(0.467) 
Firm age square 0.089 
(1.093) 
0.0815 
(1.085) 
0.085 
(1.090) 
0.100 
(1.105) 
0.031 
(1.032) 
Firm size  -0.452**** 
(0.636) 
-0.425**** 
(0.653) 
-0.379*** 
(0.685) 
-0.360*** 
(0.698) 
-0.430*** 
(0.650) 
Leverage 0.317**** 
(1.374) 
0.349**** 
(1.419) 
0.326**** 
(1.386) 
0.270**** 
(1.311) 
0.276**** 
(1.319) 
Organisational 
Slack 
-0.720**** 
(0.486) 
-0.689**** 
(0.502) 
-0.686**** 
(0.503) 
-0.653**** 
(0.520) 
-0.656**** 
(0.518) 
Tobin’s Q -0.564**** 
(0.569) 
-0.588**** 
(0.555) 
-0.586**** 
(0.556) 
-0.535**** 
(0.585) 
-0.519**** 
(0.595) 
EO  1.061**** 
(2.890) 
   
EO*Time  -0.241**** 
(0.785) 
   
Innovativeness   0.122** 
(1.130) 
  
Proactiveness    0.719**** 
(2.053) 
 
Risk taking     1.879**** 
(6.550) 
Risk taking*Time     -0.401**** 
(0.669) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial Crisis 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4495 
(3754 
censored and 
741 failure 
events) 
3879 
(3262 and 
617 failure 
events) 
4495 
(3754 
censored and 
741 failure 
events) 
4495 
(3754 
censored and 
741 failure 
events) 
3886 
(3262 
censored and 
624 failure 
events) 
Wald (Sandwich) 
Chi2 Statistics  
390.882**** 747.726**** 443.160**** 
 
421.445**** 579.424**** 
 
Hazard ratio statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
 
In table 9.6 above, in all the models, the robust version of the Wald test, which is 
similar to the F-test in the panel regressions, indicates that the covariates of the 
models had a significant effect on firm failure (p<0.001).  
 
Model 2 tested hypothesis H4 on the effect of EO on the risk of firm failure. Model 
3 tested hypothesis H6c on the effect of innovativeness on the risk of failure. Model 
4 tested hypothesis H7c on the effect of proactiveness on the risk of failure. Lastly, 
model 5 tested H8c on the effect of risk taking dimension on the risk of firm failure.  
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Model 1 which included only the control variables indicates that the variables 
exhibit the hypothesised effects except for firm age. Systematic risk as hypothesised 
in chapter 6 had a significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.01). One standard 
deviation increase in the squared term of systematic risk led to 30.7 % increase in 
the probability of failure. Firm size, as hypothesised, had a significant negative 
effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Firm size (log of employees) led to 36.4 % 
decrease in the probability of failure. Firm age (log of firm age) was shown to 
decrease the risk of failure by 50.6 % (p<0.001). The U-shaped effect of firm age on 
firm failure was not supported. Organisational slack had a significant negative effect 
on firm failure (p<0.001) such that it decreased firm failure by 51.4 %. Leverage led 
to a 37.4 % increase in firm failure (p<0.001). Tobin’s Q had a significant negative 
effect on firm failure, in which one standard deviation increase in Tobin’s Q led to a 
decrease in firm failure by 43.1 % (p<0.001).  
 
In the second model, EO was included as the main predictor variable. According to 
the Cox regression results, one standard deviation in EO increased the risk of firm 
failure by a multiple of 2.89 (p<0.001). Thereby, hypothesis H4 was supported. 
However, this effect was not proportional with time. Thereby, the EO*log(time) 
coefficient can inform the effect of EO at a chosen time. Thus, to obtain the effect of 
EO at any point in time then this equation was used (1.061-log(months)*0.241) 
(Allison, 2010). As for the control variable, systematic risk had a significant 
positive effect on firm failure (p<0.01). Tobin’s Q and firm age and firm size had a 
significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Leverage had a significant 
positive effect on firm failure (p<0.001).  
 
Model 3, which included only the innovativeness dimension of EO, reveals that 
innovativeness had a significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.05). Thereby, 
hypothesis H6c was not supported. Systematic risk had a significant positive effect 
on firm failure (p<0.01). Firm age, Tobin’s Q, and organisational slack had a 
significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Firm size had a significant 
negative effect on firm failure (p<0.01). Leverage had a significant positive effect 
on firm failure (p<0.001). 
 
In model 4, proactiveness was the main predictor variable. According to the Cox 
regression results, proactiveness led to an increase in firm failure by a multiple of 
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2.053 (p<0.001). Thereby, hypothesis H7c was supported. Systematic risk had a 
significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.01). Tobin’s Q, firm age, and 
organisational slack had a significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Firm 
size had a significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.01). Finally, leverage had 
a significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.001).   
 
In model 5, risk taking dimension of EO was the main predictor variable. According 
to the model results, risk taking had a significant positive effect on firm failure, in 
which risk taking increased the risk of firm failure by a multiple of 6.55 (p<0.001). 
Thereby, hypothesis H8c was supported. Firm age, organisational slack, and Tobin’s 
Q led to a decrease in firm failure (p<0.001). Furthermore, firm size led to a 
decrease in firm failure (p<0.01). Leverage led to an increase in firm failure 
(p<0.001).   
 
The next section will present the robustness results of the Cox regression results 
among the sample of failed firms. 
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9.5 Robustness Check of Full Failure Model  
 
For ensuring robustness, the firms were also stratified based on their industrial 
classification. The results are shown below in table 9.7.  
 
Table 9.7: Cox Regression Full Failure Model Robustness Results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Systematic Risk 0.292**** 
(1.340) 
0.286**** 
(1.332) 
0.287**** 
(1.333) 
0.266**** 
(1.305) 
0.141* 
(1.152) 
Firm age -0.705**** 
(0.494) 
-0.802**** 
(0.448) 
-0.707**** 
(0.493) 
-0.623**** 
(0.536) 
-0.742**** 
(0.476) 
Firm age square 0.087 
(1.091) 
0.069 
(1.072) 
0.083 
(1.087) 
0.097 
(1.102) 
0.026 
(1.027) 
Firm size  -0.454**** 
(0.635) 
-0.428**** 
(0.651) 
-0.381*** 
(0.683) 
-0.362*** 
(0.696) 
-0.436*** 
(0.646) 
Leverage 0.316**** 
(1.372) 
0.347**** 
(1.415) 
0.325**** 
(1.385) 
0.268**** 
(1.308) 
0.272**** 
(1.314) 
Organisational 
Slack 
-0.738**** 
(0.478) 
-0.698**** 
(0.497) 
-0.701**** 
(0.496) 
-0.672**** 
(0.511) 
-0.663**** 
(0.515) 
Tobin’s Q -0.568**** 
(0.566) 
-0.599**** 
(0.549) 
-0.590**** 
(0.554) 
-0.539**** 
(0.583) 
-0.536**** 
(0.585) 
EO  1.071**** 
(2.921)
  
   
EO*Time   -0.244**** 
(0.783) 
   
Innovativeness   0.122** 
(1.130) 
  
Proactiveness    0.724**** 
(2.064) 
 
Risk taking     1.916**** 
(6.796) 
Risk 
taking*Time 
    -0.409**** 
(0.664) 
Financial Crisis 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4495 3879 4495 4495 3886 
Wald 
(Sandwich) 
Chi2 Statistics  
354.320**** 627.126**** 394.947**** 387.588**** 573.367**** 
 
Hazard ratio statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
The Wald test in the models showed that the covariates had a significant effect on 
firm failure (p<0.001).  
 
Model 2 tested hypothesis H4 on the effect of EO on the risk of firm failure. Model 
3 tested hypothesis H6c on the effect of innovativeness on the risk of failure. Model 
4 tested hypothesis H7c on the effect of proactiveness on the risk of firm failure. 
Model 5 tested H8c on the effect of risk taking on the risk of firm failure.  
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According to the table 9.7 above, model 1, which included only the control variables 
showed that systematic risk had a significant positive effect on firm failure 
(p<0.001). Similarly, leverage had a significant positive effect on firm failure 
(p<0.001).  Firm size, firm age, organisational slack, and Tobin’s Q had a 
significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.001).  
 
In model 2, which included EO as the main predictor variable, showed that EO had 
a significant positive effect on firm failure. EO increased the risk of failure by a 
multiple of 2.92 (p<0.001). This validated hypothesis H4. As for the control 
variables, firm size, firm age, organisational slack, and Tobin’s Q had a significant 
negative effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Systematic risk and leverage had a 
significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Furthermore, the lagged value 
of EO showed that it increased the risk of firm failure by a multiple of 2.125 
(p<0.001). 
 
Model 3, which included innovativeness, showed that innovativeness had significant 
positive effect on firm failure (p<0.05). Thereby, hypothesis H6c was not supported. 
As for the control variables, systematic risk and leverage had a significant positive 
effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Firm age, organisational slack, and Tobin’s Q had a 
significant negative effect on firm failure(p<0.001). Lastly, firm size had a 
significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.01). 
 
In model 4, which included proactiveness, showed that proactiveness had a 
significant positive effect on firm failure, in which it increased the risk of failure by 
a multiple of 2.06 (p<0.001). Thereby, hypothesis H7c was supported. Systematic 
risk and leverage had a significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Firm 
size (p<0.001), firm age (p<0.001), Tobin’s Q (p<0.001), and organisational slack 
(p<0.001) had a significant negative effect on firm failure.  
 
In model 5, which included risk taking, indicated that risk taking had a significant 
positive effect on firm failure, in which risk taking increased the risk of failure by a 
multiple of 6.79 (p<0.001). Thereby, hypothesis H8c was supported. Organisational 
slack, firm age, and Tobin’s Q had a significant negative effect on firm failure 
(p<0.001). Firm size had a significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.01). 
Lastly, leverage had a significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.001). 
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The next section will outline the separate failure model results of the separate samples 
of failed firms: mergers and acquisitions (M&A), bankruptcy or liquidity, and 
privatisation (no longer filing with the SEC). Thus, the next section will present the 
competing risks model, which considers different modes of exit, in which the 
hypotheses were further tested exclusively on the firms that failed due to merger and 
acquisition, bankruptcy and liquidity, and privatisation (Wagner & Cockburn, 2010).  
 
9.6 Separate Failure Groups of Firms’ Cox Regression Results 
 
The following section represents the Cox regression results of the different failure 
groups of firms, which were separated into firms that failed due to merger and 
acquisition in table 9.8, liquidity and bankruptcy in table 9.9, and lastly those due to 
other reasons (becoming a private company or no longer filing with SEC) in table 
9.10. In each of the different tables 9.8, 9.9, and 9.10, there are five models similar 
to the previous models examined earlier in the main results and robustness sections.  
 
In the thesis sample of firms, 357 firms were subjected to a merger and acquisition. 
After the Z-score classification, 224 firms were left and were considered as failed 
due to a merger or acquisition. Thereby, most of the firms in the sample failed due 
to reason of merger or acquisition (224 firms). Furthermore, 16 firms failed due to 
liquidity or bankruptcy and lastly 28 firms failed due privatisation. Examples of 
firms that failed due to merger and acquisition are: ADC telecommunications, EMC 
technologies inc, Intergraph corp, Msc software corp, Printronix inc, Infinium 
software inc, and Sensormatic electronics. Examples of firms that failed due to 
liquidity and bankruptcy are: Energy conversion Devices, Sheldahl inc, Three-five 
systems inc, Trident microsystems inc, Lodgenet interactive corp, Evergreen solar 
inc, and Astropower inc. Examples of firms that failed due to privatisation are: 
Innovex inc, Dell inc, Trinsic inc, Powerwave technologies inc, Saba software inc, 
Silicon graphics inc, and Sento corp.  
 
Firms that failed due to merger or acquisition were exhibited among all the high-
technology industries in the overall sample. Firms that failed due to bankruptcy or 
liquidity were present only in the communication equipment, communication 
services, software, electronics, and computer hardware industries. Similarly, firms 
that failed due to privatisation, were present among the software, electronics, 
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communication equipment, computer hardware, telephone equipment, and 
measuring and controlling devices. One high-technology dummy was removed from 
the analysis for multicollinearity reasons and for avoiding the dummy-variable trap 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). 
 
The first table will present the Cox regression results of the effects of EO and its 
dimensions on the risk of failure in the sample of failed firms due to merger or 
acquisition. 
 
Table 9.8: Failure due to Merger and Acquisition  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Systematic 
Risk 
0.286**** 
(1.332) 
0.295**** 
(1.344) 
0.280**** 
(1.324) 
0.258*** 
(1.295) 
0.196** 
(1.217) 
Firm age -0.814**** 
(0.443) 
-0.929**** 
(0.395) 
-0.817**** 
(0.442) 
-0.745**** 
(0.475) 
-0.913**** 
(0.401) 
Firm age 
square 
0.041 
(1.042) 
0.022 
(1.023) 
0.038 
(1.039) 
0.050 
(1.052) 
-0.011 
(0.989) 
Firm size  -0.402**** 
(0.669) 
-0.393*** 
(0.675) 
-0.338*** 
(0.713) 
-0.321*** 
(0.725) 
-0.449**** 
(0.638) 
Leverage 0.268**** 
(1.308) 
0.298**** 
(1.348) 
0.276**** 
(1.319) 
0.227**** 
(1.256) 
0.263**** 
(1.301) 
Organisational 
Slack 
-0.687**** 
(0.503) 
-0.658**** 
(0.517) 
-0.657**** 
(0.518) 
-0.629**** 
(0.533) 
-0.663**** 
(0.515) 
Tobin’s Q -0.561**** 
(0.570) 
-0.582**** 
(0.559) 
-0.580**** 
(0.560) 
-0.535**** 
(0.586) 
-0.532**** 
(0.587) 
EO  1.006**** 
(2.737) 
   
EO*Time  -0.230**** 
(0.794) 
   
Innovativeness   0.107* 
(1.114) 
  
Proactiveness    0.625**** 
(1.869) 
 
Risk taking     1.713**** 
(5.546) 
Risk 
taking*Time 
    -0.389**** 
(0.677) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial 
Crisis 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4495 (3780 
censored and 
715 events) 
3879 (3275 
censored and 
604 events) 
4495 (3780 
censored and 
715 events 
4495 (3780 
censored and 
715 events 
3886 (3275 
censored and 
611 events 
Wald 
(Sandwich) 
Chi2 Statistics  
332.120**** 658.036**** 382.765**** 366.221**** 457.247**** 
 
Hazard ratio statistics in parentheses. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
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Table 9.8 above represents the Cox regression results in the sample of firms that 
failed due to merger or acquisition. Model 2 tested hypothesis H4 on the effect of 
EO on the risk of organisational failure. Model 3 tested hypothesis H6c on the effect 
of innovativeness on the risk of firm failure. Model 4 tested hypothesis H7c on the 
effect of proactiveness on the risk of firm failure. Lastly, model 5 tested H8c on the 
effect of risk taking on the risk of firm failure.  
 
In the first model, which only included the control variables, systematic risk and 
leverage were shown to have a significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.001). 
Firm age, firm size, organisational slack, and Tobin’s Q (p<0.001) were shown to 
have a significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.001).  
 
In model 2, which included EO as the main predictor variable, EO was shown to 
have a significant positive effect on firm failure, in which EO increased risk of 
failure (of merger and acquisition) by a multiple of 2.73. Thereby, hypothesis H4 
was supported. As for the control variables, firm age, organisational slack, and 
Tobin’s Q were both shown to have a negative effect on the risk of firm failure 
(p<0.001). Firm size was shown to have a significant negative effect on firm failure 
(p<0.01). Systematic risk and leverage were shown to have a significant positive 
effect on firm failure (p<0.001). 
 
Model 3, in which the innovativeness dimension was included, revealed that 
innovativeness had an insignificant effect on firm failure at the 5% level. Thereby 
hypothesis H6c was not supported. Firm age, organisational slack, and Tobin’s Q 
were shown to have a significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Firm size 
was also shown to have a significant negative effect on failure (p<0.01).  Lastly, 
systematic risk and leverage were both shown to have a significant positive effect 
on firm failure (p<0.001).  
 
Model 4, which included proactiveness, showed that proactiveness has a significant 
positive effect on firm failure, in which it increases the risk of firm failure (of 
merger and acquisition) by 86.9 % (p<0.001).  Thereby, hypothesis H7c was 
supported. Systematic risk was shown to have a significant positive effect on firm 
failure (p<0.01). Leverage had a significant positive effect on firm failure 
(p<0.001). Firm size was shown to have a significant negative effect on firm failure 
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(p<0.01). Lastly, organisational slack, firm age, and Tobin’s Q were shown to have 
a significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.001). 
 
Model 5, which included risk taking dimension of EO only, indicated that risk had a 
significant positive effect on firm failure by merger and acquisition (p<0.001), such 
that risk taking increased the risk of failure by a multiple of 5.54. Thereby, 
hypothesis H8c was supported. Systematic risk (p<0.05) and leverage (p<0.001) 
were shown to increase the risk of firm failure significantly. Conversely, Tobin’s Q, 
firm size, firm age, and organisational slack were shown to decrease the risk of 
failure significantly (p<0.001).  The next section will outline the regression results 
of firms that failed to bankruptcy or liquidity.  
 
Table 9.9: Failure due to Bankruptcy and Liquidity  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Systematic 
Risk 
0.127 
(1.136) 
0.117 
(1.125) 
0.129 
(1.139) 
0.110 
(1.117) 
-0.228 
(0.796) 
Firm age -0.283 
(0.753) 
-0.232 
(0.793) 
-0.350 
(0.704) 
 
-0.217 
(0.805) 
-0.088 
(0.915) 
Firm age 
square 
0.102 
(1.107) 
0.184 
(1.202) 
0.066 
(1.069) 
0.119 
(1.127) 
0.104 
(1.110) 
Firm size  -1.436**** 
(0.238) 
-1.495**** 
(0.224) 
-1.550**** 
(0.212) 
-1.389**** 
(0.249) 
-1.435**** 
(0.238) 
Leverage 0.486**** 
(1.626) 
0.541**** 
(1.719) 
0.459**** 
(1.583) 
0.455**** 
(1.578) 
0.388*** 
(1.474) 
Organisational 
Slack 
0.148 
(1.161) 
0.029 
(1.030) 
0.104 
(1.110) 
0.173 
(1.189) 
0.129 
(1.138) 
Tobin’s Q -0.767**** 
(0.464) 
-1.073**** 
(0.342) 
-0.715**** 
(0.489) 
-0.734**** 
(0.480) 
-0.885**** 
(0.413) 
EO  0.772** 
(2.164) 
   
EO*Time  -0.156** 
(0.855) 
   
Innovativeness   -0.229 
(0.795) 
  
Proactiveness    0.410 
(1.508) 
 
Risk taking     2.346**** 
(10.448) 
Risk 
taking*Time 
    -0.443**** 
(0.642) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial 
Crisis 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4495 (4432 
censored and 
63 events) 
3879 (3827 
censored and 
52 events) 
4495 (4432 
censored and 
63 events) 
4495 (4432 
censored and 
63 events) 
3886 (3834 
censored and 
52 events) 
Wald Chi2 
Statistics  
146.255**** 150.989**** 148.536**** 146.043**** 177.456**** 
Hazard ratio statistics in parentheses. *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
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In table 9.9 above, model 2 tested hypothesis H4 on the effect of EO on the risk of 
failure. Model 3 tested hypothesis H6c on the effect of innovativeness on the risk of 
failure. Model 4 tested hypothesis H7c on the effect of proactiveness on the risk of 
firm failure. Model 5 tested H8c on the effect of risk taking on the risk of firm 
failure.  
 
Model 1 outlines the results of the control variables. It revealed that firm size and 
Tobin’s Q had a significant negative effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Leverage had 
a significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.001).  
 
Model 2, which included EO as the main predictor variable, showed that EO had a 
significant positive effect on firm failure (by bankruptcy or liquidity), in which EO 
increased the risk of failure by a multiple of 2.16 (p<0.05). Thereby, hypothesis H4 
was supported. The control variables firm size and Tobin’s Q had a significant 
negative effect on firm failure (p<0.001). Leverage had a significant positive effect 
on firm failure (p<0.001).  
 
In model 3, which included innovativeness dimension, it was revealed that 
innovativeness had an insignificant effect on the risk of failure. Thereby, hypothesis 
H6c was not supported. Firm size and Tobin’s Q had a significant negative effect on 
failure (p<0.001). Leverage had a significant positive effect on failure (p<0.001).  
 
In model 4, which included the proactiveness dimension, it was shown that 
proactiveness had an insignificant effect on firm failure. Thereby, hypothesis H7c 
was not supported. Firm size and Tobin’s Q had a significant negative effect on 
failure (p<0.001). Leverage had a significant positive effect on firm failure 
(p<0.001).  
 
In the final model, which included risk taking, risk taking had a significant positive 
effect on firm failure (of bankruptcy or liquidity) by a multiple of 10.44 (p<0.001). 
Thereby hypothesis H8c was supported. Firm size and Tobin’s Q had a negative 
effect on failure (p<0.001). Leverage had a significant positive effect on failure 
(p<0.01). The next table will outline the regression results of the sample of firms 
that failed due to privatisation.  
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Table 9.10: Failure due to Privatisation   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Systematic 
Risk 
0.161 
(1.175) 
-0.178 
(0.836) 
0.201 
(1.223) 
0.199 
(1.221) 
-0.321 
(0.725) 
Firm age -0.633*** 
(0.531) 
-0.766** 
(0.465) 
-0.7004*** 
(0.496) 
-0.517** 
(0.596) 
-0.586* 
(0.556) 
Firm age 
square 
-0.266 
(0.766) 
-0.258 
(0.772) 
-0.260 
(0.771) 
-0.231 
(0.793) 
-0.389 
(0.677) 
Firm size  -0.540*** 
(0.583) 
-0.270 
(0.763) 
-0.252 
(0.777) 
-0.379* 
(0.684) 
-0.153 
(0.858) 
Leverage 0.488**** 
(1.630) 
0.475**** 
(1.609) 
0.491**** 
(1.634) 
0.396**** 
(1.487) 
0.248* 
(1.282) 
Organisational 
Slack 
-1.960**** 
(0.141) 
-1.850**** 
(0.157) 
-1.990**** 
(0.137) 
-1.834**** 
(0.160) 
-1.423*** 
(0.241) 
Tobin’s Q -0.551*** 
(0.576) 
-0.482* 
(0.617) 
-0.714**** 
(0.489) 
-0.528*** 
(0.589) 
-0.317 
(0.728) 
EO  1.256**** 
(3.514) 
   
EO*Time  -0.223*** 
(0.800) 
   
Innovativeness   0.465**** 
(1.593) 
  
Proactiveness    1.203*** 
(3.330) 
 
Risk taking     3.432**** 
(30.947) 
Risk 
taking*Time 
    -0.602**** 
(0.548) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial 
Crisis 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4495 (4441 
censored and 
54 events) 
3879 (3840 
censored and 
39 events) 
4495 (4441 
censored and 
54 events) 
4495 (4441 
censored and 
54 events) 
3886 (3847 
censored and 
39 events) 
Wald Chi2 
Statistics  
159.098**** 146.508**** 162.999**** 153.074**** 143.553**** 
 
Hazard ratio statistics in parentheses 
*p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, **** p<0.001 
 
In table 9.10, which outlines the results of failure due to privatisation, model 2 
tested hypothesis H4 on the effect of EO on the risk of firm failure. Model 3 tested 
hypothesis H6c on the effect of innovativeness on the risk of firm failure. Model 4 
tested hypothesis H7c on the effect of proactiveness on the risk of firm failure. 
Lastly, model 5 tested H8c on the effect of risk taking on the risk of firm failure.  
 
Model 1 indicated that firm age, firm size, and Tobin’s Q had a significant negative 
effect on firm failure (p<0.01). Organisational slack had a significant negative effect 
on firm failure (p<0.001). Leverage had a significant positive effect on firm failure 
(p<0.001). 
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Model 2, which included EO, showed that EO had a significant positive effect on 
failure (p<0.001), in which EO increased the risk of firm failure (privatisation) by a 
multiple of 3.51. Thereby, hypothesis H4 was supported. Organisational slack 
(p<0.001) and firm age (p<0.05) had a significant negative effect on firm failure. 
Leverage had a significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.001). 
 
Model 3, which included innovativeness only, indicated that innovativeness had a 
significant positive effect on the risk of failure by privatisation, in which it increased 
the risk of failure (by privatisation) by 59.3 %. Thereby, hypothesis H6c was not 
supported. Firm age (p<0.01), organisational slack (p<0.001), and Tobin’s Q 
(p<0.001) had a significant negative effect on firm failure. Leverage had a 
significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.001). 
 
In model 4, which included proactiveness dimension, it was shown that 
proactiveness had a significant positive effect on firm failure (by privatisation), in 
which it increased the risk of failure by a multiple of 3.33 (p<0.01). Thereby, 
hypothesis H7c was supported. Firm age (p<0.05), organisational slack (p<0.001), 
and Tobin’s Q (p<0.01) had a significant negative effect on firm failure. Leverage 
had a significant positive effect on firm failure (p<0.001). 
 
In the last model, which included risk taking, it was shown that risk taking had a 
significant positive effect on firm failure (by privatisation) in which risk increased 
the chances of failure of firms by a multiple of 30.9 (p<0.001). Thereby, hypothesis 
H8c was supported. Organisational slack decreased the risk of failure (p<0.01). 
 
The next section will outline the survival graph results of the effects of the high 
levels of EO and its dimensions on the survival rate of the sample of firms. The 
following section is outlined to further address hypotheses H4, H6c, H7c, and H8c. 
 
9.7 Effect of Top and Bottom 25% values of EO and its Dimensions on Firms’ 
Survival 
 
 
The following section represents the effect of the top and bottom values of EO and 
its separate dimensions on the firms’ survival. In the sample of firms, EO ranged 
from -28.8 to 8.7 among the sample of firms. Thus, EO was segregated into low and 
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high exhibition of EO based on one standard deviation above the mean for the top 
25% and one standard deviation below the mean for the bottom 25% as well as 
separating the variables into 4 quantiles to represent the top 25 % values and bottom 
25 % values (e.g. Campbell et al., 2012; Haynes et al., 2014). Similar to EO, 
proactiveness had a large standard deviation ranging from values of -7.11 to 0.97. 
Innovativeness and risk taking had a lower standard deviation and less variation in 
the sample of firms.  
 
The ‘Kaplan-Meier product-limit estimates’ of the survival functions of the sample 
of firms were used to compare the different values of each of the main predictor 
variables on firm survival, a method that was also utilised for examining the 
survival probability of the high-technology industry as shown above in section 9.2. 
Below are the figures of low/high EO and each of its dimensions’ effects on firm 
survival probability to further test hypotheses H4, H6c, H7c, and H8c. 
 
Figure 9.23: The Effect of High EO on Firm Survival  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.23 tested for H4, in which the hypothesis stated that the 
relationship between EO and the risk of firm failure is positive over time. 
 
In the above figure 9.23, firms with a higher level of EO exhibited a higher 
probability of failure. Thus, the red line which represents high values of EO (top 
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25% in the sample) had a significantly less survival probability (p-value<0.0001) 
than firms with lower levels of EO. Thereby, hypothesis H4 was supported. As seen 
in the figure, the failure rate of firms that exhibited high levels of EO increased as 
the time factor increased. Thereby, as shown in the figure, the effect of EO was not 
proportional with time. The results of the graphic representation of the effect of high 
levels of EO aligned with organisational learning theory. Most of the firms in this 
sample were in the software industry. 
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Figure 9.24: The Effect of High Innovativeness on Firm Survival  
 
 
 
The above figure 9.24 tested for H6c, in which the hypothesis stated that 
innovativeness decreases the risk of failure.  
 
In the above figure 9.24, firms with a higher level of innovativeness had less of a 
probability of survival (p-value<0.001). Thereby, hypothesis H6c was not 
supported. Most of the firms were in the software and electronics industries. 
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Figure 9.25: The Effect of High Proactiveness on Firm Survival  
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.25 tested for H7c, in which the hypothesis stated that 
proactiveness increased the risk of failure.  
 
 
In the above figure 9.25, firms with higher levels of proactiveness exhibited a higher 
probability of failure as well (top 25% in the sample). Thereby, hypothesis H7c was 
supported. Firms that were more proactive had a significantly less survival 
probability (p-value<0.0001). Most of the firms in this sample were in the software, 
electronics, and measuring and controlling devices industries.  
 
  
350 
 
Figure 9.26: The Effect of High Risk taking on Firm Survival  
 
 
 
 
The above figure 9.26 tested for H8c, in which the hypothesis stated that risk taking 
has a positive effect on the risk of failure.  
 
In the above figure 9.26, firms with higher levels of risk exhibited a significantly 
higher probability of failure (top 25% in the sample) (p-value<0.0001) than firms 
with lower values of risk taking. Thereby, hypothesis H8c was supported. Most of 
the firms in this sample were in software, electronics, communication equipment 
and computer hardware industries.  
 
9.8 Chapter Conclusion  
 
The survival analysis results revealed that EO and each of its dimensions 
innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking had a significant positive effect on the 
risk of firm failure in the overall sample of failed firms.  
 
Specifically, in the overall sample of failed firms, EO had a significant positive 
effect on firm failure, supporting H4. Innovativeness was shown to increase firm 
failure, not supporting H6c, proactiveness was shown to have a positive effect on 
firm failure, supporting H7c, and risk taking was shown to have a positive effect on 
firm failure in support of H8c. 
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Among the sample of firms that failed due to merger and acquisition, EO was 
shown to increase firm failure supporting H4. Innovativeness had an insignificant 
effect on failure, not in support of H6c. Proactiveness was shown to increase firm 
failure supporting H7c. Risk taking was shown to increase firm failure supporting 
H8c.  
 
In the sample of firms that failed due to bankruptcy, it was shown that EO increased 
the risk of failure supporting H4. Innovativeness and proactiveness had an 
insignificant effect on failure, not in support of H6c and H7c. Risk taking increased 
the risk of failure, supporting H8c.  
 
In the sample of firms that failed due to privatisation, EO and its dimensions 
proactiveness and risk taking increased the risk of firm failure supporting H4, H7c, 
and H8c respectively. Whereas innovativeness was shown to increase firm failure, 
not in support of H6c.  
 
The high-technology industry was shown to have a lower survival probability in 
comparison to other industries supporting H5.  
 
The next chapter will be the discussion section of the results of Study 1 (chapter 7 
and 8) and Study 2 (chapter 9). 
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Chapter 10 
 
Discussion of Results  
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10.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
 
Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) has gained an accelerating and broadening 
exponential interest in recent years. Literature has undisputedly considered that EO 
is advantageous to a firm’s performance (Gupta & Dutta, 2016; Wales, 2016). 
However, recent research has not captured the dangers of entrepreneurial behaviours 
that could result in total losses and not necessarily generate economic returns (i.e. 
EO-as-Experimentation) (Wales, 2016; Wales et al., 2013c). Even so, researchers 
are calling to move away from the EO-as-Experimentation perspective (Eshima & 
Anderson, 2017). 
 
Few have questioned or challenged the notion that EO leads to improved firm 
performance, and the majority of researchers universally accept that EO is 
advantageous on firm performance (i.e. EO-as-advantage perspective) (Andersén, 
2010). This thesis focuses on the possible organisational outcomes that arise from 
an entrepreneurial orientation by considering the alternative perspective of the EO-
firm performance relationship, which is the EO-as-Experimentation perspective 
(Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
To test the EO-as-Advantage versus the EO-as-Experimentation perspectives, this 
research utilises objective panel data to examine the effects of EO and its 
dimensions (innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking) on several firm 
performance measures over time. Most importantly, this research also examines the 
effect of EO and each of its dimensions on the risk of failure along a longitudinal 
timeframe. When assessing the effects of EO and each of its dimensions on 
important organisational outcomes, this research has aimed to address the literature 
gaps (conceptualisation-measurement misalignment, survivor bias, cross-sectional 
bias, testing value of EO against short-term measures of performance, and bundling 
the various dimensions of EO into a gestalt index). This chapter addresses the 
empirical findings from Study 1, which objectively examined the effects of EO and 
its dimensions on firm performance over time and Study 2, which examined the 
effects of EO and its dimensions on probability of firm failure. The chapter in turn 
emphasises the contributions this thesis offers to the literature.  
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The chapter will begin with a reminder for the reader of the literature gaps followed 
by the ways in which this thesis addresses the mentioned gaps. The chapter will then 
discuss the analysis results of Study 1 and Study 2.  
 
10.2 Addressing the Literature Gaps 
 
The literature has been biased by a conceptualisation-measurement misalignment, in 
which researchers measure EO using EO scales that reflect managerial opinions, yet 
EO was initially conceptualised as a firm-level behaviour (Miller, 1983). The 
literature has also been subject to a survivor bias, in which the majority of EO 
researchers examine the effect of EO among a sample of active or surviving firms 
(Rauch et al., 2009). Furthermore, a major study design limitation is that most 
studies on EO conduct a cross-sectional examination of the effect of EO (e.g. 
Lomberg et al., 2016). Thus, the effect of EO over time has been disregarded. The 
literature has been also biased by testing the effect of EO on short-term measures of 
firm performance, ignoring its impact on long-term firm value (Gupta & Wales, 
2017). Another limitation is that the gestalt conceptualisation, in which researchers 
combine the various dimensions of EO into an index, has been the predominant 
stance (Wales, 2016). This masks the independent effects of each of the EO 
dimensions (e.g. Hughes & Morgan, 2007).  
 
This thesis addressed the aforementioned gaps. To address the conceptualisation-
measurement misalignment, the thesis measured EO through objective secondary 
proxies, which reflect the behavioural outcomes or actions of the firm (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2011). Surprisingly, secondary measures of EO have not been widely 
used in comparison to the established psychometric approach (i.e. the EO scale) 
(Wales, 2016). The adoption of objective measures does not only avoid the 
conceptualisation-measurement problem, but it also gets rid of common method bias 
and response and subjectivity bias of the survey design (Gupta & Gupta, 2015; 
Short et al., 2010). To address the survivor bias, this thesis included a sample of 
failed firms and conducted a separate analysis of the EO-firm performance 
relationship among the surviving firms versus the failed firms (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011). The examination of the EO-firm performance relationship among 
the sample of failed firms provided insight into the dangers associated with EO and 
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revealed new theoretical revelations into the possible outcomes from EO. To 
address the cross-sectional design problem, this thesis examined the longitudinal 
effect of EO and each of its dimensions on firm performance from the pre-crisis 
(fiscal year 2000) until the post-crisis period (fiscal year 2014). The dependent 
variable problem was addressed by including various indicators of firm performance 
to test the value of EO on short-term performance (through ROA) as well as long-
term performance (through Tobin’s Q). The thesis also examined the effect of EO 
on the long-term viability of a business (risk of firm failure). By considering several 
performance indicators (i.e. multi-dimensional nature of firm performance), 
researchers can assess and compare the value of EO against specific indicators 
(Gupta & Wales, 2017). To address the dominance of the gestalt conceptualisation 
of EO, we examined the various effects of the EO dimensions on different 
performance indicators as well as on firm viability. As a result, the theoretical 
implications of the effects of each of the EO dimensions on the different measures 
of firm-level outcomes could be tested. 
 
This research aimed to challenge the over-arching positive effect of EO on a firm’s 
performance by answering the questions on the effect of EO on firm performance as 
well as firm failure within the theoretical framework of organisational learning 
theory and prospect theory. Following the Rauch et al. (2009) meta-analysis, 
research has taken for granted the positive impact of EO on a firm’s performance 
and this can be shown by the recent works of Shahzad et al. (2016) and Mthanti and 
Ojah (2017). However, recent studies have found that EO positively moderates the 
relationship between family involvement and risk of failure (Revilla et al., 2016) 
and that the positive effect of EO decreases over time (Gupta & Gupta, 2015). To 
address this inconsistency, within the theoretical framework, 8 hypotheses were 
developed and tested relating the effect of EO and each of its dimensions on firm 
performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA) and failure.  
 
The next sections will provide a discussion of the results of the effects of EO and 
each of its dimensions on firm performance and risk of failure. 
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10.3 Study 1: Longitudinal Effect of EO and its Dimensions on Firm 
Performance  
 
This section discusses the results from Study 1, which examined the longitudinal 
effect of EO and its dimensions on firm performance measures (ROA and Tobin’s 
Q) among the samples of surviving and failed firms.   
 
10.3.1 Longitudinal Effect of EO on Firm Performance among Surviving and 
Failed Firms 
 
This research argued that EO aligns more with the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective, which was first outlined by Wiklund and Shepherd (2011), even though 
most of the literature has provided evidence supporting the EO-as-Advantage 
perspective (Rauch et al., 2009). We provided an argument for and found empirical 
evidence that the current research might not be capturing the double-edged sword 
nature of EO.  
 
Drawing theoretical insights from organisational learning theory, this research found 
that the effect of EO on a firm’s performance aligned more with the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective. Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) considered that EO is 
an exploratory type of behaviour, which is characterised by experimenting and 
delving into endeavours that are far from a firm’s competencies. This 
characterisation of experimentation held within EO has the possibility to increase 
variation in outcomes, in which such endeavours may either enhance a firm’s 
performance or conversely might decrease it to below the minimum performance 
level needed for survival (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). This characteristic or nature 
of EO is then shaped as a double-edged sword (Patel et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
according to prospect theory, EO is a risk-producing strategy (Swift, 2016). Myopic 
loss aversion within prospect theory predicts that, since an entrepreneurial 
orientation is characterised by being a long-term orientation and whose value is 
assessed less frequently in comparison to short-term decisions, firms are more likely 
to be risk-oriented towards entrepreneurial behaviours (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; 
Swift, 2016).  
 
Study 1, which focused on the longitudinal effect of EO and its dimensions on a 
firm’s performance, argued based on organisational learning theory, that in a sample 
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of surviving firms EO enhanced a firm’s performance until a threshold point, but 
beyond that threshold a firm’s performance decreased. Organisational learning 
theory builds on the distinction of explorative and exploitative behaviours and 
considers EO to be more of an explorative risky behaviour (Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2011). When firms focus more on explorative endeavours at the expense of 
exploitative predictable behaviours (i.e. a higher EO level), this leads to a higher 
possibility of a negative outcome occurring (March, 1991, 2006). Thereby, in a 
sample of surviving firms, we initially argued and found that EO has an inverse U-
shaped effect on a firm’s performance.  
 
In certain contexts (Chinese firms or small firms), it has been shown that EO has an 
inverse U-shaped effect on a firm’s performance (Tang et al., 2008; Wales et al., 
2013c). That is, even though the literature agrees that EO generally leads to a 
positive effect on a firm’s performance, in some contexts (i.e. small firms), at higher 
levels of EO, the positive effect on performance starts to diminish (Wales et al., 
2013c). We argue that the question of whether the potential benefits of pursuing EO 
outweigh its costs is context-dependent (Wales et al., 2013c). However, that context 
in this thesis is not firm-dependent (e.g. Wales et al., 2013c) or country-dependent 
(e.g. Tang et al., 2008), but it is survivor-dependent (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). 
According to the results of Study 1, it was shown that indeed EO had an inverse U-
shaped effect on a firm’s performance (short-term and long-term measures). Yet, the 
inverse U-shaped effect was predominantly a negative effect as the linear and the 
quadratic terms of EO were both significantly negative. 
 
The literature has captured the positive impact of EO on a firm’s performance since 
it focused on a sample of surviving firms and typically with cross-sectional studies 
(Rauch et al., 2009). We argue based on the EO-as-Experimentation perspective that 
in the sample of failed firms, EO has a negative effect on a firm’s performance and 
may be thought of as a contributory factor to that failure. Failed firms are likely to 
be more entrepreneurially oriented and firms that put more of an emphasis on EO 
are likely to suffer from higher costs of engaging in risky entrepreneurial behaviours 
(March, 1991). It was shown in chapter 8 that in the sample of failed firms, EO had 
a significant negative effect on a firm’s performance (short-term and long-term 
measures). These results challenge the EO-as-Advantage perspective and most of 
the studies on EO. The results have clear implications for further theoretical 
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considerations in examining the longitudinal EO and firm performance relationship 
rather than taking for granted its positive effect. 
 
Lastly, using insights from organisational learning and prospect theory, we argue 
that as EO increases its effect on firm performance becomes more negative among 
surviving firms. At lower levels of EO, it signifies firms pursuing a less risky 
incremental innovative entrepreneurial strategy. Thereby, EO at lower levels should 
be less resource-intensive and less risky and would enhance a firm’s performance 
(Wales et al., 2013c, Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). As EO increases, the costs are 
likely to outweigh its benefits as EO represents an over-reliance on bold moves and 
experimental gambles to explore and seek opportunities (Mintzberg, 1973; Patel et 
al., 2015). Furthermore, as EO increases, firms are more likely to pursue radical and 
dramatic innovative strategies in comparison to incremental innovations (Swift, 
2016; Wales et al., 2013c). Atuahene-Gima and Ko (2001) state that a highly 
entrepreneurially orientated firm may be blinded by the belief that it is 
technologically superior and may aggressively pursue EO in the expectation that it 
would lead to higher returns. This belief in technological superiority is a myopic 
short-sighted belief, according to prospect theory (Swift, 2016; Wales et al., 2013c). 
This thesis has shown that by examining the effect of different values of EO on a 
firm’s performance, at higher values of EO, EO had a significant negative effect on 
firm performance (short-term and long-term measures). Furthermore, it was shown 
that as EO increased, its negative effect on a firm’s performance became stronger. 
 
In summary, the results of the effect of EO on firm performance among the samples 
of surviving and failed firms align more with the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective. Interestingly, Study 1 results reveal a predominantly negative inverse 
U-shaped effect of EO on firm performance among the surviving firms. This finding 
differs from Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) study in that EO was not shown to have 
a positive effect on a firm’s relative performance among surviving firms. Thus, high 
levels of EO do not necessarily lead to better performance results (e.g. Karmann et 
al., 2016). This research has shown that EO does not have a relatively beneficial 
effect on a firm’s performance, even among surviving firms.  
 
The next section will outline the effect of the EO dimensions on firm performance 
in the sample of surviving and failed firms. 
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10.3.2 Longitudinal Effect of EO Dimensions on Firm Performance   
 
As previously outlined, the literature has tended to treat the different dimensions of 
EO as an aggregate index, which masks the possibility of revealing the independent 
effects from each of the EO dimensions (e.g. Eshima & Anderson, 2017). This 
section will consider the separate outcomes from each of the EO dimensions on firm 
performance.  
 
By examining the effects of each of the EO dimensions on firm performance (long-
term measure of performance), it was shown that the EO dimensions had differential 
effects. Innovativeness, in comparison to proactiveness and risk taking, was shown 
to have a positive effect on long-term performance whereas both proactiveness and 
risk taking had a significant negative effect on the long-term performance in both 
samples of surviving and failed firms.  
 
In the literature, it has been shown that innovativeness enhances a firm’s 
performance. It has been argued that innovativeness, through its technological 
leadership, leads to product differentiation and creates a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Hughes & Morgan, 2007). The findings in this thesis revealed that 
innovativeness improved a firm’s long-term market value since it generates new 
knowledge assets and develops new competencies. However, according to 
organisational learning theory, since innovativeness is an explorative trial and error 
behaviour (Patel et al., 2015), it was also shown in Study 2 that it led to enhanced 
firm failure over time.  
 
Most of the literature considers that proactiveness enhances a firm’s performance 
since it seizes opportunities in future markets and anticipates changes in market 
demand (Dess & Lumpkin, 2005). However, by drawing predictions from 
organisational learning theory, our research found that proactiveness had a negative 
effect on a firm’s performance since proactiveness represents a long-term gamble on 
forecasting future market trends (Patel et al., 2015).  
 
Risk taking was shown to have a concave effect on the short-term performance and 
to lead to a decrease in the long-term performance. The results of the risk taking 
dimension, according to the risk-return paradox, revealed that risk taking had an 
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inverse U-shaped effect in the short-term (Kreiser et al., 2013). However, the 
concave effect of risk taking on short-term performance was predominantly 
negative. According to organisational learning theory, risk taking behaviour entails 
high costs in the long-run due to the requirement of firms to take bold and uncertain 
moves in committing a large amount of their resources to risky ventures without 
knowing the success of such outcomes (Dess & Lumpkin, 2005). Using insights 
from organisational learning theory, we found that risk taking had a negative effect 
on a firm’s long-term performance.  
 
The next section will outline the discussion of the results of Study 2, which 
examines the effect of EO and its dimensions on the risk of firm failure.  
 
10.4 Study 2: Effect of EO and its Dimensions on Firm Failure  
 
This section discusses the results from Study 2, which examines the effect of EO 
and its dimensions on firm failure. The classification of firm failure will first be 
discussed. Then, the effect of EO on firm failure will be outlined followed by a 
discussion of the results of the effects of the EO dimensions on firm failure. 
 
10.4.1 Firm Failure Classification  
 
By deconstructing the outcome of firm failure and separating firm failure from 
performance, similar to the deconstruction of the EO dimensions, new revelations 
were made in this thesis on the effect of EO and each of the EO dimensions in the 
separate samples of failed firms. It has been argued in the literature that there are 
complexities in examined relationships that go unnoticed if firm performance and 
firm failure are considered to be analogous (Josefy et al., 2017). For instance, the 
Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) study argued that EO would increase the risk of 
failure, but that it would be positively related to firm performance in the sample of 
surviving firms. In fact, we showed that one of the EO dimensions, innovativeness, 
increased the risk of failure (privatisation) over time, even though it enhanced long-
term performance of firms. Instead of examining the universal blanket effect of EO 
on an aggregate firm-level outcome, this thesis brought new insights by examining 
the separate EO dimension’s effects on firm performance as well as on risk of 
failure in the separate samples of failed firms.  
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Even though most authors tend to censor or remove acquisitions from their analysis 
without a theoretical justification (e.g. Revilla, 2016; Swift, 2016), this thesis 
considers that firm failure entails either a discontinuation of ownership, bankruptcy 
or insolvency, or privatisation (no longer filing with the SEC). Bankruptcy may be a 
clear indicator of failure, yet M&A and privatisation also entail failure. Thus, this 
thesis has justified the consideration into including M&A and privatisation as a risk 
of failure, in which there are cases of firms that would have filed for bankruptcy if it 
wasn’t for their acquisition. The Altman (1968) Z-score was used to empirically 
separate successful exits from failed firms (Josefy et al., 2017; Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011).  
 
The next section will discuss the effect of EO on firm failure followed by a 
discussion of the effect of each of the EO dimension on firm failure. 
 
10.4.2 Effect of EO on Firm Failure 
 
By drawing predictions from organisational learning theory, this thesis found that 
firms in the high-technology industry have a higher mean value of entrepreneurial 
orientation. We also found that the high-technology industry had a lower survival 
rate in comparison to other industries. This higher mean value of EO is because 
such firms are faced with high-intense competition and changes in the industry, 
which cause their competencies to become obsolete (Levinthal & March, 1993; 
March, 1991). Such firms are forced to seek more entrepreneurially oriented 
strategies and to constantly engage in experimentation to be able to keep up with the 
constant changes in the industry (Uotila et al., 2009). Organisational learning theory 
predicts that with increasing risky explorative strategies at the expense of reliable 
exploitative strategies, firms would face higher risk of failure (March, 1991). 
Consistent with the insights from organisational learning theory, our results showed 
a positive association between higher EO values (in the high-tech industry) and 
lower survival probability (of the high-tech industry). As such, achieving a balance 
between EO explorative strategies and conservative exploitative strategies is most 
important in R&D intensive high-technology industries (Uotila et al., 2009). 
 
We showed that failed firms on average were being more entrepreneurial in 
comparison to surviving firms. This research aligns with prospect theory prediction, 
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which considers that failed firms, with a relatively lower performance compared to 
surviving firms, are likely to be more entrepreneurially oriented (Swift, 2016). Most 
importantly, the association of EO with lower performing firms could entail that EO 
is a predictor of a higher likelihood of firm failure.  
 
The time-series variations of EO over this research’s period from the pre-crisis 
(fiscal year 2000) until the post-crisis period (fiscal year 2014) revealed that EO was 
increasing during the eve of the financial crisis (fiscal year 2008) in both samples of 
surviving and failed firms. Furthermore, the failed firms had a higher mean value of 
EO during the fiscal year 2008 in comparison to surviving firms. This is an 
interesting revelation, which brings into question the EO-as-Advantage perspective. 
The financial crisis is a significant economic downturn, characterised by an increase 
in the financial innovation (in the form of financial instruments) and deregulation, 
which resulted in increasing the risks (Knights & McCabe, 2015). The time-series 
graph of EO showed that EO was increasing during the financial crisis, which could 
be a response to or the leading factor to the crisis (Slevin & Terjesen, 2011).  
 
Considering the above findings, we tested for the causal effect of EO on firm failure 
using survival analysis. The EO-as-Experimentation perspective predicts that EO 
has a positive effect on firm failure, as EO is associated with explorative and risky 
behaviours and increases the variability in outcomes ranging from home-runs to 
total losses (Wales, 2016). We found that failed firms exhibited higher EO values 
and more variability through higher standard deviations (shown in table S.1). By 
utilising survival analysis, it was revealed that the results aligned with the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective and that EO led to a higher probability of failure, yet 
that probability was not proportional with time. That is, the highly entrepreneurially 
oriented firms in comparison to their industry peers were increasingly deviating 
from the sample and had a higher risk of failure as time increased. The risk of EO 
on firm failure increased in the overall sample by a multiple of 2.89, confirming our 
prediction that EO has a positive relationship with the risk of failure. This provides 
new research stream to consider the possible outcomes of EO on firm failure. The 
results do not imply that firms should emphasise conservative strategies at the 
expense of exploratory strategies, instead they highlight the risks associated with 
being increasingly entrepreneurially oriented.  
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Most of the literature on firm survival tends to treat survival/failure as a binary 
outcome (Josefy et al., 2017), even though firm failure can be either a result of 
discontinuation of ownership, insolvency, or IPO exit. By examining the effect of 
EO on risk of failure in the different samples of firms, we showed that EO increased 
the risk of failure in all the different samples of failed firms (M&A, bankruptcy, and 
privatisation). Thus, it is not only insightful to examine the overall effect of EO on 
the risk of firm failure, but it is also important to examine the risk of EO on failure 
in the different samples of failed firms (Josefy et al., 2017). Interestingly, EO did 
not only increase the risk of failure from M&A or privatisation, but it also increased 
the risk of bankruptcy.  
 
The next section will discuss the results of the effect of each of the EO dimensions 
on the risk of firm failure.  
 
10.4.3 Effect of EO Dimensions on Firm Failure  
 
Initially, this thesis argued that, according to the multi-dimensional 
conceptualisation of EO, each of the EO dimensions (innovativeness, proactiveness, 
risk taking) exhibit differential effects on firm failure similar to their effects on firm 
performance. However, we showed that all three EO dimensions increased firm 
failure.  
 
Innovativeness (R&D-based proxy for firm-level innovation) has been argued to 
enhance a firm’s survival (Cefis & Marsili, 2005; Lee, 2003) particularly in the 
high-technology industry (Zahra, 1996) since it provides firms with first-mover 
advantages and positions them ahead of imitator firms (Lee, 2003). In Study 1, we 
showed that innovativeness had a positive effect on long-term firm performance. 
This is consistent with previous research that has shown that innovativeness has a 
positive impact on a firm’s performance (e.g. Hughes & Morgan, 2007). However, 
some studies have found that innovativeness (R&D intensity) has an insignificant 
effect on long-term performance (Lin et al., 2006).  
 
Contrastingly, in Study 2, we showed that innovativeness had a positive effect on a 
firm’s failure and increased the risk of failure by 13% despite its positive impact on 
the long-term firm performance. Firms that were highly innovative in the sample 
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had a significantly lower survival probability. Among the separate samples of failed 
firms, innovativeness increased the risk of firm failure in the form of  privatisation, 
yet it did not increase the risk of bankruptcy. This finding is interesting as EO 
overall increased the risk of bankruptcy, but its innovativeness dimension did not. 
 
Possible reasons for the discrepancy between the effect of innovativeness on firm 
performance versus firm failure may be due to the possibility that innovativeness is 
‘more uncertain than playing a lottery as it is a game of chance’ (Coad & Roa, 2008, 
p. 646). Since innovativeness represents a trial and error behaviour (Patel et al., 
2015), our findings suggest that the downside of innovativeness is not the upfront 
costs of investment, but the negative effect on the viability of the business over 
time.  
 
This thesis has also argued, according to organisational learning theory, that 
proactiveness has a positive effect on firm failure as proactiveness entails firms to 
take long-term gambles on their resources to be invested and orchestrated in 
forecasted and latent market needs (Patel et al., 2015). The high-technology industry 
is an aggressive rivalry industry and requires from firms to invest in the current 
market and take advantage of the market opportunities. By being overly proactive, 
firms would be risking their current market positioning to act upon unknown 
predicted information in futuristic markets and conversely sacrifice developing their 
current competencies (Atuanhene-Gima et al., 2005). As was shown through 
survival analysis, proactiveness indeed had a positive effect on firm failure in the 
overall sample of failed firms; highly proactive firms had a lower survival 
probability. This corroborates the results from Study 1, which revealed that 
proactiveness had a significant negative effect on long-term firm performance.  
 
The findings in this thesis revealed that risk taking has a positive effect on the risk 
of firm failure whereby highly risk taking firms had a lower survival probability. 
According to organisational learning theory, risk taking involves behaviours that 
increase the variance in firm performance returns and result in uncertain outcomes 
(Patel et al., 2015; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011) which could lead to higher 
likelihood of failure (Alvarez, 2007; Kreiser et al., 2013). In addition, risk taking is 
linked with increased corrupt behaviours (Karmann et al., 2016) as well as 
decreased performance (Hughes & Morgan, 2007; Lomberg et al., 2017).  
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Our findings showed that not all the EO dimensions increased the risk of failure 
uniformly across the different samples of failed firms. Innovativeness and 
proactiveness were shown to increase the risk of failure from M&A and 
privatisation, whereas risk taking was shown to increase the risk of failure among all 
the samples of failed firms (M&A, privatisation, and bankruptcy). EO increased the 
risk of failure in the form of bankruptcy due to its risk taking dimension only and 
increased the risk of failure, in the form of M&A and privatisation, due to the 
increased risk of failure from its three dimensions.  
 
The next section will discuss the results of the varied mean values of the EO 
dimensions in the sample of surviving and failed firms and their variation across 
time in the time-series graphs. 
 
10.5 EO Dimensions’ Mean Values and Time-series Effects 
 
Interestingly, even though EO on average was higher among the high-technology 
firms and in the sample of failed firms, the EO dimensions were not uniformly 
higher as well. Similarly, even though EO was highest during the financial crisis, 
the EO dimensions were not unvaryingly at their highest peak during the financial 
crisis. 
 
On average innovativeness and risk taking dimensions of EO were higher among the 
high-technology industry and in the sample of failed firms, however proactiveness 
was lower. This indicates that a firm can be more entrepreneurially oriented and 
exhibit higher values of one or more of the dimensions, but not necessarily all the 
EO dimensions (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). This aligns with the conceptualisation set 
forth by Lumpkin and Dess (1996) that EO is not considered to be the sum of the 
EO dimensions as first outlined by Miller (1983). Thereby, such results indicate that 
it is important to adopt the multi-dimensional conceptualisation and examine the 
separate effects of the EO dimensions instead of bundling the different dimensions 
into an index.  
 
By examining the separate mean values of the EO dimensions among the surviving 
and failed samples of firms and in the high-technology industry versus the excluded 
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sample, it was shown that proactiveness was lower among the failed sample of firms 
and firms in the high-technology industry. A possible reason that failed firms were 
being less proactive (proxied through retained earnings) is that, when faced with the 
competitive pressures of the high-technology industry and their relative lower 
performance when compared to surviving firms, they would leverage their internal 
resources more aggressively to make the leap towards a higher-performance level 
and to be able to compete with higher-performing firms in a highly-intense 
competitive industry (Davidsson et al., 2009). As such, failed firms would have a 
higher cost of financing their growth internally in comparison to surviving firms 
(Davidsson et al., 2009). Furthermore, the negative value of proactiveness among 
the sample of failed firms could be due to the possibility (or fact) that they were 
retaining losses instead of profits. Similarly, Altman (1968) predicted that failed 
firms would have lower retained earnings.  
 
It was revealed in this thesis that innovativeness and risk taking dimensions of EO 
were increasing during the financial crisis period (fiscal year 2008) in the samples 
of surviving and failed firms. Innovativeness and risk taking were relatively at their 
highest peak during the financial crisis. However, proactiveness was decreasing 
until it reached its minimum point (a mean value less than zero) during the financial 
crisis. Even though EO on average was highest during the financial crisis, the EO 
dimensions were not similarly increasing during the financial crisis as well.  Among 
the surviving firms, proactiveness was decreasing from the pre-crisis (fiscal year 
2007) until it reached its lowest point in fiscal year 2009. Similarly, among the 
sample of failed firms, proactiveness was decreasing until it reached its lowest point 
during the financial crisis. Firms during the financial crisis were performing poorly 
(relatively lowest points of Tobin’s Q and ROA during fiscal year 2008) and 
possibly were at a disadvantage (cost-of-capital disadvantage) from facing a higher 
financial cost of internal capital (from retained earnings) to finance their growth in 
comparison to highly performing firms (Davidsson et al., 2009). This could explain 
the observed decrease in proactiveness during the financial crisis. 
 
Through the results of Study 1 and the time-series graphs, we showed that there is 
no covariation between innovativeness and proactiveness. Similarly, Lomberg et al. 
(2017) found that proactiveness uniquely explained most of the variation in a firm’s 
performance. This entails that proactiveness single-handedly affected a firm’s 
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performance, especially when it was not aligned with innovativeness or risk taking. 
Yet, Anderson et al. (2015) considered that innovativeness is not independent from 
proactiveness. Our results reveal that proactiveness could be independent from the 
EO dimensions, innovativeness and risk taking, and challenges the overarching 
position on EO of a positive covariance among the EO dimensions (Wales et al., 
2013c). This provides a potential conceptual contribution to EO. 
 
The next section will discuss the theoretical contributions of this thesis.  
 
10.6 Summary of Theoretical Contributions 
 
This thesis has contributed to the existing literature by using objective measures and 
including failed firms in its analysis.  
 
In seeking to address the aforementioned theoretical gaps (in section 10.2) and 
advance knowledge on EO, this research examined the longitudinal effect of EO and 
each of its dimensions on firm performance (short-term and long-term measures) 
and on risk of failure. To guide this research, this thesis has used insights from the 
theoretical framework of organisational learning and prospect theory (Bernartzi & 
Thaler, 1995; March, 1991, 2006). Based on our theoretical framework, we had 
three main hypotheses in relation to EO: 1) EO has an inverse U-shaped effect on 
performance among surviving firms that is lower levels of EO lead to a positive 
impact on performance, but as EO increases its positive impact decreases among 
surviving firms, 2) EO has a negative effect on a firm’s performance among failed 
firms, and 3) EO has a positive relationship with the risk of failure.  
 
In support of our hypotheses we found that indeed EO had an inverse U-shaped 
relationship with performance among the sample of surviving firms. By testing for 
different values of EO in the sample of surviving firms, we showed that at lower 
values of EO, EO had a positive effect on firm performance. As EO increased, it had 
a significant negative impact on firm performance. Among the sample of failed 
firms, EO had a negative effect on performance. Based on the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective, our results reveal that there are risks associated with 
entrepreneurial behaviours, which would jeopardise the firm’s standing in the long-
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run (Burgelman, 1991; Hambrick & De’Aveni, 1988; Levinthal & March, 1993). 
Our findings indicate that past research did not capture the double-edged nature of 
EO. This is because most of the past research examined the effect of EO along a 
cross-section and only amongst surviving firms. When examined over time in a 
sample of surviving as well as failed firms, evidently EO was shown to be more in 
line with the EO-as-Experimentation perspective (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011).  
 
The most important contribution is its theoretical contribution of the outcomes from 
EO and its dimensions. The theoretical contribution of this thesis is threefold: 1) 
organisational learning theory and prospect theory can predict whether EO and each 
of its dimensions have adverse effects on firm performance and survival 2) 
addressing the survivor bias in EO literature reveals that by including a sample of 
failed firms, EO is a cause of failure rather than a response to a failing situation, 3) 
the different effects of the sub-dimensions of EO reveal the independence of the 
dimensions and the importance of examining the separate effects of the dimensions 
rather than the overall EO construct. The below paragraphs will therein discuss the 
theoretical contributions. 
 
10.6.1 Organisational Learning Theory and Prospect Theory 
 
 
Most of the literature considers EO to be a driver for firm success and a strategic 
behaviour for building an inimitable competitive advantage based on the resource-
based view (RBV) (Rauch et al., 2009), which has birthed the EO-as-Advantage 
perspective. The EO-as-Advantage perspective, the dominating view of EO in the 
literature, most certainly disregards the risks associated with EO and the fact that 
engaging in entrepreneurial behaviours involves risk taking behaviours (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011).  
 
Even though one of the main arguments of RBV on the sustainable competitive 
advantage of EO requires a longitudinal analysis, this is unarguably absent from the 
EO research (Barney et al., 2001). Recent research has shown that EO’s positive 
effect decreased over time even though initially EO had a strong positive impact on 
a firm’s performance (Gupta & Gupta, 2015). This does not align with the EO-as-
Advantage perspective.  
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Theoretically speaking, EO is an explorative endeavour that leads to uncertain 
outcomes and is risk-seeking and variation-increasing (Burgelman, 1991; March, 
1991). According to organisational learning and prospect theory, our findings 
indicate that surviving firms were spending less on EO and thus were more 
exploitative and risk-averse in comparison to failed firms that were more 
entrepreneurially oriented (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; March, 1991). Most 
importantly, we revealed that below-average performing firms that were highly 
explorative and entrepreneurial were more likely to fail (Levinthal & March, 1993). 
Thereby, this thesis reveals that by using organisational learning theory and prospect 
theory, EO does not lead to a sustained competitive advantage. On the other hand, 
by adopting an exploratory risky strategy, EO might have a positive effect on the 
risk of failure.  
 
Organisational learning theory and prospect theory are interlinked in that they 
predict organisational change and search exploratory strategies based on the firm’s 
performance relative to a reference value (Argote & Greve, 2007). Organisational 
learning model developed by Lant and Mezias (1990) was influenced by prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). That is, firms engage in exploratory learning 
to reduce the perceived gap between the current performance level and the desired 
wealth state (Lant et al., 1992). When firms engage in proactive forward looking 
long-term gambling behaviours and extreme re-orientation problematic search 
strategies to initiate organisational change in the prospect of achieving higher 
profitability, they inherently subject themselves to a higher degree of uncertainty 
and increase the possibility of failing (Crant, 2000; Dodgson, 1993; Eisenhardt 
1989). Thus, according to prospect theory and organisational learning theory, we 
propose that the risks inherent within EO are attached to the proactiveness forward 
looking dimension and the risk taking dimension. 
 
This thesis posited that organisational entrepreneurial learning behaviours are not 
entirely risk-producing strategies as innovative learning strategies might produce 
long-term benefits in that they enhance the existing competencies by building new 
knowledge flows, initiating new discoveries, and leading to internal development, 
which allows firms to remain viable and dynamic in uncertain changing 
environments (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). According to insights from organisational 
learning theory, the benefits of entrepreneurial behaviours on long-term 
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performance are contained within the innovativeness dimension (Zahra et al., 1999). 
This is important as it was shown that in contrast to the proactiveness and risk 
taking dimension, innovativeness was the only type of explorative learning that 
enhanced long-term performance over time. In this sense, since the innovativeness 
dimension operates differently (by building new knowledge bases) in comparison to 
the proactiveness and the risk taking dimension, the benefits of innovative learning 
outweigh its costs on firm performance in the long-run. Yet, interestingly, as 
innovative learning requires extensive resources (Schumpter, 1942), our results on 
its effect on the overall risk of failure reveal that as it is an exploratory learning 
mechanism, firms that increase their innovative learning at the expense of 
exploitative learning enhance their risk of failure over time (March, 1991). That is, 
even though innovativeness is required for strategic renewal, ‘too much of change’ 
would increase the risk of failure by causing the firm to lose the sense of its 
direction (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Perhaps then, the costs of the innovative learning 
dimension are not only immediate but might entail long-term costs when it is 
sustained and increased over time.  Thus, over time solely explorative learning 
mechanisms, whether they are innovative, proactive, or risk taking in nature would 
enhance the risk of failure across a significant timeframe (Levitt & March, 1988; 
March, 1991). 
 
Before the proposition of Bowman’s risk-return paradox, most economic theories 
considered that the risk-performance relationship was positive (Bowman, 1980). By 
using insights from prospect theory, Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) revealed that 
the risk and return relationship is negative among below-average performers. Thus, 
based on prospect theory, it has been empirically shown in the literature that as 
firms increase their levels of risk taking, the probability of negative outcomes 
increases (Chou et al., 2009; Singh, 1986). As the risk-return paradox was inspired 
by prospect theory, this thesis uses prospect theory to predict different outcomes 
from exploratory learning behaviours among surviving above-average performing 
firms and failed firms. By using prospect theory in conjunction with organisational 
learning theory, this thesis reveals that entrepreneurial orientation is a double-edged 
sword or a paradoxical concept (Argote & Greve, 2007), a phenomenon similar to 
the risk-return paradox (Fiegenbaum, 1990). The paradoxical nature of EO refers to 
the relationship of EO with performance among the sample of surviving firms 
versus failed firms, in which the results showed that EO had an inverse-U shaped 
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relationship with performance among surviving firms, yet a negative relationship 
with performance among failed firms. Thus, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) and organisational learning theory (Levinthal & March, 1993) revealed that 
being more entrepreneurially oriented does not pay off for firms facing distress 
(Dodgson, 1993). 
 
Due to the limitations in the literature of a cross-sectional bias and a survivor bias, 
this thesis sought to address these limitations by including a representative sample 
of surviving and failed firms and using insights from organisational learning theory 
and prospect theory. EO and its dimensions may be explained by learning-related 
independent organisational processes that operate to either produce new knowledge 
flows, anticipate future demand, and to make timely decisions and large 
commitments to resources before assessing alternatives to reduce the discrepancy 
between the current state and a desired reference value (Bowman, 1980; Crant, 
2000; Garud & Nayyar, 1994). The myopia of explorative learning as well as its 
sub-dimensions was revealed when assessed against long-term outcomes over a 
significant period of time. When organisational learning is applied with prospect 
theory, it reveals the paradox of EO. This is integral to set in motion a new stream 
of research that addresses the double-edged sword nature of EO. 
 
The next section will outline the second theoretical contribution of this study, which 
is the inclusion of the sample of failed firms to assess differential outcomes of 
entrepreneurial exploratory learning behaviours among failed firms versus surviving 
firms. 
 
10.6.2 Survivor Bias and Inclusion of Failed Firms 
 
 
The literature has been limited by a survivor bias, in which most researchers 
conclude that EO is advantageous to a firm’ performance whilst only examining its 
outcomes in a sample of surviving firms (e.g. Rauch et al., 2009; Shahzad et al., 
2016). Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) theorised that EO would increase the risk of 
failure, based on predictions from organisational learning theory (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011). Yet, few EO researchers have followed upon the predictions of 
Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) and utilised the theoretical framework of 
organisational learning theory (Wales, 2016). From a theoretical perspective, the 
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decision heuristics and biases involved in organisational behaviours may be difficult 
to assess and understand without considering the various properties of different 
organisational learning processes (Denrell, 2003).  
 
Interlinked with organisational learning theory, prospect theory is integral in 
addressing the problem of under-samples of failed firms (Denrell, 2003). Based on 
prospect theory, firms can be classified based on their relative performance 
(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988). Firms that are below-average performers are likely 
to exhibit a different degree of exploratory and risky behaviours in comparison to 
firms that are high-performers. Thus, it is important to address the overwhelming 
and plaguing survivor bias to reveal the different outcomes from entrepreneurial 
behaviours in the sample of failed firms in comparison to the sample of surviving 
firms. The literature has continuously shown that EO has a direct positive effect on 
firm performance whilst only examining its effect among surviving firms. Yet, if 
researchers use theoretical predictions from organisational learning theory and 
prospect theory, it can be revealed that EO might exhibit a variance-seeking and 
producing nature with its adverse impact on below-average performing firms 
(Argote & Greve, 2007; Dodgson, 1993). Organisational learning theory predicts 
that highly explorative behaviours lead to a higher risk of failure over time, which 
has been empirically shown (e.g. Swift, 2016). This aligns with the alternative EO-
as-Experimentation perspective, which was originally conceptualised and defined 
by Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) based on insights from organisational learning 
theory.   
 
The under-sampling of failed firms, due to theoretical gaps in the EO literature, 
leads to the systematic biased beliefs that certain strategies that may hurt 
performance of firms are perceived to be beneficial and superior to other strategies 
(Bromiley, 1991; Lant et al., 1992). Researchers that examine entrepreneurial 
orientation (a construct that includes proactive gambling strategies and risk-seeking 
behaviours) learning processes among above-average performers would be ‘dis-
proportionally represented’ and would reveal that entrepreneurial learning 
behaviours are performance-enhancing rather than variability-producing (Denrell, 
2003). Such research designs that exclude failed firms is not uncommon in the 
management literature and more specifically in EO research; thus, this brings into 
question the possibility that once-considered valued firm-level behaviours may not 
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be consistently ideal throughout time. This means that researchers have only been 
considering one of the edges of the sword and this produces misleading view of the 
EO-firm performance relationship (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). This balanced 
inquiry of the two edges of the sword reveals that the anti-failure bias in the 
literature that excludes organisational learning theory and prospect theory leads to 
the overestimation of performance and underestimation of the risks associated with 
exploratory learning processes when sustained over time. The anti-failure bias has 
led to masking the adverse effects of exploratory learning processes (Denrell, 2003) 
even though it is well known based on theory that they are prone to biases and 
spurious errors of estimation (Huber, 1991; Levinthal & March, 1993). By including 
a sample of failed firms, we were able to show that EO led to an increased risk of 
failure rather than being the response to a failing situation. 
 
The next section will outline the theoretical contribution of revealing the multi-
dimensional nature of the EO construct on organisational outcomes. 
 
10.6.3 Multi-Dimensional Conceptualisation of EO 
 
 
This research has argued that each of the EO dimensions has a varying effect on 
firm-level outcomes. The findings of this thesis provide empirical evidence, that is 
consistent with the multi-dimensional conceptualisation of EO (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996). Each of the EO dimensions had opposing effects on the long-term 
performance. Supporting the hypotheses, it was shown that innovativeness 
improved the long-term performance, yet proactiveness and risk taking decreased 
the long-term performance. Most of the literature that examines the EO and firm 
performance relationship and even recent literature adopts the gestalt 
conceptualisation of EO and only examines the overall effect of EO (Eshima & 
Anderson, 2017; Mthanti & Ojah, 2017). Yet, several researchers have shown that 
the EO dimensions have differential effects (Hughes & Morgan, 2007; Karmann et 
al., 2016).  
 
Based on organisational learning theory, this thesis theorised that the learning 
process and its corresponding outcomes differs among the separate types of 
generative or explorative learning (Zahra et al., 1999). Morgan and Berthon (2008) 
defined generative learning as generating new distinctive ideas along with their 
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distribution and interpretation, taking responsive action, and engaging in risk taking 
actions.  The innovativeness dimension is the constitute of organisational learning 
behaviours that leads to developing new valuable knowledge and core competencies 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994) and is beneficial on the firm’s long-term performance 
(Grant, 1996). The learning and knowledge that are therein generated are integral 
for the strategic renewal of the firm and its development. Whereas the other 
dimensions of the explorative experimental learning behaviours, proactiveness and 
risk taking, operate through reducing a gap between the current state and a desired 
futuristic state based on organisational learning theory and prospect theory 
(Bowman, 1980; Crant, 2000). There are higher uncertainties attached to the 
proactiveness and risk taking dimensions as they operate based upon unknown 
aspired or predicted targets that the firm sets as a reference (Lant & Mezias, 1990). 
We hypothesised that even though generally explorative generative learning 
involves higher risks and a possibility of negative firm-level outcomes, the 
generative learning processes are more complex rather than a one-dimensional 
construct termed ‘EO’. Overall the EO construct leads to a negative effect on long-
term firm performance over time, yet this undermines the complex nature of its 
different dimensions or learning processes. By examining the overall effect of EO, 
the effect of EO on firm performance reveals a negative concave decreasing 
relationship. The proactiveness and the risk taking dimensions mask the positive 
impact of the innovativeness dimension. If the multi-dimensional conceptualisation 
was not adopted, then one would not be able to reveal the enhancing effect of the 
innovative learning dimension on long-term performance.  
 
Yet, innovativeness dimension of EO involves the search for developing new radical 
innovative products and implementing R&D processes that differ in a dramatic way 
from previous products and methods of operation. This sets the possibility for 
extreme losses over time (Hurely & Hult, 1998; Taylor & Greve, 2006). Explorative 
innovative learning entails risks, in which uncertainty exists as to whether 
breakthrough innovations would be later adopted by consumers and transform into 
marketable products (Baker & Sinkula, 2005). Furthermore, even though 
innovativeness does have benefits on the long-term performance, an exclusive focus 
on explorative innovation would negatively impact the standing of the firm as a 
balance must be achieved between explorative and exploitative behaviours (March, 
1991; Morgan & Berthon, 2008). Recent research has revealed that high levels of 
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R&D intensity may be subject to diminishing returns (Koryak et al., 2018) and even 
enhance failure over time (Swift, 2016). This reveals the importance of considering 
the impact of explorative positively-viewed learning behaviours on the most 
important organisational outcome, the firm’s viability. 
 
In summary, this thesis indicates that there is a need to consider the longitudinal 
effect of EO and each of its dimensions among a representative sample of surviving 
and failed firms. It also urges researchers to adopt objective measures of EO to be 
able to examine its effects along a significant timeframe (e.g. Gupta et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, this research shows that a consideration for several performance 
outcomes is vital to reveal the different effects of each of the EO dimensions on 
several firm-level outcomes (short-term performance, long-term performance, and 
firm failure).  
 
This research contributes to the theoretical development of EO by revealing that the 
EO-performance relationship is more consistent with the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective, which originates from organisational learning theory (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2011) and is consistent with predictions from prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). This should encourage more theorising in the EO research to 
move away from the focus on the resource-based view (Wales, 2016) to more 
theoretical frameworks that consider the risks associated with EO.  
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10.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
To provide a deeper understanding of the risks associated with EO and its 
dimensions, this thesis examined the effects of EO and each of its dimensions on 
firm-level outcomes (performance and failure). The novelty of this research lies in 
separating the samples of surviving and failed firms to test the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective. Our findings surfaced the major problems in the 
literature, of which most importantly are the issues of cross-sectional design and 
survivor bias. The results of this thesis aligned with the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011), which originates from organisational 
learning theory. When examining the separate effects of the EO dimensions, it was 
shown that even though innovativeness improved the long-term performance, it led 
to a higher rate of failure over time. Whereas proactiveness and risk taking were 
shown to lead to a negative long-term performance as well as higher probability of 
failure. This indicates that EO, and unequivocally its dimensions, lead to a higher 
risk of failure over time. Our findings have clear implications for theoretical 
development and more consideration beyond the resource-based theory when 
examining the EO and firm performance relationship.   
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 11.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
 
This research aimed to address the effects of EO and each of its dimensions on 
different organisational performance outcomes as well as on risk of firm failure by 
drawing theoretical predictions from organisational learning theory and prospect 
theory. 
 
The motivation behind this thesis stemmed from major limitations underlying our 
understanding of the longitudinal impact of an entrepreneurial orientation on a 
firm’s viability in the long-run. Specifically, most of the literature examines the 
cross-sectional effect of EO on a short-term measure of firm performance, and 
concludes that EO is advantageous on a firm’s performance and is critical for firms 
to ensure a sustainable substantial competitive advantage (Gupta & Gupta., 2015). A 
recent review by Gupta and Dutta (2016) revealed the few number of articles that 
have critiqued EO in the literature (Andersén, 2010; Covin & Wales, 2012; Miller, 
2011). Thus, there is a major setback in advancing our understanding on EO if most 
of the research to this date continues to repeat the same limitations of past research 
to arrive to the desirable conclusion that EO universally is positive on a firm’s 
performance. This thesis aimed to challenge this hegemony in alignment with the 
EO-as-Advantage view of EO through the theoretical foundation of organisational 
learning theory and prospect theory. As such, this thesis predicted that EO’s double 
edged nature would be revealed when assessed over a significant period.  
 
To date our understanding of the causal mechanism of the effect of EO on important 
organisational outcomes is limited, which has led to knowledge on EO to be 
underdeveloped and mis-specified. Most of the literature on EO currently is 
significantly limited to resource-based theory (Rauch et al., 2009; Wales, 2016). Of 
great potential and significance is organisational learning theory, which 
hypothesises that EO may lead to a risk of failure as an increased focus on 
exploratory behaviours carries with it great risk and potential for failure (March, 
1991). Furthermore, prospect theory, based on myopic loss aversion, considers that 
firms that are at a risk of failure or in a financial distress situation are more likely to 
engage in higher levels of risky entrepreneurial behaviours (Swift, 2016). In 
comparison to resource-based theory, such theories capture this potential downside 
of EO.  
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This thesis addressed its research aim by (1) testing the effect of EO and each of its 
dimensions on various measures of firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) in the 
separate samples of surviving firms and failed firms, and (2) testing the effect of EO 
and its independent dimensions, innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking, on 
the risk of firm failure. To test the causal effect of EO and its dimensions on firm-
level outcomes, panel fixed effect regression was used to examine the effect of EO 
and its dimensions on firm performance measures in the samples of surviving and 
failed firms (Study 1) and survival analysis was employed to examine the effect of 
EO and its dimensions on the risk of firm failure (Study 2). By using organisational 
learning and prospect theory as the theoretical backbone to this thesis, 8 hypotheses 
were developed.  
 
The findings of this thesis showed that the hypotheses that are tailored to the effect 
of EO on firm performance and risk of failure (H1, H2a and H2b, H3a and H3b, , 
H4, and H5) were supported. Specifically, it was shown that EO had an inverse-U 
shaped relationship with short-term and long-term firm performance among 
surviving firms, thus supporting H2a and H2b.. Furthermore, it was shown that EO 
had a significant negative effect on short-term and long-term firm performance 
among failed firms supporting H3a and H3b. The results also revealed that EO 
significantly increased the risk of firm failure supporting H4. In support of H1, 
failed firms were more entrepreneurially oriented. Firms in the high-technology 
industry were more entrepreneurially oriented and had a significantly lower survival 
probability, thus supporting H5. With respect to the EO dimensions, this thesis 
showed that six of the eight hypotheses (H6b, H7b, H7c, H8a, H8b, H8c) tailored to 
the effect of each of the EO dimensions on firm performance as well as on risk of 
failure were supported. That is, innovativeness had a significant positive effect on 
long-term performance (supporting hypothesis H6b), proactiveness had a significant 
negative effect on long-term performance (supporting H7b), and risk taking had a 
significant negative concave effect on short-term performance (in support of H8a) 
and a significant negative effect on long-term performance (supporting H8b). Two 
of the hypotheses, H6a and H7a, were not supported due to presence of endogeneity. 
This reveals that Tobin’s Q is more of a superior measure compared to ROA, since 
our results of the innovativeness and proactiveness dimension on ROA were biased 
with endogeneity (Uotila et al., 2009).  Lastly, hypothesis H6c was not supported 
and contrary to this hypothesis, it was revealed that innovativeness had a significant 
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positive effect on firm failure. In support of hypotheses H7c and H8c, proactiveness 
and risk taking had a significant positive effect on firm failure respectively. The 
contributions of these results are discussed in the next section.  
 
11.2 Research Contributions 
 
The findings of this thesis have significant theoretical and research implications for 
EO through the theoretical frameworks of organisational learning theory and 
prospect theory. This thesis has shown that, regardless of the few early researchers 
who have critically questioned the superior performance outcome from EO, most 
previous research has been biased towards presuming a positive EO-firm 
performance relationship (e.g. Andersén, 2010). The majority of previous research 
focused on performance effects from EO more so than what was actually being 
captured when assessing the effect of EO on firm performance (Gupta & Wales, 
2017). 
 
The dominating view that EO improves a firm’s performance is still surprisingly 
present as recent research cites the Rauch et al. (2009) meta-analysis study and 
concludes that ‘EO is important for firms to pursue as consistently findings in the 
research prove that highly entrepreneurially oriented firms grow at a faster rate’ 
(Eshima & Anderson, 2017). This conclusion is premature because such a statement 
is flawed considering that major limitations in the research continue to be ignored. 
Such limitations are: 1) EO has been measured using subjective managerial 
perceptions through the Miller (1983)/Covin and Slevin (1989) EO scale (e.g. 
Eshima & Anderson, 2017; Patel et al., 2015), 2) the EO gestalt conceptualisation 
has been the most common conceptualisation disregarding the individualistic effects 
of EO dimensions (e.g. Gupta & Gupta, 2015), 3) the research examines the cross-
sectional effect of EO without taking into consideration the time factor (e.g. 
Lomberg et al., 2017), 4) the value of EO is tested on aggregated firm performance 
indices or short-term measures (Gupta & Wales, 2017), and lastly and most 
importantly, 5) there is a survivor bias, in which firms disregard examining EO 
among a sample of failed firms (e.g. Eshima & Anderson, 2017, Lomberg et al., 
2017; Rauch et al., 2009). 
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Using the theoretical arguments from organisational learning theory and prospect 
theory, this research advances our knowledge by examining the longitudinal effect 
of EO over a 15-year period on several firm performance outcomes. The novelty of 
the work is in accounting for the effect of EO and its dimensions over time. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of several performance measures allows the capturing of 
the multi-dimensional nature of firm performance (short-term and long-term 
performance and risk of failure). Contrary to previous research, this research 
controls for heterogeneity and endogeneity of omitted variables, and allows for 
causal inferences by using panel data modelling instead of the dominating cross-
sectional testing in EO research (Gupta & Gupta, 2015).  
 
According to organisational learning and prospect theory, the outcomes of an 
exploratory entrepreneurial orientation are only revealed in the long-run, and thus 
the value of EO should be assessed against a long-term measure of performance 
(Uotila et al., 2009). Thus, this study mainly focused on the long-term measure of 
performance (Tobin’s Q), which assesses the value of EO in the long-run. Tobin’s Q 
was used, since very little attention has been directed towards stock-based measures 
or market value of EO (Gupta & Wales, 2017). As noted by Gupta and Wales 
(2017), assessing the value of EO on stock-based measures of performance would 
allow researchers to bridge this important organisational behaviour (EO) into the 
finance and economics domains (e.g. Uotila et al., 2009). Furthermore, to move the 
EO research forward, secondary measures of EO should go in tandem with adoption 
of stock-based long-term measures of performance (Gupta & Wales, 2017). Tobin’s 
Q is an important organisational performance outcome that would reveal the long-
term implications of EO (Gupta & Wales, 2017). Market based measures have been 
used to examine effects of variables along a long-time horizon (Gupta et al., 2016), 
thus, validating the use of this measure in our research.  
 
The novelty of this research extends beyond including a long-term measure of 
performance to measuring the effect of EO on the risk of firm failure. This has not 
been tested in previous literature. Testing EO against the risk of failure is vital 
because the nature of its experimentation and uncertainty are brushed over in most 
research (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). Moreover, it is essential to examine the 
effect of EO against the risk of failure rather than on long-term performance only. 
We use organisational learning theory and prospect theory as the backbone of this 
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research to theorise outcomes from EO on the probability of organisational failure. 
Even though we showed that being innovative was beneficial on the long-term 
performance, it led to a higher risk of failure over time. Thereby, the risk inherent 
within EO cannot be realised unless tested on the risk of failure.   
 
Contrary to most research and consistent with the multi-dimensional 
conceptualisation of EO, this thesis theorised that each of the EO dimensions 
exhibited a different effect on firm performance. Examining the effect of the EO 
dimensions on different firm performance indicators is in contrast to most research 
that prefers to bundle the EO dimensions into the gestalt EO construct and examine 
its overall effect on a hybrid measure of performance. Indeed, such performance 
hybrid measures have been increasing (Gupta & Wales, 2017). In this respect, this 
research is a major contribution as it provided the ability to expose the ‘nuanced 
EO-performance effects’ (Gupta & Wales, 2017). Our findings showed that, as 
hypothesised, the risk taking dimension had a contrasting effect on firm 
performance in comparison to innovativeness, and its effects were different when 
assessed on short-term performance versus long-term performance. This implies that 
the independent effects of the EO dimensions between and among themselves are 
only revealed when several performance outcomes are taken into consideration.  
 
To allow the longitudinal investigation of EO on several firm performance 
measures, this research advanced the prior research by utilising objective secondary 
proxies. Even though subjective measures have been the dominant conceptualisation 
of EO, some researchers have only recently adopted the secondary measurement 
approach (e.g. Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2011; Mthanti & Ojah, 2017; Shahzad et 
al., 2016). Using objective measures rigorously for examining EO is a ‘state-of-the 
art’ approach, as their use is still new and fledgling to date. The objective 
measurement of EO forgoes the limitation of subjectivity managerial bias and non-
response bias of EO scale measurement. Furthermore, the objective measurement of 
EO would conceptually align with EO as a firm-level behaviour instead of 
mistakenly considering managerial perceptions as firm-level behaviours. 
 
In addition to the above, this research addressed the major limitation of survivor 
bias in the literature. Based on organisational learning theory, it separated the 
outcomes from EO and its dimensions on firm-level outcomes in two sets of 
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samples (surviving firms versus failed firms) (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2011). By 
doing so, this research theorised the outcomes from EO among surviving firms 
distinguishably from its outcomes in the sample of failed firms. Research to date is 
still subject to this major limitation of survivor bias (e.g. Lomberg et al., 2017). 
What is surprising is that Wiklund and Shepherd (2011) theorised negative 
outcomes from EO among the sample of failed firms, yet researchers continued to 
ignore the potential downside of EO. Recent research still cites the infamously 
Rauch et al. (2009) meta-analysis as evidence that EO is beneficial. This is alarming 
as the limitations of past research is being repeated among current researchers. If 
such limitations continue to be ignored, then what is novel about the new stream of 
research? Not only did this thesis examine the separate impact of EO and its 
dimensions on several performance measures among the surviving firms versus the 
failed firms, but it also examined the separate impact of EO and each of its 
dimensions on the risk of firm failure in the separate samples of failed firms. 
Recently, a review of firm survival/failure in the literature revealed that most 
researchers bundle the effects of their tested variables in an overall sample of failed 
firms without capturing the multi-dimensional aspect of failure (Josefy et al., 2017). 
Thereby, it is important to examine the effect of EO on the overall risk of failure as 
well as on a specific form of failure (e.g. M&A, bankruptcy, privatisation).  
 
Lastly, the focus of the effects of EO and its dimensions on firm-level outcomes, 
within the context of large high-technology firms and the pre-crisis to the post-crisis 
period, represents a contextual consideration that allowed for deeper and more 
meaningful insights into EO’s double-edged nature. Such a specific context offers 
more focused theoretical revelations (Gupta & Wales, 2017; Wales, 2016). The 
significant added value of this thesis is its theoretical contribution.   
 
The next section will present the managerial practical implications of the research 
findings.  
11.3 Managerial Implications 
 
This thesis has practical implications for managers of large US firms in the high-
technology industry. It highlights the possible negative outcomes of EO on firm 
performance over time and thus provides insights on how to better ensure the 
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probability of firm survival in the overly competitive constantly changing high-tech 
market at times of significant economic crisis. Most of the current industrial 
hindsight focuses on start-up failures in line with the conventional belief that a 
majority of start-up businesses are likely to fail. Moreover, the research on revealing 
the possible double-edged nature of EO has tended to focus on small business 
performance (e.g. Wales et al., 2013b; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005) or family 
businesses (e.g. Revilla et al., 2016). Yet, established large firms can also be subject 
to failure. The ultimate goal of managers is to ensure the survival of their business 
over time. This is where the findings of this research are valuable to them as we 
address whether large established firms might fail as a result of being too 
entrepreneurial. 
A firm that is entrepreneurial is fundamentally innovative, proactive, and risk 
taking. The question is then: do managers really benefit from being more 
innovative, proactive, and risk taking in the long-run? The findings of this research 
on the effect of each dimension of EO on several performance outcomes (short-
term, long-term, and survival) provide an interesting outlook for managers since 
each dimension of EO was shown to have a unique effect on a specific performance 
outcome. Managers must realize the trade-offs of the separate EO dimensions on the 
different performance outcomes. According to the results of this research, if the goal 
of managers is to achieve short-term returns, then they might benefit from being 
proactive and taking moderate risks. Thus, as most managers tend to be short-term-
focused and to be concerned with affecting their immediate current rather than the 
long-term environment (Levinthal & March, 1993), proactiveness and risk taking 
might provide such managers with short-term benefits. Whereas, if the goal of the 
managers is to enhance their long-term stock or market value, then they must attend 
to being more innovative (by spending more on R&D) and be less proactive and less 
risk taking. Yet, overall, being entrepreneurial is a resource intensive strategy that 
drives the firm to engage in behaviours and activities that are far from its 
competencies and that might subject it to a higher probability of failure. As our 
findings suggest to managers, being innovative, proactive, and risk taking over time 
increase the probability of failure for large US high-tech firms. Thus, a high-
technology overly competitive industry might subject firms to engage in behaviours 
that are too entrepreneurial or explorative (rather than exploitative or refining 
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behaviours). It is this constant experimentation and exploration that highly increases 
the chances of failure over time. 
Most of the current research on EO focuses on its outcomes in a sample of surviving 
firms. There is a huge research gap on examining the possible outcomes of EO in a 
sample of failed firms. Firms that cease to exist either due to an acquisition or 
liquidation should be examined in EO research, especially if survival or 
performance are the dependent variables of concern.  Managers might use research 
findings as guidelines on how to steer their firms. Thereby, research that mostly 
concludes that EO is advantageous to a firm (and only examines surviving firms) 
would lead to biased managerial beliefs that there are more financial returns to 
entrepreneurial investment strategies. Through our research, it was shown that 
entrepreneurial behaviours do not exhibit a linear effect on a surviving firm’s 
performance. That is, managers should realize that entrepreneurial behaviours might 
benefit a surviving firm’s performance at lower levels of investment. However, as 
surviving firms increase their focus and alignment of their strategies with only 
entrepreneurial strategies, such firms would suffer from lower performance returns 
in the short-run and the long-run. Thus, large surviving firms might benefit from 
being entrepreneurial since they differentiate themselves from competitors. With 
increasing levels of being entrepreneurial, firms are likely to engage in more risk-
taking and experimental foolishness. The finding of EO’s non-linear effect on 
performance among surviving firms corroborates with the double-edged nature of 
EO. In contrast, our findings of EO’s linear negative effect on performance among 
failed firms indicate that EO has a negative effect on performance of failed firms 
(even at lower levels of investment). In contrast to most research, such findings 
would assist managers to realize that entrepreneurial behaviours are not linearly 
advantageous when examined over time. That is, EO not only can enhance 
performance up to a threshold point among surviving firms, but it might also have a 
negative effect on performance among failed firms and even enhance the probability 
of their failure over time.  
 
Overall EO decreased the long-term performance over time and enhanced the risk of 
failure (M&A, bankruptcy, and privatisation) for large firms in the high-technology 
industry. Highly entrepreneurially oriented firms had lower survival probability. 
Deconstructing the latent EO construct into its main components provided further 
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understanding for managers that being entrepreneurially oriented is fundamentally 
involving dimensions of contrasting effects: being innovative had a positive effect 
on the long-term performance, while being proactive and taking risks had a negative 
effect on the long-term performance. Interestingly, even though being innovative 
had a positive effect on the long-term market value of the firm, it increased the risk 
of failure over time. Furthermore, the EO dimensions, proactiveness and risk taking, 
were shown to increase the risk of failure. Thereby, practitioners must take into 
account the negative impact of EO and each of its dimensions on firm survival, 
especially that EO is continuously and universally considered to be a performance-
enhancing orientation for firms (Rauch et al., 2009). When EO is high, there are 
incurring costs for firms that potentially ignite the halt to their presence in the 
market. Being overly-focused on pursuing exploratory behaviours at the expense of 
reliable exploitative activities is likely to result in a higher likelihood of losses than 
gains (March, 1991; Swift, 2016). The high-technology industry forces firms to 
pursue higher exploratory endeavours to ensure they do not face a risk of 
obsolescence.. Our findings suggest that large firms must not be overly explorative, 
especially in R&D intensive high-technology industries (March, 1991; Uotila et al., 
2009). The question then is which learning mechansims are valuable and to what 
threshold would firms reach the desired performance level (Miner & Mezias, 1996).  
Certain examples of firms that had a high entrepreneurial orientation and failed as a 
result of bankruptcy or liquidation in our sample include: Midway Games Inc., 
Remec Inc, Sheldahl Inc, and Trident microsystems Inc etc. Midway Games Inc. 
was an American video game developer that franchised Mortal Komba and was one 
of the world’s leading producers in making video games. It revived the video game 
industry with the introduction of Mortal Kombat in 1992. Yet, it overly expanded in 
the mid 1990’s and acquired several companies to begin producing its own ‘home 
games’. With the shift in focus of the firm, this added more R&D costs, in which the 
annual R&D of the firm increased from 1995 to 1996 from a value of 8.4 million to 
$ 32.5 million. The company retained over 80 % of its shares and they were 
reinvesting their profits to maintain their increased growth. This is the case 
especially for growing companies that may prefer to retain their earnings to fuel 
their business instead of paying dividends. However, eventually with increasingly 
engaging in-debt financing, borrowing heavily, and taking more risks, the company 
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filed for bankruptcy in 2011. This clear example indicates to managers the risks that 
are associated with EO over time. 
Established giant firms are always in a race to be first-movers and managers are 
mostly concerned with being the first to market (Tellis & Golder, 1996). There is a 
managerial bias that riskier investments will lead to more returns and this biased 
relationship becomes steeper when firms are facing crisis situations. Errors in the 
learning process held within entrepreneurial behaviours are costly and can even lead 
to disastrous outcomes for firms. Including a sample of failed firms in the study 
holds great value for managers as lessons are ought to be learned. Kodak is a classic 
example of a firm that failed to realise the importance of transitioning from film to 
digital photography. As a result, the firm filed for bankruptcy by 2012 and its failure 
resulted in significant losses for its employees and its shareholders. Managers do not 
realize that, by excessively supporting radical technologies that are of an 
experimental nature, they are subjecting their firms to a higher failure possibility as 
well.  
The technologies that are expected to materialise into marketable and profitable 
novel discoveries and to lead to new avenues for growth and development are the 
same as those that could result in costly errors of estimation. Thus, the first to 
market is not always synonymous with successful outcomes. A dominant large firm 
reaches its dominant position by being explorative in nature and by exploiting its 
existing competencies. Yet by being exceedingly a pioneer might not work in the 
favour of the firm. By the 1980’s Apple computers were referred to as the ‘pioneers 
of personal computers’.  Yet, Micro Instrumentation and Telemetry Systems (MITS) 
was the initial market pioneer. In 1976, MITS was termed the ‘IBM of home 
computers’ (Freiberger & Swaine, 1999). The early success and lead of the firm was 
not long-lasting. Yet, most of the industry does not discuss the failure of such firms 
and attributes the ‘undeserved praise’ to other firms, such as Apple Inc. (Tellis & 
Golder, 1996).  Interestingly in the sample of our study, Apple Inc. was one of the 
firms that was exhibiting levels at the lower-end to moderate in entrepreneurial 
orientation and its dimensions. For firms to survive, managers should realise that a 
balance must be achieved between explorative foolishness and exploitation. In light 
of the findings, managers must acknowledge the uncertainty inherent within 
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entrepreneurial behaviours and the possibility that being a market pioneer does not 
necessarily lead to long-term success and viability. 
The next section will outline the limitations and the possible future research 
directions.  
 
11.4 Limitations and Future Research  
 
This thesis has focused on the direct effects of EO and its dimensions on firm 
performance and risk of failure in the form of a longitudinal analysis. Even though 
the results of this thesis provide new exciting revelations, further future research is 
warranted. The below section will outline the limitations and possible research 
avenues to address these limitations.  
 
The first limitation of this thesis is that it only focused on the direct impact of EO 
and the EO dimensions on organisational outcomes, without considering possible 
moderators that would affect the strength of the EO-firm performance. Previous 
research has focused on investigating new potential moderators that influence the 
established EO-firm performance relationship, yet this has been only their principal 
unoriginal contribution (Gupta & Wales, 2017).   
 
The majority of the previous research has tended to focus on external environmental 
factors that affect the EO and firm performance relationship (Ireland et al., 2009; 
Rauch et al., 2009). Contingency theory explicates that the relationship between two 
variables might be contingent on a third variable. “To decrease the potential for 
false interpretations, the introduction of moderators into bivariate relationships 
allows for a better, more precise understanding” (Rosenberg, 1968, p. 100). 
Therefore, this research could be further extended to examine possible internal 
moderating factors that would affect the EO and firm performance/risk of failure 
relationship. Examining internal CEO factors is important to pursue, since there is a 
gap in the literature regarding exploring the role of managerial characteristics in the 
EO-performance relationship. Only recently, a study examined the role of 
managerial discretion (Gupta et al., 2016). There is a need to account for the human 
agency in understanding the function and performance outcomes from EO.  
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Considering the human agency context when understanding EO might also 
challenge the hegemony of EO-as-Advantage view, especially when dark leadership 
or managerial traits (e.g. CEO overconfidence or greed) are tested on the EO-firm 
performance relationship. CEOs that display overconfident or greedy personalities 
are inclined to take more risks and display higher levels of EO (Engelen et al., 
2015), which in turn would have adverse effects on firm performance (Haynes et al., 
2014). Thereby, a fruitful research avenue could be to examine the moderating 
effect of CEO overconfidence or greed on the EO-firm performance relationship 
while controlling for intervening factors that would suppress the managerial impact 
such as board’s power (e.g. Haynes et al., 2014). 
 
Based on upper echelon theory, over time organisations become reflections of their 
top managers (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). However, CEOs have limited 
perceptions of a situation, and thus are likely to make subjective decisions based on 
their own characteristics or past experiences (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). A CEO’s 
personal or cognitive characteristics are based on ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon, 
1957), which can have a major effect on an organisation’s strategic decisions 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and eventually affect its overall performance 
(Hambrick & Quigley, 2014). The upper echelon literature has tended to focus on 
simple managerial demographical factors. Furthermore, Haynes et al. (2015) 
indicated that the literature has predominantly focused on the positive side of 
entrepreneurial leadership neglecting its negative side. As initially Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996) argued, the EO-firm performance relationship is more complex than a 
direct relationship and in effect the examination of contingent moderating dark 
leadership or CEO traits on the EO-firm performance relationship would provide 
new insights for the EO literature (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2005). 
 
Second, as we focused on the direct effect of EO on firm performance, we could 
have missed to consider the antecedents to EO. Most interestingly, in our findings 
the EO construct and each of the EO dimensions were varying across the years in 
the time-series figures and were not consistent over time. The dynamic nature of EO 
was shown by using panel data. This suggests that it is important to know what 
drives the EO of the firm. Only recently, researchers have started to consider the 
drivers of EO, in which they found that firm growth trigged the EO of the firm 
(Eshima & Anderson, 2017). Thereby, perhaps researchers can examine possible 
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antecedents to EO and how such antecedents cause the variations in the exhibition 
of EO across a longitudinal timeframe.  
 
Third, this thesis has relied on objective proxies for the EO dimensions and the firm 
performance measures. Even though the objective proxies address the limitations of 
the subjective EO scale measurement, there are some concerns with objective 
measurement as well (Dalton and Aguinis; Ketchen et al., 2013). 
 
To address such limitation, a possible research avenue would be to compare the 
results of the effect of the EO proxies (risk taking, innovativeness, and 
proactiveness) on firm performance with results of EO using computer-aided textual 
analysis (CATA). Possibly, content analysis using CATA could be run on a sub-
sample of firms for certain years since the validation of proxies through content 
analysis does not require the usage of the whole sample. 
 
Even though the proxies intended for use in this doctoral research have been 
outlined in past research, it is important to break from the assumption that these 
proxies are inherently or intuitively accurate. To prevent the risk of measurement 
malaise as put forward by Ketchen et al. (2013), it is important to test for such 
proxies even though other researchers (e.g. Kreiser et al., 2013; Shahzad et al., 
2016) have also adopted Miller and Le Breton-Miller’s (2011) proxies of the EO 
dimensions. EO could be comparably measured using content analysis of CEO 
shareholders letters, which are publicly available, to ensure a reliable measurement 
of the EO dimensions. 
 
Content analysis using CATA is superior to human analysis of texts since it is free 
of coder bias and is more reliable and faster (Short et al., 2010). Reliability refers to 
consistency of measurement, in which CATA method has high test-retest reliability 
and lacks human error (Short et al., 2010). CATA method of content analysis is 
more accurate than human-coded analysis. CATA techniques are also faster and 
allow analysis of multiple texts within minutes. As this doctoral thesis adopts more 
of a positivist stance, CATA method is more in line with the philosophical position. 
A content-based measure for EO already exists through the seminal work of Short et 
al. (2010). Short et al. (2010) provided an example of construct validation by CATA 
(through DICTION software) using the EO construct. They developed a list of 
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keywords for each of the dimensions of EO. Since then, some studies have also used 
Short et al. (2010) keywords to capture each of the EO dimensions (e.g. Engelen et 
al., 2015; Gupta et al., 2016). 
 
Fourth, as with other research studies, the results of this thesis are context-
dependent. The findings provide new theoretical extensions to the literature on EO, 
yet they are relevant to the sample of US large high-tech firms. Future research can 
extend to examine the longitudinal effect of EO and each of its dimensions on firm 
performance and risk of failure among a possible sample of firms of different sizes, 
which belong to different industries, and which could be extended to different 
country settings.  
 
Fifth, this research has focused only on the three main dimensions of EO without 
considering the other dimensions, autonomy and competitive aggressiveness, as 
positioned by Lumpkin and Dess (1996). Most previous research has focused on the 
three-dimensional conceptualisation of EO by Miller (1983). A possible future 
research endeavour would be to examine the longitudinal effect of the EO 
dimensions, autonomy and competitive aggressiveness, on firm performance as well 
as on risk of failure. 
 
11.5 Chapter Conclusion  
 
This research has advanced the understanding of the outcomes of EO within the 
context of US large firms in the high-technology industry. The results provide 
unique novel theoretical implications of the effect of EO and each of its dimensions 
on firm performance as well as on risk of failure. Through utilising organisational 
learning and prospect theory, the results of the thesis aligned more with the EO-as-
Experimentation perspective. The results further advance our knowledge on the 
effect of EO on an organisation’s performance and viability by showing that EO’s 
beneficial effect among the sample of surviving firms decreased as EO increased. 
Furthermore, this thesis has shown that EO has a positive effect on the risk of failure 
over time. The postulation by Wiklund and Shepherd (2011), that EO enhances a 
firm’s performance among surviving firms based on the EO-as-Experimentation 
perspective, was not supported in this thesis. EO’s beneficial linear effect was not 
392 
 
present among surviving firms. The use of large firms provided a neutral setting to 
examine the effect of EO, since literature have found an inverse U-shaped effect of 
EO on the performance of small firms. Furthermore, by examining the separate 
effects of the EO dimensions, it was revealed that innovativeness had a positive 
effect on long-term performance, yet over time it had a positive effect on firm 
failure. Lastly, proactiveness and risk taking had a negative effect on long-term 
performance and a positive effect on failure. These novel results indicate that EO 
has a double-edged nature, an effect that is not being captured in the literature.  
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Appendix A: Prominent Studies on EO throughout the Literature 
 
Research 
Studies- 
Authors   
Construct(s) 
examined 
Sample Method Results 
 
Phase 1: Conceptual Development of EO 
 
Khandwalla 
(1976/77) 
Risk taking Top managers 
from 103 publicly 
traded Canadian 
firms 
Correlation 
analysis 
EO was 
correlated with 
higher 
performance and 
the 
organisational 
context affected 
this relationship. 
Miller & 
Friesen 
(1982) 
Innovativeness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
Divisional Vice 
presidents from 
52 Canadian firms 
Correlation 
and regression 
analysis run on 
the 
conservative 
and 
entrepreneurial 
sub-samples 
Propensity of 
entrepreneurially 
oriented 
managers drove 
their firms to be 
more innovative 
and risk taking.  
Miller (1983) Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
Divisional Vice 
presidents from 
52 
Canadian firms 
Correlation 
and 
sub-group 
samples 
regression 
analysis 
The EO 
dimensions 
differed among 
simple, 
planning, and 
organic firms. 
Covin & 
Slevin 
(1988) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
 
Senior managers 
from 80 large US 
firms 
Moderated 
regression 
analysis and 
hierarchical 
cluster 
analysis 
The EO and firm 
performance 
relationship 
was positively 
moderated 
by 
organisational 
structure 
(organic versus 
mechanistic). 
Covin & 
Slevin 
(1989) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct)  
 
Senior managers 
from 161 US 
manufacturing 
Firms 
Moderated 
regression 
analysis 
Highly EO firms 
had higher 
performance in 
hostile 
environments, 
whereas 
conservative 
firms 
were better 
performers in 
benign 
environments. 
Venkatraman 
(1989) 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking, 
Competitive 
aggressiveness 
(multi-
dimensional 
construct) 
Presidents/CEOs 
from 201 strategic 
business units of 
large, established 
firms 
Regression 
analysis 
Strategic 
Orientation 
Dimensions: 
Risk taking and 
competitive 
aggressiveness 
were negatively 
related to 
profitability of 
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the firm, while 
proactiveness 
was found to be 
positively 
related to firm 
growth and 
profitability. 
Covin & 
Slevin 
(1990) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
 
Senior managers 
from 90 US firms 
Correlation 
and 
Discriminant 
analysis 
EO-new venture 
performance 
relationship was 
more 
positive 
in 
emerging than 
in mature 
industries. 
Covin, 
Slevin, & 
Covin 
(1990) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
 
Senior managers 
from 57 small 
growth seeking 
US manufacturing 
Firms 
Correlation 
analysis 
Firms operating 
in high-
technology 
industries used 
more 
entrepreneurially 
oriented 
strategies than 
their 
counterparts. EO 
was shown to 
have a positive 
relationship with 
performance in 
firms operating 
in low-
technology 
industries. 
Zahra (1991) Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
(measured by 
innovativeness)  
CEOs from 119 
fortune 500 firms 
Correlation 
Analysis 
Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
increased 
financial 
performance. 
Covin, Slevin, 
& Schultz 
(1994) 
 
 
 
 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
scale 
Senior executives 
(CEOs/Presidents) 
from 91 US 
manufacturing 
firms 
Moderated 
Regression 
and 
sub-group 
analysis 
Positive effect of 
EO on firm 
performance was 
present among 
only firms 
whose strategic 
mission is to 
increase their 
market share. 
 
Phase 2: Development of EO-firm performance  
 
Zahra & 
Covin 
(1995) 
Corporate 
Entrepreneurship 
gestalt construct 
(Innovativeness, 
Risk taking) 
using Miller and 
Friesen (1982) 
scale 
 
 
CEOs from 108 
US manufacturing 
firms 
Moderated 
regression 
analysis 
Corporate-level 
entrepreneurship 
was positively 
related to firm 
performance, 
which increased 
over a 7-year 
period, and 
environmental 
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hostility 
positively 
moderated this 
relationship. 
Knight (1997) Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
scale  
Presidents from 
258 Canadian 
Firms 
Exploratory 
and 
confirmatory 
factor analysis, 
reliability 
analysis 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
EO scale 
possessed a 
valid, reliable, 
and consistent 
two-factor 
(Innovativeness 
and 
Proactiveness) 
structure across 
two cultures. 
Zahra & 
Neubaum 
(1998) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
modified version 
of Miller (1983) 
CEOs from 321 
new ventures 
Regression 
Analysis 
EO was 
positively 
related to 
performance in 
high-technology 
but not 
low-technology 
industries. 
Wiklund 
(1999) 
Innovativeness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
utilising Miller 
and Friesen 
(1982) scale 
Managing 
directors 
from 132 small 
Swedish 
firms surveyed 
over three 
consecutive years 
(one-year lags 
between 
measurements of 
EO and 
performance) 
Regression 
Analysis 
A positive EO-
firm 
performance 
(growth and 
profitability 
combined) 
relationship 
which increased 
over time.  
Zahra & 
Garvis (2000) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
modified version 
of Miller (1983)  
CEOs from 98 US 
manufacturing 
firms 
Regression 
Analysis 
EO or 
international 
corporate 
entrepreneurship 
was positively 
related with  
performance 
(profitability and 
growth). The 
effect of EO on 
firm 
performance was 
an inverted U-
shaped 
relationship in a 
hostile 
environment. 
Lumpkin & 
Dess (2001) 
Proactiveness, 
Competitive 
aggressiveness 
(multi-
dimensional 
construct) using 
Executives from 
94 
non-diversified, 
non-affiliated for-
profit US 
firms 
Factor and 
Regression 
analysis 
Differential 
effects of 
proactiveness 
and competitive 
aggressiveness 
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modified scale 
of Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
and they 
represented 
different 
constructs.  
Kemelgor 
(2002) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
Managers 
from 8 matched 
firms within 
the Netherlands 
and 
the United States. 
Correlation 
analysis and 
T-tests 
The EO-
performance 
relationship was 
stronger and 
more significant 
in the case of US 
firms rather than 
firms in the 
Netherlands, and 
firms in the US 
displayed higher 
EO levels. 
Kreiser, 
Marino, & 
Weaver 
(2002) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking, 
(multi-
dimensional 
construct) using 
modified scale 
of Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
Owner or general 
managers of small 
medium 
organisations 
from 6 countries  
Confirmatory 
factor analysis 
EO dimensions 
were 
independent and 
revealed unique 
variance in line 
with Lumpkin 
and Dess (1996). 
Wiklund & 
Shepherd 
(2003) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
scale 
Managers from 
384 Swedish 
small and medium 
sized 
Firms 
Hierarchical 
regression 
analysis 
EO positively 
moderated the 
relationship 
between a firm’s 
ability to exploit 
its knowledge 
based resources 
and firm 
performance. 
Wiklund & 
Shepherd 
(2005) 
Innovativeness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Miller (1983) 
scale 
Managing 
directors 
from 413 small 
Swedish firms 
surveyed over 
a one-year lag 
between 
predictors and 
dependent 
variable 
Hierarchical  
regression 
analysis 
Three-way 
configurational 
model better 
explained 
performance: 
strategy (EO) 
access to capital, 
and 
environmental 
dynamism. 
Covin, 
Green, & 
Slevin 
(2006) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
scale 
Senior-most 
executives from 
110 US 
manufacturing 
firms 
Regression 
analysis 
EO was not 
significantly but 
positively 
related to sales 
growth. Three 
factors affect the 
relationship 
more positively: 
less participative 
decision making, 
emergent 
strategies, low 
proficiency of 
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learning from 
failures.  
Hughes & 
Morgan 
(2007) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking, 
Competitive 
aggressiveness, 
Autonomy 
(multi-
dimensional 
construct) using 
Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996) 
scale  
Managing 
directors from a 
sample of 211 
young high-
technology firms 
at an emerging 
stage of 
development  
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
Innovativeness 
had a positive 
effect on product 
performance, 
proactiveness 
had a positive 
effect on product 
and customer 
performance, 
whereas risk 
taking had a 
negative effect 
on product 
performance. 
Competitive 
aggressiveness 
and autonomy 
showed no effect 
on firm 
performance. 
Tang, Tang, 
Marino, 
Zhang, & Li 
(2008) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness 
Risk taking, 
 (gestalt 
construct) 
utilising the 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
scale  
Top management 
teams from 185 
Chinese firms 
Hierarchical  
Regression 
Analysis 
The relationship 
was indicated to 
be curvilinear, 
such that high 
investment in 
EO lead to 
diminishing 
positive returns 
on firm 
performance. 
Rauch, 
Wiklund, 
Lumpkin, & 
Frese (2009) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking, 
Competitive 
aggressiveness, 
Autonomy 
(multi-
dimensional and 
gestalt construct) 
Meta-analysis of 
51 studies (53 
samples) using the 
Miller (1983) or 
Covin and Slevin 
(1989) scales or 
modified versions 
Meta-analysis Positive 
relationship 
between EO 
and firm 
performance, the 
EO-firm 
performance 
relationship was 
moderately 
large, EO 
represented a 
gestalt construct, 
stronger EO-
firm 
performance 
relationship in 
the high-tech 
industry. 
Phase 3: Maturation of EO-firm performance 
Short, 
Broberg, 
Cogliser, & 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking, 
Competitive 
Content analysis 
using computer-
aided text analysis 
Hierarchical 
regression 
analysis  
EO had a 
positive effect 
on market-based 
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Brigham 
(2010) 
aggressiveness, 
Autonomy 
(multi-
dimensional and 
gestalt construct) 
of shareholder 
letters on a 
sample of 450 
S&P and a sample 
of 205 Russell 
2000 firms from 
2001-2005  
performance. 
Innovativeness 
and 
Proactiveness 
had a positive 
impact on 
performance and 
risk taking had a 
negative effect 
on performance. 
Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller 
(2011) 
Objective 
measures of the 
EO dimensions: 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
898 Fortune 1000 
firms from 1996 
until 2000 (263 
family firms, 141 
lone founders, and 
492 other firms) 
using data from 
Compustat and 
CSRP 
Panel 
regressions 
Lone founder 
owners who 
exhibit 
entrepreneurial 
identities were 
correlated with 
higher firm-level 
EO and higher 
firm 
performance.  
Wiklund & 
Shepherd 
(2011) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
utilising the 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
scale 
CEOs from 239 
small- and 
medium-sized 
Swedish firms in 
four industrial 
sectors (three-year 
lag between 
measures of 
independent and 
dependent 
variables) 
Probit model, 
relative 
performance 
model, and T-
test 
Surviving firms 
with more EO 
had higher 
relative 
performance 
than those with 
lower EO. EO 
had a positive 
effect on firm 
failure.  
Kraus, 
Rigtering, 
Hughes, & 
Hosman 
(2012) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(multi-
dimensional 
construct) using 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
scale 
CEOs from a 
sample of 164 
SMEs in the 
Netherlands in 
2009 
Hierarchical 
linear 
regression 
analysis 
Proactiveness 
positively 
impacted firm 
performance. 
Innovativeness 
improved firm 
performance in 
turbulent 
environments 
whereas risk 
taking 
negatively 
impacted 
performance in 
turbulence 
markets. 
Mousa & 
Wales (2012) 
EO gestalt 
construct 
measured 
objectively by 
summing the 
total number of 
products with 
164 US firms in 
the high-
technology 
industry that 
undergone an IPO 
between 2001 and 
2005 
Cox 
Proportional 
Hazard model 
EO increases 
post-IPO 
survival. 
Furthermore, 
founder CEOs 
positively 
moderated the 
EO-survival 
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the total number 
of 
risk factors 
relationship. 
Kreiser, 
Marino, 
Kuratko, & 
Weaver 
(2013) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(multi-
dimensional) 
utilising Covin 
and Slevin 
(1989) scale  
Owners/general 
manager of 1,668 
small- and 
medium- sized 
enterprises 
(SMEs) in nine 
countries in 13 
different 
industries 
Hierarchical 
regression 
analysis 
Innovativeness 
and 
Proactiveness 
had a positive U-
shaped 
relationship with 
performance 
whereas risk 
taking had a 
negative U- 
shaped 
relationship with 
performance.  
Rosenbusch, 
Rauch, & 
Bausch 
(2013) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Miller (1983) 
and Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
scales  
Meta-analysis of 
studies that focus 
on the EO-
performance link 
and the 
relationship 
between EO and 
environmental 
variables as well 
as the relationship 
between 
environmental 
variables and 
performance.  
Meta-analysis 
and structural 
equation 
modelling  
EO had a 
positive effect 
on firm 
performance 
relationship. EO 
mediated the 
relationship 
between 
environmental 
munificence, 
dynamism, and 
hostility and 
firm 
performance. 
Wales, Patel 
& Lumpkin 
(2013b) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989)  
CEOs from 173 
High-technology 
Manufacturing 
small and young 
firms in the US 
states from 
Corptech 
directory  
Path analysis 
based on 
bootstrap 
standard errors 
Higher levels of 
CEO 
narcissism was 
positively 
related with 
higher EO. 
Partial mediation 
of EO on CEO 
narcissism and 
performance 
variance. 
Wales, Patel, 
Parida, & 
Kreiser 
(2013c) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
utilising Covin 
and Slevin 
(1989)  
CEOS from 258 
Swedish small 
firms 
Hierarchical 
OLS 
regression  
Inverted U-
shaped 
relationship was 
found between 
EO and small 
firm 
performance. 
Dai, 
Maksimov, 
Gilbert, & 
Fernhaber 
(2014) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(multi-
dimensional 
construct) 
utilising 
modified version 
of Covin and 
Owners or chief 
executives from 
500 SMEs in 10 
industries  
Regression 
analysis 
Relationship 
between 
innovativeness 
and 
proactiveness 
and international 
scope was U-
shaped, and the 
relationship 
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Slevin (1989) 
scale 
between risk 
taking and 
international 
scope was 
inverse-U 
shaped. 
Engelen, 
Kube, 
Schmidt, & 
Flatten (2014) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
utlising Covin 
and Slevin 
(1989) scale 
CEOs and 
members of the 
TMT from 219 
SMEs in Germany 
Stepwise 
Regression 
analysis 
EO-firm 
performance 
relationship was 
positive. A 
firm’s absorptive 
capacity 
positively 
moderated the 
relationship 
between EO and 
firm 
performance in 
the presence of 
turbulent 
markets. 
Lechner & 
Gudmundsson 
(2014) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness,  
Risk taking,  
Autonomy,  
Competitive 
aggressiveness 
(multi-
dimensional 
construct) using 
Lumpkin and 
Dess (1996) 
Managers of 335 
Small Icelandic 
firms  
PLS path 
modelling 
Innovativeness 
had a positive 
effect on 
performance. 
Risk taking and 
Competitive 
aggressiveness 
had a negative 
effect on 
performance. 
Proactiveness 
and autonomy 
had no 
significant 
effect. 
Engelen, 
Neumann, & 
Schwens 
(2015) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
measured using 
Short et al. 
(2010) CATA 
method 
142 observations 
from 61 
companies in the 
high-tech setting 
from 2005 to 
2007 from 
Execucomp  
Generalized 
estimated 
equation 
regression 
analysis 
The relationship 
between CEO 
overconfidence 
and EO was 
moderated by 
market 
dynamism, with 
CEO 
overconfidence 
effect on EO 
being stronger at 
higher levels of 
market 
dynamism. CEO 
overconfidence’s 
effect on EO 
was increasing at 
a decreasing 
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rate.  
Gupta & 
Gupta (2015) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) 
measured using 
a historiometric 
approach 
Large, publicly 
traded 42 German 
firms listed in the 
Forbes 2010 
ranking over 10-
year panel data 
from year 1999 
until 2008 
Regression 
Analysis Fixed 
effects 
The positive 
effect of EO 
became less 
significant over 
time and the 
external 
environmental 
factors impacted 
the superior 
effect of EO on a 
firm’s 
performance 
over a 10-year 
span. 
Patel, 
Kohtamäki, 
Parida, & 
Wincent, 
(2015) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) was 
measured by 
modified scales 
by Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
and Lumpkin 
and Dess (2001) 
Managers from 
147 small young 
firms in the 
AffarsData 
directory in high-
technology 
industry during 
2007 and 2009.  
Structural 
equation 
modeling 
(Path analysis) 
EO and Potential 
absorptive 
capacity 
increased the 
variation in 
innovation 
outcomes, but 
the realized 
absorptive 
capacity lead to 
financial returns 
from EO. 
Gupta, 
Mortal, & 
Yang (2016) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
CATA method 
of shareholder 
letters for 
measuring EO 
(Short et al., 
2010)  
243 large firms on 
the Forbes 2000 
list  
from five 
countries: 
Australia, Canada, 
Germany, United 
Kingdom, and 
United 
States from 2005 
until 2008 
Regression 
analysis 
The positive 
impact of EO on 
the stock-market 
value of firms 
was contingent 
on the 
organisational 
and industrial 
discretion. 
Karmann, 
Mauer, 
Flatten, & 
Brettel (2016) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(multi-
dimensional and 
gestalt construct) 
using Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
scale 
CEOs of 411 
firms in Germany 
during 2012 
Binary logistic 
regression 
analysis 
Innovativeness 
decreases 
corrupt 
behaviours. Risk 
taking increases 
corrupt 
behaviours. EO 
insignificant 
effect on 
corruption.  
Lomberg, 
Urbig, 
Stöckmann, 
Marino, & 
Dickson 
(2017) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Miller 
Top managers 
from 1,024 small- 
and medium-sized 
firms from six 
countries: 
Australia, 
Hierarchical 
ordinary least 
squares 
regression and 
communality 
analysis 
Only 
proactiveness, 
from the EO 
dimensions, had 
a unique effect 
on firm 
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(1983)/Covin 
and Slevin 
(1989) scale 
Finland, Mexico, 
Netherlands, 
Norway, and 
Sweden. 
performance. 
There was also a 
strong bilateral 
shared effect 
between 
innovativeness 
and 
proactiveness. 
Revilla, 
Pérez-Luño, 
& Nieto 
(2016) 
Innovativeness,  
Proactiveness,  
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
scale 
Managers from 
Spanish firms in 
five medium- and 
high-  
manufacturing 
industries from 
2007 until 2013 
Cox 
Proportional 
Hazard 
regression  
Family 
involvement 
decreases the 
risk of business 
failure, but EO 
positively 
moderates the 
relationship 
between family 
involvement and 
risk of failure. 
Shahzad, 
Wales, 
Sharfman & 
Stein (2016) 
Objective 
measures for the 
EO dimensions: 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(multi-
dimensional 
construct) 
The Kinder, 
Lydenburg, and 
Domini (KLD) 
database for 
shareholder data 
from 2005 until 
2008, Compustat 
for financial data, 
and EO data from 
secondary sources 
from 2004 until 
2007 for a sample 
of 1,015 public 
US firms 
Random-
effects panel 
regression 
Innovativeness 
and 
Proactiveness 
have a positive 
effect on 
shareholder 
value. Risk 
taking has a 
negative effect 
on shareholder 
value.  
Eshima & 
Anderson 
(2017) 
Innovativeness, 
Proactiveness, 
Risk taking 
(gestalt 
construct) using 
Covin and 
Slevin (1989) 
and Anderson et 
al. (2015) scale 
Most senior 
executives of 535 
small to medium-
sized South 
Korean firms and 
executives of 107 
small to medium-
sized firms in the 
UK 
Confirmatory 
factor analysis 
Reciprocal 
relationship of 
growth and EO 
relationship with 
growth being a 
predictor of EO 
and adaptive 
capability 
mediates the 
relationship 
between growth 
and EO. 
Mthanti & 
Ojah (2017) 
EO (gestalt 
construct of 
dimensions 
innovativeness, 
proactiveness, 
risk taking) 
measured at the 
macro-level by 
secondary data  
93 countries from 
CANA 
(Castellacci & 
Natera, 2011) and 
WDI (World 
Bank’s 
Development 
Indicators) 
databases from 
1980 to 2008 
System-GMM 
analysis 
EO at the macro-
economic level 
has a positive 
impact on 
economic 
growth.  
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Appendix B: Technical Issues in Dataset Construction 
 
Compustat and CRSP databases are merged to compute EO and firm performance 
variables as well as relevant control variables. Through using SAS, I first merged 
Compustat and CRSP datasets. Both Compustat and CRSP have unique firm 
identifiers. Thus, merging the two datasets is done through the company’s unique 
identifier and not through the company’s name. In CRSP, each firm is identified by 
a unique firm identifier (PERMCO) whereas the security stock file is identified by 
the identifier, PERMNO. In Compustat, each firm is identified by a unique firm 
identifier (GVKEY). For merging Compustat and CRSP, it can be done through 
CUSIP method by matching either CUSIP at security level or at the firm level. At 
the security level, PERMNO (in CRSP) is matched to GVKEY (in Compustat) and 
the CUSIP in CRSP (8-digit CUSIP) is matched to CUSIP in Compustat (CNUM, 
first 6 digits of CUSIP) and CIC (two-digit CUSIP issue number).  At the firm level, 
PERMCO (in CRSP) is matched to GVKEY (in Compustat) and CUSIP in CRSP 
(first 6 digits of CUSIP) is matched to CUSIP in Compustat (CNUM). According to 
WRDS, by matching using CUSIP firm identifier, about 80% of PERMCO in CRSP 
is matched to GVKEY in Compustat. Thereby, about 20 % are unmatched cases 
(specifically about 80% of GVKEY in Compustat is matched to PERMCO in CRSP 
and 81 % of cases of PERMCO in CRSP is matched to GVKEY in Compustat).  
 
To match Compustat and CRSP, the CCM (Compustat-CRSP merge) method was 
used. The CCM method involves using the merged Compustat/CRSP link file from 
WRDS to merge Compustat with CRSP. Using the CCM method increases the 
matching percentage to more than 80 % (specifically about 87% of cases of 
GVKEY in Compustat is matched to PERMCO in CRSP and about 84 % of 
PERMCO in CRSP is matched to GVKEY in Compustat). First, monthly CRSP file 
was adjusted to have beginning and end fiscal year dates. Compustat data is in fiscal 
years, so to merge with the link table a file was created based on calendar dates and 
in specific the beginning and end dates for the fiscal years. According to WRDS, 
then Compustat-link table was merged with the CRSP monthly file based on the 
beginning and end fiscal year dates. Thus, Compustat and CRSP were merged based 
on fiscal year end. The CCM method is clearly outlined in the WRDS website. To 
make sure that firms included are those that are publicly traded, the merged file of 
Compustat and CRSP only included firms with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. 
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Furthermore, the header exchange code from CRSP monthly stock file is coded 1, 2 
or 3 to indicate whether the firm’s securities are in NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq 
respectively. This means that only firms that are publicly traded were included. 
Moreover FIC, foreign incorporation code, which indicates the country the company 
was incorporated in, should be USA to include only US firms (Hoberg & Parabhala, 
2009). After all the Study’s calculations of the included variables, only firms that 
are in the technology industry are chosen from the overall sample for the analysis. 
The appropriate method for merging was used to make sure that matching of firms 
is done properly. This step dictates the firm pool that was used.  
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Appendix C: Data Items used from the Databases 
 
The data items here were used in the computations of the variables of interest.  
 
1. Data items used from Compustat North America Fundamentals Annual 
 
The following data items from Compustat were collected to compute the variables. 
The data items that were used from Compustat are: company name (CONM), firm 
identifier (GVKEY), end of the fiscal year (FYR), fiscal year of the current fiscal-
year end month (FYEAR), historical SIC (SICH), foreign incorporation code (FIC), 
NCUSIP (historical CUSIP firm identifier), CUSIP (firm identifier), research and 
development expense (XRD), retained earnings (RE), gross sales (SALE),  common 
shares outstanding (CSHO),  price close- annual calendar year (PRCC_C), price 
close- annual fiscal year (PRCC_F), liabilities (LT),  total current liabilities (LCT), 
total current assets (ACT),  total long-term debt (DLTT), total debt in current 
liabilities (DLC), preferred stock liquidating value (PSTKL),  total assets (AT),  
capital expenditure (CAPX), property, plant, and equipment (PPENT),  total long 
term debt (DLTT),  total debt in current liabilities (DLC),  number of employees 
(EMP), income before extraordinary items (IB),  cash and short term investment 
(CHE), earnings before income and tax (EBIT), working capital (WCAP), research 
company deletion date (DLDTE), research company reason for deletion (DLRSN), 
status alert (STALT).  
 
2. CRSP 
 
The monthly stock file from CRSP was used to merge with Compustat whereas the 
daily stock file was used to measure the risk taking, dimension of EO. 
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Appendix D: STATA commands 
 
 STATA commands 
Panel Data setup  xtset gvkey fyear 
Linearity testing nlcheck  
Multicollinearity test: VIF regress, VIF 
Correlation of coefficients  estat vce, corr 
Heteroscedasticity test xttest3 
Autocorrelation test Xtserial 
Residual generation Predict res, e 
Graphic distribution of residuals kdensity res, normal 
Winsorization  winssor2 x, suffix(_w) cuts (1 99) 
Standardisation  egen x_std=std(x) 
LM test xttest0  
Hausman test est store fe  
est store re  
hausman fe re, sigmamore 
Robust Hausman test Xtoverid 
Time effect test Testparm 
Generation of time dummies tabulate fyear, generate(dum) 
Descriptive statistics  summarize x, detail 
Adjusted R-squared display "adjusted R2 = " e(r2_a) 
Robust clustered errors vce(robust) or vce(cluster gvkey) 
Bootstrapped errors vce(bootstrap, reps(500)) cluster(gvkey) 
Scatterplot of residuals scatter res x 
Scatterplot of quadratic relationship graph twoway qfit y x|| scatter y x 
twoway function y_variable_name = _b[_cons] 
+_b[x_variable_name]*x + 
_b[x_variable_name]*x^2 
High tech dummy statistics  univar x, by(dummy high tech variables) 
Mean centering  summarize x, meanonly 
gen centered_x = x - r(mean) 
u-test utest x x_square, fieller level (90) 
Fixed effect panel regression  xtreg y x, fe  
Marginsplot of EO margins, at(eo=(10(5)-10)) 
marginsplot 
Sargan-Hansen Endogeneity test Xtivreg2 
Academic tables Esttab 
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Appendix E: SAS commands 
 
 SAS commands 
Estimation of the Cox partial likelihood 
method 
Proc PHREG 
Ties=Efron 
Estimation of the survivor functions using the 
Kaplan-Meier method 
Proc Lifetest 
Options:  
‘CL’ option shows the 95% confidence interval 
limits around the survivor functions. 
‘At risk’ option  
‘STRATA’ option shows the comparison of the 
survival functions of two groups 
Robustness of Cox regression results 
 
Option: ‘COVSANDWICH’ is used in ‘Proc 
PHREG’, which accounts for the dependence of 
the observations 
Option: ‘STRATA’ to stratify the firms based 
on their sub-industry 
Generation of low, high of main predictor 
variables  
Proc rank 
Proportionality and linearity testing  Proc Loess 
Generation of Schoenfeld residuals  Ressch  
Generation of martingale residuals  Resmart  
 
